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SUMMARY IN ENGLISH 
The traditional idea that human rights are fundamental rights held by individuals against their state is 
under pressure, in part because of the emergence of non-state actors who in terms of power and 
leverage stand alongside and sometimes even above the state. One category of such non-state actors 
are business enterprises. Business enterprises can contribute significantly to the protection and 
promotion of human rights, but they can also interfere with human rights. From a legal perspective, 
however, associating ‘business’ and ‘human rights’, albeit increasingly commonplace in public 
discourse, is not straightforward, precisely because traditionally the duty bearer under human rights 
law is the state. The fundamental question is thus whether business enterprises have a responsibility 
for human rights and, if so, how that responsibility looks like (or should look like). Some specific 
questions arising in that regard concern the nature of the responsibility, the concrete rights binding on 
business enterprises, the types of duties borne under those rights and the beneficiaries thereof, and the 
possible ways of enforcement. 
Point of departure to understand the responsibility of business enterprises for human rights is 
international law and, in particular, the United Nations Guiding Principles on business and human 
rights. These principles, which have been endorsed by the Human Rights Council, were drafted by the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General in order to rationalize the debate on business and 
human rights by unifying the existing standards and practices under international law in a single 
framework. According to this international legal framework, states remain the sole duty bearers under 
international human rights law as it stands today. In other words, business enterprises cannot hold any 
direct human rights duties under international law. There are at least two important nuances, however. 
First, business enterprises have a moral responsibility to respect human rights, which is grounded in 
social expectations. Second, states must protect human rights, which means that they must take the 
necessary steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress human rights abuse by business enterprises.  
The state obligation to protect implies that within the domestic legal order the conduct of business 
enterprises should be constrained by human rights – it should be noted that under national law human 
rights (generally taking the form of constitutional rights) may directly affect business enterprises or 
indirectly, meaning through the laws, regulations and policies that implement human rights in private 
relationships. Hence, to understand the extent to which business enterprises are actually responsible 
for human rights, also the operationalisation of the state obligation to protect at the national level must 
be examined.  
In light of these findings, the dissertation begins with discussing the international legal framework and 
then proceeds with examining the possible legal impact of human rights on business enterprises under 
national law. For that purpose an abstract analytical framework is developed, which is then used to 
scrutinize the relationship between human rights and business in a specific legal order, namely South 
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Africa. It is, moreover, not sufficient to look at the law on the books. Business enterprises are only 
effectively responsible for human rights, if rights holders can vindicate their rights, either by directly 
calling business enterprises to account or by forcing the state to protect their rights (better). Therefore, 
the dissertation also examines the opportunities and challenges for victims of human rights violations 
by business enterprises to enforce their rights through judicial remedies. Again, this issue is scrutinised 
in abstracto as well as in concreto, through a case study on the use of strategic litigation to vindicate 
the rights of mineworkers or neighbouring communities who are exposed to environmental 
degradation caused by mining companies.  
Finally, the dissertation returns to the international arena and, based on the findings of the study, 
reflects on how the international legal framework should be developed further. Accepting that at least 
for the time being international human rights law only binds states, and not business enterprises, two 
proposals are formulated to reinforce the existing international legal framework. 
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SAMENVATTING IN HET NEDERLANDS 
Het traditionele idee dat mensenrechten fundamentele rechten zijn die individuele burgers hebben ten 
aanzien van hun staat, is onder druk komen te staan deels omwille van de opkomst van niet-statelijke 
actoren die evenveel, zo niet meer, macht en invloed hebben als de staat. Eén categorie van dergelijke 
niet-statelijke actoren zijn ondernemingen. Ondernemingen kunnen aanzienlijk bijdragen tot de 
bevordering en bescherming van mensenrechten, maar kunnen mensenrechten ook aantasten. Vanuit 
een juridisch perspectief is het associëren van ‘ondernemingen’ en ‘mensenrechten’ – zij het meer en 
meer gebruikelijk in het publieke discours – echter niet vanzelfsprekend, net omdat de staat 
traditioneel gezien de plichtdrager is voor mensenrechten. De fundamentele vraag is dus of 
ondernemingen een verantwoordelijkheid hebben voor mensenrechten en, indien dit zo is, hoe die 
verantwoordelijkheid eruit ziet (or eruit zou moeten zien). Een aantal specifieke vragen die rijzen in 
dat verband, hebben betrekking op de aard van die verantwoordelijkheid, de concrete rechten die 
ondernemingen (zouden) verbinden, het type plichten dat zij onder die rechten (zouden) dragen en de 
begunstigden daarvan, en de mogelijke afdwingingsmechanismen.   
Het vertrekpunt om de verantwoordelijkheid van ondernemingen voor mensenrechten te begrijpen is 
het internationale recht en, in het bijzonder, de Richtinggevende Principes van de Verenigde Naties 
inzake ondernemingen en mensenrechten. Deze principes, die bekrachtigd zijn door de 
Mensenrechtenraad, werden opgesteld door de Speciale Vertegenwoordiger van de Secretaris-
Generaal om het debat inzake ondernemingen en mensenrechten te rationaliseren door de bestaande 
normen en procedures onder het internationale recht te verenigen in één enkel kader. Volgens dit 
internationaal rechtskader blijven staten de enige plichtdragers onder het vigerende internationale 
recht inzake mensenrechten. Bijgevolg kunnen ondernemingen geen rechtstreekse verplichtingen 
dragen onder internationale mensenrechten. Er gelden echter minstens twee belangrijke nuances. Ten 
eerste hebben ondernemingen een morele verantwoordelijkheid om mensenrechten te respecteren die 
gegrond is in sociale verwachtingen. Ten tweede moeten staten mensenrechten beschermen, hetgeen 
inhoudt dat zij de noodzakelijke stappen moeten nemen om misbruik van mensenrechten door 
ondernemingen te vermijden, te onderzoeken, te bestraffen en te remediëren. 
De beschermingsplicht van staten brengt met zich mee dat mensenrechten het gedrag van 
ondernemingen binnen de nationale rechtsorde zouden moeten beheersen – er kan reeds worden 
opgemerkt dat onder het nationale recht mensenrechten (die veelal de vorm aannemen van 
grondwettelijke rechten) ondernemingen direct kunnen raken of indirect, dit wil zeggen via wetgeving, 
regelgeving en beleid uitgevaardigd om mensenrechten te implementeren in private betrekkingen. Om 
te begrijpen in welke mate ondernemingen daadwerkelijk verantwoordelijk zijn voor mensenrechten, 
moet bijgevolg de operationalisering van de beschermingsplicht van de staat op nationaal niveau 
worden onderzocht.  
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In het licht van deze vaststellingen begint dit proefschrift met een bespreking van het internationale 
rechtskader, waarna de mogelijke juridische impact van mensenrechten op ondernemingen binnen de 
nationale rechtsorde wordt onderzocht. Daartoe wordt een abstract analytisch kader ontwikkeld, dat 
vervolgens gebruikt wordt om het verband te onderzoeken tussen mensenrechten en ondernemingen in 
een specifieke rechtsorde, namelijk Zuid-Afrika. Het volstaat bovendien niet om alleen naar ‘the law 
on the books’ te kijken. Ondernemingen zijn enkel effectief verantwoordelijk voor mensenrechten, 
indien rechthebbenden hun rechten kunnen doen gelden, ofwel door ondernemingen rechtstreeks aan 
te spreken ofwel door de staat te verplichten hun rechten (beter) te beschermen. Daarom onderzoekt 
dit proefschrift ook de mogelijkheden en uitdagingen voor slachtoffers van mensenrechtenschendingen 
door ondernemingen om hun rechten af te dwingen middels gerechtelijke middelen. Het proefschrift 
analyseert deze kwestie opnieuw zowel in abstracto als in concreto, middels een gevalstudie naar het 
gebruik van strategische procesvoering om de rechten te beschermen van mijnbouwwerkers en 
naburige gemeenschappen die blootgesteld worden aan milieuverontreiniging veroorzaakt door 
mijnbouwbedrijven.  
Tot slot keert het proefschrift terug naar het internationale niveau en reflecteert, op basis van de 
bevindingen van het onderzoek, over de wijze waarop het internationale rechtskader verder 
ontwikkeld zou moeten worden. Terwijl aanvaard wordt dat minstens op dit ogenblik internationale 
mensenrechten enkel staten, en niet ondernemingen, rechtstreeks verbinden, worden twee voorstellen 
geformuleerd ter versterking van het bestaande internationale rechtskader. 
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PART I.  
A BOTTOM-UP APPROACH TO BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
WHY, WHAT AND HOW?  
  
2 
 
1. GENERAL JUSTIFICATION OF THE RESEARCH APPROACH 
The relationship between business and human rights and, in particular, the extent to which business 
enterprises are responsible for human rights have triggered heated debates.1 Consensus about the best 
strategy to ensure such responsibility is far from within reach. At present, the business and human 
rights field is governed by a polycentric governance system or ‘regime complex’.2 Discussions on how 
to enhance the effectiveness of this regime have primarily focused on three regulatory approaches, that 
is on direct (legally binding) international regulation, on private regulation by (predominantly) non-
state actors and, in the case of companies operating across borders, on the exercise of jurisdiction by 
states other than the state where the human rights violations (may) occur, including the state where the 
transnational corporation is domiciled, the so-called home state.3  
Regulation and enforcement by host states, where the human rights violations actually take place, is all 
too often overlooked. Nonetheless, this dissertation submits that neglecting host state regulation and 
enforcement could jeopardise the comprehensiveness and effectiveness of the whole regulatory 
framework.4 Therefore, without denying the respective significance of international, private and 
extraterritorial regulation, this dissertation concentrates on the role of host state regulation and 
enforcement in ensuring that business enterprises are responsible for human rights and argues that, at 
present, the legal framework of the host state is the most realistic and readily available avenue to 
enforce corporate accountability for human rights (Section 5). To substantiate that argument, Chapter 
1 discusses the specific advantages of host state regulation over the three other regulatory approaches 
(Section 2), the recent history and political context of the debate on business and human rights 
(Section 3), and the value of a bottom-up approach (Section 4). The Chapter begins, however, with 
unravelling, in broad outline, the architecture of the polycentric governance system that, as was said, 
currently governs the business and human rights field (Section 1).  
                                                     
1
 For legal scholarship on business enterprises as rights holders, see e.g. M. Emberland, The human rights of 
companies: exploring the structure of ECHR protection (Oxford University Press, 2006).  
2
 J.D. Prenkert and S.J. Shackelford, “Business, Human Rights, and the Promise of Polycentricity,” Vand. J. 
Transnat’l L. 47 (2014), 456. 
3
 See also D.K. Anton and D. Shelton, Environmental Protection and Human Rights (Cambridge University 
Press, 2011), 863-864. 
4
 Cf. O. Amao, Corporate Social Responsibility, Human Rights and the Law: Multinational Corporations in 
Developing Countries (New York: Routledge, 2011), 2-3 and 71 (criticising the little attention paid to the legal 
framework in developing countries (host states) and writing that international law should complement and not 
substitute home state and host state regulation). 
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1.1. Business and human rights: a polycentric governance system 
The responsibility of business enterprises for human rights is regulated by four regimes that each 
comprise infinite sources of norms:5 (1) national and international public law; (2) private regulation; 
(3) national and international private law; and (4) corporate governance, which internalises the first 
three regimes.6 Key to such a polycentric system is that governance is not only sourced in the state, but 
also in other actors.7 Before explaining these regulatory regimes, it should already be observed that 
‘national’ private or public law can comprise laws from the host state, the home state or even a third 
state, which is discussed further in Section 1.2.  
First of all, national and international public law encompasses all rules developed by one or more 
states that govern the public sphere, namely intra-state relations as well as (vertical) relations between 
states and natural or legal persons. Included in this regulatory regime are international human rights 
law and constitutional law. Moreover, international ‘law’, as used here, consists of hard law as well as 
soft law, which includes any “international instrument other than a treaty that contains principles, 
norms, standards or other statements of expected behaviour”.8 For the purposes of this dissertation, 
and contrary to some other writings,9 the term ‘soft law’ only refers to instruments adopted, endorsed 
or acceded to exclusively by public power and, accordingly, does not comprise private standards 
which form part of the regulatory regime discussed next.  
The second regime, ‘private regulation’ is a form of civil governance based on social compliance 
mechanisms and comprises all regulatory standard-setting initiatives that are developed and monitored 
by a variety of non-state actors, ranging from business enterprises themselves, over civil society 
organisations to intergovernmental organisations and sometimes even states – two examples are the 
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights and the Ten Principles of the International 
                                                     
5
 For a discussion of polycentricity on business and human rights, see e.g. J.D. Prenkert, “Conflict minerals and 
polycentric governance of business and human rights,” in R.C. Bird, D.R. Cahoy and J.D. Prenkert, Law, 
Business and Human Rights 203 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014), 203-208; Prenkert and Shackelford, supra 
note 2. 
6
 This classification is inspired by existing literature. See J.G. Ruggie, “Global Governance and New 
Governance Theory: Lessons from Business and Human Rights the Global Forum,” Global Governance 20 
(2014), 8-9 (not including national public law nor private law); R.G. Steinhardt, “Corporate Responsibility and 
the International Law of Human Rights: The New Lex Mercatoria,” in ed. P. Alston, Non-State Actors and 
Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2005), 179 and further (distinguishing between the market, domestic 
regulation, civil liability and international (quasi-)regulation).  
7
 Prenkert, supra note 5, 204. 
8
 D. Shelton, “Normative Hierarchy in International Law,” Am. J. Int’l L. 100 (2006), 319.  
9
 See e.g. J. Nolan, “The corporate responsibility to respect human rights: soft law or not law?” in S. Deva and 
D. Bilchitz, Human Rights Obligations of Business 138 (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 139. 
4 
 
Council on Mining and Metals.10 They are called ‘multi-stakeholder initiatives’ when different of these 
stakeholders are involved at the same time.11 Precisely because of the implication of actors other than 
states, this regulatory regime is often called ‘private regulation’, which should evidently be 
distinguished from ‘private law’. However, given that states sometimes endorse, or participate in, such 
initiatives, the use of the term ‘private regulation’ can be confusing12 – although, allegedly, the role of 
states in private regulation has recently decreased.13 In any case, and as was said previously, 
instruments that stem exclusively from public power, even if states act in the context of an 
intergovernmental organisation, are included in the definition of soft law and belong to the previously 
discussed regulatory regime.14 The significant increase in private standard-setting initiatives has by 
some scholars been described as ‘civil regulation’, ‘re-regulation’ or even as a ‘regulatory 
renaissance’.15 
Thirdly, national and international ‘private law’ governs the horizontal relationships amongst private 
actors, as opposed to the vertical relationships between states and natural or legal persons (see infra 
Section 2.1). Any given business enterprise can in principle be affected by rules of private ‘law’ 
adopted by either the host state, the home state or a third state.  
Corporate governance, lastly, concentrates on the management of business enterprises, namely on 
issues dealing with ownership and control, such as decision-making procedures at companies, 
                                                     
10
 Abbott and Snidal have developed a governance triangle to depict the variety in private regulation, ranging 
from schemes developed exclusively by either the business community or non-governmental organisations to 
schemes resulting from a joint initiative, which may even be supported by the state. K.W. Abbott and D. Snidal, 
“Strengthening International Regulation through Transmittal New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration 
Deficit,” Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 42 (2009), 512 and 516-518. See also E.P. Mendes, Global Governance, Human 
Rights and International Law: Combating the Tragic Flaw (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 191. For the two 
examples, see http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org and https://www.icmm.com/en-gb/about-us/member-
commitments/icmm-10-principles. 
11
 For a discussion, see e.g. D. Baumann-Pauly et al., “Setting and enforcing industry-specific standards for 
human rights: the role of multi-stakeholder initiatives in regulating corporate conduct,” in D. Baumann-Pauly 
and J. Nolan, Business and Human Rights 107 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016); A. Tamo, “New thinking on 
transnational corporation and human rights: Towards a multi-stakeholder approach,” Neth. Q. Hum. Rts. 34(2) 
(2016b): 147-173.  
12
 Tamo (2016b), supra note 11, 150. In that case, the ‘private’ regulation has a quasi-public character. A. Tamo, 
“Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives and the Evolution of the Business and Human Rights Discourse: Lessons from the 
Kimberley Process and Conflict Diamonds,” in J. Martin and K.E. Bravo, The Business and Human Rights 
Landscape 75 (Cambridge University Press, 2016a), 77. 
13
 Abbott and Sindal, supra note 10, 541. 
14
 An example of an instrument on business and human rights that stems exclusively from public power are the 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises adopted by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. For other examples, see Abbott and Snidal, supra note 10, 514. The UN Global Compact and the 
International Labour Organization Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning multinational enterprises and 
social policy, on the other hand, are classified as private regulation as they involve the participation of 
stakeholders other than states.  
15
 N. Jägers, “Will transnational private regulation close the governance gap?” in eds S. Deva and D. Bilchitz, 
Human Rights Obligations of Business 295 (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 301; J. Nolan, “Refining the 
Rules of the Game: The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights,” Utrecht J. Int'l & Eur. L. 30 
(2014), 8-9. 
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reporting requirements and the ethical responsibilities of directors. Corporate governance generally 
also reckons with the responsibility that business enterprises have for human rights in accordance with 
the first three regulatory regimes as part of their so-called ‘corporate social responsibility.’16 The latter 
responsibility is concerned with a more extensive set of interests, including aside from human rights 
also environmental protection and the prevention of corruption, for instance, and is in essence 
regarded as optional.17 ‘Internalisation’ by a company of its responsibility for human rights generally 
finds expression in a code of conduct, which does not mean, however, that they accept to be legally 
bound by such norms.18  
1.2. Strengthening the framework for business and human rights 
Although host state regulation and enforcement has attracted some scholarly interest, three discourses 
seem to remain prominent in the debate as to how the effectiveness of the above-depicted polycentric 
governance system for business and human rights can be strengthened. Those dominant discourses 
concentrate on the adoption of legally binding international regulation (a segment of the first 
regulatory regime, namely ‘hard’ international public law), the development of non-binding standards 
(a segment of the first regime, namely soft law codes, as well as the second and fourth regulatory 
regimes) and the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction (the third regulatory regime, namely private 
law, and a segment of the first regulatory regime, namely national public law, but each time by a state 
other than the one where the violations (may) occur).19 To substantiate the argument that host state 
regulation and enforcement is an essential component of an effective polycentric system governing 
business and human rights, this Section briefly explains the downsides to private regulation and the 
problems with the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The option of directly binding international 
regulation, in turn, is discussed in Section 1.3, which describes the recent history and political context 
                                                     
16
 See also J.A. Zerk, Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility: Limitations and Opportunities in 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 31. For an analysis of the differences and 
complementarity of corporate social responsibility and business and human rights, see F. Wettstein, “From side 
show to main act: can business and human rights save corporate responsibility,” in D. Baumann-Pauly and J. 
Nolan, Business and Human Rights 78 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016). 
17
 C. López, “The ‘Ruggie process’: from legal obligations to corporate social responsibility?” in eds S. Deva 
and D. Bilchitz, Human Rights Obligations of Business 58 (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 59. Mendes 
discerns five generations of stakeholder expectations: corporate governance (relating to issues like legal 
compliance, confidential information, the structure of boards); the prevention of corruption; the interests of 
voluntary stakeholders (namely employees, customers and suppliers); the interests of involuntary stakeholders 
(local communities and the environment); and, the public interest. Mendes, supra note 10, 191-195. According 
to Addo and Martin, the main problem in the field of corporate governance is that there exist too many initiatives 
and that a common strategy is presently lacking. M. Addo and J. Martin, “The Evolving Business and Society 
Landscape. Can Human Rights Make a Difference?” in eds. J. Martin and K.E. Bravo, The Business and Human 
Rights Landscape 348 (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 351 and 367. 
18
 Zerk (2006), supra note 16, 43. 
19
 See also Anton and Shelton, supra note 3, 864. 
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of the debate on business and human rights at the international level so as to show how this option is 
currently constrained by geopolitical interests.  
A first regulatory option that attracts a lot of attention consists of the development of non-legally 
binding standards through soft law, private regulation and company codes of conduct. Although, as a 
matter of principle, they are not legally binding, these standards may harden thanks to, first, their 
consistent application (see also infra Section 1.4) and, second, their impact through the ‘courts of 
public opinion’.20 It should be noted that these standards may not only be concerned with the 
responsibility of business enterprises for human rights but can cover the entire spectrum of corporate 
social responsibility. Accordingly, they fill the lacunae that presently exist under international law as 
regards the social responsibilities of business enterprises.21 
This first regulatory option has its critics, however.22 A lot of criticism boils down to their very 
essence, which is that they are voluntary initiatives so that they cannot be judicially enforced when 
business enterprises, notwithstanding a commitment, pay little attention to them.23 Moreover, they 
tend to be developed only after a serious incident caused public outcry.24 The procedures through 
which such voluntary standards are developed and subsequently monitored are also believed to offer 
insufficient guarantees with respect to transparency, participation, deliberation and accountability.25 
Finally, studies into their actual impact on the behaviour of business enterprises have been 
                                                     
20
 These ‘courts’ evaluate a company’s social license to operate. S. Wheeler, “Global production, CSR and 
human rights: the courts of public opinion and the social license to operate,” Int’l J. Hum. Rts. 19(6) (2015), 
765-770. See also P. Bloomer, “Are Human Rights an Effective Tool for Social Change? A Perspective on 
Human Rights and Business Human Rights in Motion,” SUR - Int'l J. on Hum Rts. 20 (2014), 117; Human 
Rights Council, “Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights,” Report of the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises, John Ruggie, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (7 April 2008), para. 54. Cf. J. Nolan (2013), 
supra note 9, 142 (writing that the difference between soft and hard law develops on a continuum).  
21
 S. Chesterman, “Law, Standards or Voluntary Guidelines?” in eds. G. Nystuen, A. Follesdal and O. Mestad, 
Human Rights, Corporate Complicity and Divestment 44 (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 54; J. Nolan 
(2014), supra note 15, 8. 
22
 See e.g. Mendes, supra note 10, 197 and further.  
23
 C. Avery, “Business and Human Rights in a Time of Change,” in eds. M.T. Kamminga and S. Zia-Zarifi, 
Liability of Multinational Corporations under International Law 17 (Den Haag: Kluwer, 2000), 58. Contra Tamo 
(2016b), supra note 11, 169 (stating that the narrow conceptualisation of multi-stakeholder initiatives as non-
binding is no longer sufficient); J. Nolan (2014), supra note 15, 13 (arguing that “the differentiation between soft 
and so-called hard (legally-binding) law is not binary but one that should be viewed as developing on a 
continuum”).  
24
 A good example is the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh that was adopted following the Rana 
Plaza disaster, resulting in the death of over 1,100 people. Note, however, that this is a legally binding 
agreement, concluded between trade unions, brands and retailers, albeit that they accede to this agreement on a 
voluntary basis. See http://bangladeshaccord.org. 
25
 Abbott and Sindal, supra note 10, 555-556; J. Nolan (2014), supra note 15, 13. Such obstacles could be 
overcome by ‘re-inviting’ government or through multi-stakeholder initiatives. See, respectively, C. Ryngaert, 
“Transnational Private Regulation and Human Rights: The Limitations of Stateless Law and the Re-Entry of the 
State,” in eds. J.L. Černič and T. Van Ho, Human Rights and Business 99 (Oisterwijk: Wolf Legal Publishers, 
2015), 103; Tamo (2016b), supra note 11, 169-173. 
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inconclusive.26 Without being opposed against voluntarism, also John Ruggie, the former Special 
Representative on Business and Human Rights (see infra Section 1.3), has expressed his concern that 
“companies do not necessarily recognize those rights on which they have the greatest impact” and that 
“some interpretations [of international human rights] are so elastic that the standards lose meaning, 
making it difficult (…) to assess performance against commitments.”27  
In the case of transnational corporations,28 another regulatory option to strengthen the polycentric 
system governing business and human rights relies on the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by 
states other than the host state, namely by the state where the holding company is based (the home 
state) or even by a third state where that corporation is also active. Generally, the home states or third 
states that are expected to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction are developed countries, or at least 
emerging economies, so that, arguably, their position of power vis-à-vis business enterprises is 
stronger, their legal institutions better developed and their human, financial and technical resources 
less scarce.29 These states could assume either one or more of the following authorities: to regulate 
how business enterprises vested or active within their territory act abroad (prescriptive or legislative 
jurisdiction); to make their judiciary competent to scrutinise the foreign conduct of such enterprises 
(adjudicative or judicial jurisdiction); and, to deploy their own resources to induce or compel legal 
compliance by these enterprises when acting abroad (enforcement or executive jurisdiction).30  
Given that under general international law jurisdiction is, in principle, founded on a territorial basis 
and thus limited to a state’s territory, any state that seeks to subjugate a company to its authority for its 
conduct in another state, should have a legitimate basis for exercising such extraterritorial 
                                                     
26
 R.C. Bird, D.R. Cahoy, and L.J. Dhooge, “Corporate Voluntarism and Liability for Human Rights in a Post-
Kiobel World,” Ky. L.J. 102 (2013-2014), 626. 
27
 Human Rights Council, “Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and 
Accountability for Corporate Acts,” report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of 
human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/035 (9 February 
2007), para. 74. 
28
 For a definition and discussion, see infra Section 2.3. 
29
 D. Bilchitz, “Corporate Law and the Constitution: Towards Binding Human Rights Responsibilities for 
Corporations,” S. African L.J. 125 (2008), 785. 
30
 O. De Schutter, International Human Rights Law: Cases, Materials, Commentary (Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 162; S. Tully, “Introduction,” in ed. S. Tully, International Corporate Legal Responsibility 1 
(Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer International, 2012b), 47. Cf. National Commissioner of The South African Police 
Service v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre (CCT 02/14) [2014] ZACC 30 (30 October 2014), 
para. 25 (enumerating the different ways in which domestic criminal jurisdiction is exercised). 
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jurisdiction.31 Hence, notwithstanding a few exceptions, such as the principle of universal jurisdiction 
for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture, a sufficiently close nexus is generally 
required between the state exercising jurisdiction and the facts over which it exercises jurisdiction, for 
instance when the perpetrator or the victim is a national of the state (active versus passive personality 
principle) or when the facts have adverse effects within the state’s territory.32 In principle, however, 
the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is considered permissible but not obligatory.33  
Nevertheless, some scholars34 have called upon states to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction vis-à-vis 
business enterprises that commit human rights violations abroad, precisely because in the archetypical 
case of corporate human rights abuse, the host state is a developing country where government lacks 
the resources and political willingness to regulate and monitor the conduct of business enterprises that 
bring investment to their country, and sometimes even is the main perpetrator of human rights 
violations.35 An exception to the principle of territorial jurisdiction would mainly serve, first, to admit 
(or even require) that home states regulate the foreign activities of transnational corporations vested 
within their territorial jurisdiction (home state regulation) and, second, to allow that victims of human 
                                                     
31
 A. Reinisch, “The Changing International Legal Framework for Dealing with Non-State Actors,” in ed. P. 
Alston, Non-State Actors and Human Rights 37 (Oxford University Press, 2005), 56. The Guiding Principles 
make a distinction between direct extraterritorial jurisdiction and measures with extraterritorial effects. For a 
discussion, see Human Rights Council, “Corporate responsibility under international law and issues in 
extraterritorial regulation: summary of legal workshops,” addendum to the Report of the Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, John Ruggie, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/35/Add.2 (15 February 2007). For a general critique of the 
approach by the former Special Representative to extraterritoriality, see D. Augenstein and D. Kinley, “When 
human rights ‘responsibilities’ become ‘duties’: the extra-territorial obligations of states that bind corporations,” 
in eds. S. Deva and D. Bilchitz, Human Rights Obligations of Business 271 (Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
32
 S. Baughen, Human Rights and Corporate Wrongs: Closing the Governance Gap (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2015), 44. 
33
 See Principle 2 of the United Nations Guiding Principles (UNGPs) and its commentary, annexed to Human 
Rights Council, “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, 
Respect and Remedy’ Framework,” report by Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of 
human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31 
(21 March 2011). 
34
 See e.g. C. Broecker, “Better the Devil You Know: Home State Approaches to Transnational Corporate 
Accountability,” 41 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 41 (2008-09), 212-213; B.T. Cragg, “Home is Where the Halt Is: 
Mandating Corporate Social Responsibility through Home State Regulation and Social Disclosure,” Emory Int’l 
L. Rev. 24(2) (2010), 751-755 and 759-762; S.L. Seck, Home State Responsibility and Local Communities: The 
Case of Global Mining, Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L. J. 11 (2008):177-206 (arguing that Canada should, and may 
even be duty-bound to, adopt home state regulations). Cf. Augenstein and Kinley (2013), supra note 31 (arguing 
that a state’s prospective de jure extraterritorial authority creates a de facto relationship with possible victims of 
human rights violations, bringing them within that state’s power and triggering its extraterritorial human rights 
obligations); J. Nolan, “Mapping the movement: the business and human rights regulatory framework,” in eds. 
D. Baumann-Pauly and J. Nolan, Business and Human Rights 32 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016c), 37 (writing that 
the barriers to extraterritorial regulation are probably political rather than legal). 
35
 See e.g. Baughen, supra note 32, 7. 
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rights violations, if they wish, pursue a remedy in the home state or possibly even in a third state in 
which the transnational corporation is active (transnational litigation36).  
Notwithstanding such calls, however, home state regulation and transnational litigation remain 
exceptional, as many states refuse to adopt such regulations and deny adjudicative jurisdiction over 
claims related to events abroad.37 In any case, home state regulation and transnational litigation are 
unlikely to constitute an effective remedy for all victims due to the various obstacles that they would 
encounter in accessing such remedies, not in the least because they generally belong to poor and 
vulnerable groups who lack the necessary resources to seek redress in any state other than their own – 
which is already hard in itself as the case study will demonstrate. 
1.3. Recent history and political context of business and human rights 
In order to explain why also the third regulatory option, namely directly binding international 
regulation, arguably constitutes too big a leap for the time being, the history to the debate on business 
and human rights must be outlined. Concerns about business enterprises38 (dis)respecting human rights 
already arose at the birth of contemporary international human rights law, and were soon accompanied 
by a call to have the responsibility of business enterprises for human rights directly regulated under 
international law.39 The first few decades, however, the call for regulation was only accommodated by 
private regulation and soft law, until in the early 2000s the strife for directly binding international 
regulation was nearly successful. Indeed, after years of work, in 2003, the Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights approved the UN ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of 
                                                     
36
 For an overview of transnational litigation, see e.g. M.D. Goldhaber, “Corporate Human Rights Litigation in 
Non-U.S. Courts: A Comparative Scorecard,” UC Irvine L. Rev. 3 (2013): 127-149; C. Kaufmann, “Holding 
multinational corporations accountable for human rights violations: litigation outside the United States,” in eds. 
D. Baumann-Pauly and J. Nolan, Business and Human Rights 253 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016); G.L. Skinner, 
“Beyond Kiobel: Providing Access to Judicial Remedies for Violations of International Human Rights Norms by 
Transnational Business in a New (Post-Kiobel) World,” Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 46 (2014): 158-265. 
37
 One argument against home state ‘regulations’ reads that they interfere with the sovereignty of the host state, 
whereas forum non conveniens (the finding that there exists another forum that is more appropriate to hear the 
claim) constitutes a typical exception to ‘transnational litigation’ in common law countries. See the discussion in 
e.g. Broecker, supra note 34, 187-195 and Seck (2008), supra note 34, 185-196.  
38
 Similar concerns have been raised in relation to other non-states actors. See e.g. Reinisch, supra note 31, 77 
(referring inter alia to the loss of control by states over transnational corporations, liberalisation, privatisation 
and deregulation).  
39
 The Havana Charter of 1948 for an International Trade Organisation already stipulated fair labour standards. 
The Charter never entered into force, however, inter alia because the Senate of the United States of America 
refused to ratify the agreement. Nevertheless, most authors only start their historical account of the debate in the 
1970s when the UN Economic and Social Council commissioned a study into the impact of multinational 
corporations. This resulted in the creation of a commission to elaborate a code, which was never adopted, 
however. For a brief discussion of the history to the business and human rights debate, see e.g. Bilchitz (2008), 
supra note 29, 754 and further; D. Bilchitz and S. Deva, “The human rights obligations of business: a critical 
framework for the future,” in eds. S. Deva and D. Bilchitz, Human Rights Obligations of Business 1 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), 4-10; J. Nolan (2013), supra note 9, 146-154. 
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Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights’, in short the 
‘UN Norms’.40 Nevertheless, the consensus reached amongst the experts that sit on the Sub-
Commission did not set a precedent for the former Commission on Human Rights itself (the present 
Human Rights Council), which could not endorse the UN Norms in view of the strong opposition by 
the business community and a number of states41 who were eager to protect the interests of businesses. 
In order to placate the supporters of the UN Norms, the Commission instead appointed John Ruggie 
Special Representative to the Secretary-General on business and human rights.  
Years of research by the Special Representative and his team, which included consultations with 
relevant stakeholders, culminated in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (the 
UNGPs), which were adopted (without a vote)42 by the Human Rights Council in 2011.43 These 
Principles are meant to guide the implementation of the three-pillar Framework that had been 
introduced by John Ruggie three years earlier.44 Under the latter ‘protect, respect, remedy’ 
Framework, states have a (legal) obligation to protect human rights against possible interferences by 
business enterprises, which themselves have a (moral) responsibility to respect human rights,45 while 
victims should be ensured access to effective – judicial and non-judicial, state-based and non-state-
based – remedies.  
The fundamental difference between the UN Norms and the UNGPs is that the latter do not create any 
direct, legally binding duties for business enterprises, nor do they establish an international 
enforcement mechanism. At the same time, business enterprises are assumed to be ‘morally’ obliged 
to respect human rights. The UNGPs are then best understood as restating international law,46 without 
                                                     
40
 Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, “Norms on the responsibilities of 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights,” UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (26 August 2003). 
41
 According to Ruggie, “most states”. J.G. Ruggie, “Incorporating human rights: lessons learned, and next 
steps,” in eds. D. Baumann-Pauly and J. Nolan, Business and Human Rights 64 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 
65. 
42
 This is not necessarily a sign of unanimity. According to Deva, for instance, no vote was organised in order to 
prevent that certain states would be forced to either vote against or to abstain. S. Deva, “Treating human rights 
lightly: a critique of the consensus rhetoric and the language employed by the Guiding Principles,” in eds. S. 
Deva and D. Bilchitz, Human Rights Obligations of Business 78 (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 90-91. 
43
 UNGPs, annexed to Report A/HRC/17/31, supra note 33, endorsed by Resolution 17/4 of the Human Rights 
Council of 16 June 2011, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4 (6 July 2011). The endorsement of the UNGPs was a first 
in the sense that the Council (nor the former Commission on Human Rights) had never before endorsed a 
normative instrument that was not negotiated by states themselves. Ruggie (2016), supra note 41, 64. 
44
 ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, supra note 20, endorsed by Resolution 8/7 of the Human Rights 
Council of 18 June 2008, UN Doc. A/63/53 (2008). 
45
 Notwithstanding scepticism about this moral duty, as discussed previously (supra Section 1.2), various 
(general or thematic) voluntary initiatives have been adopted at different levels of governance (national, regional 
and international) to promote compliance therewith. 
46
 Contra O. De Schutter, “Foreword,” in eds S. Deva and D. Bilchitz, Human Rights Obligations of Business xv 
(Cambridge University Press, 2013), xxi-xxii (denying that they are a restatement of international law and 
calling them a tool and practical guidance).  
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creating new law: “they elaborate upon the implications of already existing standards and practices for 
states and businesses” and “unify these standards and practices under a single framework”.47 The 
advocates of the UN Norms were evidently not satisfied with the UNGPs, precisely because they 
believe the time has come to change this paradigm of international human rights law. The launch of a 
new attempt to move international law in that direction was thus only a matter of time.  
This happened in June 2014, when the Human Rights Council voted a resolution establishing an open-
ended intergovernmental working group ‘for the elaboration of a legally binding instrument on 
business and human rights’ (Resolution 26/9).48 Nevertheless, at least pending the process of 
negotiating, drafting and adopting such instrument, the UNGPs remain vitally important, which was 
underscored in another resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council the following day 
(Resolution 26/22).49 Notwithstanding the impression that Resolution 26/9 may create, this process of 
developing a binding treaty on business and human rights has, at least presently, little prospect of 
success. This was already evidenced by the fact that whereas Resolution 26/22 was adopted without a 
vote,50 the vote on Resolution 26/9 was divided, with twenty members of the Council voting in favour, 
fourteen against and thirteen abstaining. Furthermore, as displayed in Table 1 below, amongst the ‘no’ 
voters were the United states of America (US), the member states of the European Union (EU) as well 
as Japan. This voting pattern51 demonstrates that the debate on business and human rights is not free 
from geopolitical interests. Evidently, a binding treaty on business and human rights cannot be 
effective if it is signed and ratified mainly by developing countries.  
 Table 1. Voting pattern for Resolution 26/9 
 Yes No Abstention 
African Group Algeria, Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Congo, Ivory Coast, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, 
Namibia, South Africa 
 Botswana, Gabon, Sierra 
Leone 
Asia-Pacific 
Group 
China, India, Indonesia, 
Kazakhstan, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Viet Nam 
Japan, Republic of Korea Kuwait, Maldives, Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates 
                                                     
47
 Bird, Cahoy and Dhooge, supra note 26, 622. 
48
 Resolution 26/9 of the Human Rights Council of 26 June 2014 on the elaboration of an international legally 
binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights, UN 
Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9 (14 July 2014). 
49
 Resolution 26/22 of the Human Rights Council of 27 June 2014 on human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/22 (15 July 2014), para. 2. 
50
 This is not necessarily a sign of unanimity, however. See also supra note 42. 
51
 The composition of the Human Rights Council should be taken into account, however, as its membership is 
limited to forty-seven states, elected by the UN General Assembly.  
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Eastern 
European 
Group 
Russian Federation Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Montenegro, Romania, the 
former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia  
 
Latin 
American and 
Caribbean 
Group 
Cuba, Venezuela  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru 
Western 
European and 
Others Group 
 Austria, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, United 
Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, 
United States of America 
 
This pattern was largely mirrored in the attendance list of the first session of the intergovernmental 
working group that took place in July 2015. The EU only attended the first meetings – France stayed 
throughout the session, however – while the US, Australia and Canada, for instance, were not 
represented.52 Moreover, during its short attendance the EU recalled its position on Resolution 26/9 
and insisted that a panel discussing the implementation of the UNGPs would be added to the 
programme.53 The attendance list of the second session of the intergovernmental working group, in 
October 2016, was already an improvement, with the EU attending the entire session this time, as well 
as states like Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, Japan and the Republic of Korea 
amongst others.54 Nevertheless, the policy position of these states does not seem to have changed 
much. This is illustrated, for instance, by the EU’s persistence that “that any further steps must be 
inclusive, rooted in the Guiding Principles” and that “the motto should remain to implement existing 
obligations”.55  
Since the adoption of Resolution 26/9 there are thus two parallel processes: (preliminary discussions 
on) the elaboration of a binding treaty56 and the implementation of the UNGPs by states adopting 
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 Human Rights Council, Report on the first session of the open-ended intergovernmental working group on 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights, with the mandate of 
elaborating an international legally binding instrument, UN Doc. A/HRC/31/50 (5 February 2016), paras 6-7. 
53
 Ibid. para. 13. 
54
 Human Rights Council, Report on the second session of the open-ended intergovernmental working group on 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/34/47 (4 
January 2017), Annex I. 
55
 Ibid. para. 112. In advance of the meeting, the EU had also contributed views in writing, reiterating that a 
dedicated agenda item should be included in the programme to reaffirm the commitment by all States to 
implementing the UNGPs. 
56
 For a discussion on the possible process for adopting a treaty and its eventual content, see L.C. Backer, 
“Pragmatism Without Principle? How a Comprehensive Treaty on Business and Human Rights Ought to Be 
Framed, Why It Can’t, and the Dangers of the Pragmatic Turn in Treaty,” in eds. S. Deva et al., Business and 
Human Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2017 [forthcoming]). 
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national action plans, in which they identify priority measures to operationalise their obligation to 
protect (for a discussion of these plans, see infra Part II, Section 1.1.1.2). The question is then whether 
these two processes are competitive or complementary. Opinions diverge. On one side of the 
spectrum, a fear exists that the treaty process diverts already scarce resources, that some states use it as 
an excuse to rest on their laurels, awaiting its outcome, and that the precious consensus that had been 
achieved on the UNGPs will fade away.57 In relation to the latter objection, it is in any case true that 
the adoption of Resolution 26/9 immediately sparked opposition.58 On the other side, Blackwell and 
Vander Meulen,59 for instance, discern at least five mutual benefits of the two ongoing processes, 
including the fact that by adopting and reviewing national action plans, states can identify gaps in 
protection that should be addressed in the treaty as well as common ground with other states on which 
consensus for a treaty is within reach.  
Whilst, ideally, the two processes should indeed reinforce each other,60 the answer to the question 
whether the elaboration of a binding treaty and the implementation of the UNGPs through the 
adoption of national action plans are competitive or complementary processes is probably located 
somewhere in-between. A (possible) treaty would definitely benefit from the prospecting exercises 
that states undertake when they prepare, draft and review their national action plans, provided that 
those experiences are adequately taken into account by the treaty drafters, while the protection of 
human rights would likely be bolstered by a treaty. Nevertheless, it is noticeable that those countries 
that have already published a national action plan or that are in the process of drafting one, are known 
to be opposed to the treaty, whereas the sponsors and supporters of the binding treaty have not yet 
taken any step towards drafting a national action plan and seem to be awaiting the outcome of the 
treaty process.61  
                                                     
57
 See e.g. J. Loots, “Of Aims and Means: More Coordination and Harmonization of Efforts are Critical to 
Further Progress on Business and Human Rights,” Institute for Human Rights and Business (29 October 2014); 
M. Taylor, “A Business and Human Rights Treaty? Why Activists Should Be Worried, Institute for Human 
Rights and Business,” Institute for Human Rights and Business (4 June 2014). See also Carey L. Biron, 
“Contentious Start For UN Process Toward Business And Human Rights Treaty,” (MintPress News, 10 July 
2014) (reporting the statement by Peter Frankental (director of the economic relations program, Amnesty 
International UK), that the real threat to the UNGPs comes from governments’ reluctance to implement them). 
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 J. Nolan, “A business and human rights treaty,” in eds. D. Baumann-Pauly and J. Nolan, Business and Human 
Rights 70 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016a), 71. 
59
 S. Blackwell and N. Vander Meulen, “Two Roads Converged: The Mutual Complementarity of a Binding 
Business and Human Rights Treaty and National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights,” Notre Dame J. 
Int'l Comp. L. 6 (2016), 52-53. 
60
 See also J. Nolan (2016c), supra note 34, 72. 
61
 The countries that have already published a national action plan (dd. 1 May 2017) are Colombia, Denmark, 
Germany, Finland, France Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. 
Several other countries are in the process of developing a plan, and most of these are either European or Latin 
American countries, with only a few African (Kenya, Mozambique, Mauritius and Morocco) and Asian countries 
(Japan, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand).  
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1.4. Bottom-up law-making 
Creating international law has long been a monopoly of sovereign states, who negotiated and ratified 
treaties, for instance, depending on whether they coincided with their interests. This conservative, 
Westphalian narrative is bygone.62 On the one hand, non-state actors, like intergovernmental 
organisations and international nongovernmental organisations, are increasingly implicated in 
international law-making.63 On the other hand, international rules no longer emerge only from the 
traditional sources of international law stipulated in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice,64 but emerge from diverse sources, which are not necessarily legally binding, or even 
state-based. In sum, contemporary international law makes provision for multiple methods of law-
making and for the involvement of diverse actors – ‘global legal pluralism’.65 
International norms can thus not only be imposed from the top down, but also be developed from the 
bottom up. In the latter scenario, the norms flow from the practices of relevant stakeholders, which 
are, according to Levit, practitioners who have “intimate knowledge of their niche trade and/or interest 
areas and who constitute norms rooted in the nitty-gritty technicalities of their trade rather than the 
winds of geopolitics.”66 A crucial gain of bottom-up law-making is that even norms that do not 
coincide with the interests of states may arise, although, on the flipside, the independence and 
impartiality of the different stakeholders involved in such law-making is not always guaranteed.67 
Aside from their development through practice, Levit identifies a second ‘defining feature’ of bottom-
up law-making, which is that these norms (which are voluntary at least from the perspective of 
international law) gradually become more restrictive thanks to their repeated and consistent 
application in practice and, sometimes, their subsequent endorsement by states.68  
                                                     
62
 J.A. Hessbruegge, “Human Rights Violations Arising from Conduct of Non-State Actors.” Buff. Hum. Rts. L. 
Rev. 11 (2005), 21; J.K. Levit, “Bottom-up International Lawmaking: Reflections on the New Haven School of 
International Law,” Yale J. Int'l L. 32 (2007), 395; H.M. Osofsky, “The Creation of the International Law of 
Climate Change: Complexities of Sub-State Actors,” in C. Bailliet, Non-State Actors, Soft Law, and Protective 
Regimes: From the Margins 179 (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 185. Cf. Zerk (2006), supra note 16, 23 
(writing that the shift from a state-centred to a market-dominated world should be reflected in greater 
prominence to people-centred as opposed to state-centred concerns). 
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 See also J.E. Alvarez, “Are Corporations Subjects of International Law?” Santa Clara J. Int'l L. 9 (2011), 9. 
64
 Article 38(1) of the Statute stipulates the following: “The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance 
with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a. international conventions (…) 
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of a general 
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provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.” Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, adopted on 26 June 1945, 993 UNTS 25. 
65
 See also Levit (2007), supra note 62, 395; Osofsky, supra note 62, 193-194. 
66
 Levit (2007), supra note 62, 409.  
67
 Ibid. 417. 
68
 Ibid. 409. 
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A bottom-up approach that capitalises “on the acquired knowledge of local actors as an essential 
resource for developing international norms and policies”69 seems all the more pertinent for 
international ‘human rights’ law. This branch of the law is, after all, designed to confer rights to 
individuals, which makes that the parties that are primarily interested in compliance with human rights 
are individual rights holders, whose first priority is protection in everyday life, at the local level.70 This 
is poetically captured in the following well-known quote from Eleanor Roosevelt.  
In small places, close to home – so close and so small that they cannot be seen on any map of 
the world. Yet they are the world of the individual person: The neighbourhood he lives in; the 
school or college he attends; the factory, farm or office where he works. Such are the places 
where every man, woman and child seeks equal justice, equal opportunity, equal dignity 
without discrimination. Unless these rights have meaning there, they have little meaning 
anywhere. Without concerted citizen action to uphold them close to home, we shall look in 
vain for progress in the larger world.71   
As international human rights law is meant to empower people, the extent to which rights holders are 
actually capable of enforcing their rights is an indicator of its effectiveness.72 In many instances, 
human rights are the only recourse that vulnerable people have left to defend themselves against 
injustice.73 Besides, that human rights should foremost be protected at the local level also finds 
expression in the general principle of international law according to which domestic remedies should 
be exhausted before having recourse to any available international remedy.74  
The specific issue of business and human rights, arguably, even demands bottom-up law-making. One 
reason is that companies are fundamentally different from states, as their birth-right is profitmaking 
rather than social welfare. While opinions on the precise meaning of the responsibility of business 
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 G.O. Aguilar, “The Local Relevance of Human Rights: A Methodological Approach,” in ed. K. De Feyter, 
The Local Relevance of Human Rights 109 (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 112. 
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 X. Dai, “The ‘Compliance Gap’ and the Efficacy of International Human Rights Institutions,” in eds. T. Risse 
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 De Feyter (2011), supra note 73, 14-15. 
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enterprises for human rights still differ – due to diverging philosophical and political ideologies – 
there is little disagreement that this responsibility cannot be identical to that of the state (see also infra 
Part II, Section 1.2.1.2).75 Practical needs and experiences at the domestic level could then guide the 
delimitation and definition of corporate human rights duties.76 As other scholars have argued, an 
additional reason why the business and human rights debate requires a bottom-up approach, is that the 
needs of potential victims should be at the centre of attention,77 as well as the experiences of local 
actors from civil society who seek to create responsibility for human rights on the part of business 
enterprises.78 A third consideration is that when international law is developed from the bottom up, it 
is more likely to leave the required margin for local stakeholders, in particular government actors, 
business enterprises, civil society and potential victims of human rights violations, to internalise the 
emerging norms.79 Without such margin international law risks to be in vain. Fourthly and finally, a 
bottom-up approach is inherent to polycentric governance, which is exactly aimed at providing parties 
with various mechanisms to solve conflicts at different levels of governance.80 
Evident sources of bottom-up law-making in the business and human rights field are private standard-
setting initiatives and company codes of conduct.81 Another source with high potential, however, are 
domestic judgments.82 National courts are crucial for the enforcement and development of 
international law, not only because they offer the first line of defence, but also because each time 
domestic courts are asked to engage with international law, they need to determine the existence and 
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content of those norms.83 Moreover, given that judicial dialogue amongst different jurisdictions is 
increasingly common, these determinations are likely to influence the application of international law 
by other courts as well.84 International law may thus emerge from national practices, especially when 
domestic legal systems start converging.85 
1.5. First things first: host state regulation and enforcement through litigation 
The two greatest achievements of the UNGPs are, firstly, that they have rationalised the current 
international legal framework and thereby set a clear, common baseline for all future discussions on 
business and human rights, and, secondly, that they have received an enormous degree of endorsement 
by the different stakeholders, which was a first with respect to this issue86 – although this is not to say 
that the UNGPs are without criticism.87 These two achievements align with the general thrust of the 
former Special Representative (1) to secure “thick stakeholder consensus” on a conceptual and 
normative framework (2) which would establish “the parameters and perimeters” for the gradual 
further development of the international regime governing business and human rights – a ‘building 
blocks’ approach, as it were.88 Hence, the adoption of the UNGPs merely represented the “end of the 
beginning”.89  
International, private and extraterritorial regulation are each valuable in their own right and contribute 
to the construction of the international regime. It is submitted, however, that host state regulation is 
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too often demoted by scholars, practitioners and politicians alike.90 Nonetheless, international, private, 
extraterritorial and host state regulation should complement and reinforce each other, because in 
tandem these different regulatory regimes have the best chance of establishing a comprehensive 
framework within which victims are actually able to vindicate their rights vis-à-vis business 
enterprises.91 What is needed is a “multi-pronged, multi-layered and multi-stakeholder approach that 
institutionalizes a networked form of governance”.92  
Furthermore, the most urgent concern in the contemporary business and human rights debate is 
accountability,93 namely how the human rights duties of business enterprises can and should be 
enforced. In comparison with a binding treaty, non-legally binding standards and extraterritorial 
regulation, which each have their limitations as was discussed earlier, host state mechanisms (host 
state regulation and litigation) are “easier to access, require fewer resources and provide relief more 
quickly.”94 They are the most efficient and single readily-available trajectory to enforce the 
responsibility of businesses for human rights,95 and should in any case be part of the story.96  
Admittedly, focussing on the host state is no panacea either. For one, many host states lack the 
willingness and/or capacity to ensure adequate regulation and enforcement97 – note, however, that the 
focus of this dissertation is not on weak governance zones (see infra Part IV, Section 1.2.2.1). Another 
evident drawback is that the approaches by different states likely diverge. Such divergence is not to be 
heartened, since it could affect a state’s locational environment and thus result in companies moving 
their business to the countries where the risk of incurring liability is the lowest.98 Business enterprises 
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being subjected to different rules depending on the country in which they operate also creates 
uncertainty, which again affects the investment climate. Some kind of international initiative could, at 
least partially, respond to this challenge. The question is, however, how such intervention should look 
like, in form and substance. Indeed, an international initiative should not necessarily take the form of 
hard law (a treaty) and, as was previously explained (supra Section 1.3), insufficient support currently 
exists for an instrument that would directly regulate the human rights obligations of business 
enterprises as a matter of international law and, possibly, create an international enforcement 
mechanism. A less far-reaching, more ‘minimalist’ approach thus seems better suited. In that regard, 
any international initiative should be concerned, first and foremost, with enhancing the effectiveness 
of the international legal framework on business and human rights as it was shaped by the UNGPs.99 
This will, however, be discussed more in detail in Part IV.  
Ensuring that business enterprises can effectively be held accountable for human rights is essential. 
Therefore, one of the first concerns should be to secure the ‘boundary conditions’ that safeguard rights 
holders’ ability to enforce their rights vis-à-vis business enterprises at the domestic level. In order to 
identify those elements, the domestic operationalisation of the UNGPs has to be scrutinised, both in 
theory and in practice. As the Working Group on Human Rights and Business has acknowledged, this 
issue is underrepresented in research.  
Research in the field of business and human rights lacks comprehensive data on the number 
and nature of complaints against companies for their adverse impacts and the effectiveness of 
the bodies tasked with investigating and remediating those impacts.100 
Consequently, this dissertation tackles the business and human rights debate, firstly, by focussing on 
the host state and, secondly, by reviewing the challenges and opportunities for victims of human rights 
violations by business enterprises to vindicate their rights, in particular through litigation. Local 
stakeholders take centre stage in this perspective, but the higher objective is to identify gaps in the 
business and human rights framework which could be addressed through an international initiative. 
Accordingly, the question of strengthening the responsibility and accountability of business enterprises 
for human rights is tackled from the bottom-up and benefits from the advantages of that approach, 
which were discussed previously (supra Section 1.4).101  
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2. ‘BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS’ AND ‘STRATEGIC LITIGATION’: 
SOME DEFINITIONS 
Details matter in law, and lawyers like to dispute the exact meaning of legal terms. Therefore, a clear 
definition of key legal concepts that are used throughout this dissertation is indispensable. Many of 
these concepts serve to distinguish between different forms of, or dimensions to, one phenomenon, 
construct or idea, creating so-called ‘typologies’. Although these typologies are crucial to rationalise 
and understand the law, also in this dissertation they are not intended to be absolute and merely serve 
an academic purpose.102 
(…) typologies are not the point. Typologies are at best abstract instruments for temporarily 
fending off the complexities of concrete reality that threaten to overwhelm our circuits. Be 
they dichotomous or trichotomous, typologies are ladders to be climbed and left behind, not 
monuments to be caressed or polished.103 
2.1. Disentangling ‘the private’ and ‘the public’  
Originally, legal traditions inspired by Roman law adhered to a strict separation between private and 
public law.104 Human rights, as they were codified in international law and entrenched in numerous 
constitutions since the 1950s, were traditionally classified as public law, because they governed the 
relationship between citizens and the state. Compared with this traditional approach, the very idea of 
‘private human rights duties’ constitutes a paradigm shift. The distinction between private and public 
law is, however, a tenuous one in contemporary society. Not only do different areas of law combine 
corrective (private) and social (public) objectives,105 but also the basic idea that the private sphere is 
subject to a purely private market logic is challenged, since public power defines private law and, 
                                                     
102
 As Westerman has written “rational reconstruction is not carried out for its own sake but is a means to a 
further end”. P.C. Westerman, “Open or autonomous? The debate on legal methodology as a reflection of the 
debate on law,” in ed. M. Van Hoecke, Methodologies of Legal Research 87 (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013), 
92. 
103
 Shue acknowledged this caveat when he distinguished between duties to avoid depriving, to protect from 
deprivation and to aid the deprived. H. Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreign Policy 
(Princeton University Press, 1996), 160. 
104
 As the Roman lawyer Ulpian once declared: “Publicum ius est quod ad statum rei Romanae spectat, ius 
privatum est quod ad singulorum utilitatem,” cited in B. Grabowska, “Horizontal Impact of Human Rights: 
Dialogue between Constitutional and International Law,” in eds. K. Topidi and L. Field, Transnational Legal 
Processes and Human Rights 63 (Farnham: Ashgate, 201), 63. 
105
 Traditionally, private law is considered to be concerned with correcting wrongdoings between individuals and 
public law with the social good and duties owed towards society. Environmental law, however, is a typical 
example of an area of law displaying both corrective and social objectives. See also McLeod-Killmurray, supra 
note 93, 292-293; D. Oliver and J. Fedtke, “Human Rights and the Private Sphere: The Scope of the Project,” in 
eds. D. Oliver and J. Fedtke, Human Rights and the Private Sphere 3 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007b), 22. 
21 
 
hence, creates private power.106 How the distinction between ‘the private’ and ‘the public’ is blurred is 
fittingly expressed in the following quote from a judgment of the South African Constitutional Court.  
Much of this interesting debate is concerned with an analysis of power relations in society; the 
shift which has taken place in the demarcations between “private law” and “public law”; how 
functions traditionally associated with the state are increasingly exercised by institutions with 
tenuous or no links with the state (…). Suffice it to say that it could be dangerous to attach 
consequences to or infer solutions from concepts such as “public law” and “private law” when 
the validity of such concepts and the distinctions which they imply are being seriously 
questioned.107 
Although defining ‘private law’ as non-public law thus seems faulty,108 for reasons of clarity and 
academic consistency the concept is still used in this dissertation to designate those rules that regulate 
the relationships between private actors.109 ‘Private actors’, in turn, are all natural and legal persons 
that are not organs of the state and that do not act as a public actor, whose conduct is attributable to the 
state.110 The latter scenario occurs when a private actor is empowered by law to exercise public or 
regulatory functions, when it acts under the instructions, directions or control of the state or when it is 
entirely dependent on the state, and violates human rights in that context.111 Generally, a different term 
is used to describe ‘actors other than the state’ when that discussion concerns actors operating on the 
international scene or ‘transnationally’, without representing a single state. Examples are 
intergovernmental organisations, international nongovernmental organisations and transnational 
corporations. Instead of ‘private actors’ those actors are commonly called ‘non-state actors’. 
Accordingly, to designate actors other than (organs of) the state this dissertation employs the term 
‘private actors’, when they operate domestically, and ‘non-state actors’, when they operate 
transnationally.  
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Finally, in the context of the case study, the term ‘civil society actors’ embraces any private actor that 
constitutes some kind of organisation or association – hence, excluding individual natural persons112 – 
and that has specialised knowledge about issues related to business and human rights as well as 
practical experience with trying to safeguard human rights against possible violations by business 
enterprises.113 They are thus a sub-category of private actors, which seek to hold companies 
accountable without themselves being directly affected by the corporate conduct, either because they 
advocate for particular issues, such as environmental protection, sustainable development and/or 
human rights, or because they offer legal services. Mostly they are domestic private actors, although 
they may be assisted by transnational agents, such as international nongovernmental organisations.114 
The individuals who work for, or are a member of, civil society actors, are either called ‘members of 
civil society’ or are designated with the term describing their position, such as ‘lawyers’ or ‘activists’ 
(see also infra Part III, Section 2.1.2). 
2.2. Private actors and human rights: which norms and duties?  
When used in this dissertation, the concept ‘human rights norms’ encompasses all norms whether they 
are codified in national or international instruments and emanate from hard law, soft law or private 
regulatory initiatives. Every ‘norm’ consists of the substantive right itself, the duties imposed by that 
right, and the underlying values and purposes.115 Accordingly, also the terms ‘human rights’ and 
‘human rights duties’ have a generic meaning. No distinction is made a priori based on whether they 
concern international human rights or constitutional rights, and first, second or third generation rights, 
nor on whether they are incorporated in a legally binding or voluntary norm and have prescriptive or 
persuasive force.  
The question regarding the possible human rights duties that private actors may bear has arisen in two, 
very different ways. A first way is through the idea of ‘converse duties’, which are duties that rights 
holders owe to society or to the state, like the duty to place certain physical abilities at the service of 
the state. Such duties have been criticised, because they actually reduce the protection of rights holders 
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and could be abused by states either to deny certain rights or to overly restrict them.116 In contrast, the 
duties that rights holders owe vis-à-vis each other, like the duty not to interfere with the rights held by 
others, are called ‘correlative duties’. Such duties should strengthen the protection of rights holders, 
and are not meant to alter the obligations of the state.117 This dissertation is only concerned with 
correlative duties, since what is at stake is the protection of rights holders against business enterprises, 
which in principle also hold certain rights.  
That business enterprises have human rights duties does not automatically entail that such duties are 
imposed by a legally binding and judicially enforceable norm. The binding nature of a human rights 
norm can range from making business enterprises merely ‘responsible’ for human rights, to triggering 
their ‘accountability’ and perhaps even their ‘liability’.118  
First of all, a norm creates a ‘responsibility’ for human rights as soon as the duty bearer is (morally or 
ethically) expected to respect those rights and to comply with the duties that they create. Accordingly, 
in this dissertation the term ‘responsibility’ is not meant to designate secondary norms of 
responsibility for human rights violations, unless it is explicitly stated so.119 Any human rights norm – 
provided that it is capable of taking effect against private actors (see the discussion on horizontal 
effect, infra Part II, Section 1.2.2.1) – can create a responsibility on the part of business enterprises to 
respect the right incorporated therein. The social expectation that business enterprises respect human 
rights is hardly controversial and is reflected in the second pillar of the UNGPs. Nowadays, also the 
business community is unlikely to dispute that companies bear a responsibility for human rights; it is 
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increasingly accepted that business should not only be concerned with profit but also with people and 
planet (the triple bottom line).120  
Nevertheless, when a human rights norm is not accompanied by a mechanism through which rights 
holders can demand duty bearers to justify non-compliance, the binding force of that norm remains 
quite limited. In that case, the norm may create a responsibility, but there is no ‘accountability’. Such 
human rights norms are mere privileges that rights holders can use to restrain others who try to prevent 
them from exercising their rights.121 For accountability to exist, rights holders should have the 
opportunity to demand that duty bearers formally justify their conduct in light of their duties, through 
judicial, state-based non-judicial or non-state based remedies. These mechanisms only create real 
accountability, however, if they ensure transparency, answerability and controllability.122 Many non-
legally binding standards are accompanied by a (non-state-based) accountability mechanism, and the 
number of companies committing themselves to such standards is increasing as well. Accordingly, 
aside from recognizing their responsibility for human rights, many companies have also come to 
accept, at least to a certain extent, that they can be called to account for their conduct. 
When a human rights norm is codified in a legal norm that is embedded in a system of rules that also 
create a forum and prescribe the procedures for the (quasi-)judicial enforcement of the norm in that 
forum, the responsibility of duty bearers for the human right at stake is not merely a moral or social 
responsibility, but a legal responsibility.123 In that case, business enterprises can be called to account 
for their behaviour in court. Hence, they may be liable for the legal consequences of their behaviour 
provided that the specific elements for such liability to exist are present (which differ from one legal 
system to the other and depend on factual and legal circumstances).124  
It should be stressed that whether and to what extent business enterprises bear human rights duties has 
no impact on the duties of states. Precisely because the respective obligations of business enterprises 
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and states are fundamentally different (for instance, ‘do not violate’ versus ‘enforce regulations that 
should prevent violations’), they are always complementary, as will also be discussed in the case study 
(infra Part III, Chapter 2). Accordingly, human rights duties on the part of business enterprises can 
only strengthen, and never weaken, the protection of rights holders. 
2.3. Business enterprises: what’s in a name 
The terms ‘business enterprise’ and ‘company’ are used here as generic and interchangeable concepts 
to designate any undertaking that manages a business or trade. Whilst many business and human rights 
scholars concentrate on the legal status of ‘transnational corporations’ or ‘multinational enterprises’,125 
the nationality or legal incorporation of a company is not considered a relevant factor for the purposes 
of this dissertation. Accordingly, ‘companies’ may be entirely domestically-owned, have listings on a 
foreign stock exchange or even be controlled by a foreign-based parent company. Although a 
characteristic of transnational corporations is that no single state may be able to control them, because 
they can easily swift capital from one country to the other,126 the choice of a generic definition is 
believed to be justified for at least three reasons,127 the most evident one being that the nationality of a 
perpetrator does not matter for victims. Treating them differently on that basis would lack any rational 
basis and, hence, be discriminatory.128 
A second justification is that any company is capable of violating human rights.129 The risk of human 
rights violations might even be higher for domestically owned companies, as they may be treated more 
favourably by their government than transnational companies or may have less resources to invest in 
human rights due diligence130 – a claim that is sometimes also uttered by transnational corporations 
themselves.131 In this regard, it is noteworthy that one of the reasons why the open-ended 
intergovernmental working group established by Resolution 26/9 for the elaboration of a treaty on 
business and human rights (supra Section 1.3) is so controversial, is precisely the fact that the working 
group’s mandate is restricted to transnational corporations and ‘other business enterprises’. The latter 
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term was (originally) defined as “all business enterprises that have a transnational character in their 
operational activities”, excluding “local businesses registered in terms of relevant domestic law”.132 At 
the first session of the working group the EU insisted that the working group would amend its mandate 
to include ‘all’ business enterprises.133 This was not accepted at first,134 but by the second session an 
agreement was reached to widen the scope of the working group to cover all business enterprises, at 
least for the time being.135  
A third reason justifying a broad definition of the term ‘business enterprise’ is that the precise meaning 
of ‘transnational corporations’ and ‘multinational enterprises’ is disputed.136 In fact, these two 
concepts have each emerged from a different discipline. The term ‘multinational enterprises’ comes 
from economical science, where it comprised any company that “owns (in whole or in part), controls 
and manages income generating assets in more than one country”.137 ‘Transnational corporations’ has 
its roots in international law and, in particular, in the business and human rights field, and refers to all 
companies operating across national borders.138 Given that over time the legal techniques for 
conducting business across borders have become increasingly diverse, the meaning of ‘multinational 
enterprises’ has later been extended beyond foreign direct investment.139 Whilst the meaning of the 
two terms has thus been equated, there is still no consensus about when exactly a company becomes 
transnational or multinational. Even in relation to the definition that was given to ‘transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises’ in Resolution 26/9 prior to the second session of the 
intergovernmental working group, there were a number of uncertainties, such as the question whether 
it included enterprises that are simply involved, in some way, in global production chains.140 A flexible 
approach thus seems appropriate, since the ways in which businesses may act transnationally are 
infinitely diverse. 
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2.4. ‘Strategic’ litigation for ‘change’ 
Langford defines a ‘strategy’ as “the autonomous space that an organisation or individual creates for 
itself” on the medium and long term to pursue a certain interest, and ‘tactics’ as “the initiatives 
undertaken on the space or terrain of the other to advance the strategy.”141 Accordingly, for the 
purposes of this dissertation ‘strategic litigation’142 is a tactic employed by victims, activists and 
lawyers whereby business enterprises or government actors are called to account for their conduct in 
court with the aim of testing, enforcing and strengthening, through litigation, the responsibility and/or 
accountability of business enterprises for human rights. It should immediately be stressed that strategic 
litigation is but one tactic that can be used for that purpose and is generally used in tandem with 
alternative tactics.  
Speaking of strategies and tactics in relation to litigation is not mere decorative word use: “[s]trategic 
thinking is as important in litigation as it is in war.”143 For activists and lawyers to engage in such 
litigation, they should have a predetermined plan that is motivated by a specific mission and 
objectives.144 As a first crucial step, they should thoroughly evaluate their position and that of the 
direct victims. This requires profound knowledge of the legal system and of the specific matter’s legal 
context and anticipation of any relevant factor that may influence the judicial proceedings or the 
reception of a particular case by courts and of a particular judgment by government or by business 
enterprises.  
After this evaluative phase, the court case should be designed having regard to all factors that may, 
adversely or advantageously, affect the prospect of success. In choosing the appropriate cause(s) of 
action, the relevant counterparty, the right legal arguments and the suitable remedies, strategic litigants 
should also anticipate the reactions of the counterparty and of the court.145 In strategic litigation, 
activists and lawyers also look for the ‘right’ case, a sympathetic victim who is willing to go through 
lengthy judicial proceedings, is aware of the risks, and knows that his or her own situation may not 
improve – at least not at short notice. As the case study will also demonstrate (infra Part III, Section 
2.4.3), in principle, strategic litigation relates to novel, uncharted legal issues, which makes them even 
harder to predict and even more challenging than ordinary lawsuits. 
                                                     
141
 Langford (2015), supra note 112, 20. 
142
 For a detailed discussion of the relevant factors influencing strategic litigation, see infra Part II, Section 2.2 
and Part III, Sections 2.4 to 2.7.  
143
 A. Kanner and T.L. Nagy, “Legal Strategy, Storytelling and Complex Litigation,” Am. J. Trial Advocacy 
30(1) (2006), 7. 
144
 Ibid. 2. 
145
 Ibid. 8. 
28 
 
Strategic litigation for social change by its very nature entails that the parties engaging in such 
litigation pursue certain long-term objectives with a social impact that reaches beyond the individual 
case that is litigated. Moreover, in general, strategic litigation does not end with the (successful) 
finalisation of one case, but involves follow-up litigation as well as action to monitor the impacts. The 
specific type of strategic (human rights) litigation for ‘social transformation’ or ‘change’ that is 
examined in the context of this dissertation seeks to shift the balance of power in society by 
empowering vulnerable victim groups so that they are actually able to vindicate their rights vis-à-vis 
business enterprises and so that business enterprises are truly accountable for human rights. It should 
be emphasised that the dissertation does not take a position as to how such accountability should be 
achieved; depending on the situation and on their preferences, victims could demand (1) that the state 
regulates and monitors corporate conduct, (2) that the state provides redress, (3) that the company 
accounts for its behaviour, and/or (4) that the company provides redress. This arguably constitutes 
social change, because victims’ vulnerability for human rights violations and companies’ ability to 
commit such violations are inherently intertwined and linked to structural inequalities in society.146 Or, 
as Backer et al. have written about litigation specifically in the business and human rights field,  
Catalyzing litigation produces empowerment among the most neglected group of human right 
stakeholders in two ways: it serves to remedy individual wrongs, and it provides a powerful 
venue for participation of traditionally excluded groups who may now more vigorously 
participate in the international development of business and human rights standards.147 
                                                     
146
 Cf. S. Gloppen, “Courts and Social Transformation: An Analytical Framework,” in eds. R. Gargarella, P. 
Domingo and T. Roux, Courts and Social Transformation in New Democracies 35 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 
37-38 (defining social transformation as “the altering of structured inequalities and power relations in society in 
ways that reduce the weight of morally irrelevant circumstances, such as socio-economic status/class, gender, 
race, religion or sexual orientation”). 
147
 Backer et al., supra note 78, 265. 
29 
 
3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
As was mentioned before and will be explained more in detail below (infra Part II, Section 1.1), 
according to the UNGPs, international human rights law only binds states, which are obliged to protect 
human rights against possible infringements by companies. At least from the perspective of 
international law, business enterprises’ responsibility for human rights is a mere social expectation. 
All legal responsibility for human rights is passed on to states, whose domestic legal framework 
should safeguard human rights from interferences by business enterprises. If states comply with their 
duty, however, human rights will constrain business enterprises under national law. The question is 
thus to what extent business enterprises are constrained by human rights at the domestic level.  
In view of the finding that the international legal framework stops short of imposing legally binding 
human rights duties on business enterprises and instead places a tremendous responsibility on states, 
two main research questions are tackled in this dissertation. The first question is whether business 
enterprises are indeed responsible for human rights under national law. This question essentially 
explores the domestic operationalisation and the effectiveness of the UNGPs. A number of sub-
questions arise in that context, in particular whether there exists accountability for human rights 
violations by business enterprises and which kind of barriers victims (may) face when they try to 
enforce such accountability. In addressing these issues, special attention is paid to judicial remedies as 
a mechanism to ensure accountability. The second question concerns how international law and 
domestic law (should) interact in the business and human rights field. To answer this question, the 
dissertation first scrutinises the how and why of the current international legal framework on business 
and human rights and, after having explored the domestic operationalisation of the UNGPs in line with 
the first research question, examines how international law could strengthen the ‘domestic’ approach 
to business and human rights that is presently proclaimed by the UNGPs.  
The two research questions assume a practice-oriented approach in which the actual needs and 
experiences of local stakeholders take centre stage. Therefore, in addition to a fundamental analysis of 
the law, the dissertation includes a case study to check the law on the books with the law in action. In 
the context of that case study empirical data were collected (see also infra Chapter 5). The case study 
is then used as a lens to reflect on the operationalisation and effectiveness of the international legal 
framework on business and human rights and as guidance to make propositions in order to strengthen 
that framework. In particular, based on the practice of local stakeholders who seek to ensure 
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accountability for human rights violations by business enterprises, a number of boundary conditions 
are identified that are imperative for such accountability to be effective.148 
In sum, the overall objective of the dissertation is to examine how the international legal framework 
on business and human rights functions in practice, in particular at the domestic level, whether it is 
effective and how its effectiveness could be improved. Accordingly, the dissertation seeks to 
contribute to the business and human rights field (1) by rationalizing the law on the obligation to 
protect and its domestic operationalisation and by addressing the conceptual and normative questions 
that arise in that context, (2) while reckoning with the practical experiences of local stakeholders who 
seek to vindicate human rights against business enterprises, and (3) by identifying any gaps in 
protection and reflecting on how these gaps could be addressed.  
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4. STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
The dissertation is divided into four main Parts, including this first Part, which introduces the topic, 
defines some key concepts, explains the research questions and objectives, and describes the 
methodology.  
Next, Part II consists of a fundamental analysis of the two leading themes that are tackled in this 
dissertation, namely ‘business and human rights’ and ‘strategic litigation’ to ensure accountability for 
human rights violations by business enterprises. In Chapter 1 the legal framework on business and 
human rights is discussed, from the perspective of both international law (Section 1.1) and national 
law in abstracto, and thus not specifically South African law (Section 1.2). Chapter 1 of Part II ends 
with a brief reflection on the peculiar relationship between human rights law and trade and investment 
law, because the risk of conflicts between these two branches of the law is particularly high when the 
rights and duties of business enterprises are at stake (Section 1.3). Chapter 2 then delves into the topic 
of strategic litigation. It comprises two main Sections that, respectively, introduce the analytical 
framework for the use of litigation to effect social change (Section 2.1) and explain the variables that 
influence strategic litigation as well as the decisions that have to be adopted in its course (Section 2.2). 
Part III of the dissertation is devoted to the case study. Chapter 1 sketches the general framework, by 
discussing the state of affairs of business and human rights in South Africa (Section 1.1), the legal 
effect of human rights on companies under South African law (Section 1.2), the interplay between 
international and South African law (Section 1.3) and the elements of the general context within which 
strategic litigation takes place (Section 1.4). Next, in Chapter 2 of Part III the practical experiences of 
local stakeholders that use litigation to enforce accountability for human rights violations by business 
enterprises are explored. Through this analysis the different decisions that these actors have to take 
when they determine the strategy of their litigation are highlighted as well as the determinants 
underlying these decisions. The Chapter begins with a description of the factual background (Section 
2.1) and of the legal framework (Section 2.2) of mining, the environment and human rights. Next, the 
three ‘focus matters’ are introduced, which will be used as illustrations throughout the case study 
(Section 2.3). Thereafter, strategic litigation to hold mining companies accountable for human rights 
violations due to environmental degradation is analysed in depth (Sections 2.4 to 2.6), and the Chapter 
ends with a review of how South African civil society actors define and measure success (Section 2.7).  
Finally, the findings of Parts II and III are brought together in Part IV. Chapter 1 briefly summarises 
the general thread and identifies a number of lessons learnt regarding the conditions that impede or 
facilitate victims’ ability to vindicate their rights. Thereafter, Chapter 2 reflects on how the 
international legal framework could be developed to increase its effectiveness in ensuring that business 
enterprises are responsible for human rights and that there exists accountability for violations by 
business enterprises. 
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5. METHODOLOGICAL SETTING 
The methodology applied for this dissertation was not limited to traditional legal methods but also 
involved the collection of empirical data. This is motivated by the research questions and objectives 
given that empirical data, which gives an insight into the actual experiences of stakeholders on the 
ground, is imperative to understand the practical implications of the UNGPs at the domestic level as 
well as their strengths and weaknesses. The legal theoretical analysis149 of business and human rights 
is thus complemented with practice-oriented research in order to test the efficacy of the legal 
theoretical framework and to make recommendations to improve its effectiveness.150  
Empirical data were collected in the context of a case study. The case study method entails an in-depth 
analysis of a small and selective, but manageable, sample, and its strategic focus facilitates intensive 
data generation and the combination of multiple collection techniques (triangulation). The case study 
examined in this dissertation is demarcated based on a geographical focus (South Africa), an industry 
focus (mining) and three indicators, which are all necessary but sufficient conditions for a matter to be 
included.151  
This Chapter first demarcates the case study; it justifies its focus on South Africa (Section 5.1.1.1) 
and, in particular, on the mining industry (Section 5.1.1.2) and explains that the human rights 
violations examined are direct violations (Section 5.1.2.1) that are associated with environmental 
health hazards (Section 5.1.2.2) and suffered by neighbouring communities and/or mineworkers 
(Section 5.1.2.3). Thereafter, the methodology for the fundamental part (Section 5.2) and the 
qualitative part (Section 5.3) of the dissertation is discussed more in detail. 
5.1. The case of the South African mining industry  
5.1.1. Mining in South Africa: the pertinence of the case 
A geographically (South Africa) and thematically (interferences by the mining industry with the rights 
of mineworkers or neighbouring communities) demarcated case study necessarily has consequences 
for the generalisability of any findings, as will be discussed in Part IV. Nevertheless, it is submitted 
that the concrete case that was studied is particularly instructive, not in the least because of the 
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awareness in South Africa about the risk of human rights abuses by business enterprises, in particular 
in the mining industry (see also infra Part III, Section 1.1.1) and because of the relatively high number 
of cases in which human rights-based approaches, including litigation, are used to resolve conflicts.  
5.1.1.1. South Africa 
As was said before, many human rights violations by business enterprises are committed in developing 
countries by companies vested in or operating from developed countries. Since developing countries 
are eager to attract investment in their pursuit of economic growth – while their governance systems 
often suffer from a lack of resources and a weak rule of law – there is a risk for them to engage in a 
regulatory race-to-the-bottom, rather than to tighten their laws and regulations.152 This also applies for 
African countries, where numerous human rights violations by companies have been reported,153 and 
where inadequate regulation and non-enforcement constitute a major concern for human rights 
protection.154 Nevertheless, no thorough analysis of strategic litigation to hold companies accountable 
for human rights has yet been carried out.155 Given that the economic growth of Sub-Saharan African 
countries also relies on their natural resource base more than in any other region in the world,156 the 
risk that laws, regulations and policies are designed and enforced in such a way as to advance the 
interests of the elite (extractives) industries – so-called regulatory capture – is high.157  
Within that region of Sub-Saharan Africa, the choice to focus on South Africa was partly motivated by 
some practical considerations on the part of the researcher, such as language (English being one of the 
eleven official languages, so that all laws and most judgments are available in English), political 
stability, physical accessibility (fairly good roads and local public transport to reach the respondents) 
and institutional links with local partners (in particular the University of Pretoria). More important, 
however, were the scientific considerations. First of all, the South African Bill of Rights is one of the 
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few legal instruments that expressly stipulate that private actors are bound by human rights. This 
constitutional dispensation, which has to be understood in light of the country’s history and the time at 
which the Constitution was adopted (infra Part III, Section 1.1.1), represents a unique opportunity to 
assess the practical implications and actual relevance of legally binding human rights duties for 
companies. 
Secondly, given this explicit constitutional dispensation as well as the awareness, in view of South 
Africa’s past, that business enterprises may abuse human rights, the use of litigation to ensure 
corporate accountability are not that uncommon. There is thus a sufficiently large sample of matters 
that can be reviewed as to whether, under what conditions and why domestic enforcement of corporate 
accountability for human rights is or is not effective.158 This is also explained by the fact that in the 
course of its history a strong civil society has emerged in South Africa (see infra Part III, Section 
2.1.2). These civil society actors regularly use rights-based strategies to pursue their objectives, and 
they rely heavily on the human rights protections provided by the Bill of Rights.159 If need be, they 
litigate a matter up to the Constitutional Court. Some examples of famous, successful rights battles 
dealt with access to antiretroviral medicines, protection against eviction, the abolition of the death 
penalty and access to schoolbooks.160 Accordingly, the use of human rights arguments in court, but 
also out-of-court, to achieve social change is a reasonably common phenomenon in South Africa.  
Third, although South Africa is an emerging economy,161 the country should not be placed on an equal 
footing with countries like Russia or China. The South African economy has had a few rough financial 
years and its economic outlook is not very optimistic either. Since mining still contributes 7.7% to the 
country’s gross domestic product in real terms (2015), the interests of the mining industry are also the 
interests of government.162 Hence, the risk of regulatory capture is not alien to South Africa. 
Moreover, the country’s mineral wealth does not necessarily translate in increased power towards the 
mining companies wishing to extract those mineral resources, since the government depends on those 
companies’ technologies and expertise to exploit the minerals.163 It should thus not be claimed without 
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more that the South African context does not share many of the features that are common to the 
contexts in which business enterprises violate with human rights.  
5.1.1.2. The mining industry 
The South African mining industry constitutes only a part of the larger extractive sector, which covers 
the extraction of any ‘natural resource’, namely any substance that exists naturally in the earth, id est 
comes from nature without human intervention, including “air, land, water, natural gas, coal, oil, 
petroleum, minerals, wood, topsoil, fauna, flora, forests and wildlife.”164 The case study is only 
concerned with the extraction of mineral resources, however, such as oil, gas, gold, platinum, platinum 
group metals, coal, diamonds and the three T’s (tin, tungsten and tantalum).  
Human rights violations in the mining industry are a long-standing problem. Of the reported cases in a 
study on human rights violations by business enterprises carried out by the former UN Special 
Representative, John Ruggie, for instance, 28% concerned human rights violations associated with the 
extraction of mineral resources, which was the highest score of all the sectors examined in that 
study.165 This is hardly surprising as the extraction of minerals is an ecologically-intensive undertaking 
that poses high risks, amongst others, of water, air, soil or noise contamination.166 This will be 
discussed more in detail in relation to the South African mining industry in the case study (infra Part 
III, Section 2.1.1). Also the fact that states with the highest mineral wealth often have the lowest rate 
of economic growth and development remains striking.167 
5.1.2. The demarcating factors 
5.1.2.1. Direct human rights violations… 
The case study deals with direct human rights violations by private mining companies. This excludes 
three categories of human rights violations that trigger specific rules of attribution, which complicate 
the analysis.  
Firstly, human rights violations by ‘public companies’ are not considered. These are companies that 
are either state-owned or that, although being privately owned, act as a public actor (see the definition 
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of private actors supra in Section 2.2). In principle, the conduct of such companies is directly 
imputable to the state, as if the state itself committed the violation.168 The other two categories of 
matters that do not qualify as direct human rights violations are instances of beneficial and silent 
complicity by business enterprises.169 Beneficial complicity means that a company takes advantage of 
a human rights violation committed by another actor, in particular the state, while silent complicity 
entails that a company chooses not to denounce systematic or continuous human rights violations even 
though they have regular contacts with the perpetrators and have the leverage to bring the violations to 
an end.170  
Accordingly, for a business enterprise to commit a ‘direct human rights violation’ its activities should 
in se interfere with human rights. This also comprises instances where companies are directly 
complicit in human rights violations, meaning that they knowingly assist in them. On the other hand, 
the mere fact that a state is either complicit in the human rights violations or simultaneously breaches 
its own obligations and is thus in some way involved, does not alter their qualification as direct 
violations by a business enterprise.171  
5.1.2.2. … associated with environmental health hazards  
Furthermore, the case study concentrates on those violations that are associated with environmental 
degradation or pollution, which is a prominent concern in the mining industry, and the consequent 
health hazards.172 The link between human rights and the environment is, arguably, straightforward, as 
environmental degradation or pollution may affect a whole range of rights, in particular economic, 
social, cultural and environmental rights, such as the rights to health, food, water and housing, but also 
civil and political rights, such as the rights to life and personal integrity (see also infra Part III, Section 
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2.2.1.2).173 Given that the human rights violations considered are associated with environmental 
degradation caused by mineral extraction, they are committed by mining companies in their core 
business operations. This excludes, for instance, incidents of arbitrary arrest or inhuman treatment by 
private security guards. 
Noteworthy is that the individuals who are most likely to suffer from environmental health hazards 
belong to vulnerable groups. Indeed, the structural phenomenon whereby environmental risks are 
unequally distributed, with the harms being disproportionately borne by developing countries and, 
within countries, by poor and marginalised groups, is called ‘environmental injustice’.174 
Environmental injustice may even coincide with ‘environmental racism’, when the vulnerable people 
who bear the burden of environmental risks predominantly belong to a certain race.175  
[Environmental justice] understands that all persons have equal rights to be protected from 
contamination, to live in a healthy environment they can enjoy thanks to a fair distribution of 
environmental benefits and opportunities, and to be fully involved in decision making 
regarding those issues.176  
5.1.2.3. … and suffered by neighbouring communities and/or mineworkers  
Although exceptions are imaginable, the majority of human rights violations that are directly 
perpetrated by business enterprises in their core business operations affect not just one individual but 
generally a group of people. The three major victim groups are employees, neighbouring communities 
and consumers.177 The case study is only concerned with interferences with the rights of mineworkers 
and neighbouring communities.  
The people belonging to these groups are often vulnerable, not in the least because they have 
significantly less resources than the mining company, which leaves them in a weaker position, but also 
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because they lack the necessary leverage to be able to influence the company’s behaviour or the 
governmental policies affecting that behaviour. Consequently, victims of human rights violations by 
mining companies often (have to) join forces in order to make up for their lack of power and seek to 
vindicate their rights together, regardless of whether those rights are ‘individual’ rights held by 
‘everyone’ or ‘collective’ rights held by ‘all peoples’.178  
In this regard, it should also be noted that the term ‘neighbouring communities’ as used in this 
dissertation has a generic meaning and designates any group of local people who live in the immediate 
surroundings of a company and who share given needs or interests, in particular in view of their 
neighbourliness, regardless of the size, history, distinctiveness or other characteristics of the group.179  
5.2. Fundamental study 
As was explained in the Sections discussing the research questions and objectives and the structure of 
the dissertation (supra Sections 3 and 4), there is a fundamental part and an empirical research part. 
The fundamental part comprises an analysis of two main topics, namely the legal framework for 
business and human rights and the use of strategic litigation to ensure accountability for human rights 
violations by business enterprises. Both topics were scrutinised first in abstracto and subsequently 
specifically in relation to South Africa. For each topic, the research began with an exploratory study so 
as to establish which issues required a thorough analysis.  
As regards the legal framework for business and human rights, the extensive literature study 
concentrated on the obligation of states under international law to protect human rights against 
violations by companies and on the implications of that obligation at the domestic legal level. 
Accordingly, an analytical framework was drafted that unravels the different options for business 
enterprises to be affected by human rights under national law. It is submitted that based on this 
framework the impact of human rights on business enterprises within any given domestic legal system 
can be appraised comprehensively. Thereafter, a similar literature study was carried out to assess, 
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through the analytical framework that had been developed, the particular impact of human rights on 
business enterprises in the South African legal order.  
As regards strategic litigation, existing literature on the use of litigation to achieve social change was 
consulted, including scholarship on the judicialisation of society. As will be explained below, the 
analytical frameworks that have been developed by other scholars in the past were used as a point of 
departure to identify the elements that are constitutive of strategic litigation and that could, at least 
hypothetically, be relevant for the use of litigation to ensure accountability of business enterprises for 
human rights as well. The abstract review was again followed by a specific analysis of the use of 
strategic human rights litigation in South Africa. 
Although the fundamental study of the business and human rights field and of strategic litigation 
constituted the point of departure for the case study, throughout the research the two topics (business 
and human rights and strategic litigation), the two levels of analysis (in abstracto and specifically in 
relation to South Africa) as well as the fundamental and practice-oriented parts of the study 
continuously interacted with one another, which resulted in some readjustments.180  
5.3. Qualitative empirical research 
5.3.1. Data collection  
In the context of the case study empirical data were collected and analysed so as to gain an insight into 
the experiences of local stakeholders in South Africa who actually seek to enforce accountability for 
human rights violations by business enterprises. Three collection techniques were used for that 
purpose: interviews, document analysis and observation. In particular, practitioners were interviewed, 
court papers as well as judgments consulted and interactions between or amongst lawyers, activists, 
victims, mining companies, government authorities and experts observed. The data were collected 
during two research stays in South Africa of respectively 18 weeks (November 2014 – March 2015) 
and 7 weeks (March – May 2016), but also through email correspondence with a number of 
informants. In addition, brochures, reports and other documents published by civil society actors as 
well as most judgments and some court papers were publicly available (namely online) and could thus 
be accessed through a traditional desktop study.  
Interviews. The respondents belonged to either one of the following groups: lawyers (attorneys, 
counsels and legal researchers), ‘activists’181 or experts (respectively 25, 6 and 5 respondents). They 
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are listed in Table 13 in Annex 1. The interviews with the first two groups of respondents were semi-
structured interviews, based on a single topics list, but the questions were slightly adapted to the 
profile and expertise of the individual respondent and to the specific matters in which he or she is or 
was involved. One respondent was not formally interviewed, but has extensively shared information 
and exchanged ideas through personal contacts and e-mail correspondence. The interviews with 
experts, except for one, a legal scholar, were not based on the same topics list, because the questions 
were tailored to their knowledge and expertise. A number of respondents were interviewed a second 
time and/or shared information about ongoing cases through e-mail correspondence, as is also 
indicated in Table 13 in Annex 1. The follow-up interviews were not structured, but were driven by 
the respondents’ replies to questions relating to specific cases or topics on which they had worked or 
were working at that time.  
During the interviews the respondents were probed to share factual and knowledge information182 
about situations and processes relating to the issue of business and human rights in South Africa and, 
in particular, to the use of strategic litigation to denounce human rights violations associated with 
environmental health hazards caused by mining. The information that they accordingly shared 
pertained to themselves, meaning that it was first-hand information based on the respondents’ own 
experiences. Given that they are also experts who get involved in such situations and processes in 
view of their professional (or voluntary) activities, the data also qualify as ‘expert’ opinions.  
Judgments and court papers. The second source from which data were extracted are judgments, 
including interlocutory decisions, and ‘court papers’, a term designating all papers that are submitted 
to a court in the context of a legal dispute by parties involved in those proceedings, such as notices of 
motion, summons, affidavits,183 heads of argument and particulars of claim.  
These documents were collected for relevant court cases, which were identified based on a search of 
the online database of the Southern African Legal Information Institute,184 a case law review by third 
parties,185 references by respondents or by legal scholars and cross-references in other cases. All cases 
of which the researcher took note accordingly and that met the criteria to be classified as ‘directly 
relevant’ were included in the study, but exhaustiveness cannot be ensured. The ‘related’ and ‘legally 
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relevant’ cases were selected based on their relevance for the case study – the categorisation of court 
cases as ‘directly relevant’, ‘related’, or ‘legally relevant’ is explained below (Section 5.3.2).  
Most judgments are publicly available on the online database of the Southern African Legal 
Information Institute. Others were consulted through law reports that are accessible in South Africa, 
whilst some unpublished judgments were shared by lawyers or activists who were involved in the 
litigation. As for court papers, in turn, few such documents are available online and access to them 
was generally obtained with the assistance from lawyers or activists involved therein. Court papers 
were only consulted for ‘ongoing cases’ and for the three focus matters that were selected for in-depth 
discussion (infra Section 5.3.2). 
Again the data supplied by judgments and court papers contain factual information as well as, in the 
case of legal arguments by litigating parties or legal reasoning by judges, knowledge information. In 
addition to court papers, some other relevant documents were consulted as well, such as administrative 
decisions or appeals, and reports or assessments prescribed by law (such as the social and labour plan 
that mineral rights holders have to submit to government, see infra Part III, Section 2.2.3). Those 
documents provided valuable background information for the case study.  
Observations. Finally, the researcher observed a number of meetings between or amongst relevant 
stakeholders, notably activists, lawyers, government authorities, representatives from mining 
companies, communities, mineworkers and experts. Both factual and knowledge data were extracted 
from these observations, which have mainly informed the general framework of the case study and are 
not directly referenced in the dissertation – see also the discussion of the researcher’s experiences 
(infra Section 5.3.3). The observed meetings include conferences, seminars, workshops and client-
lawyer or lawyer-counterparty meetings, and are listed in Table 14 in Annex 1.  
5.3.2. Data analysis 
The collected data were processed and analysed through MaxQDA©. The transcribed interviews, the 
court papers and the judgments were uploaded into this software system and coded, whereby the 
meaning assigned to each code was carefully jotted. Those codes were informed by the analytical 
framework drafted in the course of the fundamental part of the study that preceded the data collection. 
The coding system was adapted a few times while the data were processed and analysed, since the 
findings of the practice-oriented case study were continuously reviewed in light of the fundamental 
study and vice versa. 
The court cases that informed the case study were classified into three categories: ‘directly relevant 
cases’, ‘related cases’, and ‘legally relevant cases’ – see Tables 15 and 16 in Annex 1. Some cases, 
especially amongst the directly relevant cases, are ongoing, which means that no final decision has yet 
been adopted. Court papers were consulted for ongoing cases as well as for the litigation in the three 
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focus matters that were selected for in-depth scrutiny, as explained below. For the other court cases, 
only judgments were examined. The data on ongoing cases and on the three focus matters are up to 
date until 31 March 2017. 
The ‘directly relevant’ court cases (17 cases) satisfy three cumulative criteria: (1) the applicants, 
plaintiffs or, in a criminal case, aggrieved parties are either (members of) neighbouring communities 
or mineworkers; (2) the defendants, respondents or, in a criminal case, accused parties are, broadly 
speaking,186 government and/or mining companies; and (3) the dispute relates to the impact of mining 
on the environment and the consequent health hazards. Two clarifications should be made in this 
regard. Firstly, the parties in civil cases are called applicants versus respondents or plaintiffs versus 
defendants depending on whether it are application or action proceedings.187 In order to avoid 
confusion around the term ‘respondent’, which can thus refer either to the interviewees or to the 
defending party in application proceedings, ‘respondent’ will be used for interviewees, whilst the 
counterparty in application proceedings will be called the ‘responding party’. Secondly, a case still 
classifies as a directly relevant case, if it is appealed by the counterparty, following which the 
community members or mineworkers, who initiated the proceedings at first instance, become the 
responding parties or defendants on appeal.  
Three matters that meet the three criteria above have been selected for in-depth scrutiny: the Carolina 
matter, the Tudor Shaft matter and the silicosis class action. These cases are discussed at length at the 
beginning of the case study (infra Part III, Section 2.3), and will be cited as illustrations throughout the 
case study. Litigation is ongoing in the silicosis class action, whilst in the Carolina and Tudor Shaft 
matters urgent applications have resulted in interim court orders. Nonetheless, the problems that 
triggered the applications are not yet finally resolved and are currently addressed through out-of-court 
engagements. If those processes do not produce the desired outcome, follow-up litigation may be 
considered.  
The ‘related cases’ (5 cases) are disputes between mining companies, on the one hand, and 
mineworkers or communities, on the other – although, in case of a SLAPP suit, they are instituted by 
the former against the latter instead of vice versa – but they do not directly concern interferences with 
human rights associated with environmental degradation. Lastly, the ‘legally relevant cases’ are cases 
on legal issues that are covered in the dissertation. This third category comprises three sub-categories, 
namely cases dealing with (1) mining, environmental or company law (35 cases), (2) with the 
responsibilities of business enterprises for human rights (10 cases), or (3) with the general legal and 
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constitutional framework (32 cases). Included in the first type of cases are, for instance, matters 
concerning environmental degradation caused by mining or other industries, such as farming, tourism 
and manufacturing, in which a court interprets a legal rule that would also be relevant in a hypothetical 
dispute between a mining company and a community or mineworkers. Examples of the second and 
third types of case are, respectively, judgments in which constitutional rights are applied to a dispute 
between individuals and business enterprises and judgments in which the courts rule on the applicable 
procedural rules in public interest litigation.  
5.3.3. Research ethics 
The Ethical Commission of the law faculty of Ghent University approved the data collection 
techniques, the consent form for respondents and the general interview plan on 7 November 2014.  
Respondents participated in the research on a voluntary basis, and their informed consent was secured 
in advance. In particular, persons and organisations whose participation was solicited immediately 
received a ‘research summary note’ explaining the research objectives and questions of the research 
project as such and of the case study in particular. A brief summary thereof was again presented orally 
before each interview began, and at that time respondents were asked to express their agreement that 
the interview would be recorded and transcribed for the researcher’s reference. The individual 
respondents and organisations that supported the research project are thanked in the dissertation’s 
acknowledgments section.  
The respondents were ensured confidentiality and anonymity. Therefore, quotes from the interviews 
do not disclose the name of the specific respondent, but are accompanied, in principle, by an 
individual reference code to enable verification. Each code is composed of the letter ‘R’ 
(‘respondent’), followed by a number. There are thirty-six reference codes. When the identity of the 
respondent could be inferred from a quote’s context, which would then allow to link a particular 
respondent with his or her anonymised reference code and, accordingly, with all his or her statements, 
the reference code for such ‘contextual’ quote was replaced by ‘AS’ (‘anonymous source’).  
Some respondents have requested that certain information or quotes would only be used and published 
upon their approval. However, it was decided to allow all respondents to read the case study before the 
dissertation was submitted to the council of the law faculty of Ghent University and to the jury, so as 
to allow them to review any information that could be linked to them. The respondents also received 
the full dissertation upon its finalisation.  
All questions dealing with voluntary participation, informed consent, confidentiality, 
acknowledgement and access to the findings were also stipulated in a consent form, which was shared 
with the respondents before the interview so that they could read the form in advance. In principle, a 
hard copy of the form was signed at the time of the interview. However, this form mainly served as an 
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insurance for the respondents, and they were not obliged to sign. Except for three respondents who did 
not wish to formalise their participation, the other respondents all signed the form.  
5.3.4. An account of the researcher’s experiences  
Throughout the research project, I was based at the Human Rights Centre of Ghent University, where I 
spent most of my time, conducting desktop research. When I entered the field to collect data for the 
case study, I did so as an outsider. I am not trained in South African law, and had to make myself 
familiar with its legal system through self-study. The obvious downside was that the preparation to 
enter the field and to study South African law took more time than I had initially expected and 
definitely more than what would have been the case if I had conducted a case study on Belgium. 
Moreover, when I analysed the collected data, I regularly came across previously unknown, or even 
unheard of, legal rules, concepts and constructs, all the more because South Africa has a hybrid 
common law/civil law tradition. Hence, when this was necessary to understand the legal, social and 
political setting of the case study, I had to study those issues more in depth before I could proceed. 
This ranged from more ‘basic’ questions, such as the difference between attorneys and advocates, to 
substantial questions, such as the organisation of the judiciary.  
On a practical side, coming from outside South Africa also meant that I had to create my own network 
in order to be able to collect the necessary data. Fortunately, my university has several contacts at the 
University of Pretoria, who warmly welcomed me and offered me a basis from which I could conduct 
my research in South Africa, for which I am very grateful. Evidently, however, I had to solicit the 
participation of civil society actors and their staff myself. I was pleasantly surprised to experience that 
most organisations and persons whom I contacted, were happy to contribute to the research project. 
They either participated in an interview or assisted me in other ways, for instance by sharing court 
papers, inviting me to seminars, conferences and community workshops, allowing me to observe 
confidential meetings with clients or with (the legal representatives of) counterparties and taking me 
on field trips to mining sites and affected communities. 
Personally, I believe that the field was so receptive because this type of research, where a researcher 
conducts interviews with lawyers and activists regarding their litigation strategies, is quite uncommon, 
both in general and in South Africa. Hence, the respondents are not overburdened with such requests. 
One respondent spontaneously suggested another possible explanation, being precisely the fact that I 
come from abroad, because, allegedly, insiders are quickly labelled in a certain way. 
I am very happy that you are doing this thing away from people who think that we can be 
biased or prejudiced, because when you come from outside South Africa, like Belgium, I do 
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not think you have any prejudice or any bias. So when you come here, you are neutral, and 
you are looking at the issues the way they are. You are not taking sides.188 
Notwithstanding this enthusiasm of one respondent, the reality seems more complex. As was 
discussed earlier (supra Section 1.3), the business community, civil society and states are very divided 
on the question whether companies should bear legally binding human rights duties, as a result of 
which the different stakeholder groups tend to organise parallel, instead of joint, meetings and 
consultations on the topic. For instance, although mining companies were invited to attend a seminar 
on transparency in the mining industry, organised by the South African Human Rights Commission, 
an independent body, they did not. Members of civil society who were present at the seminar 
denounced that all too often mining companies ignore such opportunities for engagement.  
I experienced this distrust also personally. Although I was interested to understand the challenges and 
opportunities that mining companies themselves identify in the debate on business and human rights, 
and for that reason wanted to attend a workshop where mining companies would discuss their views of 
and their experiences with the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, the organisers 
cancelled my attendance last-minute. Conveying their decision, they gave reasons like the following. 
Our meeting is a business-to-business, invitation only event. (…) [I]t is important to create 
safe spaces for companies to share challenges and discuss what implementation of respect for 
human rights means in practice. (…) 
(…) companies are coming based on the fact that this is a safe space for companies.  
(…) company representatives will have an opportunity to engage with each other on issues of 
common interest (including issues related to stakeholder engagement) but in this instance 
without the presence of other stakeholders. 
Evidently, I regretted this decision since I strongly believe in objective, independent and impartial 
academic research. While the perspective from which I tackle the debate on business and human rights 
in this dissertation, which focusses specifically on the effective enforcement of accountability for 
human rights violations by business enterprises, may be rather specific and perhaps perceived as 
‘adversarial’, this perspective did not entail any a pre-determined value judgment on business 
enterprises, their conduct and their human rights policies.  
In any case, the willingness amongst lawyers, activists and experts to contribute to the research project 
was high. I was even allowed to observe confidential meetings and to consult confidential documents. 
Although I could not use such data directly in the dissertation, it gave me the opportunity to become 
more familiar with the different aspects to the dispute between mining companies, on the one hand, 
and mineworkers, communities and civil society actors, on the other. In one such meeting, for 
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instance, mineworkers told about their state of health and its impact on their daily lives. I also received 
plenty of information that, strictly speaking, reached beyond the purposes of the dissertation, but that 
allowed me to get the full picture. Sometimes these were positive experiences, other times less so. For 
instance, I observed meetings between an affected community and representatives from a mine, 
facilitated by a civil society actor. At these meetings, the community was informed about the mine’s 
social investment projects and its representatives listened to the concerns and complaints of the 
community. On the other hand, I also got hold of several pamphlets, for example, that were distributed 
by mining companies in communities affected by mining, in which they make certain promises, 
disguise or simplify reality or even indirectly threaten opponents of a mining project. Two examples 
are provided in Figures 1 and 2 below. 
  
Figure 1. Two illustrations in a brochure of a to-be-constructed mine 
The illustration top left depicts that a surface lease agreement (to be concluded between a mining company 
and the communities on whose land the company wants to mine) will determine how the lease will be 
divided amongst the communities depending on how much land from each community is used. The soup 
pot displayed the name of the mine and the municipality, whilst each soup plate represented a community. 
The illustration top right accompanies the statement in the brochure that community members who will 
lose their farming land will be assisted to acquire other land or to find another way of making a living. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Excerpts from a pamphlet of a mine seeking to expand its operations  
According to the pamphlet, if the mine goes ahead with its expansion plan, additional jobs will be 
created (42% of which would be recruited locally, as stated elsewhere on the pamphlet) and, if not, 
the mine will have to close and jobs will get lost. 
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Overall, the experience of conducting a case study in South Africa and collecting empirical data was 
very rewarding and has improved my understanding of what is really at stake and what matters for 
local actors. Definitely for a topic like business and human rights, which directly affects the daily lives 
of many people, I believe such field research is invaluable. 
48 
 
PART II.  
THE FUNDAMENTALS OF ‘BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS’ AND 
‘STRATEGIC LITIGATION’ 
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Two topics are analysed in Part II, namely the international legal framework on business and human 
rights and its operationalisation within domestic legal orders (Chapter 1), and the use of strategic 
litigation to enforce accountability for human rights violations by business enterprises (Chapter 2).  
Chapter 1 commences with a synopsis of the international legal framework, as it is restated by the 
United Nations Framework for business and human rights and its implementing Guiding Principles 
(Section 1.1). The three pillars of that Framework (the state obligation to protect, the corporate 
responsibility to respect, and access to remedies) are briefly explained. In view of the fact that states 
are burdened with the responsibility to regulate and monitor corporate conduct and to provide a 
remedy when human rights are nevertheless interfered with, the Chapter then continues with 
examining the different ways in which human rights can, in theory, affect business enterprises at the 
domestic level (Section 1.2). For that purpose, an analytical framework is proposed which reviews the 
horizontal effect, scope and application of human rights within the domestic legal order and the 
recognition and enforcement of protective duties of the state. The Chapter ends with a general 
discussion of the frictions between international trade and investment law, on the one hand, and 
human rights law, on the other, and explains how the former may prevent states from complying with 
their obligation to protect human rights (Section 1.3).  
Thereafter, Chapter 2 delves into the issue of using strategic litigation so that victims of human rights 
violations by business enterprises can vindicate their rights. In order to sketch the context of the use of 
strategic litigation, the Chapter first briefly mentions two analytical frameworks that were developed 
by scholars to examine the ability of litigation to effect social change, and explains that litigation is 
generally used in tandem with alternative tools (Section 2.1). Following this introduction, strategic 
litigation in business-related human rights matters is scrutinised more in depth (Section 2.2). That 
analysis begins with a discussion of the factors that may affect access to justice. Thereafter, the (so-
called ‘umbrella’) decisions are discussed that litigating parties must adopt when they design their 
litigation strategy (namely which remedies, which arguments and which counterparty). This is 
followed by an examination of what constitutes ‘success’, and the Chapter ends with a general 
overview of the contextual factors that must be borne in mind as well. 
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1. HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUSINESS 
Part I has already indicated that although in a world of globalisation non-state actors are not rarely as, 
if not more, powerful than states, international human rights law continues to look at society through 
Westphalian spectacles.189 This means that (the formerly omnipotent) states remain the primary duty 
bearers under international human rights law, as restated by the UNGPs. This Chapter thus begins with 
outlining the three pillars of the UN Framework and some of the implementing guiding principles 
(Section 1.1). Through this discussion, it is also explained that, notwithstanding the focus of 
international law on the state, the construct of ‘the obligation to protect’ at least reckons that at the 
domestic level states should ensure that business enterprises are responsible for human rights. Hence, 
after setting forth the international legal framework, the Chapter proceeds with explaining how the 
legal effect of human rights on business enterprises in the domestic legal order should be scrutinised 
(Section 1.2). Finally, the Chapter returns to international law to explain that in many cases 
international investment law negatively affects the domestic policy space of states within which they 
are (believed to be) allowed to adopt national laws, regulations and policies in pursuit of their 
obligation to protect human rights (Section 1.3).190  
1.1. Business and human rights according to the UNGPs  
According to the UNGPs, only states have legally binding human rights duties under international law. 
The UNGPs’ sole and limited concessions are, first, that states have to protect rights holders against 
possible human rights violations by business enterprises (Section 1.1.1) and, second, that the social 
expectation is that those enterprises themselves respect human rights (Section 1.1.2). In addition, the 
UNGPs stress the vitality of access to remedies, so as to enable victims to vindicate their rights 
(Section 1.1.3).  
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1.1.1. First pillar: obligation to protect 
1.1.1.1. The ‘obligation to protect’ 
Notwithstanding the emergence of numerous powerful non-state actors,191 the premise of international 
law remains one where states are the primary duty bearers. This is partly explained by the principle of 
territorial sovereignty under general international law, which, in theory, grants states exclusive 
jurisdiction over their territory and their nationals. Hence, in principle, third states are prohibited from 
interfering with a state’s internal affairs and international law does not determine how private actors 
should behave on the territory of a particular state. International human rights law as such already 
limits this principle of territorial sovereignty, by creating rights for private actors.192 The interference 
with state sovereignty is greater, however, when international law also starts regulating the duties of 
private actors.  
According to Knox, legally binding international regulation of private conduct can be situated on a 
continuum, depending on whether international law ‘contemplates’, ‘specifies’, ‘places’ or ‘enforces’ 
private human rights duties.193 Also the degree of interference with state sovereignty varies along that 
continuum. First, international law merely ‘contemplates’ private human rights duties, when states are 
required to take the measures necessary to ensure that private actors comply with international law. In 
that scenario the impact on state sovereignty is minimal. If international law concretises (or 
‘specifies’) the precise duties that states should impose on private actors, this limits the discretion of 
states to adopt those measures they prefer. Evidently, the sovereignty of states is even more 
constrained when international law directly prescribes the conduct of private actors, or ‘places’ human 
rights duties on private actors.194 The enforcement of such duties still occurs at the domestic level, 
unless international law also creates an international mechanism to ‘enforce’ private human rights 
duties. The latter scenario entails the greatest interference with state sovereignty. The placement of 
duties on private actors, let alone their international enforcement, is extremely rare, however.195  
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States must protect against human rights abuse within their territory and/or jurisdiction by 
third parties, including business enterprises. This requires taking appropriate steps to prevent, 
investigate, punish and redress such abuse through effective policies, legislation, regulations 
and adjudication.196 
As the above-cited principle indicates,197 the UNGPs endorse ‘the obligation to protect’ doctrine and 
thus acknowledge that international law at least contemplates human rights duties for business 
enterprises, which should then be imposed by domestic law and enforced through domestic remedies. 
The degree of specification of those duties depends on the right concerned and the instrument 
incorporating that right.198 According to the UNGPs, international human rights law does not place any 
duties directly on non-state actors, like business enterprises.  
Broadly speaking,199 the obligation to protect comprises the following two cumulative duties: (1) a 
(preventive) duty to adopt and enforce reasonable legislative, administrative, judicial and other 
measures that regulate business conduct and (2) a (remedial) duty to ensure redress whenever, despite 
the preventive measures, business enterprises do not comply with their duties.200 States are in principle 
free to decide which measures they adopt, provided that they are reasonable.201 Accordingly, the 
obligation to protect is one of due diligence; the failure to prevent and/or redress a violation does not 
automatically trigger the state’s international legal responsibility, unless its conduct is considered 
unreasonable.202 Hence, international law does not assume that business enterprises have no human 
rights duties at all, but those duties are only legally binding, if they have a basis in national law, and 
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State
Company Victims
can only be enforced through domestic remedies.203 This also means that when a company violates 
human rights, victims have to be content, at the international level, with calling the state to account for 
its failure to adequately regulate corporate conduct and/or to provide an appropriate remedy. This 
creates a triangular relationship between victims, the state and business enterprises, as depicted in 
Figure 3 below.204  
 
 
Following Principle 2, which stipulates that states “should set out clearly the expectation that all 
business enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction respect human rights throughout 
their operations”, Principles 3 to 10 of the UNGPs and their explanatory commentaries clarify the 
practical implications of the obligation to protect for states’ dealings with business enterprises 
(‘operational principles’). They should, for instance, take additional steps to protect human rights 
against possible violations by state-owned companies, promote human rights in public contracts, be 
mindful of their human rights obligations when they enter into investment agreements (see also infra 
Section 1.3), and ensure that state actors that shape business practices are aware of and observe the 
state’s human rights obligations.205 These principles suggest that more is expected from states than 
merely regulating corporate conduct, which the discussion of national action plans next will confirm.  
1.1.1.2. Implementation through national action plans 
In an attempt to urge states to implement their obligation to protect by proposing concrete action 
measures, the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other 
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Figure 3. Triangular relationship victims/state/company under international law 
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business enterprises206 has called on all states to draft a national action plan.207 A major added value of 
these plans – and the best practices for redacting and updating them that have emerged since that first 
call208 – is that they have clarified the ambit of the obligation of states to protect human rights against 
possible interferences by business enterprises.  
After all, many states interpret(ed) their obligation to protect rather narrowly and concentrate(d) on the 
extent to which the responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights is ‘hardened’ through 
domestic laws, regulations and policies, for instance through a stringent labour law regime.209 They 
project their obligation to protect entirely on what is expected from the other party, being business 
enterprises, and thereby ‘externalise’ their own responsibility.210 Nonetheless, the obligation to protect 
as it is contemplated by the UNGPs reaches beyond such narrow interpretation. Plenty of decisions 
that states take (or refuse to take) have the potential to affect the power and leverage of business 
enterprises in society and/or the protection and enforceability of human rights. As was said before, this 
is the case for decisions relating to state-owned companies, to the state’s own commercial transactions 
and to business-related policies such as trade and investment. The case study will demonstrate that 
also many rules of procedural law affect victims’ ability to vindicate their rights vis-à-vis business 
enterprises, one example being standing rights. If a state does not admit class actions, for instance, this 
may impede litigation against business enterprises, because individual claims may be too small to be 
litigated or individual victims may lack the resources to pursue such litigation.211 States should thus be 
careful not to unduly hamper access to courts and, at best, try to correct the evident power imbalance 
between victims and business enterprises and/or government actors.212 
Furthermore, not only the substance of laws, regulations and policies may affect the relationship 
between business and human rights, but also the procedure through which these measures are 
developed and implemented. An important element in that connection are the capacity and resources 
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that state actors have at their disposal to comply with the state’s human rights obligations.213 The 
former UN Special Representative, John Ruggie, for instance, has deplored the fact that 
notwithstanding their potentially huge impact on human rights (infra Section 1.3), trade and 
investment agreements are generally negotiated by officials from the trade department who have little 
to no experience with human rights.214  
In sum, besides ‘hardening’ the responsibility of business enterprises for human rights through 
domestic law, every state should review the coherence of its entire polity and political economy and of 
all law and policy in order to assess whether these different elements of its architecture reckon with its 
obligation to protect human rights.215  
1.1.2. Second pillar: responsibility to respect 
The foundational principle of the second pillar of the UN Framework reads that “[b]usiness enterprises 
should respect human rights”, which “means that they should avoid infringing on the human rights of 
others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved.”216 According 
to the UNGPs, this responsibility is not grounded in law but in social expectations.217 Hence, from the 
perspective of international law, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights is not legally 
binding nor (quasi-)judicially enforceable. On the other hand, perhaps precisely because it is not a 
legal obligation, it does extend beyond mere compliance with domestic law, which is particularly 
relevant for business enterprises that are active in countries where certain rights are not protected by 
law or where such law falls short of international human rights standards.218 Neither is the 
responsibility to respect limited to the activities proper of a particular company, but applies to all 
possible adverse impacts linked to its operations, products or services throughout its commercial 
relationships, including the supply chain.219  
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To provide guidance to business enterprises as to how they can identify, prevent, mitigate and account 
for their human rights impacts, the UNGPs incorporate a roadmap to conduct ‘human rights due 
diligence’.220 In particular, companies should (1) assess actual and potential human rights impacts, (2) 
integrate, and act upon, those findings, (3) track responses and (4) communicate how they address 
impacts.221 This concept of ‘due diligence’ was actually borrowed from corporate governance, which 
should facilitate the business community’s understanding of their responsibility to respect.222 
Ordinarily, carrying out ‘due diligence’ means that business enterprises review their policies and 
operations on a continual basis and/or at the occasion of specific transactions in order to identify and 
manage financial risks.223 Thus, the UNGPs expect companies to undertake a similar exercise for their 
actual and potential adverse human rights impacts.  
Nonetheless, ordinary due diligence is fundamentally different from human rights due diligence. The 
former is concerned with financial risks that are internal to the company itself and that affect its 
viability and its shareholders’ interests, whereas adverse human rights impacts are external to the 
company in the sense that they primarily affect the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders – 
notwithstanding that adverse human rights impacts may eventually also have financial repercussions 
for the company.224 Moreover, carrying out human rights due diligence requires meaningful 
engagement with those rights holders,225 which is alien to ordinary due diligence. As a result, human 
rights due diligence does not match business thinking as much as it may have been expected to do.226 
This dissertation submits that the association of ordinary due diligence with the financial position of 
companies may even partly explain why many business enterprises believe that funding social projects 
suffices to comply with their ‘social responsibility to respect human rights’ – so that they do not assess 
nor address the adverse impacts of their core business activities.227 
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Also the legal implications of human rights due diligence are not settled. Due diligence is used as a 
standard of conduct both in international human rights law to assess whether states have discharged 
certain legal duties, like their obligation to protect human rights, and in national law to establish 
whether a private actor has acted negligently, for instance, whilst in corporate governance due 
diligence is understood as a process to manage risks.228 Consequently, the question is whether carrying 
out human rights due diligence can be used as a legal defence against liability.229 In its Guidance on 
improving corporate accountability and access to judicial remedy, the Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights has left this question open, so that states have the discretion to 
decide whether proof of having conducted human rights due diligence constitutes a partial or complete 
defence or has an impact on sentencing.230 
1.1.3. Third pillar: access to remedies 
Lastly, the third pillar, namely access to remedies, is an essential component of the UN Framework. Its 
effectiveness would be seriously jeopardised, if victims cannot access a remedy to enforce their 
rights.231 The UNGPs discern three types of remedies, namely judicial remedies, state-based but non-
judicial remedies and non-state-based remedies.232  
First of all, the duty of states to establish a comprehensive state-based system of remedies is inherent 
to their obligation to protect.233 Importantly, victims should not only have access to judicial remedies, 
but also to non-judicial remedies, since “[e]ven where judicial systems are effective and well-
resourced, they cannot carry the burden of addressing all alleged abuses” and “judicial remedy is not 
always required [and not] always the favoured approach for all claimants”.234 As also the UNGPs 
acknowledge, an important role in this regard is reserved for national human rights institutions.235 
In addition, the UNGPs encourage states to create and facilitate access to non-state-based remedies, 
petition business enterprises to provide for, or participate in, operational-level grievance mechanisms 
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and call for all (non-legally binding) collaborative initiatives to be accompanied by a remedy.236 One 
type of non-state-based remedies are operational-level grievance mechanisms, which are “ongoing 
procedures through which low-level complaints about a diverse array of issues can be addressed 
through dialogue and flexible alternative dispute resolution processes”, which should ensure that 
adverse human rights impacts by business enterprises are identified and resolved at an early stage.237 
Accordingly, they are assumed to be quicker and less expensive than state-based remedies, as well as a 
good occasion for companies to generate data and to improve their practices based thereupon.238 These 
mechanisms may be administered by individual business enterprises, by business enterprises acting 
jointly or by an external expert body.239 Aside from operational-level grievance mechanisms, non-
state-based remedies comprise remedies established by industry organisations or intergovernmental 
organisations,240 remedies created under multi-stakeholder initiatives, as well as remedies before 
regional or international human rights bodies.241  
1.2. Business and human rights according to national law 
The preceding discussion has demonstrated that the international legal framework on business and 
human rights, through the obligation to protect, places a tremendous responsibility on states. The 
extent to which a human rights violation actually engages the responsibility of a business enterprise 
depends on a state’s excellence in implementing its obligation to protect. To assess the degree to 
which companies are constrained by human rights in a particular state, its domestic legal system must 
thus be unravelled. A one-size-fits-all approach to business and human rights does not exist, however; 
every domestic legal system has its own way to construct the legal impact of human rights on private 
actors, like business enterprises,242 and neither have scholars agreed on a single approach to categorise 
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and explain the effects of human rights in the private sphere.243 This dissertation proposes to carefully 
scrutinise the following two legal constructs in order to assess the relationship between business and 
human rights in a given domestic legal order: the horizontality of human rights (Section 1.2.1.) and the 
protective duties of (organs of) the state (Section 1.2.2).244  
1.2.1. The horizontality of human rights 
In fact, ‘horizontality’ is a rather opaque concept, as it seems to assume a contractual relationship 
between parties with mutual rights and duties, whereas there is no such reciprocity when business 
enterprises are assumed to bear human rights duties; rights holders do not owe any duties to companies 
in return for holding those rights against them.245 On top of the conceptual discomfort, fathoming the 
precise meaning of horizontality is also difficult.246 Many different approaches in legal scholarship 
exist.247 In this dissertation, three dimensions to horizontality are discerned, which concurrently 
determine the horizontal impact of human rights on business enterprises, being horizontal effect 
(Section 1.2.1.1), horizontal scope (Section 1.2.1.2) and horizontal application (Section 1.2.1.3).  
In simple terms, the three dimensions respectively entail an inquiry into whether a human rights norm 
binds companies, which duties companies bear under such norm and towards whom, and how the 
norm and its consequent duties actually affect companies. Remarkably, many scholars do not 
(explicitly) consider the horizontal effect and scope of human rights, but immediately jump to the 
question of horizontal application.248 Such analysis arguably stands at odds with the established 
principle that a rule’s applicability does not depend on its enforceability, which also relates to the 
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difference between primary and secondary (remedial) rights.249 Following a discussion of the three 
dimensions to horizontality, the approach under the Alien Tort Statute, which deserves special 
mention, is briefly explained (Section 1.2.1.4). 
1.2.1.1. Horizontal effect250 
A specific human right has horizontal effect when it binds business enterprises. This is an all-or-
nothing, black-or-white question that is unrelated to how this effect manifests itself – id est which 
duties flow from that right and how those duties are enforced. Whether a right has horizontal effect has 
to be reviewed in abstracto and in concreto. First of all, if in a given domestic legal order there exists 
a fundamental opposition to the idea that human rights are capable of binding anyone other than the 
state, no human right within that system has horizontal effect.251 However, even when there is no such 
principled objection, a concrete right must still be suitable to bind business enterprises.252 Examples of 
rights that can only ever have implications in vertical relations between the state and its citizens are the 
right not to be subjected to the death penalty, the right to equality before the courts and the right to 
participate in elections.  
When a right has no horizontal effect, this implies that it can only be applied in a purely vertical way 
(infra Section 1.2.1.3). As will be explained, however, this does not mean that such right does not 
constrain business enterprises at all given the protective duties of the state. Only rights that have 
horizontal effect can thus be horizontally applied, whether directly or indirectly. 
1.2.1.2. Horizontal scope 
The second dimension of horizontality, the horizontal scope of human rights, deals with the types of 
duties that a right with horizontal effect creates for business enterprises (i) and the identification of the 
rights holders towards whom they owe those duties (ii).  
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(i) Types of duties 
There is little disagreement that the human rights duties of business enterprises can hardly be the same 
as those of the state, given that the raison d’être of business enterprises is fundamentally different.253 
Discussions about the duties of companies are generally conducted on a more abstract level, referring 
to the different types of duties that human rights can create. Different typologies exist in that regard,254 
but this dissertation prefers to work with the categorisation based on whether compliance with a 
specific duty is a matter of respecting, protecting or fulfilling the concerned right.255 The obligation to 
respect means that the duty bearer should refrain from interfering with the right, the obligation to 
protect that third parties should be prevented from interfering therewith, and the obligation to fulfil 
that duty bearers should facilitate (assist rights holders), promote (ensure awareness) and provide 
human rights (to rights holders who are unable, for reasons beyond their control, to realise their rights 
by the means at their disposal). 
Whilst it is generally accepted that business enterprises should not interfere with human rights, there is 
some discomfort with the idea that, under appropriate circumstances, they should also protect256 and 
fulfil257 human rights – note that also the UNGPs only speak about business enterprises’ responsibility 
to respect human rights.258 The reasons for this controversy about companies’ obligation to protect and 
especially their obligation to fulfil human rights lie in the perceived mismatch with the commercial, 
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profit-maximizing objectives of business enterprises as well as in concerns about legitimacy,259 which 
will be illustrated and discussed further in the context of the case study.260 There is also a fear that 
business enterprises would try to off-set a failure to respect a certain human right with measures taken 
to protect, facilitate, promote or provide other rights.261 In any case, a lot would depend, first, on the 
concrete duties that would emerge from the recognition that business enterprises must protect and 
fulfil human rights and, second, on the rights holders towards whom they would such those duties.262 
That parent companies should watch their subsidiaries’ conduct, for instance, may be less 
controversial, which is a duty that seems to fall under an obligation to protect human rights.263  
Another common typology264 to categorise human rights duties distinguishes between negative and 
positive duties. This terminology is avoided, however, because it may raise misunderstandings and 
confusion when it is equated with (passive) ‘duties to forebear from acting’ and (active) ‘duties to act’ 
– although not all scholars make that association and adopt a broader interpretation of negative and 
positive duties.265 First of all, rights are sometimes described as negative or positive rights, which may 
create the (wrong) impression that each right imposes either negative or positive duties.266 
Nonetheless, it should go without saying that any right is capable of creating both duties to act and 
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duties to forebear from acting.267 A similar confusion may arise, when the obligation to respect is 
described as a negative obligation and the obligations to protect and promote as positive obligations.268 
However, as also other scholars acknowledge,269 each of the three obligations to respect, protect and 
promote can create duties to act as well as duties to forebear from acting. It is evident, for instance, 
that under given circumstances the obligation to respect human rights may require certain action on the 
part of the duty bearer so as to prevent that human rights are harmed.270 Take, for instance, the right to 
water. To respect that right, companies have to take measures to avoid that their operations pollute the 
water sources of neighbouring communities. Another example is the obligation to respect the right to 
life of employees, which creates a duty for business enterprises to provide their employees with 
adequate protective equipment to avoid exposure to harmful products. In anticipation thereto Dubbink 
and Van Liedekerke, for instance, make a distinction between ‘genuinely positive duties’, which do 
not relate to any prior existing negative duty, and ‘derivative positive duties’, which are incidental to a 
negative duty.271 Arguably, however, using such terminology further complicates the legal picture. 
A second reason why the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ typology is avoided is that the differentiation 
between positive and negative duties and/or rights is regularly accompanied by the argument that 
economic, social, cultural and solidarity rights are not judicially enforceable, because contrary to civil 
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and political rights they essentially demand positive action from their duty bearers.272 However, as said 
before, this dissertation agrees that every right (regardless of its generation) and every obligation 
(whether to respect, protect or fulfil) can create duties to forebear from acting and duties to act, even 
when this requires the spending of resources.  
Whatever typology is used, the concrete duties that human rights impose on business enterprises 
remains a highly controversial issue. Therefore, it can already be observed that one way in which the 
international legal framework could be advanced is through greater specification of the concrete duties 
that companies bear under human rights that have horizontal effect.273 
(ii) Identifying rights holders 
The second question that arises when the horizontal scope of human rights is assessed, relates to the 
identification of the rights holders towards whom business enterprises owe their duties. Contrary to 
states, whose obligations are linked to their jurisdiction, the criteria that should trigger the 
responsibility of business enterprises remain highly controversial, as was also demonstrated by the 
uproar that the UN Norms caused for linking the human rights duties of companies to their ‘sphere of 
activity and influence’.274  
What should indeed be relevant is the “political, contractual, economic or geographic proximity”275 of 
a business enterprise to potential rights holders, which necessitates a case-by-case assessment.276 The 
precise degree of proximity that is required for a duty towards certain rights holders to come into 
existence is again an issue that would benefit from further clarification, for instance at the international 
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level.277 Evidently, while the (predominantly territorial) exercise of jurisdiction that serves as the basis 
to identify the human rights duties of states, is quite uniform across those duty bearers, business 
enterprises are infinitely diverse. A one-size-fits-all definition thus seems illusionary.  
1.2.1.3. Horizontal application 
When a business enterprise fails to comply with its duties owed to a rights holder under a human right 
that has horizontal effect, the remaining question is how this right is or can be applied to that duty 
bearer, so that aggrieved rights holders can vindicate their rights and that future violations can be 
prevented. Broadly, three approaches towards horizontal application exist, namely purely vertical 
application, indirect horizontal application and direct horizontal application – note that several forms 
of application may exist in parallel in one legal system, so that a different form of application may be 
used depending on the case.  
Purely vertical (or ‘non-horizontal’) application means that the right at stake is not applicable in-
between the individual and the business enterprise, but only in-between the individual and the state. 
This does not preclude that the concerned right affects companies, but this can only occur through the 
state’s protective duties, namely the obligation of (organs of) the state to protect human rights against 
possible interferences by companies whenever they perform their functions (infra Section 1.2.3). 
Next, indirect horizontal application implies that private law is interpreted and applied in conformity 
with human rights. The horizontal application is ‘indirect’, because human rights are applied through 
the realm of private law. Different models of indirect horizontal application exist. In particular, in 
interpreting and applying private law, reference can be made to either the actual rights that are at stake 
(direct-indirect horizontal application) or to the fundamental values that underlie those rights (indirect-
indirect horizontal application), and the judiciary may or may not have the competence to forge a new 
(private law) remedy if existing remedies are believed to be inadequate, for instance by developing the 
common law (strong versus weak indirect horizontal application).278  
Finally, direct horizontal application entails that the human right itself establishes a cause of action on 
the basis of which victims can proceed, and that remedies flow directly from human rights law.279 
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Accordingly, victims do not first have to identify a cause of action under existing private law before 
they can approach a court, and remedies can be created outside of private law.  
1.2.1.4. The US Alien Tort Statute  
A detailed discussion of the US Alien Tort Statute280 exceeds the purposes of this dissertation, but for 
the sake of completeness the peculiar approach to horizontality under this Statute should be 
mentioned.281 In brief, the Alien Tort Statute explicitly provides for horizontal (or ‘third party’282) 
effect of a number of international legal norms, which are indirectly applied through domestic tort law, 
because the Statute establishes a cause of action to sue a private actor in the federal courts for damages 
that are due to violations of ‘the law of nations’. Although the Statute was traditionally believed to 
deal with only three types of international law breaches (piracy, violations of safe conducts and 
infringements of ambassadors’ rights) in its landmark judgment in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain the US 
Supreme Court only held that no claims should be recognised for “violations of any international law 
norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the 18th-century 
paradigms familiar when [the Statute] was enacted.”283  
In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum284 the US Supreme Court was asked whether the Alien Tort 
Statute also applies to international law breaches by business enterprises. The Court did not address 
that question, but dismissed the claim for another reason, being the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.285 This presumption means that whenever a statute does not give a clear indication 
of its extraterritorial application, it has none, as US law should not be presumed to “rule the world”.286 
Accordingly, federal courts do not have jurisdiction over ‘foreign-cubed cases’ that involve a dispute 
in which non-US victims seek compensation for a tort committed outside the US by a non-US 
perpetrator.287 However, even before this judgment, the relevance of the Alien Tort Statute in business-
related human rights matters was limited. For one, the circuit courts were (and continue to be) divided 
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on the question whether corporate liability exists under the Statute.288 Another restriction is that the 
Statute only applies to rights that are sufficiently determinate to constitute rules of international 
customary law for the purposes of subject-matter jurisdiction, which was not found to be the case for 
the prohibition of intra-state pollution, for instance.289  
In sum, the Alien Tort Statute should be mentioned as a unique instrument providing for horizontality, 
as it creates a cause of action, based on tort law, before the US courts in case of violations of well-
established, universally recognised norms of international law. However, the case law has developed 
in such a way that the possibilities to litigate under the Statute are restricted for victims of human 
rights violations by business enterprises and that transnational litigation under the Statute has been 
dealt a hard blow by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum – 
although it cannot be excluded that specific cases may meet its ‘touch and concern’ criterion.290  
1.2.2. Protective duties 
Human rights also have an impact on business enterprises through the protective duties of the state.291 
Similar to the obligation to protect under international human rights law, domestic legal systems 
generally require that the state not only respects, but also protects, human rights.292 The doctrine on 
protective duties has mainly been developed in German scholarship, where it emerged as an antipode 
to the ‘Mittelbare Drittwirkung’ paradigm (indirect horizontal application), because this paradigm 
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could not explain all instances in which human rights affect private actors, which created a lot of 
uncertainty.293 
In accordance with its protective duties the legislature must thus consider its duty to protect and 
promote human rights whenever laws, regulations or policies touching upon these rights are proposed, 
adopted or amended. A similar obligation exists on the part of the executive in the exercise of its law-
making and -enforcing competence and of the judiciary, when judges have to adjudicate ‘horizontal’ 
disputes amongst private actors or ‘vertical’ disputes with a radiating effect on private third parties.294 
Obviously, when the state discharges its protective duties, companies are affected by the human rights 
that are at stake. The intensity and explicitness of that impact depend on a right’s horizontal effect, 
scope and application. The protective duties of the legislature and the executive are particularly 
important whenever a human right has no horizontal effect, so that only the implementing laws, 
regulations and policies that they adopt are relevant for private relationships. The executive should 
also be particularly mindful of its protective duties, when it monitors the implementation of a 
judgment that touches upon human rights in private relationships. The judiciary, in turn, must always 
consider its protective duties given its pivotal role in the horizontal application of human rights, 
whatever form it takes, as its decisions and judgments are always capable of affecting the human 
rights duties of business enterprises. Indeed, judges have to apply the laws, regulations and policies 
adopted by government (vertical application model); they must interpret private law in accordance 
with human rights and, if necessary and mandated thereto, develop private common law in accordance 
therewith (indirect horizontal application model); and, when human rights serve as an independent 
cause of action, they must apply these rights directly and balance them with any rights of the 
defending party (direct horizontal application model).  
1.2.3. Final outlook 
In fact, ‘horizontality’ and ‘protective duties’ are inherently intertwined and they are separated only to 
rationalise the possible impact of human rights on business enterprises in domestic legal orders. A 
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given situation where human rights affect companies may be explained as triggering horizontality or 
protective duties.295 The standard of care that is used (quasi-)universally in domestic tort law is a good 
illustration – a standard which should inter alia protect people’s right to personal integrity. This 
standard can be incorporated in statutory law (in accordance with the executive and/or the legislature’s 
protective duties, depending on who took the initiative) or it can be part of common law, in which case 
mainly the protective duties of the judiciary are at stake. When that standard is then applied in a 
particular case, also the horizontality of the right to personal integrity may be triggered, for instance 
when that right is used to interpret, apply and possibly even develop the standard.  
Nevertheless, for analytical purposes a separate scrutiny of horizontality and protective duties remains 
useful. It ensures a comprehensive understanding of the interplay between business and human rights 
in domestic legal systems,296 given that the answer to the question whether and to what extent human 
rights constrain business enterprises under national law is never straightforward. In view of the 
obligation to protect under international law, human rights should, in principle, have some legal 
impact on business enterprises in every domestic legal order.297 However, states are free to decide how 
this impact manifests itself, and may even provide for different approaches depending on the situation 
at hand. The only certainty then is that, contrary to the international legal framework (see supra Figure 
3), the domestic legal framework for business and human rights does not necessarily have a triangular 
design, as Figure 4 below depicts.  
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1.3. Business and human rights according to international investment law 
Before proceeding with the second topic of Part II of the dissertation, namely strategic litigation, this 
Section briefly interposes to explain how international investment law, by according rights to business 
enterprises, may weaken human rights protection. For a long time international investment law has 
been regarded as a “self-contained regime that is insulated from other branches of international law” – 
and it may even still be regarded as such.298 Under this view, international human rights law and 
international investment law constitute two separate branches of the law that exist independently from 
each other, “hermetically sealed boxes” as it were.299 Nonetheless, investment and human rights are 
closely intertwined. On the one hand, investment represents a great opportunity for realizing human 
rights, especially economic and social rights, while, on the other hand, it also poses a risk of adverse 
human rights impacts.300 The problem is that this is not reflected in investment law, which is 
predominantly concerned with protecting investors’ interests, by creating various (internationally 
enforceable) rights without imposing any accompanying duties.301  
Two main sources of international investment law are investment treaties302 (concluded between two 
or more states) and investment contracts (concluded between host states and private investors). These 
agreements are first and foremost meant to protect foreign investors against political risks resulting 
inter alia from changes in government or in bilateral and multilateral relationships303 – although, in 
theory, they should benefit the state as well, by improving its investment climate and by making 
foreign investment more attractive.304 The need for investment protection first came to the fore when 
decolonisation resulted in numerous (foreign) companies being nationalised, but later protection was 
extended beyond straightforward nationalisations so as to cover also arbitrary and discriminatory 
forms of treatment and expropriations.305 The latter term is, moreover, interpreted broadly to include 
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direct as well as indirect forms of expropriation, including changes in the investment climate that 
seriously undermine the investment or its profitability.306 In particular, to protect investors against 
such changes, investment agreements generally contain a clause on expropriation, which provides for 
‘prompt, adequate and effective compensation’ if a state nationalises or expropriates investments or 
subjects them to measures having an equivalent effect, or a so-called stabilisation clause, which 
‘stabilises’ the investment climate either by exempting investors from amendments to the law or by 
compensating them.307  
Investment protection may raise an issue under international human rights law in two regards. Firstly, 
expropriation and stabilisation clauses and the risk that they are enforced through international 
arbitration (resulting in considerable compensation awards) may have a chilling effect on states that 
want to comply with their obligation to protect human rights, which they primarily do by adopting the 
necessary laws, regulations and policies.308 There is indeed a risk that the exercise of regulatory power 
for the protection and promotion of human rights is interpreted as in breach of investment law, if the 
conditions of the expropriation or stabilisation clause, as the case may be, are not complied with, 
which makes that the domestic regulatory space for states shrinks. That is why Principle 9 of the 
UNGPs now stipulates that states should maintain adequate domestic policy space, when they 
negotiate such agreements. In that regard, the Office of the High Commissioner has, for instance, 
proposed ten principles that should guide investment contract negotiations between states and 
investors. One of those principles stipulates that if stabilisation clauses are used, they should be 
drafted in such a way that they “do not interfere with the state’s bona fide efforts to implement laws, 
regulations or policies in a non-discriminatory manner in order to meet its human rights 
obligations.”309 Secondly, investment agreements do not only disregard the responsibility of investors 
to respect human rights, but seemingly encourage them to challenge states that pursue their human 
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rights obligations.310 Nonetheless, according to the commentary to Principle 11 of the UNGPs, 
“business enterprises should not undermine States’ abilities to meet their own human rights 
obligations”. 
Depending on whether the adoption by states of certain measures for the protection and promotion of 
human rights is assessed from the perspective of investment law or human rights law, the outcome of 
that assessment may thus be contradictory, namely prohibited under investment law but obligatory 
under human rights law.311 This is highly problematic as international law provides little guidance as 
to how courts and arbitration tribunals should deal with such clashes between different branches of the 
law.312 In practice, this seems to have created a reality in which courts and arbitration tribunals favour 
“the private corporate actors over sovereign debtors/host countries of foreign investment”.313 This is 
all the more problematic given that nearly two-thirds of all disputes submitted for arbitration to the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes314 have apparently been lodged against 
developing countries, which are the ones that struggle the most with business-related human rights 
abuses.315 Scholars – as well as certain states – have, therefore, called for a new type of investment law 
that allows to balance the different interests that are at stake.316  
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2. STRATEGIC HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION  
2.1. General analytical framework 
The key role of judicial remedies in the business and human rights field must be considered in light of 
a phenomenon that has been called ‘judicialisation’ and that captures the evolution towards a political 
system and a society in which law and litigation feature prominently.317 The judicialisation of politics, 
first of all, comprises two inter-related phenomena.318 On the one hand, the judiciary increasingly 
participates in law-making, in particular through judicial review, which entails that judges scrutinise 
the constitutionality of acts and conduct by the legislature and the executive (see infra Section 
2.2.2.1). On the other hand, the legislature and the executive, as well as other organs of the state, pay 
more attention to legal rules and principles, in particular constitutional rights, when they exercise their 
functions, so as to pre-empt possible judicial intervention. Although, in principle, judicialised politics 
should not be equated with a strained relationship between the judiciary, on the one hand, and the 
legislature and the executive, on the other, it cannot be denied that it is a controversial phenomenon in 
view of the separation of powers doctrine, for reasons that will be discussed later (infra Section 
2.2.6.4). 
Not only politics has become more judicialised, but society as such.319 The use of legal arguments in 
disputes between private actors and the state as well as amongst private actors is increasingly 
common, and litigation is often considered a viable option to resolve a dispute. Against this 
background, it seems logical that also advocates for social change have appropriated rights-based 
tactics and strategies to pursue their objectives, as a result of which legal mobilisation is more 
prevalent than ever, which has not gone unnoticed.320 Several scholars, including Gauri and Brinks321 
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and Gloppen,322 have examined the use of litigation to realise human rights and have developed 
analytical frameworks for that purpose.323 This Section briefly explains the frameworks drafted by 
Gauri and Brinks and by Gloppen (Section 2.1.1), following which it is argued that the finding that 
litigation may contribute to – and perhaps even play a crucial role in – transforming society does not 
mean that it should substitute alternative tactics (Section 2.1.2).  
2.1.1. Analytical frameworks for strategic human rights litigation  
2.1.1.1. Gauri and Brinks’ theory on legalizing economic and social rights 
Gauri and Brinks have theorised on ‘the legalisation of economic and social rights’, which they 
describe as the process whereby litigation acts as a catalyst for government to adopt laws, regulations 
and policies for the effective and adequate provision of economic and social goods. As a result, 
“courts and lawyers (…) become relevant actors, and the language and categories of law and rights 
become relevant concepts, in the design and implementation of public policy.”324 There are four stages 
to this process: (1) legal mobilisation, (2) judicial decision-making, (3) bureaucratic, political or 
private-party response and (4) follow-up litigation.325 This process occurs at three levels, notably in-
between the state and individual consumers (‘provision’), in-between the state and private suppliers 
(‘regulation’) and in-between private suppliers and individual consumers (‘obligation’).326 According 
to Gauri and Brinks, whether actors resort to courts in order to realise certain rights and whether an 
attempt at legalisation results in economic and social interests being entrenched in the law depends on 
a variety of factors that influence the four stages of the process, which they categorise as demand-, 
supply-, and response-side variables, depending on whether they relate to the litigating parties 
(demand), the courts (supply) or the targets (response).327  
Contrary to this dissertation, which concentrates on the state obligation to protect and on corporate 
human rights duties, they are mainly interested in the state obligation to fulfil human rights and the 
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accruing involvement of private actors in the ‘provision’ of economic and social goods. Nevertheless, 
the analytical framework of Gauri and Brinks is relevant to this dissertation as they depart from at 
least two equal assumptions. First, litigation is capable of playing a role in the design and 
implementation of law and policy aimed at protecting human rights against business enterprises and, 
second, the responsibility of business enterprises for human rights can be enforced not only through 
the vertical relations between the state and individuals, but also through the vertical relations between 
the state and business enterprises and the horizontal relations between business enterprises and 
individuals. Also interesting is their emphasis on the dialogic nature of judicial decision-making, 
which recognises that courts are “just one actor in the deeply strategic and iterative process of 
legalization.”328  
2.1.1.2. Gloppen’s analysis of litigation and social transformation 
Another interesting analytical framework was developed by Gloppen.329 Similar to Gauri and 
Brinks,330 she discerns four stages in social rights litigation, notably claims formation (litigants 
bringing claims to the courts), adjudication (courts dealing with those claims), implementation 
(government responding to the litigation), and social outcome (litigation influencing the social context 
of the claims).331 For each of these stages she has mapped the different factors that are at play and that 
may influence the effectiveness of social rights litigation. Except for the social outcome stage, each 
stage consists of an input and an output phase. In particular, regard is had to the litigants and the claim 
for the claims formation stage, to the court and the judgment for the adjudication stage, and to the 
responsible authority and the implementation of the judgment (narrow implementation) and possible 
policy and systemic change (long-term implementation) for the implementation stage.332 Gloppen has 
also theorised on how the success of litigation should be evaluated, which will be discussed later (infra 
Section 2.2.5). 
Contrary to this dissertation, Gloppen drafted her analytical framework specifically to examine the 
accountability of the state for realizing the right to health-related services, without paying (much) 
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attention to the role and possible duties of private actors.333 Nevertheless, Gloppen’s research confirms 
that litigation may be used to effect social change, and has resulted in a comprehensive framework 
encompassing a plethora of factors that have an impact on litigation and on its outcome.  
2.1.2. Alternative strategies for change and the value of litigation 
Scholars recognise that litigation rarely constitutes a sufficient tool to effect change and is generally 
used in tandem with other tactics.334 In particular, judicial remedies are resorted to when all other 
options have failed or in case of emergency,335 or when they can secure the conditions that are 
necessary for alternative tactics to be available and effective, for instance by providing access to 
certain information, by correcting power imbalances or by forcing parties to negotiate.336 One 
explanation for the sparing and subsidiary use of litigation is the belief that judges are unlikely to “run 
faster than the societies of which they form a part”337 and that legal norms rather emerge from social 
and political norms than vice versa.338 This is also why the context within which litigation takes place 
is so important (infra Section 2.2.6) and may never be overlooked when a lawsuit’s prospect of 
success is assessed and when its impacts are measured and explained.  
Hence, to sculpt a favourable socio-political context, civil society actors should (and generally do) 
deploy alternative tactics before, during and after the litigation, so as to raise the awareness of all 
relevant actors, including politicians and governing elites as well as the society at large, to draw their 
support and to mobilise them.339 Examples of tactics that can be used for that purpose include lobbying 
politicians, informing and training victims, organizing demonstrations and media campaigns, and 
holding politicians accountable through elections.340 Similar to litigation, whether these tactics are 
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available and effective depends inter alia on the legal, historical and socio-political context (see also 
infra Section 2.2.6).341 The alternative tactics can be confrontational, but also cooperative, for instance 
by supporting government or the business community in creating an environment in which human 
rights are respected or by facilitating compliance by the state with its obligation to protect or by 
business enterprises with their responsibility to respect human rights.342 An additional upside of using 
alternative tactics to support and complement strategic litigation is that they ensure that the mission 
becomes more of a collective undertaking, instead of an individual one.343  
Aside from the need to secure broader support for a given objective, litigation may also not be the 
most obvious tactic as it has some inherent disadvantages. For one, as also the case study will 
demonstrate, few cases ever reach the courts’ dockets, even fewer result in a final judgment and many 
nuances of the dispute may get lost in its translation to legal language.344 Other drawbacks include the 
limited expertise of judges to decide on polycentric issues that raise diverse policy, budgetary and 
technical questions (see also infra Section 2.2.6.4) and the risk of non-enforcement of court orders.345 
Furthermore, while left-wing critics warn that legal strategies may divert the already scarce resources 
of civil society actors, displace other tactics and leave less space for legitimate political activism,346 
right-wing critics argue rather that (human) rights language is too strong, inhibits cooperation and 
creates a culture of dependency.347  
In sum, for various reasons litigation is, in principle, used as a back-up plan and is embedded in a 
broader social and political strategy to achieve long-term objectives.348 As a result, the different tactics 
that are used to effect change are often entangled to such an extent that assigning a concrete positive 
impact to a particular tactic is hard, if not impossible.349 
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2.2. Variables of strategic litigation  
For the purposes of the dissertation, the ultimate goal of strategic litigation is to ensure that business 
enterprises are accountable for human rights, regardless of whether this is achieved by the litigation 
resulting in tightened regulations, monitoring and enforcement by government and/or in a direct 
finding of liability on the part of the company combined with an order to provide appropriate relief. 
This Section explores the variables of such strategic litigation, in particular the factors influencing the 
course and outcome of litigation, the elements of the design of a strategic lawsuit and the different 
impacts of litigation.  
First, three factors are reviewed that affect victims’ ability to access the court system, namely standing 
rights, the availability of free or cheap legal services and protection against intimidating lawsuits 
(Section 2.2.1). Thereafter, the analysis of the design of a strategic lawsuit is structured around three 
‘umbrella decisions’ that litigating parties350 have to adopt, being which remedy (type of proceedings 
and form of relief) they want to pursue (Section 2.2.2), which counterparty they want to sue (Section 
2.2.3) and which (legal) arguments they want to use (Section 2.2.4). Following an exploration of the 
meaning of success (Section 2.2.5), the Section ends with a brief discussion of some contextual factors 
that influence litigation as well (Section 2.2.6).  
The analysis of the variables of strategic litigation in this Section is not meant to be exhaustive. Its 
structure and content is informed by the existing analytical frameworks and by the theoretical 
discussion of business and human rights in Chapter 1. Moreover, the aim of this Section is to offer a 
stepping stone to guide the discussion in the case study of the practical experiences of stakeholders in 
South Africa who use strategic litigation to enforce accountability for human rights violations by 
business enterprises. In turn, the objective of that case study not to make a conclusive analysis of all 
variables of litigation and their respective impact, but rather to assert the impressions, experiences and 
preferences of litigating parties when they design a lawsuit. 
2.2.1. Access to justice 
Access to justice has many dimensions, but three factors that affect the ability of victims and activists 
to vindicate human rights against business enterprises by having recourse to judicial remedies, merit 
particular attention: rules on locus standi (Section 2.2.1.1), the availability of free or cheap legal 
services (Section 2.2.1.2) and intimidation through vexatious litigation (Section 2.2.1.3).  
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2.2.1.1. Standing in court 
Corporate human rights violations commonly share two features; they affect a group of people, rather 
than individuals, and these victims often belong to poor and marginalised groups, meaning that there is 
generally a huge power imbalance between the perpetrator and the victims. If those victims can join 
forces, however, they become significantly stronger. This is where locus standi comes in.351 
Locus standi or ‘standing rights’ determine whether a particular party has the capacity to pursue a 
claim in court. Given that human rights violations by companies typically affect people who belong to 
a vulnerable group, an important question that arises relates to who can approach the court, other than 
the individual victims acting in their own interest.352 Rules on locus standi may, for instance, admit 
representative claims, allowing that one person acts on behalf of the others or that an (informal) 
association is established to act on behalf of its members. There exist two even more liberal types of 
standing, being public interest litigation and class actions, and their advantages in business-related 
human rights cases are widely acknowledged.353 
First, in some jurisdictions litigation can be conducted in the public interest, which means that anyone 
(in practice mainly nongovernmental organisations) can litigate in the interest of the general public 
and without having to demonstrate a personal interest.354 In principle, a number of conditions have to 
be met so as to ensure that the litigation is truly in the public interest and to prevent that courts are 
flooded with such claims. In some jurisdictions, however, public interest litigation is only available for 
specific issues and/or to specific actors.355  
A second, very liberal approach to locus standi are class actions. These are representative lawsuits that 
are conducted by a limited number of claimants acting on behalf of a group of persons who have not 
specifically authorised those claimants, the so-called ‘class representatives’, to bring an action on their 
behalf.356 Class actions are in principle only available when a larger group of persons find themselves 
in a comparable situation and have claims that raise common questions of fact and law so that 
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attending to them jointly is expedient.357 The class representatives play a very important role, as they 
are the only members of the group who are actual parties to the litigation and to whom all procedural 
rules apply.358 Every member of the class, however, either because they did not explicitly withdrew 
from the action (in the case of an opt-out class) or because they expressed a willingness to join the 
action (in the case of an opt-in class), is bound by its eventual outcome, meaning that a separate action 
can face a plea of res judicata.359 Therefore, it is crucial that adequate notice of the class action is 
given, so as to inform all potential members of the class and to give them the opportunity to join or to 
withdraw, depending on the circumstances.360 
Class actions originate in English principles of equity, but were mainly developed in the US.361 
Although they have gradually become more prevalent, they are as yet not available in all domestic 
legal orders and tend to be subject to limitations and strict criteria.362 Generally, those conditions relate 
to ‘numerosity’ (the high number of potential claimants makes a simple joinder impracticable), 
‘commonality’ (there are common questions of fact and/or law), ‘typicality’ (the claims of the 
representatives are typical of those of the other class members) and ‘adequacy’ (the representatives 
fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class).363  
2.2.1.2. Free or cheap legal services  
Given that litigation is a resource-intensive enterprise,364 the availability of free (or at least cheap) 
legal services is crucial in order not to put judicial remedies beyond the reach of most victims.365 
Various state-based and private models for free or cheap legal services exist, so that the following 
paragraphs only provide a non-exhaustive overview of the commonly available sources of legal aid.  
State-based legal aid systems, first of all, are incredibly diverse.366 Broadly speaking,367 however, they 
can be classified into two categories. The first option is that a legal aid board is established, which is 
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financed by public funds and employs its own legal practitioners, who then offer legal services for free 
or against a heavily reduced fee. The second possibility is that of a regulatory system under which 
‘regular lawyers’ (have to) offer (a certain amount of) free or cheap legal services which are then 
(partially) reimbursed by the state. Eligibility for state-based legal aid depends on the criteria set by 
law, which differ from one jurisdiction to the other, but generally include a means test.368 Legal aid 
boards sometimes also work with a strategic agenda, on the basis of which they can select, amongst 
those cases that meet the statutory criteria, the ones that they will effectively take on.  
Sources for private legal aid, in turn, are even more diverse.369 First, there is always the possibility that 
individual legal practitioners offer their services pro bono. Second, legal clinics may be established at 
the university where professors, lecturers, (candidate) attorneys and legal trainees provide services for 
free, in particular first-line legal services. Third, pro bono services may also be offered by law firms 
that operate as non-governmental, not-for-profit organisations. These firms may get their funds from 
private donations, government subsidies and (limited) fundraising activities. As the case study will 
demonstrate (infra Part III, Sections 2.1.2 and 2.5.1), such ‘public interest law firms’ are, for instance, 
quite common in South Africa. 
Another option is that lawyers (who generally work for a regular, incorporated law firm) offer legal 
services to certain clients for a ‘contingent’ or ‘conditional’ fee.370 This means that legal practitioners 
agree not to be paid for their legal services and not to be reimbursed any costs incurred during the 
proceedings until and unless the dispute is successfully resolved. The success fee may be higher than 
the fee that a legal representative would normally charge for his or her services, is generally set at a 
(small) percentage of the value of the claim and is agreed in advance and stipulated in an agreement, 
the ‘contingency fee agreement’.371 If the litigation is successful, legal practitioners receive their 
success fee, as agreed with the client, and the costs advanced during the litigation are reimbursed by 
the counterparty at the amount determined in the court’s costs order or in the settlement. Contingency 
fees are controversial,372 however, and are prohibited in some domestic legal orders.373 
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Unfortunately, the demand for free or cheap legal services generally exceeds their supply, as the 
lawyers offering such services remain few in numbers and have scarce financial, technical and human 
resources.374 Because they cannot take on every case, they tend to work on the basis of selective 
criteria and/or a strategic agenda, as will be illustrated in the case study.375 As a result, only a 
fragrance of all business-related human rights cases reach the courts’ dockets.  
2.2.1.3. Intimidating litigation 
A final factor that may negatively affect the courage of victims and activists to oppose activities that 
(may) interfere with human rights and their ability to vindicate those rights in court, is the risk of 
being slapped with a lawsuit. It is increasingly common for powerful elites, like business enterprises, 
to try and silence critical voices by intimidating them through litigation, a tactic that is called strategic 
litigation against public participation (or SLAPP) and that has supposedly spread from the US.376 
SLAPP suits are frivolous, meritless lawsuits or motions that are filed with the sole purpose of 
intimidating opponents by imposing costs on them, by discrediting them and by prolonging the 
process.  
Evidently, SLAPP suits can create a considerable chilling effect and deter victims, activists or their 
lawyers from going to court. Even if such litigation is ultimately dismissed with costs, the resources of 
the party who is slapped with such a suit are tied up in judicial proceedings for a lengthy period of 
time throughout which the outcome of the litigation remains unpredictable.  
2.2.2. Remedies 
In this dissertation, the term ‘remedy’ refers both to the concrete relief that litigating parties seek to 
obtain (id est the form of reparation) and the proceedings through which such relief is sought.377 
Before discussing, in abstracto, the type of proceedings that may be available (Section 2.2.2.1) and the 
orders that litigating parties may request from the court (Section 2.2.2.2), it should be noted that the 
choice of a remedy frequently unmasks the kind of justice that litigating parties desire – albeit that 
sometimes different forms of justice may be pursued simultaneously, even by way of one and the same 
remedy. Without dwelling upon the concept of justice, which oversteps the legal domain and the 
                                                     
374
 See also Gloppen (2011), supra note 322, 20; Zerk (2014), supra note 212, 82. 
375
 In the case of donor-funded organisations, funds may be earmarked and available only for specific cases.  
376
 T. Murombo and H. Valentine, “SLAPP Suits: An Emerging Obstacle to Public Interest Environmental 
Litigation in South Africa Public Interest Litigation in South Africa,” S. Afr. J. on Hum. Rts. 27 (2011): 82-106. 
377
 Also the Office of the High Commissioner uses the term ‘remedy’ to refer to both the processes through 
which redress is provided and their substantive outcomes. OHCHR, Interpretative Guide on the Corporate 
Responsibility to Respect, supra note 129, 7. See also Drimmer and Laplante, supra note 238, 320. 
83 
 
dissertation’s ambit,378 it suffices to mention at least three layers of justice, namely retributive, 
corrective and social justice. This is relevant to analyse human rights litigation and to explain the 
strategic decisions that are made in such litigation, because understanding these layers of justice will 
assist in evaluating the interplay between the objectives pursued through litigation, the remedies used 
and the assessment whether the litigation was successful.379  
An important distinguishing feature of litigation concerns the question which actor takes centre 
stage.380 When litigating parties are mainly concerned with punishing either the company (for having 
violated human rights) or government (for having failed to prevent and/or redress the violation), the 
litigation strategy is oriented towards the responsible actors and seems to unmask a desire for 
retributive justice. Other lawsuits concentrate on the victims (distributive justice). Litigating parties 
may then, for instance, want to secure reparation for the actual victims so as to redress the harm that 
they suffered and to restore their pre-existing rights (backward-looking, corrective justice), or they 
may want to address the structural causes of the violation having regard to similarly placed 
individuals, so as to ensure that such human rights violations do not happen again (social justice). 
2.2.2.1. Type of judicial proceedings 
In theory, human rights violations by business enterprises can be denounced in criminal, civil, 
administrative or constitutional proceedings.381 It should be noted that this is again a typology that 
mainly serves an academic purpose. An overlap is possible, for instance when a court is competent to 
rule on the civil liability of the accused party in a criminal case or when the constitutionality of a law 
can be challenged in the course of either civil, criminal or administrative proceedings.  
Criminal and civil proceedings should be in place in every domestic legal order, albeit with some 
provisos, such as the fact that not all human rights violations qualify as a crime, that the criminal 
responsibility of business enterprises is not recognised in all jurisdictions and that government liability 
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is sometimes subject to limitations.382 Whether a specific human rights violation is then tackled in 
criminal or civil proceedings depends on several factors, such as the burden and standard of proof, the 
expected length of the proceedings and the desired reputational impact.383  
For example, the requirement to establish criminal intent on the part of the accused party is subject to 
a higher standard of proof than what is the case for civil liability.384 On the other hand, a criminal case 
has the crucial advantage that a public prosecutor is involved, who investigates the matter with the 
support of the state apparatus, which significantly attenuates the burden for victims.385 A few domestic 
legal orders, especially in the common law countries, however, facilitate access to evidence through 
‘discovery’, a procedural device that admits litigating parties to demand the other party or a third party 
to hand over information that they have in their possession and that could serve as evidence in a civil 
lawsuit.386 Another element to consider is that whilst the decision to launch civil proceedings is left to 
the litigating parties, the instigation of criminal proceedings generally falls within the discretion of the 
prosecutor – unless when private prosecution is available, although the practicality thereof is 
questionable in light of the burden of proof and the costs. At the same time, if the prosecutor is willing 
to start an investigation and, subsequently, to prosecute, victims only have to lay criminal charges, 
which they can do themselves, without legal representation, and the state will bear the costs of the 
proceedings.  
Next, in the context of the dissertation, the term ‘administrative proceedings’ refers to the procedure 
through which interested and affected parties can apply for judicial review of administrative acts, in 
principle after having exhausted any available internal remedies such as appeals within the 
administration.387 Depending on the legal order, such proceedings are conducted in specialised 
administrative tribunals or in ordinary courts. Administrative proceedings thus offer a specific 
opportunity to sue administrative authorities for their actions; only they are directly involved as 
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responding parties and only their legal status is directly affected.388 Nevertheless, the outcome of the 
proceedings can have an impact on the legal status of business enterprises as well. Indeed, when an 
administrative decision that authorises a specific activity by a company, for instance, is cancelled 
following a successful application for judicial review, then the company has to discontinue its 
activities until it obtains a new authorisation. At the occasion of such review, courts can even 
incidentally scrutinise the conduct of the business enterprise itself, for example in order to assess the 
lawfulness of the administrative act.389  
Finally, the term ‘constitutional proceedings’ used here encompasses a broad category of remedies that 
seek some kind of constitutional relief, such as a finding of constitutional (in)validity of laws, 
regulations and policies (judicial review), a declaration of rights or duties, an interpretation of laws, 
regulations and policies in conformity with the constitution, and an award of constitutional damages. 
Proceedings may also be classified as ‘constitutional’ when a cause of action is directly derived from 
the constitution, when relief is granted outside of private law or when the constitutionality of a 
judgment by a lower court is challenged. 
As regards judicial review, most legal orders admit, in conformity with the rule of law, that the 
judiciary can review acts and conduct by the legislature and the executive so as to scrutinise their 
compatibility with the law and with the constitution.390 Diverse judicial review systems are applied 
across domestic legal orders, and they can at least be distinguished on the basis of the following two 
features. First, depending on whether jurisdiction over constitutional matters is assigned to a 
specialised court or to several or all courts, the system of review is classified, respectively, as 
centralised or diffuse, although hybrid systems are common.391 Second, legal orders may admit 
concrete review (at the occasion of an actual dispute), abstract review or both. Judicial review systems 
may also vary in terms of standing requirements and the scope of the judiciary’s powers of review, in 
particular whether or not courts have the authority to scrutinise both acts and omissions, to grant 
mandatory orders (to act or to forebear from acting), to impose supervisory orders (compelling a party 
to report back to the court), and to establish expert committees that investigate and monitor 
compliance.392  
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2.2.2.2. Relief: looking for adequate court orders 
Which relief litigating parties can request is to a great extent a function of their cause of action, the 
type of proceedings they resort to and the identity of the party that is sued. Litigating parties should 
thus factor in the question of relief at the time of taking those decisions. In principle, the forms of 
relief that may be available in a particular legal order can be infinitely diverse. Therefore, what 
follows is a non-exhaustive overview.393 
A particular form of relief can be classified as ‘punitive’, ‘reparative’ (sometimes also called 
‘compensatory’) or ‘preventive’,394 which broadly reflect, respectively, retributive, corrective and 
social justice. Since ‘strategic’ litigation is presumed to have a medium or long term objective that 
transcends the individual interests at stake in a given case (see supra Part I, Section 2.4), strategic 
lawsuits generally seek to achieve some kind of social impact, which may, however, even be pursued 
through damages claims, as will be illustrated in the case study. Nevertheless, a consideration that 
strategic litigants should bear in mind is that legal scholars have reported that the more individualised 
the requested relief is, the higher the chance is that it will be granted, since “courts are more likely to 
engage in particularising the universal than in universalizing the particular.”395  
Relief should at all time be adequate, effective, prompt and appropriate – id est proportional to the 
gravity of the violations and the resulting harm.396 Concrete examples of forms of relief include 
financial or non-financial compensation, restitution (restoring the original situation that existed before 
the violation), rehabilitation (like medical and psychological care and legal and social services), 
injunctions (compelling or prohibiting to act in a certain way), penalties (such as fines or prison 
sentences), and declaratory orders.397 The effect of one form of relief is not necessarily limited to 
either punishment, reparation or prevention.398 For instance, a finding of tortious liability resulting in 
the award of damages may have a preventive dimension in addition to its inherent reparative function, 
inter alia by forcing business enterprises that operate under the logic of the bottom line to factor in the 
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risk of high compensation awards.399 In the case of punitive damages, the relief even has a punitive 
function. Penalties are another example, since they obviously serve to punish perpetrators, but also to 
deter the commission of similar acts in the future. Prison sentences can obviously not be imposed on 
corporate entities, which rather get fined. The actual impact of fines is questioned, however, amongst 
other reasons because they are not believed to carry the same stigma as prison sentences and may 
simply be set off as costs.400  
One peculiar form of relief for human rights violations deserves special mention, namely 
‘satisfaction’, which comprises any order that is aimed at offering symbolic reparation for moral 
damage.401 The UN General Assembly has recommended states to make such relief available in human 
rights cases.402 Nevertheless, until today satisfaction features most prominently in the jurisprudence of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which has, for instance, ordered public apologies, 
guarantees of non-repetition and the erection of public memorials.403 Other examples of satisfaction 
include commemorations and tributes to victims, the verification of facts and their full and public 
disclosure, and the inclusion of an accurate account of the violations in training and in educational 
material.404 Although orders for satisfaction are primarily case-specific and victim-oriented, a broader 
social impact is not inconceivable as they always involve an element of public disclosure. 
Also very useful are supervisory orders, which entail that the judiciary retains jurisdiction so as to 
monitor the implementation of its orders.405 According to Roach and Budlender,406 the appropriateness 
of adopting a supervisory order against government depends on the cause underlying a party’s 
behaviour. In particular, if a failure to comply with certain duties is due to a lack of willingness, closer 
monitoring of a party’s adherence to the order is required than when a party merely did not understand 
or obliterated its duties. 
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Domestic legal orders should leave sufficient leeway as regards the forms of relief that can be 
requested and granted in a particular case,407 especially in human rights litigation, where reparations 
should acknowledge the harm that victims have suffered, and even more in business-related cases, 
where it should be possible to tailor relief to the corporate structure of the perpetrator. Illustrations of 
(more innovative) forms of relief that may be available in some states for business-related human 
rights cases include the following: the publication of the company’s name on a list of business 
enterprises falling short of the minimum standards of responsible conduct; the exclusion from benefits, 
like foreign investment subsidies, or from public procurement procedures; the cancellation or 
suspension of the company’s listing; compulsory publication of the conviction and the sanctions 
imposed; confiscation of property; suspension or cancellation of licenses; obligation to pay money into 
funds; and forced dissolution.408  
2.2.3. The counterparty 
Contrary to international human rights remedies, most of which are, to date, only concerned with the 
state, different actors may be held liable (possibly concurrently) at the domestic level. This Section 
provides an overview of some of the actors that may be called to account in abstracto, even if in 
certain domestic legal orders or for certain constellations of facts not all options are available. In view 
of their relevance for the case study, the discussion looks at state versus company liability (Section 
2.2.3.1), liability of the company as such or of a responsible individual acting for that company409 
(Section 2.2.3.2), and parent company liability (Section 2.2.3.3). Overall, it can already be observed 
that a victim-oriented perspective calls for as much flexibility as possible regarding which actor(s) can 
be called to account for human rights violations by business enterprises,410 which will be discussed 
further infra in Part IV. 
2.2.3.1. Government versus corporate liability  
Human rights violations by business enterprises trigger the state’s international legal responsibility for 
having failed to comply with its obligation to protect unless the state demonstrates that it has adopted 
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all reasonably available measures to prevent the violation and to provide adequate relief (supra 
Section 1.1.1.1). Similarly, under national law state actors may be held accountable for not having 
complied with their (protective) duties (supra Section 1.2.2), which depends on the options to hold 
government actors civilly or criminally liable as well as the availability of judicial review of 
administrative acts and of legislative and executive acts (supra Section 2.2.2.1).  
Evidently, however, also the responsibility of the business enterprise that actually committed the 
violation should be triggered, unless the state has blatantly disregarded its obligation to regulate and 
monitor corporate conduct. Given their distinct involvement in the human rights violation, namely a 
failure to regulate, monitor or enforce411 (on the part of government) and a failure not to interfere with 
human rights (on the part of the company), their respective responsibility is triggered for a different 
reason. Therefore, the accountability of government and of business enterprise should, in principle, 
exist concurrently.412  
Whether litigating parties then choose to sue either government or business enterprise (or both), and 
their justification for that decision may elucidate their opinion about the respective responsibility for 
human rights of the state and of business enterprises, which remains a controversial topic in the global 
debate on business and human rights.413 In particular, their choice may be justified by strategic, 
practical or principled considerations, as will be discussed in detail in the case study (infra Part III, 
Section 2.6.3.1). To give an example, suing only government notwithstanding the fact that a cause of 
action is available against the company as well, may be motivated by a belief that the state has to 
protect its people, against whomever.  
2.2.3.2. Institutional versus individual corporate liability 
Corporate liability can take the form of institutional liability of the abstract entity, ‘the company’, or of 
individual liability of agents within that company who act on its behalf, such as (managing) associates, 
directors and senior employees.414 The three main questions that arise in this regard are whether legal 
entities, like companies, can be called to account ‘as such’, how conduct by individuals is attributed to 
the company and how institutional and individual liability relate to one another.  
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Whilst civil liability can be imposed as much on legal persons as on natural persons, holding 
companies criminally liable remains controversial.415 Many legal orders regard institutional criminal 
liability as incompatible with the foundational principles of criminal law.416 The main objection reads 
that legal persons cannot be ‘guilty’ of committing a crime, since they do not have a own mind and 
can only act through natural persons, who are believed to be the ones that should be held criminally 
liable.417 The number of legal systems where business enterprises do not have criminal responsibility 
is gradually decreasing, however, as they come into contact with the experiences of states where such 
responsibility does exist, albeit sometimes only for specific crimes.418 
If a company can be called to account (civilly or criminally), the question of attribution of individual 
conduct to the company arises given that it is an abstract entity that can only act through natural 
persons. Different options exist in that regard.419 In the case of ‘the identification approach’, for 
instance, the conduct of senior managers is automatically imputed to the company as they are believed 
to represent the company’s directing mind and will. Vicarious liability, on the other hand, entails that a 
company is liable for the acts committed by its employees within their function or by contractors 
within the scope of their contract. Rules on attribution are rarely perfect, however, and depending on 
the circumstances they have been criticised for being under-inclusive (for instance, when a company 
cannot be held liable if the harmful conduct is not caused by the acts of one individual but is due to a 
systemic problem) or over-inclusive (for instance, when the company is accountable for the fault of 
individuals without itself having committed any fault).420 If both the company and the responsible 
individual can, in principle, be called to account, the last question concerns the allocation of 
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responsibility amongst these two actors. This raises several sub-questions, such as whether the liability 
of the one actor depends on a finding that the other is liable, and whether they can be held liable 
concurrently for the same conduct.421  
The questions on attribution and allocation of responsibility are important, because pros and cons to 
both institutional and individual liability have been discerned in legal scholarship.422 A first reason 
why institutional liability may be favoured over individual liability, for example, is the fact that 
companies are not “simply the sum of individuals working for them.”423 In instances where abuse by a 
particular individual in a company cannot be divorced from the ‘corporate culture’424 that prevails in 
that company and in which individuals thus have to work, imposing liability only on an individual 
person seems reasonless, because there is a considerable risk that business will continue as usual once 
the company has reprimanded (and perhaps replaced) that person. Other arguments in favour of 
institutional liability relate inter alia to the recognition that companies are separate moral agents with 
autonomy of action,425 the potential barriers to suing individuals (such as the identification of the 
responsible person),426 the wish to create a standard of acceptable corporate conduct,427 the financial 
resources of companies to pay compensation428 and the creation of an incentive for shareholders to 
monitor corporate conduct.429  
There are also advantages to individual liability, however. For instance, when a business enterprise is 
dissolved, the risk exists that the human rights violation will never be redressed, which is all the more 
frustrating when the dissolution is in fact elicited in a fraudulent way by the managers, who have 
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secured their own interests and those of the shareholders.430 Moreover, when only the business 
enterprise is held liable, the actual wrongdoers may wash their hands unless they are disciplined by the 
company.431 As to which liability acts as a better deterrent, no straightforward reply seems to exist. On 
the one hand, individuals are believed to act more risk-averse when their personal liability is at stake, 
especially when they risk a prison sentence,432 whereas companies cannot be imprisoned and can 
easily spread the financial burden of liability – unless the penalty imposed is compulsorily dissolution. 
On the other hand, the regulatory impact of institutional liability is higher, when it incentivises 
companies to adopt codes of conduct and to invest in training and monitoring.433  
Nevertheless, the finding that both institutional and individual liability have their (dis)advantages 
should not lead to the conclusion that the silver bullet is to hold companies and individuals always 
simultaneously liable. Indeed, they may see this as an opportunity to disclaim their own responsibility 
and to focus on the other.434 Whether the company as such, an individual within that company or both 
should be called to account and held liable thus depends on the circumstances of the case, the goal of 
the litigating parties and the preferences of the actual victims.435  
2.2.3.3. Liability of parent companies 
The issue of parent company liability receives most attention in legal scholarship in relation to 
transnational corporations. Scholars are particularly intrigued by the question whether parent 
companies in developed countries can be held accountable for human rights violations committed by 
their subsidiaries in developing countries.436 This issue, which relates to the exercise of extraterritorial 
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jurisdiction (supra Part I, Section 1.2), falls outside the scope of this dissertation.437 Nevertheless, the 
question of parent company liability may also arise in relation to companies that are based in the same 
country as their subsidiary.  
Suing parent companies has a number of pros and cons. On the one hand, these companies are more 
likely to dispose of the required knowledge and technical and financial resources to advice their 
subsidiaries on appropriate policies and to pay for possible damages.438 When parent companies are 
taken to court, the internal regulatory impact of such lawsuit may also be greater.439 On the other hand, 
the liability of parent companies raises difficult legal-technical questions and there may be sly 
attempts to circumvent liability, so that the costs and duration of the proceedings may increase.440 If 
litigating parties consider it appropriate to sue a parent company, there presently exist, in theory, two 
main options to establish liability on the part of that company. Whether these options are actually 
available in a concrete case depends on the applicable law and the circumstances of that case.441  
First, parent companies may be liable qualitate qua, id est based on their managerial control. Such 
liability is only exceptionally found, however, due to the principle of separate legal personality, which 
is held dear in corporate law around the world.442 According to this principle, the mere holding of 
shares is insufficient to make a parent company liable for the conduct of its subsidiary, since they 
constitute two separate legal entities. In most domestic legal orders, this ‘corporate veil’ can only be 
pierced under exceptional circumstances, such as in case of fraud or corruption.443 A corporate entity 
being established with the sole purpose of evading legal obligations and liabilities is a typical scenario 
in which fraud can be found to exist.444 Cases in which liability qualitate qua was based on a less 
formal criterion of economic integration, which entails that all group members are jointly and 
severally liable for the activities of other members because they constitute a single economic 
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enterprise under common management (the ‘enterprise theory’ or ‘single economic entity’ theory), 
remain very rare.445 
A second ground to establish parent company liability consists of arguing that the parent company 
violated its own legal duties and is thus a joint tortfeasor with its subsidiary.446 This is the doctrine of 
‘direct’ parent liability, which is different from liability qualitate qua, where a parent company is 
liable in its capacity as parent and not for reason of its own conduct.447 The most interesting 
application of the direct parent liability doctrine is found in common law, where under certain 
conditions the failure of a parent company to prevent a human rights violation by its subsidiary 
qualifies as a breach of a specific duty of care that the parent company itself holds towards the victims, 
as a result of which its liability is triggered for negligence.448 There are three cumulative conditions for 
a specific duty of care to exist, namely the damage must be foreseeable, there must exist a relationship 
of proximity between the person holding the duty of care and the beneficiary thereof, and the 
imposition of a duty of care must be just, fair and reasonable.449  
For a specific duty of care to exist on the part of a parent company, the inquiry focuses on whether the 
parent company has superior knowledge or expertise in relation to the harm and whether it is fair to 
infer therefrom that the subsidiary will rely upon its parent to avoid the harm.450 Four factors are 
relevant, albeit not exhaustive, to this inquiry: the parent and subsidiary are active in the same kind of 
business, the parent has superior or specialist knowledge, the parent is familiar with the subsidiary's 
systems of work, and the parent knows that the subsidiary relies on that knowledge to avoid the 
harm.451 In the past, courts have used this theory to establish that a parent company holds a specific 
duty of care towards its subsidiary’s employees, but it is uncertain whether a similar duty may also 
exist vis-à-vis other stakeholders, such as the neighbouring communities of a subsidiary.452  
As this discussion of liability qualitate qua and direct parent company liability shows, there are 
options to hold a parent company liable, but they are limited. Therefore, some scholars have called, for 
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instance, for a rebuttable presumption of parent company liability453 or, at least, for parent company 
liability based on complicity.454 This dissertation submits that tightening the responsibility of parent 
companies for the conduct of their subsidiaries is justifiable, because at present they reap the financial 
and commercial benefits of operating as a group but disclaim responsibility for negative consequences. 
It is also unlikely that parent companies are not aware of serious malpractices at their subsidiaries. 
Definitely when business enterprises operate under the same brand name, their commercial links are 
crystal clear. Moreover, notwithstanding a division into separate legal entities, enterprise groups 
generally have policies that apply across the group, including a single code of conduct.455 This factual 
relationship between the different members of an enterprise group should, arguably, receive more 
attention in law.  
2.2.4. Human rights in legal argument 
In the context of this dissertation, litigating parties use human rights arguments whenever they refer to 
human rights in their submissions to the court, regardless of whether such references are assigned a 
prescriptive effect.456 While it is not an entirely new phenomenon, the use of human rights language in 
litigation, and even in public discourse in general, has grown exponentially with the judicialisation of 
society (supra Section 2.1). Human rights are truly “the vocabulary of our time”.457 This also holds 
true for the ‘private’ sphere.458 Although private law has always been concerned with values like 
human dignity, integrity, autonomy and privacy, traditionally, the ‘private rights’ protecting those 
values were not called ‘human rights’.459 It is an unmistakable trend, however, that rights holders, 
activists, lawyers, scholars, prosecutors, judges and the like increasingly refer to human rights even in 
disputes amongst private actors, especially in settings where a vulnerable party faces a powerful 
private actor, such as a business enterprise.  
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Importantly, using human rights arguments is not merely an issue of semantics, but has a symbolic 
significance and can have practical implications.460 The symbolism of human rights, first of all, is 
nicely expressed in the following quote of Baxi. 
(…) [H]uman rights norms and standards impact upon notions of self, society, state and the 
world at large. It is in this sense that one grasps the gestalt of contemporary human rights as 
constitutive of an astonishing fact of human social life, one that marks a revolution in human 
sensibility to, and imagination of, freedom.461 
As the quote above suggests, the explicit appropriation of human rights by people can be seen as a 
sign of emancipation and empowerment.462 This applies even more when litigating parties appeal to 
human rights in a dispute with business enterprises given that human rights were traditionally believed 
to govern the relationship between the state and its citizenry and to redress the power imbalance in that 
relationship.463 The use of such discourse in disputes with business enterprises thus contests the idea 
that human rights are the preserve of governance.464 Moreover, when aggrieved parties refer to human 
rights, for instance in a tort case against a business enterprise, they seem to suggest that their case 
raises a matter of public concern and invokes a sense of urgency and seriousness above and beyond 
their individual case,465 or that they believe that human rights should rectify inequalities amongst 
private actors and provide equality of arms in private relationships, which are objectives that 
traditional private law does not aspire.466  
Aside from the symbolic meaning of using human rights arguments, they may also have a material 
impact on the litigation. They can, for instance, influence the applicable rules on locus stand, the 
burden and standard of proof, the available defences, the award of costs orders and access to appellate 
proceedings or to supreme or constitutional courts.467 On a more practical level, the fact that human 
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rights are at stake may be an incentive for activists or lawyers to get involved and support the case.468 
Some concrete examples of the material impacts of using human rights arguments will be discussed in 
the course of the case study, at which occasion it will also be explained why these impacts may be 
considered burdensome as well and, hence, constitute a reason not to refer to human rights.  
Whether human rights arguments are capable of producing such material effects depends on the 
legally binding nature and enforceability of the concerned human rights norms, which is discussed 
below (Section 2.2.4.2).469 First, however, the mutually beneficial interplay between international and 
national human rights law is explained (Section 2.2.4.1). 
2.2.4.1. International and national human rights 
Since its emergence after the Second World War the contemporary human rights idea, according to 
which all human beings have inalienable rights that guarantee a dignified life in a democratic society, 
has undergone two evolutions: internationalisation and universalisation.470 One the one hand, 
following the proclamation of the Universal Declaration for Human Rights in 1948471 numerous other 
international human rights agreements and declarations have been adopted and an international law on 
human rights has accordingly emerged. On the other hand, an increasing number of states have 
entrenched a list of rights in a foundational document, either a constitution or an extraordinary law that 
cannot be amended by a simple democratic majority.  
In light of these evolutions international and national human rights law generally bear a high degree of 
resemblance. This begs the question whether it is valuable to use international law in domestic (human 
rights) litigation. From a legal-fundamental perspective, the answer is affirmative, since creating a 
space where international and national law interact is crucial for their mutual development.472 In 
particular, referring to international law in domestic litigation is beneficial for both international and 
national human rights law.  
First of all, the value of international law lies in its ability to ensure that national human rights law is 
developed in pace with evolving international standards and to remove any legal uncertainties that 
exist in the domestic legal order, either by filling gaps or by guiding the interpretation of national 
                                                     
468
 De Feyter (2011), supra note 73, 12. 
469
 If human rights are invoked against business enterprises, their effect also depends on the legal impact of 
human rights in the private sphere in that particular legal order (see supra Section 1.2). 
470
 L. Henkin, The Age of Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 13-29. 
471
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 116. Note that one regional human rights instrument had 
already been adopted before, namely the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of the Man, adopted by 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on 2 May 1948. 
472
 This definitely holds true now that international law pays greater attention to intra-state relationships and 
increasingly regulates the rights (and duties) of non-state actors. Allott, supra note 192, 80-82. 
98 
 
law.473 Whether in practice this added value is recognised by litigants and is eventually materialised, 
depends inter alia on the legal order within which a case is litigated and the precise issue at stake – 
see, for instance, the examination in the case study infra in Part III, Sections 1.3 and 2.6.4.1.  
In turn, national human rights law may also spur the development of international law. Due to the 
subsidiarity principle (and the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies), the dearth of international 
(quasi-)judicial enforcement mechanisms, as well as the practical barriers to access such mechanisms, 
international law is predominantly applied in domestic courts.474 Hence, whenever those courts are 
called to consider, apply and enforce international law, they contribute to its development and 
specialisation. Domestic judgments that engage with international law may even constitute formal 
sources of international law, either because they qualify as a subsidiary means to determine the law,475 
or because they provide evidence of state practice, which is one of the criteria to establish the 
existence of a rule of international customary law.476 Furthermore, thanks to the augmented judicial 
dialogue amongst jurisdictions, determinations about international law may influence the application 
of that law in other legal orders as well.477  
2.2.4.2. Legal effect of human rights 
A major variable that will determine the actual impact of human rights on litigation is their legal 
effect. For human rights norms to be capable of having a mandatory effect, they should be codified in 
a legally binding (i) and self-executing (ii) rule (of national or international law).478 However, even if a 
human rights norm is legally binding and enforceable, the litigating parties themselves and/or the court 
may still only assign moral or persuasive force to them, instead of prescriptive force (iii).479  
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(i) A legally binding norm  
Whilst the legal nature of a national norm is in principle straightforward, to ascertain the legal effect of 
an international norm in a given domestic legal order two questions must be considered.  
The first question concerns the degree of integration of international and national law, on the basis of 
which domestic legal systems used to be classified as ‘dualist’ or ‘monist’. A dualist approach sees 
international and national law as two separate, self-contained legal orders within each of which “the 
only existing rules are those that are part of the system”,480 so that international law cannot as such be 
applied domestically. International norms only produce legal effects once they are domesticated, 
namely when they are enacted as part of national law (‘direct incorporation’) or when national law is 
amended in conformity with international norms (‘indirect reception’ or ‘transformation’).481 A monist 
approach, on the other hand, considers international and national law as inherent parts of a single legal 
order. Accordingly, rules of international law – provided that they are self-executing as will be 
discussed next (ii) – are applicable in the national legal order without requiring domestic 
implementation. This brief account of the meaning of dualism and monism began with the caveat 
‘used to be’, because hybrid systems are presently the norm. Consequently, scholars have largely 
relinquished the strict dichotomy of dualism and monism and prefer to speak of monist or dualist 
‘tendencies’482 or ‘degrees’.483 Research has, moreover, demonstrated that a monist tendency does not 
guarantee that practice is one where international human rights law is directly enforced by the 
judiciary, or even used as an interpretative guide.484 
Secondly, the effect of international norms in the domestic legal order depends on their hierarchical 
position.485 Three approaches are possible: supra-constitutionalisation, constitutionalisation and quasi-
constitutionalisation.486 The first means that international law takes precedence over all national law, 
including constitutional law, the second that international law is equivalent to constitutional law and 
the third that international law is superior to ‘ordinary’ national law but inferior to the constitution. 
Since the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties explicitly stipulates that states may not rely on 
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national law to justify non-compliance with international legal obligations, the so-called principle of 
pacta sunt servanda, ‘supra-constitutionalisation’ should in principle be the norm.487 Nevertheless, in 
reality states rarely accept that international law takes precedence over constitutional law.488  
(ii) A self-executing norm 
Human rights norms, whether they are codified in national489 or international law, have to be ‘self-
executing’ in order to be capable of having a mandatory effect.490 A norm is self-executing, when the 
duties imposed by that norm are sufficiently precise, unequivocal and unconditional and when the 
means for duty bearers to comply with these duties are prescribed with directly binding force so that 
no prior implementing laws are necessary.491  
The requirement that human rights are self-executing is regularly linked to the debate about the 
justiciability and judicial enforceability of economic, social, cultural and environmental rights in 
particular.492 ‘Justiciability’ and ‘judicial enforceability’ should be distinguished, however; whilst the 
former is a black-or-white question concerning a right’s suitability for enforcement by a (quasi-) 
judicial body, the latter is rather matter of degree that relates to the type of remedies that are available 
if a right is violated.493 Whilst in most cases human rights are considered justiciable, some rights, 
especially economic, social, cultural and environmental rights, are either denied judicial enforceability 
or their enforceability is qualified, meaning that it is subject to such mitigating factors as ‘progressive 
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realisation’, ‘reasonable measures’, and ‘available resources’ (see also infra Part III, Section 
2.2.1.1).494 Hence, in relation to the latter rights, fewer remedies are available and courts are more 
deferential towards the duty bearers.495 
(iii) Prescriptive, persuasive or moral force  
Human rights can be used either in empirical or in rational arguments. Hence, even if they have, in 
theory, legal effect, they do not necessarily dictate with binding force how a particular dispute must be 
resolved.  
When human rights are used to influence the court’s decision as a matter of fact, rather than as a legal 
reason justifying a concrete decision by the court, they feature as an empirical argument.496 In those 
instances, references to human rights are motivated by moral or political considerations, such as a 
desire to emphasise the significance of the interests at stake or to raise the awareness of the litigating 
parties, the counterparties, the courts and possibly even the public at large about those interests.497 In a 
‘rational argument’, on the other hand, human rights do influence the legal resolution of an issue in 
dispute either because they prescribe a particular outcome (human rights as a ‘mandatory reason’, with 
prescriptive force) or because they support a particular decision that is primarily based on the 
application of another legal rule (human rights as a ‘permissive reason’, with persuasive force).498  
It should be noted that human rights can also simply influence the judicial decision-making process, 
expressly or implicitly, by creating a system of values and principles that affects the exercise of 
judicial scrutiny,499 which aligns with the protective duties of the judiciary.500 
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2.2.5. Effectiveness and success 
Whether and under what conditions litigation is rightly considered a success seems to be the million 
dollar question,501 which rarely lends itself to a straightforward answer. Firstly, success is not uni-
dimensional; litigation can be successful in many different ways, and a particular case may be a 
victory in one respect but a defeat in another. Quoting Gauri and Brinks, “the grandiose language of 
many decisions vastly overstates their actual impact on the ground”502 – fortunately, also the opposite 
scenario is possible. Aside from the multi-dimensional nature of success, a second difficulty concerns 
how success should be measured, which inter alia raises the difficulty of establishing a causal link 
between litigation and an alleged impact.503 As Langford admits, three factors should always be kept 
in mind in relation to measurements of success, namely which criteria are used to identify impacts, 
what is the comparator and how are causes and effects untangled.504 Hence, to avoid that the way in 
which success is evaluated distorts reality, litigation should be assessed from multiple perspectives and 
there should be absolute transparency about how success is defined and measured.505 This dissertation 
evaluates the success of litigation based on the theories developed by Rodriguez-Garavito and 
Gloppen, as further inspired by the writings of Langford et al. and Andreassen and Crawford. 
Crucially, these theories show that litigation does not stand upon itself and must always be assessed in 
context.506 
According to Rodriguez-Garavito,507 lawsuits are capable of producing four types of impact: direct 
material, indirect material, direct symbolic and indirect symbolic impacts. He distinguishes between 
direct and indirect impacts based on whether an impact is mandated by the court and affect the actors 
in the litigation or is a consequence that derives from the decision by the court and affects the actors in 
the case as well as others.508 The difference between material and symbolic impacts, in turn, depends 
on whether they imply material (tangible) changes in the conduct of groups or individuals or “consist 
of changes in ideas, perceptions and collective social constructs relating to the litigation’s subject 
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matter.”509 Next, the interesting aspect of Gloppen’s theory510 is that she analyses success from three 
angles: victory (or defeat) in court, material impact on the situation of the litigating parties themselves 
and social impact beyond the specific case. By singling out victory in court as but one dimension of 
success, Gloppen warns that judgments may never be implemented or complied with or that the court 
order may be inadequate and thus inconsequential, or – in the opposite scenario – that even cases lost 
in court may have successful impacts.511  
This dissertation combines the insights of both scholars so that the success of a lawsuit is evaluated 
having regard to its direct, indirect, material and symbolic impacts (1) in court, (2) for the litigating 
parties (‘concrete’) and (3) for the society at large (‘social’). A somewhat different meaning is 
assigned to the difference between direct and indirect impacts, as the former embrace all impacts that 
feature directly in the litigation, whether in the parties’ claims or arguments or in the court’s judgment 
or order, and that their effect is not necessarily limited to the actors in the litigation. Furthermore, 
Gloppen’s concept of ‘material’ success is here called ‘concrete’ success so as not to confuse with 
‘material impacts’. It is submitted that such detailed deconstruction is required to ensure a nuanced but 
truthful understanding of a lawsuit’s success. It merely serves an analytical purpose, however, as in 
practice the distinction between the different impacts at the different levels is frequently blurred. A 
straightforward example is that repeated concrete impacts may over time generate social impacts.512 
Two important, additional observations must be made, which is, first, that indirect effects generally 
only become apparent over time, which makes it hard to identify them,513 and, second, that litigation 
can generate impacts even before (as well as long after) the final judgment. 
The ultimate comparator to assess the ‘effectiveness of litigation’ is obviously determined by this 
dissertation’s focus on enforcing accountability for human rights violations by business enterprises 
and thereby strengthening their responsibility for human rights.514 Accordingly, success depends on 
the extent to which litigation (1) recognises and raises awareness about corporate human rights 
violations, (2) ensures that companies are forced to respect human rights and (3) is capable of 
eliminating (a number of) the symptoms and causes of the power imbalance that facilitates corporate 
                                                     
509
 Ibid. 
510
 Gloppen (2008), supra note 122, 24-25. 
511
 Ibid. 25. See also Cooper, supra note 411, 219-220. 
512
 See also N. Fraser, “Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition and 
Participation,” in eds. N. Fraser, A. Honneth and J. Golb, Redistribution or recognition? 7 (London: Verso, 
2003) (distinguishing between affirmative and transformative strategies, while acknowledging that consecutive 
affirmative lawsuits may, over time, have a transformative effect); Pieterse (2014), supra note 503, 83. For an 
application of Fraser’s theory to human rights litigation, see S. Liebenberg, “Needs, Rights and Transformation: 
Adjudicating Social Rights,” Stellenbosch L. Rev. 17 (2006), 8-10.  
513
 Pieterse (2014), supra note 503, 83. 
514
 The subjective element inherent to ‘success’ entails that its meaning is influenced by the purport of the 
dissertation, which does not necessarily accord with the specific objectives of the litigating parties.  
104 
 
abuse.515 Litigation resulting in regulatory changes is very successful in view of its exceptionally 
egalitarian effect.516 Table 2 below displays a list of exemplary impacts. 
 Table 2. Impacts of litigation 
 Direct impacts Indirect impacts 
Victory in 
court 
  
Material 
- The claims are granted and the company 
or the government is convicted. 
Material 
- The case is used as a precedent by 
similarly-situated victims. 
Symbolic 
- The rights of the victims are affirmed 
and they feel empowered. 
Symbolic 
- The media reports on the case, the 
victims and the involvement of the 
company, the government or both. 
Concrete 
success 
Material 
- The company compensates the victims 
and redresses all damage caused, as 
ordered by the court. 
- The government reviews the company’s 
licence to operate and, if necessary, pulls 
the licence, as ordered by the court. 
 
 
Material 
- The company adapts its conduct or 
activities in order to respect the victims’ 
rights. 
- The government takes account of the 
judgment in renewing the company’s 
licence, for instance by imposing 
specific conditions. 
Symbolic  
- The victims join forces to litigate and, 
accordingly, strengthen their negotiating 
position vis-à-vis the counterparty. 
- The litigating parties engage with the 
court in interpreting their rights. 
 
Symbolic  
- The perception by the general public of 
the victims, who belong to a vulnerable 
group, improves. 
- Politicians have become better aware of 
the plight of the victims. 
Social success Material  
- The government amends the law on 
licence requirements, for instance 
following a finding of 
unconstitutionality. 
Material 
- The company adopts a code of conduct 
to guide all its operations. 
- A culture of justification is created: 
government substantiates and justifies 
its act and conduct. 
- The company establishes a grievance 
mechanism for human rights complaints. 
Symbolic  
- The judgment sets a precedent for future 
Symbolic  
- Similarly-situated people are informed 
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litigation. 
- The litigation sends a message to the 
business community as to what 
constitutes responsible corporate 
conduct.  
about their rights and empowered. 
- The media reports on the structural 
causes of the case and the involvement 
of the industry, the government or both. 
- The issue is borne in mind when laws, 
regulations and policies are drafted and 
enforced. 
The impacts discussed above can also be analysed having regard to the type of power that they create, 
which further improves understanding of the different ways in which success manifests itself. 
Langford et al.,517 for instance, have analysed the impact of litigation in terms of whether it generates 
leverage (the ability to make power elites listen to concerns and act upon them), perception (the ability 
to legitimise claims, to appropriate a voice and to transform the way in which power elites perceive the 
litigating parties) or organisational power (the ability to mobilise people). These different types of 
political impact are aligned with the types of power discerned by Andreassen and Crawford,518 being 
‘power to’ (transforming the external power structures, such as legislation), ‘power with’ (creating 
space for alternative sources of power) and ‘power within’ (building internal capacity and empowering 
people to engage with external actors). Examples of how these different types of power can be 
constituted by litigation are provided in Table 3 below.  
Table 3. Typology of ‘power’ 
Power TO 
Leverage 
- The company establishes a grievance mechanism accessible for individuals who 
allege that their human rights have been violated.  
- Through the litigation the litigating parties obtain information which can be used 
for advocacy.  
Power WITH 
Perception 
- The court affirms the rights that the litigating parties hold either directly against 
the company or against government.  
- By reporting on the litigation the media raise awareness about the structural causes 
of the human rights violations and the respective involvement of industry and 
government.  
Power WITHIN 
 organisational 
power 
- The victims establish an (informal) association to become a more formidable 
opponent and to improve their negotiating position.  
- During the litigation the lawyers and activists supporting the victims organise 
trainings and workshop to inform all members of the group of their rights. 
A final observation that should be made relates to the dilemma whether litigating parties should agree 
to settle their case. This is one of the hardest decisions that can arise in the context of strategic human 
                                                     
517
 Langford et al., supra note 159, 434-436. 
518
 B.A. Andreassen and G. Crawford, “Theoretical considerations,” in B.A. Andreassen and G. Crawford, 
Human rights, power and non-governmental action 1 (London: Routledge, 2013), 7-8. 
106 
 
rights litigation.519 While the decision to accept a settlement offer should be based on the content of 
the proposal and an assessment of the expected risks and benefits of continued litigation, which 
includes a consideration of different interests and factors, the clients’ interests should ultimately 
prevail. Whether a settlement is successful depends on a similar assessment as discussed above. In that 
regard, not only the impacts of the settlement itself (which is often confidential) should be considered 
but also any impacts that the litigation may already have produced before the parties decided to settle. 
Although it is not impossible for the settlement and the preceding litigation to generate indirect social 
impacts, the compromise reached will likely be limited to the specific parties involved – which, at 
least as far as strategic litigation is concerned, is not considered very successful.520 The dilemma of 
settling cases is reviewed more thoroughly in the context of the case study (infra Part III, Section 
2.4.4).  
2.2.6. Contextual factors 
Litigation is subject to a multiplicity of input and output factors, which, moreover, do not stand by 
themselves but interact, making the course and outcome of litigation inherently unpredictable.521 
Hence, designing a lawsuit is not a matter of mathematical science, and untangling the different factors 
so as to measure their concrete effect and their contribution to the eventual success of a lawsuit, is 
arduous if not impossible.522 For instance, lawsuits are conducted in a particular legal order and relate 
to a particular issue, and thus take place in a unique historical, socio-political, legal and institutional 
setting.523 The discussion below briefly describes the meaning and limiting effect of some of these 
contextual factors that together determine the window of opportunity for strategic human rights 
litigation – without ambitioning exhaustiveness.524 
The fact that cases are litigated in a unique setting is an important caveat whenever strategic lawsuits 
are compared, whether within one domestic legal order (but at different times or relating to different 
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issues) or across legal orders (even if relating to the same issues).525 The findings from the case study 
can thus not be generalised without more (see also infra Part IV, Section 1.2.2.1).  
2.2.6.1. History 
A first group of contextual factors relate to the history of a country and its legal order. Many national 
bills of rights, for instance, were elaborated and adopted following a specific historical (r)evolution.526 
Generally, the causes of such happening have influenced, and may still influence, not only the content 
and style of a state’s constitutional law, such as the organisation of the state apparatus and its 
fundamental values, but also the legal culture and society as such. Understanding history may thus 
assist in explaining why litigation is more or less common, whether a constitution has authoritative 
power and why (not), and how separation of powers amongst the judiciary, the legislature and the 
executive is conceived and implemented.527 As regards South Africa, for instance, its past of Apartheid 
is crucial, especially for the debate on business and human rights, as will be explained later (infra Part 
III, Section 1.1.1).  
2.2.6.2. Socio-political context 
As was said before (supra Section 2.1.3), litigation is generally used in tandem with other strategies, 
precisely because it is not immune from socio-political interests.528 Indeed, notwithstanding safeguards 
for their independence and impartiality, judges are members of the society in which they perform their 
functions and tend to share the values and ideas that also determine the policies of popular 
representatives. Hence, few judges are completely insensitive to the social and political interests that 
are at stake in a particular case,529 and they are not likely to adopt a reasoning or decision that has no 
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popular support at all.530 This is also due to the fact that they depend on government and on society as 
such for their judgments to be implemented and effective.531  
Pieterse distinguishes an ‘internal’ political environment (where policy is conceptualised and 
implemented) and an ‘external’ political environment (where policy is received).532 Factors within the 
political context that may influence the effectiveness of litigation include the willingness and capacity 
of government (especially to implement or enforce court orders), the political culture, the interaction 
between the judiciary and the parties involved (government, civil society, business community), and 
judges’ sensitivity to lobbying campaigns.533 Also the transnational political environment may be 
relevant, which comprises factors such as the occurrence of similar challenges in other countries and 
the consequent transnational diffusion of experiences related thereto, or the intervention by 
transnational actors.534  
2.2.6.3. Legal context 
A third category of factors concern the legal context within which litigation takes place and comprise, 
for instance, the legal culture535 (which is influenced by factors relating to history and socio-political 
interests as well), the legal system as such536 (in particular the applicable rules of procedural and 
substantive law,537 as well as the frequency, significance and nature of similar cases and their 
outcome538), and factors that are directly linked with the court system (such as the degree of 
bureaucratisation and formalism, and even the geographical distance to the courts539) or with the way 
in which the case proceeds (such as the behaviour of the parties involved in the litigation540). As 
regards legal culture, in particular, this is “the cluster of attitudes, ideas, expectations, and values that 
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people hold with regard to their legal system, legal institutions, and legal rules”541 that prevail in a 
certain geographical and temporal space.542 This culture affects everyone, namely judges543 and 
lawyers (internal legal culture) as well as politicians and society as such (external legal culture),544 and 
is not rigid but evolves.545 
2.2.6.4. Institutional setting 
Finally, also a lawsuit’s institutional setting must definitely be considered, which encompasses factors 
relating to the judiciary’s organisation (internal dimension) and its relationship with other actors 
(external dimension).546 Relevant factors in the internal institutional context include the appointment 
procedure for judges, the bench’s composition, jurisprudential resources (such as judges’ training and 
curriculum, the financial, human and technical resources of courts, and the existence of professional 
organisations protecting the interests of judges), and the interaction between courts at different levels 
of jurisdiction, in particular in common law countries that adhere to stare decisis.547 It should be noted 
that even within one state the internal institutional context may slightly differ depending on the space 
where a dispute manifests itself and/or is resolved, for instance a rural versus an urban setting and a 
national versus a regional or local setting.548  
The independence of the judiciary is one important factor of the external institutional setting,549 but 
most discussions have focussed on the relationship between the judiciary, on the one hand, and the 
executive and the legislature, on the other. The main question is how far the competence of the 
judiciary reaches to scrutinise legislative and executive acts without violating the separation of powers 
doctrine. For the purpose of this dissertation, it is sufficient to briefly explain the two objections that 
lie at the heart of this controversy, namely the concern that non-elected judges should not substitute 
decisions adopted by the democratically elected representatives of the people (the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty) and the uncertainty whether judges have access to the required resources and information to 
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adopt well-founded decisions in polycentric matters (the issue of comparative institutional 
competence).550 
Although there is some truth in both objections, rather than prompting a finding that transformative 
human rights litigation is inherently anti-democratic and forces judges to perform a role for which they 
are ill-equipped, it is agreed that these concerns should rather encourage activists and lawyers, first, to 
integrate strategic litigation into a broader political and social strategy that secures popular support 
and, second, to ensure that all necessary information to adopt a reasoned decision is provided to the 
court.551 Furthermore, the counter-majoritarian difficulty and the principle of comparative institutional 
competence imply a particular understanding of ‘democracy’ and ‘separation of powers’ that should, 
arguably, not be taken for granted at least for the following four reasons.552  
First, the objections are based on an artificial distinction between what is legal and what is political, 
which is unpersuasive because, as Courtis for instance explains, law results from politics and, in turn, 
politicians use the law to convey political values.553 Second, they seem to presume that judges simply 
disregard the will of the people and the political deliberations that preceded the act that is challenged, 
while research has demonstrated that judges rarely rule completely against the executive and the 
legislature.554 Third, the concerns express a belief that judicial review of legislative and executive acts 
pre-empts rather than provokes inter-branch dialogue. In many cases, however, judges only apply a 
weak form of judicial review and leave sufficient room for discretion to government.555 Hence, the 
litigation presents an opportunity for genuine dialogue on constitutional matters, amongst the 
judiciary, the legislature, the executive and the citizenry, and thereby deepens democracy instead of 
weakening it.556 Fourth and finally, the criticism seems to ignore the birth-right of constitutions, as the 
very idea underlying them is precisely to prevent that human rights can ever be undermined by the 
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tyranny of the majority.557 Indeed, as Tushnet has found, most constitutional states place limits on 
democratic governance to prevent that the legislature and the executive act against the constitution.558 
In sum, many scholars559 argue that transformative human rights litigation, even when it leads to 
courts reviewing acts by the legislature or the executive, does not carve out but deepens democracy, 
because it demonstrates the checks and balances between the three branches, complements other 
accountability mechanisms, such as elections,560 and enhances deliberation and popular participation, 
for several reasons, including that courts constitute a public forum, that judges are less likely to be 
tainted by political interests, and that government can be held accountable more immediately and 
directly.561 This definitely holds true for public interest litigation and class actions, which are not 
limited to only a few aggrieved parties (supra Section 2.2.1.1.).562  
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PART III.  
A REALITY CHECK: MINEWORKERS AND NEIGHBOURING 
COMMUNITIES’ (UN)HEALTHY WORKING AND LIVING 
ENVIRONMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA  
113 
 
As the discussion of the international legal framework on business and human rights in Part II has 
demonstrated, international law does not assume that business enterprises have no human rights duties 
at all, but that such duties should be implemented under domestic law and enforced at the domestic 
level. The UNGPs urge states to ensure that business enterprises are legally responsible for human 
rights inter alia by adopting the necessary preventive and remedial (legislative, regulatory, 
administrative, judicial or other) measures. 
Hence, whether business enterprises are effectively accountable for human rights ultimately depends 
on the extent to which states excel in complying with their obligation to protect. To assess this issue, 
regard should be had to the legal impact of human rights on business enterprises under national law 
and to the ability of victims or activists acting in the public interest to access judicial remedies. In Part 
III, these questions are considered in relation to a particular domestic legal order (South Africa) and a 
specific type of human rights violations (associated with environmental degradation) committed by 
business enterprises that are active in a given industry (the extractives).  
Chapter 1 of Part III deals with the features of the South African domestic legal order that are, based 
on the analysis in Part II, considered relevant for ascertaining the responsibility of business for human 
rights. Thereafter, in Chapter 2, the practical experiences of activists and lawyers that have used 
litigation to enforce accountability for human rights by business enterprises (namely mining 
companies) are scrutinised so as to shed light on the different decisions that these stakeholders have to 
take when they determine the strategy of their litigation. The purpose of the latter analysis is to 
identify any common factors that assist (or hamper) victims in enforcing accountability for business-
related human rights abuse through judicial remedies and that (could) strengthen the effectiveness of 
such litigation.  
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1. SETTING THE SCENE: BUSINESS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO 
REMEDIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Before delving into the specific issue of using strategic litigation to ensure accountability for human 
rights violations by mining companies due to environmental degradation, a number of general features 
of the South African legal order are discussed, which together constitute the framework within which 
business-related human rights matters are litigated. One such feature concerns the legal impact of 
human rights on business enterprises in the South African legal order (1.2), namely the horizontality of 
human rights and the protective duties of state organs. Thereafter, the Chapter continues with an 
assessment of the relationship between international and South African law (1.3) and ends with a 
discussion of different factors that relate to the enforcement of accountability for human rights 
violations (1.4), videlicet the rules on locus standi, access to free or cheap legal aid, the threat of 
intimidating lawsuits, the different judicial, non-judicial and non-state-based remedies, and the 
available forms of relief.  
By way of introduction, however, the Chapter commences with explaining why the very idea of 
business enterprises having human rights obligations is not considered all that strange in South Africa 
(1.1), how this country positions itself in the international debate (1.2) and how the government tries 
to maintain its domestic regulatory space under international investment law (1.3). 
1.1. Business and human rights: a state of affairs in South Africa 
1.1.1. A history of business and human rights 
Earlier it was claimed that the idea of human rights duties for business enterprises entails a paradigm 
shift, because, at least traditionally, human rights were classified as belonging to the public sphere.563 
This does not hold true as much in South Africa, where, as Gwanyana says, “[t]he belief that placing 
duties on companies is unprecedented and not allowed was never part of [the] law.”564 The country’s 
history of Apartheid, a time during which companies maliciously conspired with the regime in order to 
preserve and even tighten discriminatory practices,565 has made everyone aware of the power of 
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business and of its ability to commit human rights abuses. 566 As the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission wrote in its final report, “[b]usiness was central to the economy that sustained the South 
African state during the apartheid years.”567 When the country made its transition to a democratic, 
constitutional state based on the rule of law, the drafters of the Constitution were mindful of the past 
and dedicated to a future where all private and public conduct would be subjected to constitutional 
scrutiny.568 Moreover, by that time, the question of human rights affecting business enterprises had 
been theorised in other jurisdictions, the experience of which was considered when the new 
Constitution was drafted.569 The result was that ever since the birth of the new state, business 
enterprises have been assumed to be responsible for human rights (see the analysis of the 
constitutional dispensation for business and human rights infra in Section 1.2.1).  
This specific historical setting receives a lot of attention from legal scholars – as well as from some 
judges570 – when they discuss the human rights responsibilities of business enterprises in South 
Africa.571 The Constitution of 1996 performs a crucial role in ensuring that business is responsible for 
human rights, as it aims at transforming572 not only the social and political institutions, but the entire 
“South African legal enterprise, including the private legal enterprise.”573 As Davis and Klare have 
written, “[a] basic assumption underlying the Constitution is that South Africa cannot progress toward 
social justice with a legal system that rigs a transformative constitutional superstructure onto a 
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common law base inherited from the past and indelibly stained by apartheid.”574 This quote bespeaks 
an awareness that private power is actually constituted by the law and thus by public power, which 
makes the distinction between the private and public sphere for the protection of human rights rather 
artificial.575 Also the Constitutional Court has pondered that “over emphasis on the differences 
between the exercise of private and public power often sheltered private power used for public 
purposes.”576 
In sum, the debate on business and human rights has a somewhat different dimension in South Africa 
in the sense that there is no paradigmatic reticence to the idea of business enterprises being bound by 
human rights. This allows for a more progressive approach to the issue of business and human rights, 
which, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 2, indeed finds expression in the discourse used by lawyers 
and activists and sometimes even in bold statements by judges. A nice illustration is the following 
holding by the Supreme Court of Appeal in a case concerning industrial pollution. 
Corporations operating within our borders, whether local or international, must be left in no 
doubt that in relation to the environment in circumstances such as those under discussion, 
there is no room for secrecy and that constitutional values will be enforced.577 
1.1.2. South Africa’s position in the international debate 
Before discussing the extent to which human rights constrain business enterprises within the South 
African legal order and reviewing the actual experiences of local stakeholders who seek to vindicate 
human rights against business enterprises, it is interesting to reflect on South Africa’s position in the 
debate on business and human rights at the level of the United Nations. The following quote from one 
of the respondents is already revealing.  
It is a shocking surprise to me that (…) there is this disconnect between progress at that level 
and actually what is happening all over the country. I am not sure how to explain it, but maybe 
the state is not one thing (…) It is a complex arrangement (…) I would not look at the 
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behaviour of the state within its own boundaries, and say this is characteristic of its 
diplomacy.578 
In June 2014 South Africa was amongst the twenty states that voted in favour of Resolution 26/9 on 
the elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on business and human rights, which 
created an open-ended intergovernmental working group (supra Part I, Section 1.3).579 The concerned 
resolution was even drafted by South Africa, together with Ecuador – the latter country not being a 
member of the Human Rights Council at that time.580 Since its establishment two sessions of the open-
ended working group have been organised, each of which were attended by representatives from the 
South African government.  
While the state is one of the main supporters of a binding treaty, South Africa has not yet taken any 
step towards adopting a national action plan regarding the concrete measures it will take to implement 
its obligation to protect in accordance with the UNGPs. This illustrates why the fear that Resolution 
26/9 may distract from the real work, id est the effective enforcement of domestic laws and regulations 
governing corporate conduct so as to prevent and redress abuse, may be founded.581 After numerous 
unanswered calls from civil society on the South African government to issue a national action plan, in 
April 2016 the Centre for Human Rights at the University of Pretoria eventually published a shadow 
baseline assessment with the support of the International Roundtable for Corporate Accountability.582 
In the executive summary of the shadow report, they write that “the South African government is 
currently prioritizing the process around a treaty on business and human rights at the UN level”.583 As 
the government has not yet even committed to drafting a national action plan, the shadow report is 
meant to lay the foundations for such a process in the future, but also to support advocacy around 
business and human rights in South Africa.584  
In relation to South Africa’s international position about business and human rights it is also 
interesting to observe that the government has not (yet) ratified the Protocol on the Statute of the 
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African Court of Justice and Human Rights and, hence, neither the Protocol on the Amendments 
thereto.585 This is noteworthy precisely because the latter amendments will extend the Court’s 
jurisdiction to legal persons. In other words, if the Protocol on the Amendments enters into force, the 
African Court will be competent to hear claims seeking to hold companies accountable for 
infringements upon international criminal law, including the most egregious human rights 
violations.586  
1.1.3. The domestic regulatory space and international investment law 
When the new South African state emerged after decades of discriminatory policies administered by 
the Apartheid regime, equality was far from within reach and the desired social transformation would 
never be achieved without affirmative action, for which the Constitution explicitly catered.587 When 
the South African government began implementing this constitutional mandate, it soon realised, 
however, that its laws, regulations and policies providing for affirmative action could be challenged 
under international investment law. Indeed, in November 2006, for instance, investors from Italy and 
Luxembourg launched arbitration proceedings claiming that the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act588 (see also infra Section 2.2.2) amounted to expropriation.589  
This Act introduced several changes to South African mining law. First of all, since its entry into force 
the state is the custodian of all minerals, but can grant, for the benefit of all South African people, 
‘limited real rights’ to prospect for or extract these minerals to applicants that meet the requirements 
set by law.590 Moreover, rights holders are no longer allowed to ‘sterilise’ – id est not exercise – their 
rights, meaning that they have to start prospecting or extracting within a time period set by law.591 
Another fundamental change is that the Mining Charter adopted in terms of the MPRDA provides that 
all mineral rights have to be held for at least 26% by previously disadvantages groups592 – a measure 
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that is part of the ‘broad-based black economic empowerment’ policy that applies across the South 
African economy.593 The Act also applies to mineral rights that were acquired before its entry into 
force, and the holders of such rights were obliged to convert their ‘old order’ rights into ‘new order’ 
rights within the transitional period set by the law.  
The Italian and Luxembourgish investors complained that these changes amounted to direct or indirect 
expropriation and, hence, filed a request for the institution of arbitration proceedings pursuant to the 
two bilateral investment treaties that South Africa had concluded with, respectively, Italy and the 
Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union – the case of Piero Foresti and Others v. South Africa.594 Those 
treaties included the following clause protecting against expropriation. 
(1) Investments of investors of either Contracting Party shall not be nationalised, expropriated 
or subjected to measures having effect equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation 
(hereinafter referred to as "expropriation) in the territory of the other Contracting Party except 
for a public purpose related to the internal needs of that Party, under due process of law, on a 
non-discriminatory basis and against prompt, adequate and effective compensation. Such 
compensation shall amount to the real value of the investment expropriated (…), shall include 
interest at a normal commercial rate until the date of payment, (…) The investors affected 
shall have the right, under the law of the Contracting Party making the expropriation, to 
prompt review, by a judicial or other independent authority of that Contracting Party, of their 
case and of the valuation of their investments (…)595 
Peculiar to this arbitration case is that four nongovernmental organisations applied to intervene as non-
disputing parties,596 which was accepted by the Tribunal. According to those interveners, the investors 
sought to challenge the international legality of constitutionally mandated measures and to question 
the South African government’s ability to implement certain legislative and policy decisions to redress 
the devastating socio-economic legacy of Apartheid, which could have serious domestic 
repercussions.597 Therefore, the non-disputing parties pleaded for “[a]n interconnected approach to 
international law” and wanted to assist the Tribunal in placing the bilateral investment treaties in 
context so as to avoid an “interpretive approach that would create an irreconcilable conflict between 
the relevant bilateral investment treaties and the human rights obligations” and “to promote a more 
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coherent international legal framework.”598 In the end, however, the dispute got settled, so that the 
arbitration Tribunal never ruled on its merits,599 and thus did not respond to the fundamental concerns 
raised by the non-disputing parties regarding the relationship between investment law and human 
rights, which is unfortunate given the uncertainties that exist in that regard (supra Part II, Section 1.3).  
As South Africa feared that the Foresti case would only be the first in a series of challenges to its 
transformative policies, the government ordered a screening of its foreign investment policy 
framework. That process ended in 2009 with the publication of a report holding that South African 
negotiators were insufficiently experienced and lacked knowledge about investment law so that the 
country had entered into agreements that were not in its long term interests.600 More generally, the 
report also found that investment agreements are predominantly concerned with protecting the 
interests of investors from developed countries and insufficiently address the interests of 
developing countries in sustainable development.601  
The balance of power in North–South negotiations is tipped heavily in favour of developed 
countries and large, politically influential corporations. (…) the current BITs extend far into 
developing countries’ policy space, imposing damaging binding investment rules with far-
reaching consequences for development. New investment rules in BITs prevent developing 
country governments from requiring foreign companies to transfer technology, train local 
workers, or source inputs locally. Under such conditions, investment fails to encourage or 
enhance development. (…)602 
The report concluded with a number of recommendations for the South African government to review 
its current investment policy “to do damage control”.603 In accordance with those recommendations, in 
July 2010 the Cabinet adopted a decision (1) to draft a new investment act codifying and clarifying 
standard provisions for bilateral investment, (2) to terminate first-generation treaties while offering 
partners a possibility to renegotiate, (3) to refrain from entering into new treaties except for 
compelling economic and political reasons, and (4) to develop a new model treaty as a basis for (re-
)negotiation.604 That decision is being implemented since 2012. In particular, several bilateral 
investment treaties have been terminated, including those with the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic 
Union, Spain, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Denmark. Furthermore, in 2015 the 
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Protection of Investment Act605 was adopted. This Act is aimed at protecting investment in a manner 
that balances the public interest and the rights and obligations of investors, affirming South Africa’s 
sovereign right to regulate investment and confirming the Bill of Rights and the laws that apply to all 
investors in the country.606  
In accordance with those objectives the Protection of Investment Act contains a number of innovative 
elements. Section 10, for instance, acknowledges that investors have a right to property, but in line 
with the South African Constitution.607 The latter caveat is important as the right to property as 
protected by Section 25 of the Constitution608 not only provides for additional legitimate restriction 
grounds, but also makes a distinction between expropriation, which must be compensated to be 
legitimate, and deprivation, which does not require compensation – provided that the deprivation 
occurs in terms of a law of general application and is not arbitrary.609 The protection of the right to 
property in the South African domestic legal order is thus less strong than investors would like it to be. 
In Agri South Africa v. Minister for Minerals,610 which is a case concerning a mining company’s claim 
for compensation based on the argument that the changes to mining law introduced by the MPRDA 
amounted to expropriation,611 for instance, the Constitutional Court held that in casu the MPRDA had 
not expropriated the claimant but deprived it of its mineral rights in a legitimate way, namely through 
a general, non-arbitrary law that seeks to facilitate broader and equitable access to mineral 
resources.612 In that judgment, the Court also emphasised the peculiar, historically-motivated 
interpretation of property rights under the Constitution.613 The following holding is particularly 
revealing.  
This brings to the fore the obligation imposed by section 25 not to over-emphasise private 
property rights at the expense of the state’s social responsibilities. It must always be 
remembered that our history does not permit a near-absolute status to be given to individual 
property rights to the detriment of the equally important duty of the state to ensure that all 
South Africans partake of the benefits flowing from our mineral and petroleum resources.614 
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Another striking provision of the Protection of Investment Act is Section 12, which explicitly 
recognises the right of the South African government to regulate and, in particular, its authority to 
adopt measures for purposes such as redressing historical, social and economic inequalities and 
injustices, upholding the rights guaranteed in the Constitution and achieving the progressive 
realisation of socio-economic rights.615 Finally, although the Act provides for a possibility to request 
international arbitration, the South African government can only agree to have an investment dispute 
referred to arbitration when all domestic remedies have been exhausted.616  
The adoption of the Act in December 2015 has meant a major step for South Africa towards 
maintaining its domestic regulatory space so as to be able to comply with its obligations under 
international human rights law – as well as other international obligations, for instance in terms of 
environmental law. The initiative has, therefore, been commended by civil society for formalizing “in 
investment terrain, the supremacy of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights” and for ensuring “that 
foreign investors remain committed to the South Africa’s development agenda [sic].”617 
1.2. Business and human rights according to South African law 
1.2.1. Constitutional dispensation for business and human rights  
1.2.1.1. A quick overview  
The extent to which human rights affect business enterprises in South Africa depends on the horizontal 
effect, scope and application of human rights and the protective duties of organs of the state (see supra 
Part II, Section 1.2). The following five constitutional provisions are particularly relevant to this 
analysis.  
7. (2) The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. 
8. (1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the 
judiciary and all organs of state. 
(2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent 
that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty 
imposed by the right. 
(3) When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms 
of subsection (2), a court— 
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the 
common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right; and 
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(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation 
is in accordance with section 36(1). (…) 
38. Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a 
right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant 
appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights. (…) 618 
39. (2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary 
law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill 
of Rights. 
172.(1) When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court— (…) 
(b) may make any order that is just and equitable, (…) 
While the meaning and effect of these provisions will be discussed more in detail in the following 
Sections on horizontality (Section 1.2.1.2) and protective duties (Section 1.2.1.3) as well as later in the 
Sections dealing with standing rights (infra Section 1.4.1.1) and remedial powers (infra Section 
1.4.3.1), this introductory Section already provides a general overview. 
Section 8(2) determines the horizontal effect and scope of the rights in the Bill of Rights, whilst 
Section 8(3) governs their (possible) indirect horizontal application. More specifically, the latter 
provision admits strong, direct-indirect horizontal application by mandating judges to develop the 
common law in order to give effect to concrete rights. In turn, Section 39(2) is inter alia619 concerned 
with – if need be strong – indirect-indirect horizontal application in conformity with constitutional 
values, as opposed to concrete rights (indirect-indirect horizontal application).  
Next, Section 38 provides an independent cause of action for the direct horizontal application of 
constitutional rights, in conjunction with the concrete right that is (allegedly) violated. This provision 
is also relevant for other forms of (non-)horizontal application, as well as for the state’s protective 
duties, because it determines standing rights and stipulates that courts should grant appropriate relief. 
In relation to relief, Section 172(1)(b), lastly, confers wide discretion to the judiciary as well, which 
includes the possibility of granting constitutional relief (in the case of direct horizontal application) 
and of strong remedies (in the case of indirect horizontal application).  
The provisions of Sections 8(3), 39(2) and 172(1)(b) also trigger the protective duties of the judiciary, 
since judges are responsible for applying human rights horizontally, whether directly or indirectly. The 
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key constitutional provisions dealing with protective duties are Sections 7(2) and 8(1), however. The 
latter provisions relate to the vertical application and the indirect horizontal application of human 
rights as well, because protective duties affect the way in which the legislature, the executive and the 
judiciary perform their functions, and thus influence laws, regulations, policies and judgments. 
It should be noted that, similar to legal scholarship on the horizontality question in abstracto, South 
African legal scholars have not agreed on one normative theory. Hence, there are different approaches 
to categorise and explain the effects of human rights in the private sphere.620 Nolan, for instance, uses 
the term ‘direct-mediated horizontal application’ to explain that human rights bind private actors, but 
in principle take effect through private law, which is here called indirect horizontal application.621 In 
turn, Bhana622 distinguishes “two legs of the horizontality debate”: the ‘scope’ and the ‘form’ of 
horizontal ‘application’, with the former relating to the content and the latter to the method of 
application. Her understanding of the ‘scope of horizontal application’ then seems to embrace both 
‘scope’ and ‘effect’ as used here, while the term ‘application’ in this dissertation is only used to 
discuss ‘the form’ of such application as Bhana calls it. When Friedman, on the other hand, writes 
about the ‘ambit’ of human rights, that term again combines ‘effect’ and ‘scope’.623 A last illustration 
are the writings by Van der Walt, who theorises about the influence of human rights on the 
development of the common law, which he calls the horizontal ‘radiation’ or ‘seepage’ of human 
rights in the private sphere, while in this dissertation this is designated as indirect horizontal 
application. His theory combines the judiciary’s protective duties (in particular to develop the common 
law in conformity with human rights) and the (direct or indirect) horizontal application of human 
rights.624 
1.2.1.2. Horizontality 
(i) Horizontal effect 
Whether the Bill of Rights has horizontal effect seems quite straightforward, as Section 8(2) explicitly 
stipulates that companies are bound by constitutional rights. There is thus no principled objection 
against horizontal effect, nor against the idea that the exercise of private power is not immune from 
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constitutional scrutiny. This acceptance has to be understood in light of South Africa’s history, as was 
explained earlier (supra Section 1.1.1).  
Section 8(2) suggests that both the nature of the right and the nature of the duty are relevant to 
determine whether a concrete right has horizontal effect. For the purposes of this dissertation, 
however, the nature of the duty rather assists in establishing the horizontal scope of a right that has, in 
principle, horizontal effect. At present, a clear normative theory on how to assess whether a right lends 
itself, by its nature, to horizontal effect does not (yet) exist.625 In Khumalo v. Holomisa, a case 
concerning defamation, the Constitutional Court has provided some limited guidance with its holding 
that “the right to freedom of expression is of direct horizontal application” “[g]iven the intensity of the 
constitutional right in question, coupled with the potential invasion of that right which could be 
occasioned by persons other than the state or organs of state.”626 Arguably,627 the Court’s use of the 
term ‘application’ here was premature, because at that point the real issue was whether the right had 
horizontal effect and all the more because in this case the Court eventually did not apply the right 
directly, but indirectly by interpreting and applying the common law in conformity with the concerned 
right.628 
Thus, according to the Constitutional Court,629 regard should be had to (1) the intensity of a right – 
which seems to be equated with the right’s importance – and (2) its susceptibility to invasion by 
private actors. In other paragraphs of the same judgment, the Court also takes into account the role of 
the private party whose right is at stake (in casu freedom of expression of the media) and the 
countervailing interests of the other private party (in casu privacy and dignity). Through the latter 
criterion the Court suggests that conflicting private interests must be balanced already at the time of 
determining the horizontal effect and scope of a particular right, and thus prior to the determination of 
how that should eventually be applied to private actors, which again blurs the different dimensions of 
horizontality.630 In view of this limited guidance, some legal scholars have developed their own 
method to determine whether a given right has horizontal effect. According to Bilchitz, for instance, 
two factors are particularly important to determine whether a right takes effect against a business 
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enterprise: (1) the (potential) impact of business enterprises on the rights at stake and (2) the 
capacities, capabilities and functions of those companies within society.631  
In any case, in practice the question whether a right has horizontal effect may be somewhat moot for 
two reasons. First, many provisions in the Bill of Rights explicitly confirm that they affect state actors 
as well as private actors. Examples are Section 9 on the right to equality (“[n]o person may unfairly 
discriminate (…) against anyone”), Section 12(1)(c) on the right to freedom and security of the person 
(“[e]veryone has the right (…) to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private 
sources”),632 and Section 32(1)(b) on the right to information (“[e]veryone has the right of access to 
(…) any information that is held by another person and that is required for the exercise or protection of 
any rights”). Second, the South African judiciary has by now recognised the horizontal effect of those 
rights that are codified in a provision that does not include an express statement on their horizontal 
effect, but that logically seem relevant in private relationships. Examples thereof include the right to 
education,633 to freedom of expression,634 to an environment not harmful to health,635 and to have 
access to housing.636  
(ii) Horizontal scope 
Not all human rights duties owed by the South African state towards everyone within its jurisdiction 
should automatically be imposed on business enterprises.637 This is implied by the caveat in Section 
8(2) making the binding effect of human rights vis-à-vis private actors conditional upon the nature of 
the specific duty imposed by the concerned right. According to Cheadle and Davis,638 whether a 
private actor bears a certain duty under a given right thus depends on whether the imposition of such a 
duty is ‘suitable’.  
Again only limited guidance has been given regarding the types of duties that business enterprises can 
bear. Before discussing the two legs of the scope question, id est the type of duties and the 
identification of rights holders, a brief observation should be made on the terminology used by the 
judiciary. In particular, courts often speak of the obligation to respect as an inherently negative 
obligation, even if it results, in the specific circumstances of a case, in a duty to take positive action to 
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avoid an invasion with human rights, whereas the obligations to protect and fulfil are considered 
inherently positive. As was explained earlier (supra Part II, Section 1.2.2.2), this dissertation avoids 
that terminology, because ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ duties are too often conflated with passive and 
active duties, whilst each of the tripartite obligations to respect, protect and fulfil is capable of 
encompassing both passive and active duties.  
First, as regards the types of duties that may be owed by business enterprises, it is settled case law of 
the Court that “at the very minimum” business enterprises may not improperly encroach on human 
rights, whether civil and political rights or economic, social and cultural rights.639 This obligation to 
respect may result in the imposition of a positive duty on private actors if action is needed to prevent 
interference with the existing enjoyment of certain rights.640 In a case concerning the eviction of a 
school from private property, for instance, the Constitutional Court set aside a judgment of the High 
Court in which it had denied that a private actor, in casu a trust, owed a constitutional obligation under 
the right to education and had found that rather this trust’s constitutional right to property was at 
stake.641 According to the Constitutional Court, socio-economic rights should be “negatively protected 
from improper invasion,” so that private parties can be required “not to interfere with or diminish the 
enjoyment of a right.”642 The Court thus concluded that “the Trust’s constitutional obligation, once it 
had allowed the school to be conducted on its property, was to minimise the potential impairment of 
the learners’ right to a basic education”, from which flew a positive duty to engage meaningfully with 
government so as to find an agreement and take steps to secure alternative placement.643  
In another case, the High Court decided in accordance with the above judgment that an advertising 
company has to respect the right to freedom of expression. In casu, this entailed that once an 
advertising contract had been concluded, the company was prohibited from taking down billboards 
merely because of the content of the advertising campaign. According to the High Court, the company 
had a “duty not to interfere with the platform provided to the applicants to freely express certain facts 
and/or views (…) and ‘to respect’ the existing protection of the applicants’ constitutional right in this 
respect.”644 In the end, the High Court issued an order of specific performance directing the company 
to reinstate the advertisement.645 
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The judiciary is reticent to accept, however, that private actors, like business enterprises, also bear an 
obligation to protect and fulfil human rights.646 For instance, the Constitutional Court has expressly 
held that “[i]t is clear that there is no primary positive obligation on the Trust to provide basic 
education to the learners”, since that obligation rests on government.647 Similarly the High Court has 
found that “a private entity does not have the positive duty or obligation to ‘promote, protect and 
fulfill’ [sic] the constitutional rights of another private entity in the same way as the State”, but does 
have the negative duty not to interfere with human rights.648 
In sum, the South African judiciary acknowledges that business enterprises must respect human rights 
– which may entail that they must act in a given way – but not that they must protect and fulfil human 
rights. Such obligations may, however, arise when laws or regulations expressly provide for such a 
role on the part of companies or when companies enter into a contractual commitment under which 
they assume specific tasks in protecting or providing socio-economic goods. In a judgment concerning 
the privatisation of the payment of social grants, for instance, the Constitutional Court has held that 
because the concerned private company exercised a public power and performed an essentially public 
function, it should for the purpose of that activity be considered an organ of state,649 which is endowed 
with constitutional obligations and accountable to the public.650 Moreover, these constitutional 
obligations continue to exist even after the dissolution of the contract.651 This meant that in casu the 
private company bore a constitutional obligation to ensure that a workable system for the payment of 
social grants would remain in place until a new one was operational.652  
In this regard, it should also be noted that South African courts adopt a lenient interpretation of the 
term ‘organ of state’, as a result of which the state’s constitutional obligations have been extended to 
all private actors that exercise traditional government functions.653 As the Constitutional Court has 
explicitly acknowledged, “government cannot be released from its human rights and rule of law 
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obligations simply because it employs the strategy of delegating its functions to another entity.”654 In 
the case study, another example of a situation in which duties to provide and to fulfil have been 
imposed on private actors (albeit this time by legislation) will be explained, at which occasion also the 
opposition against such involvement of companies in the protection and fulfilment of human rights 
will be discussed (infra Section 2.2.3). 
Importantly, when human rights take effect in the relationship between private actors, an important 
consideration to bear in mind is the fact that private duty bearers are at the same time also rights 
holders.655 Accordingly, where the imposition of particular duty on a business enterprise interferes 
with a right held by that same actor, a balancing exercise has to be conducted – after all, private actors, 
like companies, are simultaneously duty bearers and rights holders.656 South African courts are wary 
thereof, as is evident from their reasoning in specific instances of horizontality.657 For instance, in the 
case of the school eviction, the Constitutional Court held that the private party’s obligation was 
secondary in nature and that the trust had not given up its property rights so that the obligation that it 
owed to the learners was, at most, to minimise the impact of the exercise of its rights on the right to 
education.658 Another example relates to defamation cases, where the freedom of expression of one 
party has to be balanced with the other party’s interests, like human dignity and reputation.659 
As regards the second leg of the horizontal scope issue, namely towards whom business enterprises 
owe their duties, there is again no single standard or normative theory. Nevertheless, the facts 
generally speak for themselves. Since business enterprises only have an obligation to protect and 
promote human rights when such duties are explicitly imposed on them by implementing laws or 
regulations or have been accepted in terms of a contract, those laws, regulations or contracts ordinarily 
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also identify the rights holders. The obligation to respect, on the other hand, binds business enterprises 
when they exercise control over the enjoyment of a right by its holder. To establish whether a 
company is responsible for an interference with a human rights ordinary rules of causation can, for 
instance, be applied (see also infra Section 2.5.4). In certain cases this obligation to respect may 
involve positive duties to maintain the existing enjoyment of rights, but then companies have first 
facilitated that enjoyment, following which they cannot simply interrupt a previous commitment.660  
A final observation is that some scholars and civil society actors have argued that the more vulnerable 
the individual rights holder is, the stronger the obligations of the business enterprise should be.661 This 
is an interesting argument, which combines the two legs of the horizontal scope issue, as it links the 
types of duties owed by companies to the identity of the rights holder. 
(iii) Horizontal application  
When a legal dispute amongst private actors has a bearing on human rights, it triggers the question of 
horizontal application. In theory, when such dispute arises in the South African legal order, all three 
models of application of human rights are available. Consequently, it is important to stress that the 
explicit provision for horizontal effect in Section 8(2) of the Constitution does not entail that human 
rights are necessarily applied horizontally;662 they may merely affect the conduct of business 
enterprises by influencing the laws, regulations, policies, judgments and other measures that govern 
corporate conduct. This was acknowledged by the Constitutional Court, holding that “even when only 
the state is bound, rights conferred upon individuals will justifiably be limited in order to recognise the 
rights of others in certain circumstances.”663 
Nevertheless, if a legal dispute amongst private actors touches upon human rights, mostly those rights 
will affect the resolution of that dispute by being (directly or indirectly) horizontally applied to it. 
Whether such application is direct or indirect makes little, if any, difference in terms of practical 
outcome,664 but the interplay between those two modes of application and the choice for either of them 
does lead to some interesting findings. 
A first finding is that when South African courts apply human rights horizontally to private parties, 
including business enterprises, such horizontal application is rarely ‘direct’. An important reason 
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therefor is the well-established principle of subsidiarity, underscored by the Constitutional Court,665 
according to which litigating parties may only invoke their fundamental rights directly – whether 
against a state actor or a private actor – if those rights are not implemented in any rule of statutory or 
common law or if they challenge the constitutionality of such implementing rule. The subsidiarity 
principle is meant to prevent the occurrence of parallel systems of jurisprudence, one under the 
Constitution and one under private law.666 Hence, in principle courts apply existing statutory or 
common law, which they interpret in conformity with the Constitution.  
The judiciary’s predilection for such indirect horizontal application should not come as a surprise. The 
Constitution arguably dictates a hierarchy preferring indirect over direct horizontal application, given 
that Section 8(2), stipulating that the Bill of Rights has horizontal effect, is immediately followed by a 
subsection (3), explaining how the Bill of Rights should be applied to private actors.667 A four-step 
analysis is prescribed, which judges cautiously follow:668 (1) they should first apply any legislative act 
in force that gives effect to that right; (2) where no such act exists, they must apply the common law; 
(3) if the common law does not adequately protect the constitutional right at stake, they have to 
develop the common law; (4) and, if the common law limits the right at stake, they have to scrutinise 
that limitation in light of Section 36.669 Moreover, throughout this four-step analysis judges should 
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, in conformity with Section 39(2). 
Underlying this four-step analysis – as well as the subsidiarity principle – is the consideration that, in 
conformity with the separation of powers doctrine, “judges should be mindful that the major engine 
for law reform is the Legislature, not the Judiciary.”670  
Also noteworthy is that while South African courts regularly resort to concrete rights in the Bill of 
Rights so as to interpret and apply existing laws and regulations (direct-indirect horizontal 
application), their interpretation and application of the common law (indirect-indirect horizontal 
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application) is rather guided by constitutional values in accordance with Section 39(2) of the 
Constitution.671 This different effect of human rights on private law depending on whether the law at 
stake is statutory or common law is relevant, because a value-analysis tends to be less rigorous; the 
exact content of the concerned rights may go unnoticed or be compromised more easily in favour of 
factors other than those that are recognised by Section 36 as legitimate restriction grounds.672  
Yet another finding is that judges use their mandate for strong indirect horizontal application only 
sparingly. A rare exception are cases where contractual provisions were found contrary to public 
policy as interpreted in conformity with the Bill of Rights and were invalidated.673 Courts also seem 
reluctant to develop new remedies in order to give effect to concrete constitutional rights, unless 
existing private law remedies are completely absent or blatantly inappropriate and the legislature is not 
expected to act upon a judgment within reasonable time.674 Rather than developing a new remedy, the 
Constitutional Court has found, for instance, that damages at common law based on negligence 
constitute an effective remedy under Section 38 of the Constitution to vindicate the right to personal 
security.675 It is also striking how to date only at very few occasions the common law has been 
developed to give effect to the rights protected by the Bill of Rights.676  
As was already said, even more exceptional are cases between private parties in which constitutional 
rights were directly applied, for instance in which a remedy was granted outside the common law (a 
constitutional remedy) or which were based solely on the Constitution. Examples of the former 
situation are constitutional damages677 and declarations that private conduct or private contracts are 
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unconstitutional and, hence, invalid.678 As for the second situation, cases rarely proceed on a 
constitutional cause of action, which is largely explained by the subsidiarity principle. The remarkable 
consequence is that the Constitutional Court only in December 2012 for the first time adjudicated a 
matter between private parties based on a constitutional cause of action – the case dealt with the 
compatibility of the constitutions and rules of political parties with the right of everyone to participate 
in the activities of such parties (Section 19(1)(b) of the Constitution).679  
Some legal scholars have criticised the judiciary’s cautious attitude and, in particular, its disregard of 
Section 8(3), claiming that this is why the transformative objective of the Constitution has yet to be 
realised in relation to private law.680 One fundamental point of criticism is that the courts have not 
(yet) developed a normative theory about the precise relationship between human rights and the 
common law. Such theory would definitely be welcomed, because the literature about the impact of 
human rights on the common law is divided.681 Moreover, many legal practitioners still seem to 
believe, rightly or wrongly, that the common law is a self-contained legal regime that is subject only to 
its own logic and rationality and that any external influence would endanger legal certainty and 
coherence.682 An illustration is the claim by du Plessis and Ford claim that “the milk has been spilt and 
there has been a degree of constitutional colonisation of the common law.”683 Nonetheless, Justice 
Chaskalson has once written the following holding for an unanimous Constitutional Court.  
I cannot accept this contention which treats the common law as a body of law separate and 
distinct from the Constitution. (…) There is only one system of law. It is shaped by the 
                                                     
678
 Dafel, supra note 279, 82. 
679
 Ramakatsa and Others v. Magashule and Others (CCT 109/12) [2012] ZACC 31 (18 December 2012). For a 
discussion of this case, see Dafel, supra note 278 (claiming that this was the first case to proceed on a 
constitutional cause of action reaching the Constitutional Court). Note, however, that a High Court judge had 
already earlier noted, obiter dictum, that a contractual clause restricting the right to have a dispute resolved in 
court is no general law and can thus not justifiably limit Section 34 of the Constitution. Jacobs and Another v. 
Transand (Pty) Ltd (11554/2014) [2014] ZAWCHC 172 (14 November 2014), para. 65. Cf. Barkhuizen v. 
Napier, supra note 657, paras 23 and 30-33 (pondering on the question of testing contractual provisions directly 
against the Constitution, but in casu preferring to interpret ‘public policy’ as embracing constitutional values). 
Section 34 of the Constitution is cited infra in Section 1.4.2.1. 
680
 Brand (2006), supra note 267, 218; Davis and Klare, supra note 106, 410, 413, 461-462 and 509; Liebenberg 
(2008b), supra note 568, 471-478; Liebenberg (2010), supra note 83, 62; Van der Walt (2005), supra note 624, 
667-668. 
681
 See e.g. the discussion between Davis and Klare, on the one hand, and Fagan, on the other. Davis, supra note; 
Davis and Klare, supra note 106, 423-425; A. Fagan, “The Secondary Role of the Spirit, Purport and Objects of 
the Bill of Rights in the Common Law’s Development,” S. African L.J. 127 (2010): 611-27. 
682
 E.g. R12 (saying that “to me there is very little room for the Constitution in delict”) and R13 (saying that 
“most advocates in this country would rather deal with the common law and leave the constitutional stuff”). R12 
later changed this position, see infra note 1507.  
683
 Du Plessis and Ford, supra note 242, 300. 
134 
 
Constitution which is the supreme law, and all law, including the common law, derives its 
force from the Constitution and is subject to constitutional control.684  
1.2.1.3. Protective duties  
According to Sections 7(2) and 8(1) of the Constitution, the legislature, executive, judiciary and all 
organs of state are bound by the Bill of Rights and must protect the rights contained therein. The 
Constitutional Court has interpreted the obligation to protect as imposing “a positive constitutional 
duty (…) to act in protection of the rights in the Bill of Rights” so that, where necessary, courts may 
direct state actors to take the necessary steps.685 Accordingly, regardless of the horizontality of human 
rights, they necessarily influence the private sphere through the constitutional obligation to protect, 
which constrains all state organs.686 The Constitutional Court already reckoned with this determination 
in its certification judgment, holding that “[a]s long as a bill of rights binds a legislature, legislation 
which regulates the relationships between private individuals will be subject to constitutional 
scrutiny.”687 
Hence, the executive and the legislature have to regulate and monitor the conduct of private actors, 
including business enterprises, so as to prevent them from violating the rights of others and to offer 
redress when a violation does occur.688 Also other organs of state bear duties so as to protect the rights 
in the Bill of Rights.689 These protective duties apply both to the substance of their acts or conduct and 
the procedures followed. Moreover, compliance therewith is subject to judicial scrutiny,690 and 
although South African courts are mindful of separation of powers, they have not shied away from 
specifying the concrete duties of government in accordance with the constitutional principle that 
remedies must be effective even if they have policy or budgetary implications (infra Section 1.4.3.2).  
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According to Van der Walt, there is a noticeable trend that judges who are called upon to analyse the 
impact of human rights on private law opt for the protective duties discourse instead of the 
horizontality discourse.691 The discourse on protective duties appeared for the first time in a judgment 
by the Constitutional Court dealing with the protection of physical integrity, Carmichele v. Minister of 
Safety.692 In that case, the Court held that the duty of the state and its organs not to interfere with 
constitutional rights may include “a positive component which obliges the state and its organs to 
provide appropriate protection to everyone through laws and structures designed to afford such 
protection.”693 Given that “constitutional obligations are now placed on the state to respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights,” the Court developed the common law of delict by 
expanding the requirement of unlawfulness, as a result of which state authorities can more easily be 
held liable in delict.694 Although Carmichele v. Minister of Safety was the first case in which protective 
duties were considered, in fact that judgment and later jurisprudence confirming it,695 deal with the 
duty of the state to protect the physical integrity of its citizens, comparable to the European Court of 
Human Right’s line of case law following Osman v. UK696 – the Constitutional Court even explicitly 
referred to that judgment.697 Van der Walt distinguishes such ‘duty-of-care’ cases from real 
‘protective-duties’ cases.698 ‘Real’ protective duties are akin to the much broader obligation to protect 
recognised in international law and, hence, extend beyond a mere duty of care.699 Not only do they 
apply to all the rights recognised in the Bill of Rights, but they are also more radical in demanding 
from the state to adopt laws and to provide remedies that interfere with the private sphere.700 
An example of a real ‘protective-duties’ case is the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Modder East Squatters v. Modderklip,701 where the Court found that the state had failed to comply 
with its constitutional duty to protect the property rights of a farm, as it had not provided the occupiers 
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of that farm with alternative land which would have enabled the farm to enforce their eviction.702 This 
judgment was confirmed by the Constitutional Court, albeit based on a different reasoning.703 The 
Constitutional Court found that the rule of law obliges the state to provide citizens with mechanisms to 
have disputes between them resolved, as protected by the right of everyone to have access to courts 
under Section 34 of the Constitution.704 Accordingly, the state should create an infrastructure that 
facilitates the execution of court orders and “take reasonable steps (…) to ensure that large-scale 
disruptions in the social fabric do not occur in the wake of the execution of court orders”.705 In casu, 
this obligation had not been complied with as the state had failed to provide the farm with effective 
relief.706  
Also judges have protective duties. For instance, “there can be no question that the obligation to 
develop the common law with due regard to the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights is an 
obligation which falls on all of our courts”.707 According to Davis and Klare, courts should also adopt 
a ‘transformative methodology’, whereby the values and aspirations of the Bill of Rights inform every 
legal reasoning.708 Hence, if a legal dispute amongst private actors reaches the courts’ dockets, judges 
must acquit their adjudicative function in conformity with their own obligation to protect human 
rights, which may require them to balance the different interests at stake.709 A judgment or an order 
that does not take into consideration the obligation of one private party to respect the rights of the 
other is subject to review.710 In the case discussed earlier concerning the eviction, for example, the 
Constitutional Court found that the High Court had granted an eviction order to the owner of the 
property where the school was located without adequately considering the right to education.711  
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1.2.2. Company law and corporate governance 
Section 7(a) of the Companies Act of 2008 clearly brings corporate law under the realm of the 
Constitution by stipulating that the promotion of compliance with the Bill of Rights in applying 
company law is one of the purposes of the Act.712 Whether this provision suffices to harmonise 
corporate law and constitutional law is questioned, however. According to Bilchitz, for instance, what 
is still lacking is, first, a legal requirement for companies to acknowledge that they are bound by 
human rights and, second, specific legal duties imposed on directors to ensure compliance by 
companies with their human rights duties.713 Katzew has even argued that the foundational principles 
of South African corporate law should be re-evaluated, including the paradigm of shareholder 
supremacy and the principle of separate legal personality.714  
Aside from the Companies Act, regard should also be had to common law. Under common law, the 
doctrine of the enlightened shareholder is recognised, for instance, which means that directors may 
consider the interests of stakeholders – like consumers, employees, communities and the environment 
– provided that they act in the best interests of the company which are equivalent to its shareholders’ 
interests.715 They are only required to consider those external interests if the interests of the company 
demand so, because their duty to exercise their powers in the best interests of the company is 
absolute.716 
As to corporate governance, a number of principles are stipulated in the King Report.717 The first King 
Report was adopted in 1994 by the King Committee established by the Institute of Directors of 
Southern Africa, and the latest King Report (IV) was issued in 2016. All companies operating in South 
Africa may, on a voluntary basis, commit themselves to the King Report, the only exception being 
companies listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange, which are obliged under the listing 
requirements to disclose their measure of compliance with the King Report.718 Adherence is on an 
‘apply or explain’ basis, meaning that companies do not have to apply the governance principles, but if 
they do not, they should explain the reasons for that decision. Principle 3 of the King Report stipulates, 
for instance, that the governing body should ensure that the organisation is and is seen to be a 
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responsible corporate citizen, including by complying with the Constitution. In addition, it should be 
noted that the Johannesburg Securities Exchange manages a social responsibility index based on the 
triple bottom line, id est good governance for economic, social and environmental sustainability 
(profit, people, planet).719  
Interestingly, judges sometimes consider voluntary commitments when they assess the behaviour of 
companies. In VEJA v. ArcelorMittal, for instance, the Supreme Court of Appeal found that it was “not 
without importance” that ArcelorMittal had publicly committed (in its annual reports) to engage with 
environmental activists but subsequently refused to share information regarding the pollution caused 
by its activities.720  
1.3. The liaison between international human rights and the Bill of Rights 
When South Africa emerged out of Apartheid, the aim was to found a new state on a “constitutional 
order premised upon open and democratic government and the universal enjoyment of fundamental 
human rights.”721 This entailed a historic transformation from a “past of a deeply divided society 
characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice” to a “future founded on the recognition 
of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all South 
Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex.”722 As is evident from these wordings and 
from the pledge in the Interim Constitution that every South African would “enjoy all universally 
accepted fundamental rights, freedoms and civil liberties, which shall be provided for and protected by 
entrenched and justiciable provisions,”723 international human rights featured prominently in South 
Africa’s transition.724 Eventually, this commitment to universal human rights resulted in a Constitution 
that establishes a peculiar relationship between the South African state and international law.  
First and foremost, South Africa is a prime example of the now dominant hybrid dualist-monist 
approach. Dualism is the starting position, with the first sentence of Section 231(4) of the Constitution 
providing that an international agreement only becomes law when it is enacted by national 
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legislation.725 According to the Constitutional Court, there are three main methods to incorporate 
treaties into domestic law, namely enacting its provisions in a specific act, including the treaty as a 
schedule to an act or adopting a law authorizing the executive to bring the treaty into effect by way of 
a proclamation or notice in the Government Gazette.726 Nevertheless, self-executing provisions of an 
international agreement that is not (yet) enacted, as well as rules of international customary law, are 
immediately applicable provided that they are not inconsistent with the Constitution or any act in 
force.727 In practice, however, the Constitutional Court has struggled with distinguishing self-
executing treaties from treaties that require incorporation.728  
What is peculiar to the South African Constitution, however, is the fact that the analysis of the 
relationship between international and national law does not end here.729 Two additional factors should 
be considered that further attenuate South Africa’s tendency towards dualism, in particular where 
human rights are concerned. Firstly, the Bill of Rights has clearly been inspired by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights,730 with some of its provisions clearly being the twins of those of the 
Universal Declaration. International human rights law accordingly also forms part of the ‘spirit’ of the 
Bill of Rights, which is relevant in light of the courts’ mandate under Section 39(2) of the Constitution 
to promote the spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights whenever they interpret legislation and 
develop the common law.731 Secondly, the Constitution incorporates two additional interpretative 
mandates, that is Section 233,732 which demands judges to prefer a reasonable interpretation of the law 
that is consistent with international law, and Section 39(1), which is the extraordinary provision that 
compels judges to consider international law – and allows them to consider foreign law – whenever 
they interpret the Bill of Rights.733 
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Section 233 applies to all legislation, and its general reference to ‘international law’ includes all 
international law that is binding on South Africa, even if the concerned treaties are not incorporated 
into domestic law.734 Section 39(1) only applies to the interpretation of constitutional rights, but is not 
limited to binding and/or self-executing rules of international law,735 so that even soft law736 and 
regional law from other regions737 may be considered.738 The interpretative mandate of Section 39(1) 
does not oblige judges to agree with those rules of international law and with their interpretation and 
application by the relevant monitoring bodies; they only have to consider international law.739 After 
all, the Constitution is the supreme law of the country.740 The relevance of this formal hierarchy should 
again be nuanced, however, given that international human rights law inspires the Bill of Rights and in 
light of its indirect integration through the interpretative mandates of Sections 39(1) and 233.741  
Finally, it should be noted that notwithstanding the solid alliance, on paper, between international 
human rights law and South African law, the record in practice is more mixed.742 First of all, it 
depends on the issues at stake. The case study will demonstrate that litigating parties do not have the 
habit of referring to international law in all matters and that international law does not always feature 
in the reasoning of judges.743 Secondly, it is true that judges were more enthusiastic to consider 
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international and foreign law during the first few years of the new democracy, but that the gradual 
development of South African law has detracted from this initial enthusiasm.744 
1.4. Remedies to enforce corporate accountability for human rights 
Although scholars may claim that rights can exist without a remedy,745 few rights holders will be 
satisfied if they hold a right that they cannot enforce. Hence, enforceability is crucial for a right to be 
effective. This is also why ‘access to remedies’ is one of the three pillars of the UN Framework on 
business and human rights (see supra Part II, Section 1.1.3). The UNGPs identify three main types of 
remedies: judicial, non-judicial state-based and non-state-based remedies. While the use of judicial 
remedies is analysed more in-depth in the case study in Chapter 2, this Section briefly explains some 
practicalities of gaining access to judicial remedies (Section 1.4.1), describes the remedies that are in 
principle available to victims of human rights violations and which are not limited to judicial remedies 
(Section 1.4.2), and discusses the forms of relief that can be obtained (Section 1.4.3).  
1.4.1. Practicalities of accessing justice through the court system 
Access to remedies, in general, and to courts, in particular, is crucial for human rights to be practical 
and effective. The South African Constitutional Court has phrased this concern as follows. 
Access to courts is fundamentally important to our democratic order. It is not only a 
cornerstone of the democratic architecture but also a vehicle through which the protection of 
the Constitution itself may be achieved. It also facilitates an orderly resolution of disputes so 
as to do justice between individuals and between private parties and the state.746 
Notwithstanding the idea of transformative constitutionalism (supra Section 1.1.1), which stands for 
an objective to transform society through and on the basis of a constitutional project and, hence, 
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assumes that law can effect social change, also in South Africa some scholars are sceptic.747 Although 
the focus of this dissertation is precisely on the use of judicial remedies to make business enterprises 
more responsible for human rights, which is not only a rights-based strategy but a courts-based 
strategy, it is admitted and the case study will also demonstrate that there are many practical barriers 
for poor and vulnerable people to access the justice system, which is a fact that should always be 
borne in mind. The people who are most in need, are the ones who are the least aware of their rights 
and the least likely to approach the courts to enforce their rights.748 Judges in South Africa 
acknowledge that they have to perform their functions “in a country where so few have the means to 
enforce their rights through the courts.”749 Below, three potential practical barriers are discussed, 
namely standing rights (Section 1.4.1.1), access to legal services (Section 1.4.1.2) and intimidation by 
counterparties using the law to scare off opponents (Section 1.4.1.3).  
1.4.1.1. Standing in court 
Under traditional common law the authority to sue is only vested in persons who have a sufficient 
personal interest in the subject-matter of the litigation – over and above any possible interest of the 
general public – or who have a special legal right.750 In other words, to have locus standi in iudicio 
litigating parties must have a direct interest in the matter.751 Section 38 of the South African 
Constitution has introduced a “radical departure”752 from the traditional common law approach to 
standing, however, by stipulating the following broad standing rules.  
38. Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a 
right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant 
appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights. The persons who may approach a court 
are— 
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(a) anyone acting in their own interest; 
(b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name; 
(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons; 
(d) anyone acting in the public interest; and 
(e) an association acting in the interest of its members.  
According to the Constitutional Court, for these standing rights to apply it is necessary but sufficient 
that litigating parties make a clear allegation that a right recognised in the Bill of Rights is either 
violated or threatened.753 Consequently, Section 38 is triggered as soon as there is a constitutional 
claim, which has been leniently interpreted to include even claims based on ordinary statutory or 
common law, provided that the law is to be applied, interpreted and developed in conformity with the 
Constitution.754 The only limitation is that abstract questions of constitutionality cannot be litigated;755 
there must be an interest in pursuing the matter in court.  
Section 38(a) and (e) admit collective claims, respectively by several parties acting together or by an 
association created to conduct the litigation on behalf of all its members, whilst representative claims 
by a person acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in his or her own name are permissible 
under Section 38(b). In addition, Sections 38(c)756 en (d) cater for, respectively, class actions and 
public interest litigation. Given that the South African legislature has never adopted a law regulating 
class actions and public interest litigation, the courts have been left with the task of developing the law 
on these types of standing.757 Whilst civil society actors frequently litigate in the public interest, class 
actions remain exceptional.758  
In relation to public interest litigation, Justice O’Regan first wrote in a minority opinion in Ferreira v. 
Levin that whether a claim is in the public interest should be assessed having regard to a number of 
criteria, including the existence of an alternative, reasonable and effective way to bring the claim, the 
nature of the relief sought (and whether it is of general and prospective application), and the range of 
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persons who may be (in)directly affected by the order sought.759 Later, in Lawyers for Human Rights 
v. Minister of Home Affairs, a majority of Constitutional Court justices found that these three elements 
identified by Justice O’Regan are indeed relevant, but not exhaustive.760 Key is whether a person or 
organisation acts ‘genuinely’ in the public interest, which asks the question whether bringing the 
proceedings is objectively considered in the public interest.761 Other pertinent criteria for that 
assessment include the degree of vulnerability of the affected people, the nature of the right at stake 
and the consequences of the infringement.762  
It should be noted that the National Environmental Management Act even provides for a specific type 
of public interest litigation. Section 32(1) of that Act is quasi-identical to Section 38 of the 
Constitution, except for the additional subsection (e) which grants standing to any person or group of 
persons seeking relief so as to protect the environment.763 The advantage of this provision is that the 
protection of the environment is automatically deemed to be a public interest, so that no specific 
argument has to be submitted for that purpose.764 In previous cases dealing with environmental 
protection, the South African judiciary has also referred to the Aarhus Convention,765 which is 
considered exemplary of the principle of public participation in the field of environmental 
protection.766  
Despite the express provision of Section 38(c) of the Constitution and notwithstanding calls for 
implementing legislation from actors like the South African Law Commission, no statute has ever 
been adopted to regulate class actions, in particular the requirements for resorting to such actions, the 
procedure for dealing with them and any necessary adjustments to ordinary rules (such as regarding 
the prescription of claims).767 For a long time, it was uncertain, for instance, whether class actions are 
also available in non-constitutional litigation and/or in litigation against actors other than the state. 
Some of those questions were addressed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in CRCT v. Pioneer Food768 
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and by the Constitutional Court in Mukaddam v. Pioneer Foods.769 Many outstanding questions 
remain, however, such as the interaction between certification proceedings and limitation periods,770 
and the impact of a certification application on the rights of persons that are potentially covered by the 
class.771 The courts are wary, however, not “to trespass upon the domain of the legislature” by 
resolving all those issues merely through the development of the common law.772  
The Supreme Court of Appeal began its judgment in CRCT v. Pioneer Food with pondering on the 
risk that individual members of a vulnerable group of people may be unable to lodge separate, 
individual claims, which would raise a serious concern under the Constitution, as Section 34 ensures 
to everyone a right to have access to a competent court to have disputes resolved.773 Hence, the Court 
found that it would be irrational to allow class actions only in cases where constitutional rights are 
invoked, and to deny them in equally appropriate circumstances, merely because the parties cannot 
argue that any particular constitutional right has been infringed.774  
Next, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that class actions should be certified before they can proceed 
on the merits,775 because this allows courts to define the class and to examine whether the procedural 
conditions for a class action are met. In relation to the class definition, the Court found that it is 
unnecessary to identify all the members of the class at the time of the certification, as the ability to do 
so would raise the question whether a class action is truly necessary and whether individual cases 
cannot simply be joined.776 Hence, it suffices for the class to be defined in a sufficiently precise 
manner so that it is possible to examine, objectively, whether a particular individual belongs to the 
class – in other words, the class has to be ascertainable.777 This is not only important for the 
responding parties, who want to know the breadth of the claims against them, but also for potential 
class members, who must be able to determine whether they belong to the class and, hence, should opt 
in or out of the proceedings as they desire.778 
The Supreme Court of Appeal then identified the following requirements for class actions to be 
certified, in addition to the ascertainability of the class: the cause of action must raise a triable issue; 
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the relief should depend on the determination of common issues of fact and/or law; the relief sought 
must flow from the cause of action, be ascertainable and capable of determination; there should be an 
appropriate procedure for allocating damages to individual class members; the class representative has 
to be suitable to represent the class; and, a class action must be the most appropriate means to 
determine the claims given the composition of the class and the nature of the proposed action.779 In 
relation to the suitability of the class representatives, who have a prominent role in the proceedings, 
the Supreme Court of Appeal held that courts must check whether there is no conflict of interest 
between the class representatives and the members of the class and whether they are capable to 
conduct the litigation properly on behalf of the class.780 In particular, the litigation should not be aimed 
at enriching the representatives or at serving interests other than those of the class, and the 
representatives should inter alia dispose of the necessary financial resources, have the time, 
inclination and means to procure the necessary evidence and have access to legal representatives.781 
Following a further appeal on the question of class actions in Mukaddam v. Pioneer Foods, the 
Constitutional Court ruled, authoritatively, that the only real precondition for a class to be certified is 
whether it is in the interests of justice to do so.782 According to the Constitutional Court, the specific 
requirements laid down by the Supreme Court of Appeal are relevant but not exhaustive, and should 
thus only serve as factors to be considered when a court has to determine whether certification is in the 
interests of justice, and not as conditions precedent or as jurisdictional facts that must be met.783 None 
of the factors is thus decisive of the ‘interests of justice’ question.784 Indeed, a rigid assessment would 
even be suspicious in light of the right of access to courts under Section 34 of the Constitution read in 
conjunction with Section 38.785  
In that judgment, the Constitutional Court also clarified that the requirement of certification does not 
apply to class actions for the enforcement of a constitutional right against the state, as such 
proceedings assume a public character that automatically extends the reach of any order that is 
eventually issued.786 This statement is obiter, however, as the question concerning the certification of 
constitutional claims against the state was not before the Court.787 In turn, the question whether 
certification is required to lodge a class action based on the Bill of Rights against a private actor was 
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expressly left open by the Court.788 In a separate opinion, Mhlantla disagreed with this part of the 
majority’s judgment in Mukaddam v. Pioneer Foods, arguing that the Court should have clarified that 
certification is required for all class actions, regardless of their basis and the identity of the responding 
party.789 
1.4.1.2. Free or cheap legal aid 
Victims of human rights violations in South Africa who do not have the means to obtain access to the 
justice system without free or cheap legal aid, usually rely on one of the following three sources of 
free or cheap legal aid: they seek legal assistance from either Legal Aid South Africa or from a public 
interest law firm, or they conclude a contingency fee agreement with a legal practitioner – another 
option is that they are assisted by a regular law firm in the context of a pro bono programme. This will 
be discussed in concreto in Chapter 2 (in particular infra Sections 2.1.2 and 2.5.1), but some general 
observations on Legal Aid South Africa and on the regulation of contingency fees should already be 
made.  
First of all, Legal Aid is an autonomous statutory body, established by law, which renders legal aid 
and provides legal representation at state expense.790 The legal services are supplied either by its own 
staff or by legal practitioners whose services are procured by Legal Aid.791 The Legal Aid Guide 
determines which matters and which persons qualify for legal aid, but the general criterion reads that 
individuals are entitled to aid if otherwise substantial injustice will result.792 To determine whether 
such injustice would exist, regard is had to factors like the affordability of legal representation ( a 
means test), the severity of possible penal sanctions (in criminal matters) and the prospects of success 
on a balance of probabilities (in civil matters).793 In practice, Legal Aid does not often get involved in 
strategic litigation relating to business and human rights. The body mostly intervenes in criminal 
(88%) as opposed to civil (12%) cases, and those generally concern individual matters, with ‘impact 
litigation’794 not even amounting to a percentage of Legal Aid’s caseload.795  
                                                     
788
 Mukaddam v. Pioneer Foods, supra note 746, para. 41. According to Jephson, the nature of the claim should 
be irrelevant in classifying class actions, and regard should rather be had to the nature of the relief sought, such 
as damages versus declaratory orders. Jephson, supra note 211, 294. 
789
 Mukaddam v. Pioneer Foods (Mhlantla, J., separate opinion), supra note 746, para. 58. 
790
 Section 3 of Legal Aid South Africa Act 39 of 2014, Government Gazette No. 38315 [LASAA] (cited in 
Annex 2). 
791
 Section 4(1)(a) LASAA (cited in Annex 2). 
792
 Legal Aid South Africa, Legal Aid Guide (2014), 35-36. See also e.g. Section 35(2)(c) of the Constitution.  
793
 Legal Aid South Africa, Legal Aid Guide (2014), 35-36. 
794
 According to Legal Aid’s own policy, ‘impact litigation’ comprises class action lawsuits as well as individual 
matters that resolve a large number of disputes and help other communities.  
795
 Legal Aid South Africa, Annual Report (2015-2016), 27. 
148 
 
It should be noted, however, that the High Court has held that although there is no absolute right to 
legal representation, in exercising its power to decide whether or not to grant legal aid to litigating 
parties, Legal Aid should respect the Constitution and, in particular, comply with Sections 9 and 34, 
meaning that it may not distinguish unfairly nor discriminate amongst different groups of people who 
want to have their participation to the same proceedings funded.796 This judgment was appealed first to 
the Supreme Court of Appeal and later to the Constitutional Court. The latter Court found that the 
matter had become moot, but emphasised that the High Court’s judgment had been based on a case-
specific analysis and that no obligation is imposed on Legal Aid to fund legal representation and that 
“[t]he decision and the discretion remain with Legal Aid.”797  
Aside from relying on pro bono services, persons who want to approach the courts can also conclude a 
contingency fee agreement. As was explained before (supra Part II, Section 2.2.1.2), legal 
practitioners who work for a contingent fee agree not to be paid for their legal services and not to be 
compensated for any costs until and unless the dispute is successfully resolved. Contingency fee 
agreements are permissible in South Africa, subject to the rules of the Contingency Fees Act and its 
implementing regulations and provided that, according to the assessment of the legal practitioner with 
whom such an agreement is concluded, there is a reasonable prospect that his or her client will be 
successful.798 The Act admits to ask for a success fee in excess of the normal fee, but this is capped at 
100% of the normal fee and 25% of the amount obtained by the client through the proceedings after 
deduction of any costs.799 Before entering into such an agreement, the legal practitioner must also 
advise the clients on alternative methods to have their case funded.800 Another safeguard is that clients 
have a right to withdraw from the contingency fee agreement within 14 days801 and, if they feel 
aggrieved by it, they may apply for review to a professional controlling body.802 Finally, if the matter 
is ultimately settled out-of-court, such settlement agreement only gets legal effect upon its 
endorsement by the court, which will review inter alia the equitableness of the contingent fee.803  
1.4.1.3. SLAPP suits 
Another potential burden for victims seeking access to justice are the intimidating tactics that 
counterparties may employ (supra Part II, Section 2.2.1.3). Also in South Africa, companies 
                                                     
796
 Magidiwana v. President (HC), supra note 737, paras 87-98. See also the discussion infra in note. 
797
 Legal Aid South Africa v Magidiwana and Others (CCT188/14) [2015] ZACC 28 (22 September 2015), para. 
26.  
798
 Section 2(1) of the Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997, Government Gazette No. 18452 [CFA] (cited in Annex 
2). 
799
 Section 2(1)(b) and (2) CFA (cited in Annex 2)  
800
 Section 3(3)(b)(i) CFA (cited in Annex 2). 
801
 Section 3(3)(h) CFA (cited in Annex 2). 
802
 Section 5 CFA (cited in Annex 2). 
803
 Section 4 CFA (cited, in part, in Annex 2). 
149 
 
increasingly use litigation to silence persons who threaten their reputational and/or financial interests. 
There are two main options for persons who face a SLAPP suit; either they expose the malicious 
purpose of the suit or they defend themselves against the substance of those claims.  
First of all, victims can have recourse to the Vexatious Proceedings Act,804 which applies to all legal 
proceedings that are instituted persistently and without reasonable ground, for whatever reason. The 
Act allows persons facing such vexatious, meritless proceedings to apply for an order that the 
person(s) instituting them may only launch new proceedings with specific leave by the court.805 Before 
granting such leave, the court must be satisfied that those proceedings do not constitute an abuse of the 
process of the court and that there is prima facie ground for them.806 
Another option for people facing intimidating lawsuits is to argue why the requirements for the claim 
or exception to be granted are not met. A good example is Petro Props v. Barlow807 concerning a 
company that wanted to operate a fuel service station in a wetland area and sought an interdict against 
an environmental activist for reason of her ongoing campaign mobilizing public opinion, as a result of 
which the fuel service station feared that the petrol company with which it had concluded a contract 
would withdraw. In its judgment the High Court balanced the applicant’s property rights (which were 
allegedly threatened by the campaign) against the responding party’s right to freedom of expression.808 
For this balancing exercise, the Court inter alia considered the fact that the campaign was conducted 
peacefully and in good faith and was geared towards public engagement, that she did not spread any 
falsehoods to harm the applicant, and that her interest and motivation was selfless and aimed at 
environmental protection.809 Considering that “the Constitution does not only afford a shield, to be 
resorted to passively and defensively”, but that “[ i]t also provides a sword which groups like the 
respondent can and should draw to empower their initiatives and interests,”810 the Court concluded that 
the applicant had not discharged its burden to demonstrate that the campaign constituted an unlawful 
infringement of its rights.811 In another case where an environmental activist organisation was asked to 
give security of costs to ensure that it would be able to pay for adverse costs if its opposition against 
the grant of an authorisation was unsuccessful, the High Court called for a cautious approach as “bona 
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fide litigation by public interest bodies should not be discouraged through the risk of adverse costs 
orders.”812 
Nevertheless, the judgment in African Nickel v. Van As,813 calls for carefulness, especially when 
activists are unsure about the veracity of their speech. In that case, the High Court granted a request 
for an order interdicting and restraining a person from supplying or furnishing false facts and/or 
information concerning the applicant’s business (a mining company) to representatives of the printed 
media. After confirming that trading companies have the right to protect their reputation from 
injurious falsehoods,814 the Court found that freedom of speech does not allow for unlawfulness, such 
as spreading lies in the media, and that there is no right in law (not even the right to freedom of 
expression) that would shift the onus on the victims of the unlawful actions to attempt to eradicate 
such lies.815 According to the Court, this was not a SLAPP suit because the order did not gag the 
responding party from having true statements about the applicant published.816 
Another illustration of a successful defence against a SLAPP suit is Platreef Resources v. Kgobudi 
Traditional Community.817 The case concerned a mining company, Platreef, that had obtained a rule 
nisi interdicting a ‘community’ from entering its area of operation.818 What was striking was that this 
rule had been sought and obtained against an entire community, while the acts that had motivated the 
order had been perpetrated by only a few of its members and while no such entity as ‘the Kgobudi 
Traditional Community’ exists. Fortunately, the Court agreed with the defence by the community’s 
legal representatives, finding that each member of the community is an individual in his or her own 
right and an independent holder of rights and responsibilities. Under those circumstances granting an 
order against the community as such would “not only fly in the face of the rules of this Court but 
would impact on the dignity of the community as a whole (…) [and] would be the most flagrant form 
of collective punishment undermining the very architecture of our Constitution and the values of 
justice and fairness.”819 
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1.4.2. Type of remedies available 
1.4.2.1. Judicial remedies 
The right to have access to the courts is protected under the South African Bill of Rights, which 
includes the following provision. 
Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law 
decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and 
impartial tribunal or forum.820 
In a particular case, civil, criminal, administrative and/or constitutional proceedings may be available. 
This Section briefly discusses the peculiarities of the latter three types of judicial proceedings.  
(i) Criminal proceedings 
Two elements of criminal law are particularly relevant for the business and human rights debate, being 
that the law provides for both individual and corporate liability and for both private and public 
prosecution. 
First of all, there is no principled objection to holding companies criminally responsible.821 They can 
be held liable for any offence that exists under statutory or common law, unless where a statute 
establishes criminal liability on the part of natural persons only. In particular, a company is deemed to 
have performed an act (or an omission) that was (or ought to have been) performed by, on the 
instructions of, or with the (express or implied) permission of a director or servant of the company, 
provided that this act or omission was committed in the exercise of his or her powers or in the 
performance of his or her duties as director or servant.822 If particular intent is required for the act or 
omission to be considered an offence, such intent must have existed on the part of the director or 
servant, which is then attributed to the company. Moreover, any director or servant of a company that 
is liable to prosecution is also personally deemed guilty of that offence unless it is proven that he or 
she did not take part in the commission of the offence and could not have prevented it.823 The 
prosecutor is free to decide whether to prosecute only the responsible natural person, only the 
company or both, and the company and individual directors or servants can be convicted and punished 
separately for the same offence.  
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Also in South Africa criminal liability has its critics, who question the effectiveness of such remedy if 
criminal legislation is not successful in deterring the offences. After all, criminal penalties do not 
remedy the consequences of an offence, are useless if the perpetrator is no longer there and ultimately 
depend on the willingness, competence and ability of the state to prosecute.824 As also a High Court 
has held in a case concerning a complaint by an association of residents about environmental 
degradation caused by a manufactory, criminal sanctions only apply to past events, are “woefully 
inadequate” and “of little use in respect of anticipated future transgressions”.825 This limitation should 
all the more be borne in mind in the case of institutional criminal liability of a company as such, which 
is generally only convicted to a fine and/or a forfeiture of assets.  
In principle, the authority to prosecute is entrusted with the public prosecutor. Private persons should 
thus lay a criminal complaint when they believe an offence has been committed, following which the 
public prosecutor investigates the matter and decides whether or not to prosecute. Nevertheless, in two 
scenarios private persons may themselves launch criminal prosecutions. First, a number of acts 
explicitly establish a right to conduct a private prosecution where non-compliance with one or more of 
its provisions amounts to an offence.826 Second, even if no such mandate is established by a specific 
act, certain persons – including private persons who prove some substantial and peculiar interest in the 
issue of the trial arising out of some individually suffered injury – are nevertheless competent to 
initiate a private prosecution, if the public prosecutor declines to prosecute.827  
Private prosecution is strictly regulated under the Criminal Procedure Act828 and is extremely rare due 
to numerous practical barriers. Private prosecutors do not only bear the onus of proof, but also the 
(high) financial burden, for which they have to deposit a security of costs. In particular, they must pay 
for all costs related to the prosecution (including the costs for the service and execution of the criminal 
case before the court) and they risk to incur a negative costs order directing them to pay for all costs of 
the accused party, if their prosecution is (partially) unsuccessful.  
A final observation should be made relating to contempt of court, which is a legal construct peculiar to 
common law systems. Parties that do not comply with an order made by the court against them (in 
non-criminal cases) may be held in contempt of court upon application by the parties who sought the 
original court order.829 A party guilty of contempt of court is criminally liable. For an application of 
contempt to succeed, the applicant(s) must establish the original order, knowledge thereof on the part 
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of the responding party, non-compliance therewith and wilfulness and mala fides beyond reasonable 
doubt.830 The burden of proof of the first three elements falls on the applicants, following which the 
responding party must show that there exists reasonable doubt as to wilfulness and mala fides.831 For a 
court order to be enforceable through contempt of court proceedings, the order must be sufficiently 
clear and capable of implementation, however.832  
(ii) Administrative proceedings 
33. (1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair. 
(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has the 
right to be given written reasons. 
 (3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and must— 
(a) provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where appropriate, an 
independent and impartial tribunal; 
(b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsections (1) and (2); and 
(c) promote an efficient administration. 
Section 33 of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to just administrative action. In 
accordance with subsection (c), the government has enacted a statute that regulates administrative 
justice and provides for internal administrative review and external judicial review, the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act (PAJA).833 This Act is the framework law for administrative proceedings 
and inter alia determines the criteria which administrative decisions should meet in order to be 
considered just and procedurally fair. Administrative justice requirements may also be stipulated in 
specific acts.834 
Although procedural fairness depends on the circumstances of a case, some general criteria are that 
persons affected by administrative action should be given adequate notice, have a reasonable 
opportunity to make representations, be provided with a clear statement of the administrative act, be 
informed about their right to request reasons and receive adequate notice of any available internal 
appeal.835 At the administrator’s discretion, the person affected by the decision may also be provided 
the opportunity to obtain assistance, if necessary legal representation, to be heard and to appear in 
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person.836 Where administrative action affects the public, a public inquiry should be held, a notice and 
comment procedure followed, or both.837 In this regard, it should also be emphasised that public 
participation in the administration is valued greatly in South Africa. Therefore, in 1997 the 
government (under the Mandela administration) introduced an initiative to transform the public service 
so as to ensure that the interests of the people come first. The initiative is known as Batho Pele, which 
is Sesotho for ‘People First’.838 In particular, public servants should perform their tasks bearing in 
mind the following broad principles: they should consult with citizens; standards for service delivery 
should be set; redress should be ensured where standards are not met; equal access to services must be 
safeguarded; citizens have to be treated courteously; full, accurate information must be provided; 
openness and transparency should be ensured; and, there should be value for money in service 
delivery.  
When interested parties feel aggrieved by an administrative decision, they can lodge an internal, 
administrative appeal.839 Such appeal is in principle decided by the authority that is hierarchically 
superior to the one adopting the original decision. One exception that is relevant for the case study on 
mining and environmental degradation (infra Chapter 2) are appeals against authorisations for water 
usage, which are decided by the especially created Water Tribunal.840 In general, the act in terms of 
which the disputed administrative decision is issued, determines the authority that is competent to 
decide on administrative appeals and the procedures that have to be followed.841  
After exhausting all internal remedies,842 parties who feel adversely affected by an administrative act 
may submit an application for judicial review to the competent court or tribunal. The circumstances 
under which the judiciary may review an administrative decision are enumerated in the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act.843 A court or tribunal may award such orders as directing the competent 
authority to act in a specific manner, prohibiting it from acting in a specific manner, directing it to pay 
compensation and setting aside the administrative action.844 In the latter scenario, courts normally 
remit the matter for reconsideration to the competent authority (with or without directions), because 
they should “treat administrative decisions (…) with the appropriate deference which flows from the 
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constitutional principle of separation of powers”845 and administrative authorities are considered better 
placed to take such decisions given their composition, experience, expertise and resources.846 Hence, 
only rarely do courts substitute the administrative decision with their own, vary the decision or correct 
a defect resulting from it.847 Such exceptional situation arises “when, on a proper consideration of the 
relevant facts, a court is persuaded that a decision to exercise the power in question should not be left 
to the designated functionary.”848 In the past, this has happened, for instance when the authority 
adopting the original decision exhibited bias or incompetence or when the competent authority had 
been disbanded for an indefinite period of time.849  
(iii) Constitutional proceedings 
This Section briefly explains the procedure of direct access to the Constitutional Court and the system 
of judicial review applicable in South Africa.  
According to Section 167(6) of the Constitution,850 persons should be able to bring a matter directly to 
the Constitutional Court or to appeal directly to that Court, when it is in the interest of justice and 
provided that the Court has granted leave thereto. This provision has been implemented in Rules 18 
and 19 of the Constitutional Court.851 
An application for direct access, first of all, has to brought on notice of motion, supported by an 
affidavit that describes the nature of the relief sought and the grounds upon which it is based. In 
addition, the applicants must indicate the grounds on the basis of which they contend that direct access 
is in the interests of justice, whether the matter is triable without a hearing of oral evidence and, if not, 
how such evidence should be adduced and conflicts of fact resolved. In turn, direct appeals852 to the 
Constitutional Court have to be lodged within 15 days of the order against which the appeal is 
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directed. The application must contain the order from the lower court and the grounds upon which it is 
disputed, a statement clarifying the constitutional matter at stake and a statement indicating whether 
the applicant has applied or intends to apply for leave or special leave to appeal to another court. If 
leave is granted, the Constitutional Court may deal with applications for direct access or direct appeal 
summarily, without considering oral or written argument other than what is contained in the 
application itself, or may set it down for argument and direct on which issues parties should submit 
their written argument.  
In practice, direct access is extremely rare, while direct appeals are somewhat more common but still 
exceptional.853 The Court requires proof that the time delay of ordinary procedures would cause 
serious prejudice to the public interest or to justice and good government,854 a requirement that is not 
met by the mere fact that the public interest is at stake. Even public interest litigants “cannot simply 
ignore those procedural rules which are designed to regulate the fair and orderly dispatch of court 
business and the protection of the rights of all”,855 and this accelerated procedure is only designed for 
“cases where the circumstances are so exceptional and the public interest (…) are of such overriding 
importance.”856 
As far as judicial review is concerned, the South African legal order, which has both civil and 
common law roots, provides for a hybrid system (see supra Part II, Section 2.2.2.1). In principle, any 
court is competent to interpret and apply the Constitution.857 Although in doing so they may even 
declare conduct or acts unconstitutional, such findings have to be confirmed by the Constitutional 
Court when they concern a national or provincial statute or presidential conduct.858 Parliamentary and 
provincial ‘bills’ – id est before they are adopted – can also be reviewed in abstracto by the 
Constitutional Court upon application by, respectively, the President or the provincial Premier, whilst 
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parliamentary and provincial ‘acts’ may be referred to that Court by members of, respectively, the 
National Assembly or the provincial legislature.859  
1.4.2.2. Non-judicial state-based remedies 
In a country where poverty is omnipresent, litigation can be “prohibitively expensive” 860 and, hence, 
inaccessible for the average citizen, making non-judicial state-based remedies crucial. The 
Constitutional Court has, for instance, voiced the following lyrical thought about the Public Protector.  
(…) the fathers and mothers of our Constitution conceived of a way to give even to the poor 
and marginalised a voice, and teeth that would bite corruption and abuse excruciatingly. And 
that is the Public Protector. She is the embodiment of a biblical David, that the public is, who 
fights the most powerful and very well-resourced Goliath, that impropriety and corruption by 
government officials are. (…)861  
This Section discusses four state-based non-judicial remedies in South Africa, namely the Public 
Protector, the Human Rights Commission, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and special 
commissions of inquiry – although the latter very much look like quasi-judicial remedies.  
(i) Public Protector 
The Public Protector is one of the so-called ‘state institutions supporting constitutional democracy’, 
which are independent institutions subject only to the Constitution and the law – commonly called the 
‘Chapter Nine Institutions’, because they are established under the ninth Chapter of the 
Constitution.862 Whereas many states have a national human rights institute, the Public Protector is a 
body peculiar to the South African constitutional order, which is tasked with monitoring the proper 
conduct of state affairs, including safeguarding state resources against corruption.863 The 
Constitutional Court has called the Public Protector “one of the most invaluable constitutional gifts” to 
the new state.864  
The specific responsibilities of the Public Protector are enumerated in the Public Protector Act865 and 
in a number of other specific acts.866 He or she has investigative powers in relation to such matters as 
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maladministration of government affairs, abuse of power, improper or unlawful enrichment, and 
improper or unlawful prejudice caused by an act or omission by an authority or a person performing a 
public function.867  
Investigations by the Public Protector into improper state conduct can be initiated either at his or her 
own initiative or following a complaint, which any person can submit online, by e-mail, in print 
version or even orally to a staff member868 – which keeps the practical barriers as low as possible. The 
powers of the Public Protector include directing persons to submit an affidavit or to appear so as to 
give evidence, and administering oaths.869 The reports of the Public Protector are publicised on the 
institution’s website.870 After – or, where preferred, instead of – an investigation, the Public Protector 
may endeavour mediation, conciliation or negotiation in order to resolve a dispute, may advice a 
complainant on appropriate remedies or may refer a matter to another public body or authority for 
investigation.871  
As the Constitutional Court has recently confirmed, when the Public Protector orders remedial action, 
such orders are not ineffectual, and compliance therewith is not a matter of choice.872 In practical 
terms this entails that government authorities that fail to comply with orders of the Public Protector – 
or of other Chapter Nine Institutions – will be considered to act unconstitutionally, which may be 
ascertained by the courts,873 following which continued non-compliance may trigger criminal liability 
for contempt of court.  
(ii) South African Human Rights Commission 
The South African Human Rights Commission is another one of the Chapter Nine Institutions, albeit 
with the very broad competence to promote respect for, and a culture, of human rights, to promote the 
protection, development and attainment of human rights and to monitor and assess the observance of 
human rights in South Africa.874 For those purposes, the Commission has the power to carry out 
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investigations and write reports, to conduct research, to educate and to take steps to secure appropriate 
redress where human rights have been violated.875 The Commission also monitors legislative or 
executive measures relating to human rights, liaises with other institutions and organisations with 
similar objectives, reviews government policies and makes recommendations to government, and 
monitors compliance with international human rights instruments.876 In addition, the relevant organs of 
states should report, on an annual basis, to the Commission on the measures that they have adopted 
towards the realisation of the rights in the Bill of Rights.877 In practice, the latter power is largely 
ineffective, as departments repeatedly fail to comply with their duty to report, or submit a half-hearted 
report, which Fredman imputes to those departments’ lack of capacity to collect, store and process 
information.878  
The investigative powers of the Human Rights Commission are extensive and include demanding 
information, requiring personal appearances, administering oaths, searching persons, and entering and 
searching premises.879 Where the Commission launches a formal inquiry, it can even decide to 
organise an inquisitorial hearing.880 In such scenario, a panel is erected, composed of commissioners 
and external experts, and terms of reference adopted. This panel can then receive submissions by 
different stakeholders, analyse evidence, adopt findings and issue recommendations. Reports on 
investigations have to be submitted to the National Assembly,881 and after investigations the 
Commission should assist complainants and other affected persons so that they are assured of redress, 
where necessary by bringing judicial proceedings.882 Alternatively, the Commission may also initiate 
mediation, conciliation or negotiation proceedings.883  
Finally, it should be observed that the UNGPs recognise the “important role” of national human rights 
institutions that comply with the Paris Principles,884 which the South African Human Rights 
Commission does.885 According to the UNGPs, they should provide appropriate guidance to business 
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enterprises,886 and have a “particularly important role” as non-judicial state-based remedies.887 In that 
regard, the South African Human Rights Commission has, for instance, published a country guide, 
which maps the potential and actual impacts of business enterprises in South Africa,888 and led 
“several capacity building initiatives that include a focus on the UNGPs”, with a focus on agriculture 
and mining.889 
(iii) Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms 
Acts that implement the rights in the Bill of Rights generally also expressly provide for the option to 
resolve disputes through alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, such as mediation, conciliation 
and/or arbitration.890 Conflicts in the labour context can be resolved with the assistance of the special 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration.891 As was already mentioned, also the Public 
Protector and the Human Rights Commission are mandated to endeavour alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms to resolve conflicts, where they see fit.892  
Importantly, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms can never be imposed upon parties, whose 
right to approach the courts is protected under the Constitution.893  
(iv) Special commissions of inquiry 
Finally, Section 84 of the Constitution, which stipulates the powers and functions of the President, 
mandates the President in subsection 2(f) to appoint commissions of inquiry.894 A few of those 
commissions have been established to investigate serious human rights violations, but they remain 
quite exceptional.  
An example is the commission of inquiry that was established “to investigate matters of public, 
national and international concern” arising out of the Marikana massacre (see also infra Box 2),895 
which are the tragic incidents that took place at Lonmin’s mine in Marikana in August 2012 and that 
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resulted in the death of forty-four people, the injury of more than seventy, and the arrest of around two 
hundred fifty. This Commission896 had the specific mandate to inquire into, make findings, report on, 
and issue recommendations concerning the conduct of a number of actors in the course of the events 
leading up to the massacre, namely Lonmin, the South African Police Service, two labour unions – the 
Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union and the National Union of Mineworkers – as 
well as their members and officials, the Department of Mineral Resources, and other government 
departments and agencies, and any individuals and loose groupings during the events.  
Depending on the circumstances special commissions of enquiry may fall under the scope of Section 
34 of the Constitution (the right to have access to the courts),897 which entails that participants in those 
proceedings have a right to a fair public hearing and to equality of arms, which may include a right to 
legal representation.898  
1.4.2.3. Non-state-based remedies 
Victims of human rights violations by companies can also have recourse to any available non-state-
based remedy. For instance, certain companies and enterprise groups have created operational level 
grievance mechanisms for the early detection and resolution of complaints, allowing aggrieved 
persons to submit a complaint to the company or to an enterprise group through an easily accessible 
procedure. In addition, victims may seek recourse to other non-state-based remedies, such as the 
Compliance Advisor Ombudsman for the International Finance Corporation, in case the latter 
organisation funds the project in the course of which human rights were violated.899  
1.4.3. Relief sought in court 
1.4.3.1. Wide remedial powers of the judiciary 
Relief is crucial for remedies to be effective, as also the Constitutional Court has acknowledged.  
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Particularly in a country where so few have the means to enforce their rights through the 
courts, it is essential that on those occasions when the legal process does establish that an 
infringement of an entrenched right has occurred, it be effectively vindicated. The courts have 
a particular responsibility in this regard and are obliged to “forge new tools” and shape 
innovative remedies, if needs be, to achieve this goal.900 
According to Section 38 of the Constitution, when a right protected in the Bill of Rights is violated, 
courts should grant ‘appropriate relief’, for which Section 172(1) vests the courts with wide remedial 
powers.  
172.(1) When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court— 
(a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is 
invalid to the extent of its inconsistency; and 
(b) may make any order that is just and equitable, including— 
(i) an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity; and 
(ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any 
conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct the defect. (…) 
The Constitutional Court has defined ‘appropriate relief’ as such relief that is required to protect and 
enforce the Constitution, which depends on the circumstances of each case and may be a declaration of 
rights, an (interim or final) interdict, a mandamus or other relief, including damages.901 To be 
appropriate, the relief must, however, fit the injury, be fair to those affected by it and at the same time 
vindicate the right that was violated.902 This means that not only the victims’ interests are relevant, but 
also those of the counterparties and of the general public.903 
Moreover, courts are not bound by the way in which litigating parties formulate the relief that they 
request, nor by the manner in which relief was presented or argued,904 and they may even forge new 
remedies where necessary.905 Nonetheless, in many cases the common law as it stands is broad enough 
                                                     
900
 Fose v. Minister of Safety and Security, supra note 107, para. 69. 
901
 Ibid. paras 19 and 60. Different conditions must be met for these remedies to be granted. A declaratory order, 
for instance, is only awarded if the litigating party has a direct interest in an existing, future or contingent right or 
obligation and if the court is satisfied that it should exercise its discretion in favour of the applicant having 
regard to all the circumstances. For a final interdict, litigating parties must prove the existence of a clear right, an 
injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended and the absence of similar protection by means of any 
other ordinary remedy. Tergniet and Toekoms v. Outeniqua, supra note 754, paras 31 and 36. 
902
 Steenkamp NO v. Provincial Tender Board of the Eastern Cape (CCT71/05) [2006] ZACC 16 (28 September 
2006), para. 29. According to Christiansen, account is taken of the following four factors: the remedy’s 
objective, deterrence, realistic compliance and fairness to all those affected. E.C. Christiansen, “Empowerment, 
Fairness, Integration: South African Answers to the Question of Constitutional Environmental Rights,” Stan. 
Envtl. L. J. 32 (2013), 251. 
903
 C. Okpaluba, “Constraints on judicial review of executive conduct: the juridical link between the Marikana 
mineworkers’ imbroglio and the Gauteng e-tolling saga,” J. S. Afr. L. (2015), 292. 
904
 President v. Modderklip (SCA), supra note 701, para. 18, confirmed in President v. Modderklip (CC), supra 
note 677, para. 53. 
905
 Fose v. Minister of Safety and Security, supra note 107, para. 19.  
163 
 
to provide appropriate relief, which could even consist of a damage award.906 In Mankayi v. 
AngloGold Ashanti, for instance, the Constitutional Court found that “[d]elictual remedies protecting 
constitutional rights may (…) constitute appropriate relief”907 – note that where such remedies are 
granted to vindicate human rights violations by private actors, this amounts to indirect horizontal 
application (supra Section 1.2.1.2).  
When relief is granted to vindicate a right protected in the Bill of Rights, such relief is called 
‘constitutional relief’.908 Although attempting to categorise such relief as either public or private seems 
superfluous,909 the Constitutional Court believes that public law remedies may be better suited than 
private law remedies, as the purpose of the former is to benefit the public rather than only or 
predominantly the individual litigant.910  
In any case, South African Courts have used their broad mandate to make “any order that is just and 
equitable” to grant and even develop diverse forms of relief, some of which are quite innovative and 
unique.911 A good illustration thereof are constitutional damages, id est a financial compensation for 
the breach of a right protected in the Bill of Rights912 – in litigation amongst private parties this 
amounts to direct horizontal application (supra Section 1.2.1.2). Courts have also, for instance, read 
words into acts, read acts down,913 or severed provisions in order to make certain acts constitutional.914 
In addition, at various occasions prohibitory or mandatory interdicts have been issued, which 
respectively seek to prevent harm to a legal right or to make good harm already suffered.915 A peculiar 
type of mandatory interdicts are orders compelling the responding parties to engage meaningfully 
(being in good faith and reasonably) with other parties.916 
A major development, however, has been the emergence of structural interdicts, where courts have 
accompanied mandatory orders with further ancillary orders or directions so as to ensure the proper 
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execution of the main order (‘supervisory orders’).917 The first structural order was issued by the High 
Court in Grootboom v. Oostenberg, directing government to report within three months on the 
implementation of an order declaring that government is obliged to provide shelter to children who 
were homeless and to extend such shelter to their parents.918 Since that judgment structural orders have 
been adopted in various other cases.919  
Notwithstanding their wide remedial powers, courts are reluctant to issue punitive orders, namely 
punitive damages and punitive costs, in non-criminal cases. Such orders entail that the convicted party 
has to pay damages or costs over and above the actual damages suffered or costs incurred by the other 
party, by way of penalty.920 Two concerns militate against such punitive orders, being 
overcompensation and, in case government is the counterparty, the already great demand on scarce 
resources, which causes courts to question the appropriateness of using those resources to pay a party 
that has been fully compensated.921 Punitive costs have, nevertheless, been awarded in exceptional 
cases, having regard to the circumstances underlying the proceedings and/or the conduct of the losing 
party.922  
1.4.3.2. Limit: separation of powers 
Some of the forms of relief mentioned above, when are granted against the legislature or the executive, 
may raise concerns about separation of powers. Even amongst judges structural interdicts, for instance, 
are controversial,. As the Supreme Court of Appeal once held, they “have a tendency to blur the 
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distinction between the executive and the judiciary.”923 Nevertheless, the separation of powers doctrine 
in the South African legal order is one that caters for appropriate checks and balances between the 
legislature, the executive and the judiciary in order to ensure accountability, responsiveness and 
openness.924 As the Constitutional Court already held in its judgment certifying the Constitution, there 
cannot be an absolute separation of powers, because the checks and balances in a democratic state 
necessarily entail that restraints are imposed by one branch on the other.925 Hence, courts have 
acknowledged regularly that they are constitutionally mandated to provide effective relief for the 
infringements of constitutional rights, which is a responsibility catered for by the separation of powers 
doctrine as it is entrenched in the South African Constitution.926 
The Constitutional Court has, for instance, explicitly found that the judiciary’s power to declare laws 
unconstitutional does not breach separation of powers, because judges can only determine whether 
acts are constitutional, and do not have the power to alter the law as they desire.927 Also the 
codification in the Constitution of judicially enforceable economic, social and cultural rights cannot as 
such be seen as problematic for separation of powers, since the judicial enforcement of such rights 
does not differ much from the courts’ ordinary tasks under a bill of rights as the enforcement of any 
right may have budgetary consequences.928  
Nevertheless, in some cases South African courts have been reluctant to grant particular remedies, 
because they fear to intrude upon the tasks of the legislature or the executive, or simply because they 
believe they lack the institutional competence to decide on polycentric issues.929 In Mazibuko v. 
Johannesburg, a case dealing with access to water, for instance, the Constitutional Court found that 
the Constitution does not “require courts to take over the tasks that in a democracy should properly be 
reserved for the democratic arms of government” and, hence, concluded that government can be called 
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to account for its decisions, at which occasion government should explain why its policy is reasonable, 
but that the judiciary should not determine the substance of such policy.930 An interesting application 
in a more recent case is the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Minister of Water v. Kloof 
Conservancy to set aside an order by the High Court directing the Minister to appoint and mandate a 
certain number of environmental management inspectors.931 The Supreme Court justified its decision 
with reference to the separation of powers doctrine and, in particular, the argument based on 
comparative institutional competence (supra Part II, Section 2.2.6.4).932  
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2. MINING AND THE RIGHT OF MINEWORKERS AND COMMUNITIES 
TO A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT  
With the general framework of business and human rights and judicial remedies in South Africa 
having been sketched, the crux of the case study can be explored, namely the actual legal impact of 
human rights on mining companies and the ability of mineworkers and neighbouring communities 
who experience adverse impacts on their human rights due to environmental degradation caused by 
mining, to call either the companies themselves or government to account. In order to give a 
comprehensive answer to questions such as to what extent mining companies are responsible for 
human rights, how accountability for human rights violations by mining companies can be enforced 
and why a particular strategy is preferred over another, this Chapter was written based on a two-
pronged strategy, ensuring breadth and depth.933  
First, the analysis is informed by the general practice of South African lawyers and activists who are 
regularly involved in disputes relating to mining, environmental degradation and human rights, as well 
as by the knowledge of experts who are directly familiar with the issue. Data was gathered through 
interviews with these different stakeholders. Second, particular attention is paid to three ‘focus 
matters’, namely specific cases relating to human rights violations associated with environmental 
health hazards caused by mining in which litigation was resorted to (amongst other strategies). Data 
about the focus matters was collected from court papers, judgments and interviews with the 
respondents involved therein. The focus matters return throughout this Chapter to illustrate specific 
findings. They were selected because they are notorious amongst local stakeholders and because their 
factual setting and the litigation strategy used differ, so that they paint a more diverse picture.  
Since the three focus matters are referred to throughout this Chapter, they are discussed more in detail 
in a separate section (Section 2.3). Thereafter, the main issue, that is strategic litigation to ensure 
accountability for human rights violations associated with environmental degradation caused by 
mining companies, is scrutinised. This analysis is divided into four sections dealing respectively with 
litigation as a tool to ensure accountability (Section 2.4), the practicalities of gaining access to judicial 
remedies (Section 2.5), the design of a strategic lawsuit (Section 2.6) and the assessment of the 
success and failure (Section 2.7).The Chapter begins, however, with a general introduction to the 
factual background and the civil society landscape in South Africa (Section 2.1) and with a discussion 
of the legal framework, in particular the human rights at stake and the implementing laws and 
regulations (Section 2.2). 
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2.1. The factual background 
2.1.1. Mining in South Africa 
2.1.1.1. The mining industry and its impact on human rights 
Since the discovery of gold in the late nineteenth century, mineral extraction has been a major 
economic sector in South Africa. Although the industry has been in decline, in 2015 the direct 
contribution of mining to the country’s gross domestic product still amounted to 7.7% (14.7% in 
1994), while the industry also maintained approximately 426,000 jobs and generated 11.3 billion Rand 
for the Treasury in terms of direct taxes and royalties.934 Moreover, given that South Africa holds the 
largest reserves of gold, platinum, chrome and manganese in the world, and the second-largest 
reserves of zirconium, vanadium and titanium, the importance of the mining industry is unlikely to 
decrease significantly in the nearby future.935  
Regardless where it takes place, mineral extraction tends to be a large-scale, resource-intensive and 
export-oriented undertaking, which – notwithstanding its inherently temporary nature due to its 
dependence on the available deposits – displaces alternative industries like agriculture and 
ecotourism.936 Because the extraction of minerals is such an intrusive, complex and dangerous activity, 
the risk of adverse environmental and human rights impacts is high.937 Such negative impacts are 
experienced, foremost, by the people working in the mines and by the communities living in their 
vicinity. The mine itself is not directly affected by those impacts and neither is it inclined to accept 
responsibility for the costs associated therewith, meaning that the costs are ‘externalised’. Given that 
the costs are not borne by the mining company, the actual and potential negative impacts of mining on 
human rights and on the environment do not enter the balance when companies calculate the 
profitability of a project, nor are they considered by the authorities approving mining projects.938 The 
costs are thus borne by the people directly affected and, ultimately, by the South Africa people. Water, 
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for instance, is a very scarce commodity in South Africa.939 To extract mineral resources mining 
companies need a lot of water, and they regularly contaminate water sources – the Carolina matter is 
an illustration thereof (infra Section 2.3.2). Accordingly, mining increases the water stress and for 
many communities access to potable water is a daily concern and uncertainty. People who voice such 
concerns risk intimidation, however, sometimes even physical.940 
Civil society in South Africa feels that, for many years, the mining industry has gotten away with 
human rights violations.941 Fortunately, awareness about the risk of human rights abuses in the context 
of mineral extraction has increased over the years, both domestically and globally. The movement to 
improve the human rights record of mining companies, which at least initially seemed to concentrate 
on civil and political rights, has produced some tangible outcomes over the years. Two illustrations are 
the campaign against conflict minerals and the exposure of violence used by private security agents, 
which, respectively, resulted in the creation of the Kimberley Certification Process and the 
proclamation of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights.942  
The impact of mineral extraction on economic, social, cultural and environmental rights, in turn, has 
arguably received less attention, although this seems to be changing.943 This change is pushed in part 
by the environmental justice movement that calls attention to the interconnectedness of the 
environment and access to basic needs, such as water, food, health care and adequate housing.944 
Nevertheless, whilst civil society actors and scholars in South Africa plead for the integration of 
environmental protection and socio-economic rights like access to housing, sanitation and water, this 
awareness has yet to trickle down to the actual right holders.945  
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People [do not] see these things as human rights violations. Polluting water, destroying wetland, 
killing people’s cattle or destroying their crops, they do not think of that as human rights violations, 
they think of it as progress and development. That is a massive problem. The actual language of 
human rights violations is poo-pooed by the corporate sector. People say: ‘Oh, whatever, we are not 
torturing you, we are not cutting off your children’s hands, how hard can it be?’946 
Adverse impacts on economic, social, cultural and environmental rights are again also linked with 
civil and political rights, for instance because neglect for such impacts may create a hotbed for violent 
conflict. This is illustrated by the outburst of strikes in the South African mining industry in 2012, 
which met with excessive violence in the course of which over thirty mineworkers got killed and many 
more injured. One of the underlying causes of the strikes were the deplorable living conditions of the 
mineworkers, as will be discussed below (infra Box 2).  
2.1.1.2. The susceptibility of the South African mining industry for human rights abuses 
Several factors make the mining industry in South Africa particularly prone to human rights abuses.947 
Firstly, as the Constitutional Court has acknowledged at several occasions,948 the mining industry is 
still gripped by the Apartheid legacy, with mining rights remaining predominantly under the control of 
the white minority and with the black majority, living nearby or working in the mines, having to bear 
the greater share of the externalised costs.949 Also the precarious rights of communities to the land on 
which they live is a vestige of Apartheid, and mining companies can exploit this to their benefit.950 A 
second factor is that the country struggles with government capture; not only does the mining industry 
have huge leverage on account of its size and its importance for the country’s economy, but many 
officials even hold direct interests in mining companies, as shareholders, board members or executive 
directors.951  
Thirdly, and related to the previous point, is the lack of monitoring and enforcement by government. 
The main risk factor for human rights abuses by the mining industry, in particular for those associated 
with environmental degradation, is not the lack of legislation but its inadequate implementation.952 As 
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the discussion of the legal framework below will demonstrate, a plethora of laws and regulations 
govern the mining industry, and these laws and regulations seem, at least on paper, rather strong and 
comprehensive. The problem lies, however, in their enforcement, which is deficient due to an interplay 
of factors that range from unwillingness on the part of government, over incompetence (lack of 
knowledge and of financial, technical and human resources) to simple inattentiveness. 
A fourth risk factor for human rights abuses peculiar to the South African mining industry relates to its 
impact on demographics.953 A distinctive feature of the industry is that it operates on the basis of a 
migratory labour system; the mines rely predominantly on not-locally employed workers. 
Consequently, when a new mine is erected or the operations of an existing mine expanded, this causes 
an influx of people into the region, not only of mineworkers, but also of other unemployed people who 
hope to find a job in one of the parallel industries. If these people and their families are not provided 
with housing,954 they construct their own dwellings on or next to the mine’s premises, which results in 
the emergence of informal settlements.955 Another way in which mining affects demographics is by 
(gradually) pushing communities off their lands, without formally relocating them. Also this may 
result in the creation of informal settlements. 
In general, living conditions in such settlements are dire. There is no access to water, sanitation and 
electricity, except perhaps for a few bore holes or water tanks, some pit latrines and streetlights, and 
the quality of the dwellings is more than below standard. Further, because of their location right next 
to the mine, residents of the informal settlements are continuously exposed to the pollution and 
environmental degradation caused by mining. The infrastructure for public services that previously 
existed in the area, such as schools, hospitals and roads, can frequently also not cater for the sudden, 
massive increase in the number of inhabitants, as a result of which the availability and quality of those 
services becomes precarious for everyone. One respondent aptly described these adverse 
demographical impacts of mining as follows.  
People do not always articulate it, because it is slow, but one of the biggest impacts are social 
impacts, which are associated with, for want of a better word, the industrialisation of the particular 
environment where these people lived. So that industrialisation includes not only the loss of land, 
and these environmental things we have spoken about, but an influx of outsiders, pressure on local 
resources, such as clinics and schools, (…) the breaking down of traditional governments and 
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authority structures, an increase in crime, an increase in alcohol and drug abuse and an increase in 
crimes against women.956  
Fifth, and finally, notwithstanding the prominence of the South African Constitution, which is 
renowned for its progressive Bill of Rights, it has as yet to achieve its transformative objective of 
ameliorating the plight of the poorest and most vulnerable people in society, most of whom are 
illiterate. Communities living nearby mines and mineworkers generally belong to this subordinated 
group in South African society, which is a legacy of Apartheid. As socio-legal research amongst poor, 
black communities affected by mining, for instance, has confirmed, these people are little aware of 
their rights and the environment does not feature on top of their list of concerns, which are rather 
devoted to housing, basic services such as water, sanitation and electricity, and jobs.957 They know 
they have rights, but cannot identify the precise rights at stake or their content. In that same socio-legal 
study, a respondent is quoted who nihilistically declared that he has “the right to complain to the 
government about my situation, so that they can promise me everything and do nothing.”958  
2.1.2. A brief outline of the civil society landscape 
To understand the context of the case study better, it is appropriate to sketch the landscape of civil 
society in South Africa, which is extremely diverse.959 This Section is not exhaustive but limited to a 
description of the civil society actors and members that regularly act on the fore in relation to mining, 
environmental degradation and human rights.  
The term ‘civil society actors’, first of all, was previously defined as (formal or informal) 
organisations or associations that are private actors (id est actors other than organs of the state) who 
have specialised knowledge about issues relating to business and human rights and/or practical 
experience with trying to safeguard human rights against possible violations by business enterprises, 
without themselves being the direct victims of such conduct.960 For the purposes of the case study, a 
distinction is made between civil society actors that advocate for particular issues, such as the 
environment, sustainable development and/or human rights, and those that offer legal services. The 
generic terms that are used to designate these two categories of civil society actors are, respectively, 
advocacy organisations and law firms.  
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Four types of advocacy organisations can be discerned, namely faith-based organisations, community-
based organisations, other nongovernmental organisations and trade unions. They are non-profit 
organisations. Examples of advocacy organisations that regularly advocate on issues related to mining, 
environmental degradation and human rights are the following: the Bench Marks Foundation and the 
Southern African Faith Communities’ Environment Institute (faith-based organisations); Mining 
Affected Communities United in Action, the Mining and Environmental Justice Community Network 
of South Africa, Women Affected by Mining United in Action and the Land Access Movement of 
South Africa (community-based organisations); the Federation for a Sustainable Environment, 
ActionAid South Africa, the Escarpment Environment Protection Group, GroundWork, Earthlife 
Africa and the International Alliance on Natural Resources in Africa (other nongovernmental 
organisations); and, the National Union of Mineworkers, the Association of Mineworkers and 
Construction Union, and Solidarity (trade unions961). Depending on the precise issue that is at stake in 
a given case, other organisations may also come into the picture, such as Treatment Action Campaign 
(focusing on access to health) and Sonke Gender Justice (focusing on gender equality).  
As for law firms, a distinction is made between non-profit public interest law firms and incorporated 
law firms. The latter are for-profit firms that regularly offer legal services pursuant to a contingency 
fee agreement (supra Section 1.4.1.2 and infra section 2.5.1) to poor clients who otherwise cannot 
afford legal representation. Examples include Richard Spoor Attorneys Inc., Abrahams Kiewitz 
Attorneys Inc. and Mbuyisa Neale Attorneys Inc. The latter law firm often cooperates with Leigh Day, 
a UK-based law firm specialised in international tort claims. The involvement of the first two law 
firms in the silicosis class action, in turn, is funded by two US-based law firms, namely Motley Rice 
LLP and Hausfield LLP (see also infra Section 2.3.3). 
Public interest law firms carry out a range of activities in the legal field, like conducting legal research 
and providing first-line legal advice. Their attorneys may also act as attorneys of record assisting 
clients in legal disputes, and if a case in court is launched, these firms may appoint an in-house 
counsel or recruit an external advocate.962 Public interest law firms operate as non-profit organisations 
and receive their funds inter alia from grants and donations. Firms that have ample experience with 
cases relating to mining, environmental degradation and human rights are the Legal Resources Centre, 
Lawyers for Human Rights, the Centre for Environmental Rights and the Centre for Applied Legal 
Studies. Depending on the precise issue at stake, however, other firms may get involved, such as 
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Section27 (specialised in health-related matters) and the Socio-Economic Rights Institute (specialised 
in housing-related matters). 
Generally, these public interest law firms have a number of specific programmes that centre on 
concrete rights or issues. Lawyers for Human Rights, for example, has nine programmes, amongst 
which an environmental rights programme, a land and housing unit and a strategic litigation unit.963 
Each programme is guided by a strategic agenda with specific targets, which tend to be informed by 
what is going on in the field. One respondent explained this as follows. 
With strategic litigation, you find that different attorneys within our organisation deal with different 
subject matters. And within each subject matter, for example like with extractives, that is one of it, I 
happen to be in the extractives team, (…) you discuss (…) what is the mission and vision of the 
group that you are in.964 
Three further terminological clarifications should be made. Firstly, when this dissertation speaks about 
individual members of civil society (natural persons), those persons are designated depending on their 
specific position, such as (human rights or environmental) activist, researcher, attorney, counsel, 
(medical or scientific) expert or scholar. These people do not necessarily belong to an organisation or 
association that qualifies as a civil society actor.  
Secondly, throughout the case study, the term ‘litigants’ or ‘litigating parties’ is used to designate the 
parties that instigated the litigation comprising both the legal representatives (attorneys and counsels) 
and their clients (direct victims or advocacy organisations), whereas the party against whom the 
litigation is directed is called the ‘counterparty’, whether it is government or a mining company and 
regardless of the precise actors that is sued.965 
Thirdly, ‘public interest litigants’ refers to litigants that act in the public interest, relying inter alia on 
standing in terms of Section 38(d) of the Constitution.966 The (non-exhaustive) criteria that are 
considered relevant to ascertain whether parties genuinely act in the public interest were explained 
earlier (supra Section 1.4.1.1). In essence, however, public interest litigation is litigation that raises a 
constitutional matter, such as the protection of the rights in the Bill of Rights,967 and that (potentially) 
affects a range of vulnerable people. The term ‘public interest litigants’ is used when findings 
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specifically apply to such litigants, for instance when a certain procedural rule is applicable only in 
public interest litigation.  
2.2. The legal framework 
2.2.1. Mining and environmental degradation: the human rights at stake 
Environmental degradation caused by mining may interfere with a number of rights held by 
mineworkers and neighbouring communities under the Bill of Rights, including the rights to human 
dignity, life, freedom and security of the person, an environment not harmful to health and well-being, 
adequate housing, health care services, sufficient food and water, information and just administrative 
action. These are the rights that were mentioned most in the interviews with respondents and in the 
court papers for, and/or judgments in, directly relevant cases – see also Table 17a in Annex 1. 
Nonetheless, it should be stressed that this list is not exhaustive and that depending on the 
circumstances other rights may be involved as well. An example is the right to freedom of expression, 
which is at stake when victims, their lawyers or activists are intimidated or harassed because they 
denounce the impact of mining activities on the environment.  
The above-listed rights are not only codified in the Bill of Rights but also in international human rights 
instruments, the most obvious ones being the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR),968 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)969 and the 
African Charter for Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Charter).970 Therefore, the discussion 
below of the relevant rights under the Bill of Rights also refers to their twin rights in the ICCPR, the 
ICESCR and the African Charter. Before introducing each of the human rights that are most at risk 
where mining degrades the environment (Section 2.1.2), the judicial enforceability of these different 
rights should be explained first (Section 2.1.1).  
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2.2.1.1. Categories of rights and their judicial enforcement  
The economic, social, cultural and environmental rights protected under the South African Bill of 
Rights can be divided into three categories: qualified, unqualified and prohibitive rights.971 Qualified 
rights are characterised by the use of mitigating concepts like ‘access to’, ‘reasonable’, ‘available 
resources’ and ‘progressive realisation’, that qualify the duties created by those rights. In turn, 
unqualified rights do not include such qualifying concepts, while prohibitive rights are expressed in 
negative terms and, hence, definitely not qualified. Most socio-economic rights are qualified. 
Nevertheless, an example of an unqualified right is the right of children to basic nutrition (Section 
28(1)(c)) and, of a prohibitive right, the right of everyone not to “be evicted from their home, or have 
their home demolished, without an order of court made after considering all the relevant 
circumstances” (Section 26(3)). 
The practical difference between qualified rights, on the one hand, and prohibitive and unqualified 
rights, on the other, lies in the degree of deference that courts award to the legislature and the 
executive when a claim is made that those rights have been violated. Because prohibitive and 
unqualified rights impose clear and unconditional duties, those duties are immediately enforceable, 
like civil and political rights. Accordingly, non-compliance will promptly trigger the application of the 
stringent limitations clause of Section 36 of the Constitution.972 Under this provision, restrictions are 
impermissible unless they are imposed in terms of a law of general application and are reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. For the 
latter condition, regard is had to all relevant factors, including the nature of the right, the importance of 
the purpose of the limitation, the nature and extent of the limitation, the relation between the limitation 
and its purpose and less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
When a qualified right is at stake, which includes most economic, social and cultural rights, courts are 
more deferential to the legislature and the executive, as they only review whether they have acted 
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‘reasonably’.973 An important difference with the limitation clause is that the reasonableness standard 
of review does not allow courts to enquire whether other more desirable or favourable measures could 
have been adopted, or whether public money could have been better spent.974 Moreover, since the 
Constitutional Court applied this standard of review for the first time in Grootboom v. South Africa, 
the standard seems to have been attenuated. In the latter judgment, a number of substantive criteria 
were advanced to evaluate the reasonableness of government conduct, such as the requirements to 
consider the social, economic and historical context of the basic need at stake, to have special regard to 
the poorest and most vulnerable people, to treat everyone with care and concern, and to lower legal, 
administrative, operational and financial hurdles to the enjoyment of the concerned right, and the 
prohibition to exclude a significant segment of society.975 Subsequent judgments, however, have been 
criticised by scholars976 for watering down the reasonableness standard to an “over-flexible, abstract, 
and decontextualised standard of governance”977 that emphasises the process leading to a given act or 
certain conduct over its substance. 
Two other points of criticism that are voiced against the case law applying the reasonableness standard 
relate to the burden of proof and the type of relief. First, courts are believed to place a too onerous 
burden of proof on complaining parties who seek to establish unreasonableness.978 Scholars have, 
therefore, called for a stricter standard of scrutiny vis-à-vis the party allegedly infringing the right and 
for a more rigorous proportionality analysis.979 Secondly, when it has been established that an act or 
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conduct falls short of the reasonableness standard, courts are careful not to issue too strong orders 
against the legislature or the executive, which was explained as follows by the Constitutional Court.  
If government takes no steps to realise the rights, the courts will require government to take steps. If 
government’s adopted measures are unreasonable, the courts will similarly require that they be 
reviewed so as to meet the constitutional standard of reasonableness. (…) If government adopts a 
policy with unreasonable limitations or exclusions (…), the Court may order that those are removed. 
Finally, the obligation of progressive realisation imposes a duty upon government continually to 
review its policies to ensure that the achievement of the right is progressively realised.980 
Finally, the main critique rings that the judiciary is reluctant to recognise the independent content of 
the first limb of provisions codifying qualified socio-economic rights. The first limb of the housing 
right, for instance, simply reads that “everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing”. 
Nevertheless, that limb is consistently read in conjunction with the second limb, stipulating that “[t]he 
state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of this right.” This means that whenever someone claims that his or her right is 
violated, courts immediately move on to examine whether the measures adopted by government in 
pursuing the realisation of the right are reasonable, without first considering the entitlement of the 
complainant under the right in principle.981 
In sum, whether the failure to comply with a duty under a given right amounts to a unjustifiable 
violation of that right that can immediately be vindicated depends on whether the concerned act or 
conduct satisfies the strict requirements of the limitation clause (in the case of unqualified and 
prohibitive rights) or the more flexible standard of reasonableness (in the case of qualified rights). It 
should be noted, however, that South African courts are less deferential where the obligation to respect 
(the existing enjoyment of) qualified rights is at stake, as opposed to the obligation to protect or 
provide those rights.982 Since time immemorial the Constitutional Court has held that “[a]t the very 
minimum, socio-economic rights can be negatively protected from improper invasion.”983 
2.2.1.2. The specific rights at stake 
(i) The right to an environment not harmful to health and well-being 
The right that is threatened first and foremost when mineral extraction causes environmental 
degradation and pollution, is the right to an environment that is not harmful to health and wellbeing. 
This right is protected by Section 24 of the Constitution, which states the following: 
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24. Everyone has the right— 
 (a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or wellbeing; and 
(b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through 
reasonable legislative and other measures that— 
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; 
(ii) promote conservation; and 
(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while 
promoting justifiable economic and social development. 
However, notwithstanding its obvious relevance, litigating parties have, at least in the past, often 
overlooked Section 24 of the Constitution in cases concerning the impact of environmental 
degradation caused by mining on basic needs of people, such as water, food and housing.984 The 
explanation by a respondent who had not cited this provision in a particular case in which they could 
have, ran like this: 
On reflection, it ought also to have been characterised as an environmental rights case, and we ought 
to have pleaded section 24. (…) Public interest firms, have tended not to rely on Section 24. Not for 
any reasons to do with its content, but because there is more jurisprudence on [the other rights]. 
There is very little case law on section 24 that has been brought as public interest litigation.985  
In any case, the environmental rights provision of Section 24 actually creates two rights that are 
independent from each other given that they are stipulated in two separate subsections without any 
cross-reference.986 Section 24(a), first of all, codifies an individual right (‘everyone’) that is negatively 
framed (‘not harmful’), unqualified and, hence, immediately enforceable.987 The nature of the right, 
which is aimed at preventing pollution and environmental degradation, and of its corresponding duty 
(not to cause such pollution or degradation), combined with the fact that private actors are as, if not 
more, likely to pollute or degrade the environment make that Section 24(a) is capable of having 
horizontal effect in conformity with Section 8(2).988 Although the right under Section 24(b) is also 
vested in ‘everyone’, this subsection rather provides for a collective right given its allusion to inter- 
and intra-generational equity (‘for the benefit of present and future generations’), and is clearly 
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directed against government. Moreover, while Section 24(b) is justiciable, its judicial enforcement in 
concreto is qualified by the demand for ‘reasonable legislative and other measures’. In sum, Section 
24 stipulates that neither private actors, including the mining industry, nor the state may degrade the 
environment in violation of subsection (a) and that the state must take reasonable steps in line with 
subsection (b) to prevent environmental degradation and to secure that mineral resources are extracted 
in a sustainable manner.  
Interestingly, Section 24(b) refers to economic and social development, which is peculiar given that 
the provision is in essence concerned with the environment. By doing so, the Constitution expressly 
contemplates the integration of environmental protection and socio-economic development, as causing 
a certain amount of pollution and degradation in the course of development is unavoidable. According 
to the Constitutional Court, government actors should thus balance environmental considerations with 
socio-economic considerations, whenever they have to decide whether or not to authorise commercial 
or industrial activities.989 Section 24(b) also more generally affects the way in which administrative 
decisions that may have an impact on the environment should be adopted.990 An example thereof is the 
applicability of the audi et alteram partem rule, which entitles interested parties to be notified about 
mineral rights applications and to be given an opportunity at that time to raise objections, at least in 
writing.991  
The African Charter codifies a right to a generally satisfactory environment favourable to development 
as well (Article 24) – interestingly, the right is stipulated as a collective right, vested in ‘all peoples’.992 
According to the African Commission, states are obliged under this provision to take reasonable steps 
to prevent pollution and ecological degradation and to promote conservation, an obligation which 
includes such specific duties as requiring and publicising impact studies on development projects, 
conducting appropriate scientific monitoring, informing communities and ensuring meaningful 
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opportunities for affected parties to be heard and to participate in the decision-making.993 Moreover, as 
the greater part of the duties of states in respect of the right to a satisfactory environment assume non-
interventionist conduct, states should immediately observe those duties.994  
Aside from the environmental right pur sang, the African Charter also vests a right in all peoples to 
freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources (Article 21), as well as a right to development 
(Article 22). The ICESCR, in turn, does not explicitly provide for a right to a healthy environment, 
although the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has found that pollution and 
environmental degradation interfere with the preconditions that are necessary to enjoy the rights to an 
adequate standard of living and to health (Articles 11 and 12 of the ICESCR) and, hence, violate the 
Covenant.995  
(ii) The rights to life, human dignity and security of the person 
Environmental degradation can also affect several other rights than the right to an environment that is 
not harmful to health and well-being, including civil and political rights such as the rights to life, to 
human dignity and to security of the person (respectively Sections 10, 11 and 12(1)(c) of the 
Constitution). The respective provisions in the Constitution read as follows: 
10. Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected. 
11. Everyone has the right to life.  
12. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which includes the right— … 
(c) to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources; 
The right to life, first of all, is at stake whenever the pollution or environmental degradation is so 
serious that the life of mineworkers and/or of people living nearby is effectively at risk.996 Also the 
right to human dignity is affected when mining results in environmental degradation and creates health 
hazards, as the High Court has recently confirmed.997 After all, dignity cuts across all the rights 
protected by the Bill of Rights.998 This approach to dignity must be understood against South Africa’s 
history, since under Apartheid the majority of the population was in fact dehumanised. That also the 
right to security of the person comes into play has, in turn, been acknowledged by the Constitutional 
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Court in Mankayi v. AngoGold Ashanti, where the Court held that exposure to high levels of dust 
caused by mining activities implicates the right to security of the person.999 
(iii) The rights to housing, water, food and health 
Next, since a few years lawyers, activists and experts who denounce the pollution and environmental 
degradation caused by mining in South Africa have given more attention to the unequivocal link 
between the environment and socio-economic rights, such as the rights to housing, water, food and 
health.1000 One respondent eloquently said that “divorcing socio-economic and environmental rights is 
tricky territory.”1001 Indeed, that pollution or degradation of the environment is capable of affecting the 
health of people, their food security and their access to water, in breach of their right to healthcare 
services and to sufficient food and water is rather self-evident.1002 Their right to adequate housing may 
likewise be affected, however, for instance when blasting (a form of noise pollution) causes houses to 
crack or simply to collapse. The relevant provisions in the Constitution are Sections 26 and 27, which 
respectively stipulate the following: 
26. (1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, 
to achieve the progressive realisation of this right. (…) 
27. (1) Everyone has the right to have access to— 
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care; 
(b) sufficient food and water; and (…) 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, 
to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights. 
Sections 26 and 27 are both qualified rights, the enforcement of which is subject to the standard of 
reasonableness explained previously (supra Section 2.2.1.1). Furthermore, they are composite rights, 
meaning that they consist of several components which respectively relate to the quantity and quality 
of the concerned basic good and to its physical and economic accessibility.1003 
Also the ICESCR stipulates a right to adequate housing, which includes a right to adequate food, and a 
right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health (Articles 11 and 12). These 
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provisions have, moreover, been interpreted as implying a right to water.1004 With respect to the 
African Charter, only the right to health is explicitly recognised (Article 16). Nevertheless, according 
to the African Commission, the rights to housing, food and water are implied by other rights that are 
stipulated in the Charter.1005  
An important distinction between the rights as they are protected by the South African Constitution, on 
the one hand, and by the African Charter and the ICESCR, on the other, is the fact that under the latter 
instruments a number of minimum core obligations have been recognised that should immediately be 
observed, whilst the Constitutional Court has expressly rejected this theory of ‘minimum core 
obligations’ and applies the reasonableness doctrine discussed earlier instead.1006 The advantage of the 
minimum core obligations, however, is that they provide each right with substantive content as regards 
the basic needs to which every individual right holder is entitled at any time. The minimum core 
obligations under the right to water, for instance, encompass a duty to ensure access to the minimum 
essential amount of water that is sufficient and safe for personal and domestic use, and to ensure safe 
physical access to water facilities within a reasonable distance from the household.1007  
(iv) The rights to information and just administrative action 
Finally, although their relevance may be less straightforward, also the procedural rights to information 
and to just administrative action are frequently directly at stake when mineral extraction creates an 
environment that is harmful to health and well-being. These rights are stipulated, respectively, in 
Sections 32 and 33 of the Constitution, which read as follows.  
32. (1) Everyone has the right of access to— 
(a) any information held by the state; and 
(b) any information that is held by another person and that is required for the exercise or 
protection of any rights. 
 (2) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to this right, … 
33. (1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally 
fair. 
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(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has the right to 
be given written reasons. 
 (3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and must— 
(a) provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where appropriate, an 
independent and impartial tribunal; 
(b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsections (1) and (2); and 
(c) promote an efficient administration. 
Information is crucially important for mineworkers and neighbouring communities, first, to be aware 
of the health hazards to which they are exposed and, second, to be able to hold the responsible actors 
effectively accountable and, hence, to vindicate their rights.1008 Because of its central role in claiming 
other rights, the right to information has been called a ‘power’ or ‘leverage’ rather than a ‘liberty’.1009 
Interestingly, Section 32 explicitly provides that it binds private bodies as well as public bodies. The 
threshold for exercising this right against private actors is higher, however, as requesters have to 
demonstrate that they need to information for the exercise or protection of a right. The importance of 
having access to information in order to be able to ensure accountability in business-related matters 
was recently emphasised by the Supreme Court of Appeal, finding that “citizens in democracies 
around the world are growing alert to the dangers of a culture of secrecy and unresponsiveness, both in 
respect of governments and in relation to corporations.”1010 
The right to just administrative action, in turn, comes into play because mining is a regulated activity 
that is subject to different types of authorisations. If, despite the strict regulations, a mine causes 
pollution or environmental degradation and creates health hazards for mineworkers and neighbouring 
communities, the question arises whether the authorities have adopted the necessary administrative 
decisions and issued the required authorisations in a lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair manner 
and whether affected persons can challenge those authorisations. 
The right to information is protected by the African Charter (Article 9(1)) and is included in the right 
to freedom of expression under the ICCPR (Article 19(2)). Moreover, the African Commission has 
held that even the rights to health and to a satisfactory environment (Articles 16 and 24 of the African 
Charter) impose a specific duty on the state to inform communities that are exposed to environmental 
degradation and to give them meaningful opportunities to be heard and to participate in decisions 
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affecting them.1011 Similarly, the right to development (Article 22) has been interpreted by the African 
Commission as imposing an obligation on states to consult with people who are affected by a 
development project, and to ensure that they are fully informed about the project and able to 
participate in the decision-making process.1012  
2.2.2. Implementing legislation 
The different constitutional rights discussed above have also been implemented in national laws, many 
of which apply to the mining industry. The most directly relevant acts are the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act, the National Environmental Management Act, the National Water Act, 
the Mine Health and Safety Act, the Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act, the Promotion of 
Access to Information Act and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act. Their main objects are 
briefly explained below, while specific provisions will be discussed in the course of the case study, 
where it is necessary to understand concrete cases and/or elements in the design of a lawsuit.  
The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA),1013 which was also mentioned in 
the context of South Africa’s struggle with international investment law (supra Section 1.1.3), 
regulates the process of extracting mineral resources and petroleum, from beginning to end 
(reconnaissance, exploration, prospecting and mining), including the application for, and compliance 
with, the necessary permits and rights, and the application for a closure certificate when a mining 
operation ceases. The Act implements Sections 25(4)-(7) (equitable access to natural resources and 
land) and 24 (environmental rights) of the Constitution.1014 Amongst its purposes are giving effect to 
the principle of the state’s custodianship of the nation’s mineral and petroleum resources, promoting 
equitable access to those resources, expanding the opportunities for historically disadvantaged persons 
to benefit from their exploitation, promoting economic growth, and ensuring sustainable ecological, 
social and economic development of the mineral resources.1015 The MPRDA must be read in 
conjunction with its Regulations, which elaborate on the specific conditions and procedures for the 
different applications.1016 
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In accordance with the MPRDA,1017 the Minister has issued ‘Codes of Good Practice for the South 
African Minerals Industry’1018 as well as a ‘Broad-Based Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter’.1019 
These documents are meant to further the transformation of the mining industry and deal with issues 
such as employment equity, housing and living conditions, preferential procurement and mine 
community and rural development. The legally binding status of the Mining Charter is challenged, 
however, in a pending court case, in which the Centre for Applied Legal Studies has applied to 
intervene.1020  
The National Environmental Management Act (NEMA)1021 is the primary piece of legislation 
implementing Section 24 of the Constitution,1022 which should ensure that the integration of 
environmental protection and sustainable social and economic development is realised. Section 2 of 
the Act stipulates a list of principles, which apply to all environmental decision-making and which 
should govern the Act’s interpretation.1023 Amongst those principles feature the ideas of people-based 
and integrated environmental management, sustainable development, environmental justice, equitable 
access to environmental resources, participatory environmental governance and polluter-pays. Several 
regulations that further implement the NEMA have been adopted, setting, for instance, the 
requirements for environmental impact assessments.1024 Moreover, whilst the NEMA is the framework 
legislation for environmental protection and conservation, several other Acts have been proclaimed, 
which deal with particular subareas of environmental law, such as air quality, biodiversity, protected 
areas and waste.  
Section 32 of the NEMA, which deals with standing (supra Section 1.4.1.1) and costs, deserves 
special mention. In particular, Section 32(2) explicitly mandates courts not to award costs against 
litigants who are unsuccessful in securing relief for a breach of any of the provisions of the Act.1025 
Moreover, in case of a successful application, Section 32(3) allows courts to decide to order costs 
against the other party so as to compensate, in part, the legal representatives who assisted the litigants 
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for free and to reimburse any costs that the litigants incurred to investigate the matter and prepare the 
litigation.1026  
The National Water Act (NWA)1027 is environmental legislation implementing Section 24 of the 
Constitution albeit specifically concerned with the protection of South Africa’s water resources.1028 
The Act inter alia establishes the state as the public trustee of the nation’s water resources, regulates 
entitlements to use water (including by stipulating which forms of water usage require an authorisation 
and under what conditions such authorisation is granted), and organises the management of the water 
resources. The purpose of the Act is “to ensure that the nation’s water resources are protected, used, 
developed, conserved, managed and controlled” in ways that take a number of factors into account, 
such as intra- and inter-generational equality, equitable access to water, redressing the results of past 
discrimination, efficient, sustainable and beneficial use of water and facilitating social and economic 
development.1029 
The Mine Health and Safety Act (MHSA)1030 deals with labour conditions at mines. The Act’s objects 
include requiring employers and employees to identify hazards and to eliminate, control and minimise 
such risks, providing for participation by employees in matters of health and safety, for effective 
monitoring of the conditions at mines and for investigations and inquiries to improve those conditions, 
and promoting a culture of health and safety as well as training in health and safety.1031 In that regard, 
the Act also establishes committees at the mines and a general inspectorate to guard the health and 
safety conditions in the mining industry.  
The Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act (ODIMWA)1032 governs the compensation of 
‘compensatable diseases’1033 contracted by mineworkers due to their work at the mines and establishes 
the Medical Bureau for Occupational Diseases, which manages the system. Where a mineworker is 
suspected to have contracted a compensatable disease, such claim is examined by the Medical 
Certification Committee based on the reports of the medical practitioner who examined the 
mineworker. If the disease is compensatable, compensation is paid from the Mines and Works 
Compensation Fund, which is funded by levies charged on the controlled mines. Except for a person 
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suffering from tuberculosis who is entitled to 75% of his monthly wage, mineworkers with a 
compensatable disease only receive a lump sum which amounts to approximately one plus one third of 
their annual salary (in case of a first degree disease) or three times their annual salary (in case of a 
second degree disease). If a mineworker dies, no funeral expenses are paid, nor do their dependants 
receive any compensation in the form of a lump sum or pension.1034 The Constitutional Court1035 has 
acknowledged that compensation awards under ODIMWA are rather low – “pittance” according to 
one respondent1036 – compared to the awards paid out under the Compensation for Occupational 
Diseases and Injuries Act (COIDA)1037 which applies to employers who do not work in the mining 
industry or who contract a disease that is not compensatable under ODIMWA.  
The Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA)1038 implements the right to have access to 
information under Section 32 of the Constitution. The Act consists of two main parts, which deal with 
access to records held by public bodies and by private bodies, and regulates, for instance, how access 
should be requested and under what conditions a refusal is justified. Aside from giving effect to the 
right to information by enabling access as swiftly, inexpensively and effortlessly as possible, the 
objects of the Act are to promote a human rights culture and social justice, to bolster transparency, 
accountability and effective governance of both public and private bodies and to educate and empower 
people so that they understand their rights and can effectively scrutinise, as well as participate in, 
decision-making by public bodies affecting their rights.1039 
Lastly, the contents of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA),1040 which is concerned 
with the right to just administrative action under Section 33 of the Constitution,1041 were discussed 
earlier in the Section dealing with administrative proceedings (supra Section 1.4.2.1).  
On a general note, it is important to highlight the exceptional position of the mining industry in South 
Africa’s legal landscape. Not only in the context of labour is the mining industry governed by a 
different law than the one applying to all other industries (ODIMWA versus COIDA), but a similar 
phenomenon is visible in environmental law. Prior to 2014, the special status of mining meant that the 
MPRDA regulated a greater part of the environmental aspects to mining, which was exempted from 
the NEMA – although for water usage mining was subjected to the NWA. Then, in 2014, the 
government introduced the ‘one environmental system’, which has brought mining under the NEMA. 
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Nevertheless, the body competent for applying and enforcing the NEMA in relation to the mining 
industry is the Department of Mineral Resources, and not the Department of Environmental 
Affairs.1042 Only when an original administrative action adopted by the Department of Mineral 
Resources under the NEMA is challenged, does the matter return to the Department of Environmental 
Affairs, which has to decide on internal appeals. The ‘one environmental system’ has been heavily 
criticised for leaving the competence to adopt environment-related decisions with the Department of 
Mineral Resources, which amounts to allowing the wolf to guard the sheep.1043 Although the 
Constitutional Court, in a judgment dealing with the compensation of mineworkers for occupational 
diseases, has found that the distinct treatment of the mining industry is in principle justifiable in light 
of the country’s “singular history of mining, with the massive contribution of this sector to the 
country‘s wealth”,1044 some respondents openly questioned this state of affairs,1045 as also the 
following quote demonstrates.  
A regard that insulates [the extractive industry] from the sort of principles we would attach to any 
other industry and makes it something (…) having a very separate and special set of rules and so on, 
purely because it is the extractive industry, I think is quite problematic.1046  
2.2.3. Social and labour plans and the question of horizontal scope 
One particular aspect of the legal framework that deserves some digression concerns the requirement 
of mineral rights holders to submit a social and labour plan when they apply for a mining right. The 
commitments that mining companies make in terms of such plans should be linked with the question 
regarding the scope of their human rights obligations.1047 As the discussion below will demonstrate, 
the outsourcing of traditional government functions entails many risks, which has brought lawyers and 
activists to doubt whether mining companies should be involved in the protection and fulfilment 
(promotion, facilitation and provision) of human rights. Before explaining the applicable law on social 
and labour plans, some history is sketched, which partially explains the concerns of civil society.  
2.2.3.1. A history of mining villages 
Since mining began in South Africa, the country has witnessed the emergence of so-called ‘mining 
villages’, which are villages run by the mining company that operates the nearby mine and inhabited, 
at least initially, by mineworkers and their families. In those villages mining companies effectively 
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assume responsibility for public service delivery: they build and maintain infrastructure for the supply 
of electricity, water and sanitation; they construct roads, houses, clinics and schools; they ensure waste 
collection; and they provide security through the recruitment of private security agents. A mining 
village may function rather well for many years – although this is not certain – but given that mineral 
extraction is by its very nature a temporary activity, at some point in time, the mine will close down. 
At that time, the people living in the mining village risk to be abandoned to their fate. Not only do they 
lose their job, the delivery of public services is suddenly interrupted. A good illustration thereof is the 
case of the Blyvooruitzicht mine, which for many South Africans is a seminal case that demonstrates 
the inherent danger in allowing a mining company to operate as a quasi-state. 
Box 1. Blyvooruitzicht: from mining village to anarchy  
The Blyvooruitzicht mine was incorporated in 1937 and started operating in 1942. Its name – 
which translates literally as ‘happy prospect’ – predicted a prosperous future and, for many 
years, the mine met, and even exceeded, those expectations. A thriving community emerged on 
its premises. The mine “built and maintained community meeting halls, sports fields, a golf 
course and other recreational facilities.”1048 Schools, a clinic and churches were established, 
private security agents guarded the area and water and electricity were supplied and rubbish 
collected in return for a nominal fee that was deducted from the paycheck of the 
mineworkers.1049  
In 2009, the tide turned. The mining company owning and operating the Blyvooruitzicht mine, 
DRD Gold, was struck by the financial crisis and started looking for a buyer of its assets. What 
followed was a complex process fraught with irregularities and untruthful deals.1050 In any case, 
in July 2013 no one assumed any responsibility anymore over the mine nor for the 
Blyvooruitzicht community. The mine was placed in provisional liquidation and approximately 
1,500 mineworkers were retrenched.1051 The liquidators sought buyers for the mine’s assets so 
as to pay its creditors, allegedly without giving much attention to the interests of the 
community.1052 In an attempt to protect their interests, residents have applied to the High Court 
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in February 2017 for an order discharging the provisional liquidation of the mine and to place 
the company into business rescue operations.1053 
In any case, since 2013 the Blyvooruitzicht community has been abandoned to its fate, by the 
mine but also by government. Lawyers for Human Rights has reported that “[t]he municipality 
said it had no duty to intervene (…) because, inter alia, the village is located on ‘private 
property’, which is not incorporated as a formal township within its jurisdiction.”1054 The 
resulting situation in the Blyvooruitzicht community is aptly described as follows by Lawyers 
for Human Rights. 
“(…) The Mine’s free hospital closed in late 2013. Organized groups of informal miners (…) 
invaded the unsecured Mine’s premises to access the remaining gold, and clashes with the residents 
erupted. Local news reports described the area as having descended into chaos and a ‘war zone’. (…) 
Rubbish collection halted and garbage has piled up (…) Local infrastructure, including the sewage 
system, is breaking down for lack of maintenance. The Village’s access to basic services such as 
water and electricity has been repeatedly threatened. The question of whether residents will be able 
to remain in their homes, which are the technical property of the [Mine], hangs in the balance.”1055 
Community members have literally begged government to step in, claiming that “government 
cannot be permitted to abandon us at our most desperate hour.”1056 When the supply of water 
was suddenly terminated in May 2015, AfriForum and a local church applied to the High Court 
for an urgent interdict to have the supply restored.1057 By the time of that application, the 
community had been disconnected for twelve consecutive days. The application was dismissed, 
but through mediation by other parties, including Lawyers for Human Rights, the supply of 
water was nevertheless restored. A few months’ later, in October 2015, however, it became 
apparent that the Blyvooruitzicht Community’s water supply would be permanently under the 
threat of being terminated, at least as long as the Blyvooruitzicht mine is in provisional 
liquidation. This time the residents themselves, represented by Lawyers for Human Rights, 
applied to the High Court for an interdict.1058  
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On 16 October 2016, the Court issued an order without comment.1059 The local municipality was 
interdicted from disconnecting the water supply and directed to supply water at a minimum flow 
of 60%, at all times from 6am till 10am and from 5pm till 9pm and twenty-four hours in the 
schools, clinics and other public facilities. The residents were asked, in return, to pay a small fee 
per household per month as a contribution to the costs of the water supply. In addition, the local 
municipality was ordered to consult with the residents in developing its water service plan, 
which had to be produced within 120 days from the date of the order.1060 
Although in present-day South Africa new mines may no longer build and run entire villages, there is 
a legacy and, as the discussion of social and labour plans next will show, the law now explicitly 
provides for a role of mining companies in what are traditionally believed to be government functions. 
2.2.3.2. The legal framework 
Since the entry into force of the MPRDA, an application for a mining right must be accompanied by a 
social and labour plan,1061 in which the mineral rights holders undertakes certain commitments. Whilst 
this situation may not amount to mining companies running entire villages, in many instances the 
commitments made in those plans mean in practice that mining companies assume all kinds of 
responsibilities that are traditionally located with government. This ‘legalisation’ of an albeit mitigated 
form of the practice of mining villages was described as follows by a respondent.  
One of the most interesting components of that regulatory system is that it is basically a very 
effective and pretty covert form of outsourcing and privatisation. It is astounding to me that 
government has managed to outsource some core government functions.1062 
The obligation of mineral rights holders to submit a social and labour plan is elaborated in the 
MPRDA Regulations, which prescribe its mandatory contents.1063 In particular, a social and labour 
plan consists of six parts, beginning with a preamble that contains general information on the mine in 
question and ending with an undertaking that the holder of the mining right will adhere to its plan and 
inform the employees about its contents. In-between the preamble and the undertaking there are four 
main parts. First, the plan must cater for a human resources development programme which includes a 
skills development plan (concerning inter alia the number and education levels of the employees and 
the number of vacancies), a career progression plan, a mentorship plan, an internship and bursary plan 
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and the employment equity statistics. Second, the plan has to incorporate a local development 
programme, which describes the socio-economic context of the operation area, its key economic 
activities and the expected impact of the mine thereupon. This part of the plan must also elaborate on 
the infrastructure and poverty eradication projects that the mine will support and on the measures that 
it will take to address the housing and living conditions and the nutrition of the mineworkers. Thirdly, 
the plan has to stipulate the applicable procedures in case of downscaling and retrenchment, and, 
fourthly, it must also contain a financial provision that allocates the necessary budget for its 
implementation.  
According to the MPRDA Regulations, social and labour plans should bolster employment, boost the 
social and economic welfare of all South Africans and ensure that the holder of the mining right 
contributes towards the socio-economic development of the area of operation.1064 The extent to which 
the plan has been implemented must be reported, annually, to the Regional Manager,1065 who is 
responsible for monitoring compliance by the holder of the mining right with its social and labour 
plan. 
Through these social and labour plans (in particular the part on a local development programme), 
mining companies commit themselves to offering certain services that are traditionally performed by 
government. As the Blyvooruitzicht case demonstrates (albeit on a bigger scale), this risks to create 
problems once the mine ceases its operations. Problems may even arise earlier due to the lack of 
accountability. A first major problem is that the MPRDA Regulations only stipulate that the mine 
should inform its employees about the contents of the plan,1066 but not the communities living in its 
immediate surroundings, who should also benefit from the local development programme and possibly 
from the skills development programme. Community members often only get hold of the plan after a 
protracted process.1067 In particular, if the mine does not, in an informal way, agrees to hand over the 
social and labour, they have to submit an official request under the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act, and if that request is refused, which happens regularly, they are forced to go to court 
to obtain access. Nonetheless, information is essential for accountability to exist, because without 
knowing the commitments of mining companies, communities cannot begin to monitor 
compliance.1068 Given that the information obligation is already so restricted, mining companies are 
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even less likely to consult (in good faith) on the contents of the plans with the people who should 
benefit from them.1069  
A second problem is that where mining companies have failed to comply with their commitments 
under their social and labour plan, it has proved to be very hard to hold them accountable and to 
enforce compliance.1070 An important reason therefor is that commitments under such plans commonly 
lack finality and specificity, and the vaguer an obligation is formulated, the greater the opportunity is 
for companies to avoid their commitments.1071 The happenings at Marikana are a tragic example 
thereof.  
Box 2. The Marikana massacre: unfulfilled promises1072  
On 10 August 2012 a wildcat strike (not supported by the National Union of Mineworkers) 
broke out at Lonmin’s platinum mine at Nkaneng near Rustenburg, the Marikana mine.1073 
Instead of showing up for work, a group of mineworkers marched to Lonmin’s offices. When 
the protestors were dispersed, the atmosphere became grim. Security officers of Lonmin shot 
rubber bounds at strikers who intimidated other employees. On 11 August two strikers were 
shot death by union members, which increased tensions in the area with nine more people being 
killed, unaccounted for, between 12 and 14 August, some of whom were allegedly police 
officers. When the South African Police Service wanted to break the strike on 16 August and 
opened fire on a group of strikers, thirty-four miners got killed and over seventy injured. The 
incident represents the single most lethal use of force since the end of Apartheid. The strike 
continued for several more weeks.  
In September 2012, the President established a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the 
massacre and the events leading up to the incidents.1074 The terms of reference also mandated 
the Commission to examine whether Lonmin had generated an environment that was conducive 
to the creation of tension, labour unrest, disunity among its employees or other harmful conduct. 
In this context, the Commission investigated Lonmin’s failure to adhere to its housing 
commitments in terms of its social and labour plan. Although Lonmin had undertaken to build 
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5,500 houses for its employees in response to the critical housing shortage in the area and the 
dire living conditions at Nkaneng, only three of those houses had been built by August 2012.  
During the hearings of the Commission, a director gave the following declaration about 
Lonmin’s commitments in terms of its social and labour plan (SLP). 
“(…) we have to start off with what the actual obligation in the SLP says and (…) the SLP 
commitment is, Lonmin will facilitate the building of houses and it will do so by talking to the 
relevant institutions and in fact (…) in the SLP it mentions that it’s in discussions with Rand 
Merchant Bank. So one’s understanding is, houses were going to be built with the assistance of 
relevant financial institutions, not necessarily being put on Lonmin’s balance sheet in terms of assets 
and liabilities. So whether Lonmin had made the commitment to spend its own money building those 
5 500 houses I think is debatable.”1075 
In its final report, delivered on 31 March 2015, the Commission of Inquiry rejected this account 
and concluded that Lonmin’s failure to comply with its housing obligations had indeed created 
an explosive situation. In its recommendations the Commission called upon the Department of 
Mineral Resources to take the necessary steps to enforce the housing obligations of Lonmin, and 
requested an investigation into the apparent failure by that Department to monitor compliance 
by Lonmin with its social and labour plan. 
After the Commission of Inquiry’s final report was published, a group of women living nearby 
the Marikana mine submitted a complaint to the Compliance Advisor at the World Bank Group 
given that the International Finance Corporation has invested in Lonmin’s mine.1076 Their 
complaint serves two goals. First, they hope to urge Lonmin to consult with the people living in 
Marikana as to how it will address its negative impacts on the community and implement its 
commitments under its social and labour plan. Second, they seek a finding that the International 
Finance Corporation has failed to monitor its investment, to ensure adherence to its 
sustainability policies and standards and adequately to protect the communities affected by the 
Marikana mine.  
2.2.3.3. An assessment by civil society 
Overall, lawyers, activists and experts consider the involvement of mining companies in service 
delivery through social and labour plans (and the legalisation of social investment by business 
enterprises in general) a negative evolution. They feel that by giving mining companies more 
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responsibilities, they are allocated even more power, whilst in fact power should be taken away from 
them.1077 Their basic tenet is that mining companies should have as little to do with government 
functions as possible.1078 The reasons are manifold but essentially bear upon the risk of trade-offs, the 
lack of accountability and the legitimacy gap.  
Firstly, a strong perception exists that mining companies tend to try to hide their adverse human rights 
impacts behind philanthropic projects and nice discourse.1079 Or, as one respondent said, “companies 
(…) start providing services as a means of compensation.”1080 Related to this fear for trade-offs is the 
concern that government may be less inclined to enforce certain obligations against mining companies 
that perform functions that should normally be carried out, and paid for, by government.1081 
That discourse is not always followed by action is a second concern.1082 As past experiences – such as 
the events leading to the Marikana massacre – show, there is always a risk that when it comes down to 
it, mining companies deny being responsible for the provision of services that traditionally fall upon 
government and it proves hard to call them to account.1083 Adding thereto is a feeling that the more 
actors are responsible, the less accountability there is; obligations should be clearly allocated to create 
real accountability.1084  
Thirdly, the fact that government outsources a great part of its core functions through social and labour 
plans raises serious concerns about democratic legitimacy. Unlike government, mining companies are 
not democratically elected, and their presence is inherently temporary. Accordingly, they have little 
incentives to draft comprehensive programmes in favour of the collective good.1085 Moreover, when 
government is no longer responsible for basic service delivery, it cannot be held accountable for its 
performance through elections either. The finding that government itself does not develop the capacity 
to supply those services is likewise problematic, because when the mine ceases to operate, government 
is suddenly expected to take over those services but is incapable to do so, as the Blyvooruitzicht matter 
demonstrates.1086 Therefore, instead of having them taking on government tasks, one respondent 
suggested that mining companies should simply pay more taxes so as to capacitate the government and 
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that those taxes could be earmarked in order to ensure they benefit mineworkers and neighbouring 
communities.1087  
The accountability and legitimacy gaps are magnified by the previously mentioned fact that one group 
of people, namely the neighbouring communities, who should benefit from social and labour plans are 
in principle not informed, let alone consulted, about their content, meaning that they have no voice in 
the design of the service delivery system that concerns their basic needs.1088 One respondent also said 
that people have gotten confused about the different roles and responsibilities of government and of 
mining companies.1089 As a result, they often have unrealistic expectations as to the benefits that a 
mine will bring to them, expectations that are nurtured by a general feeling of unfairness that the 
country’s mineral wealth has benefited a small, inner circle but not the majority of the population.  
Civil society actors are thus not keen on mining companies taking over traditional government 
services, because mining is an inherently temporary activity, because mining companies have little 
interest in planning on the long term for the greater good, and because social investment projects only 
pay lip service to mineworkers and communities for the adverse impacts of mining, which are many 
times higher. The following quote fittingly summarises these concerns.  
[Mining] creates a totally artificial but very destructive presence for the period of its operation and 
then it leaves a level of anger and destitution and conflict.1090  
2.3. The focus matters: three cases in the spotlight 
Before delving into the issue of using strategic litigation to enforce accountability for human rights 
violations by business enterprises, this Section introduces the three focus matters, which will be used 
to illustrate findings in the sections that follow. They are directly relevant cases that meet the criteria 
that were explained earlier (supra Part I, Section 5.3.2): the victims are mineworkers or neighbouring 
communities, who sue government, mining company or both because they suffer the consequences 
from environmental degradation caused by mining. For each case, the factual background is described, 
the relevant legal rules are explained,1091 the progress of the legal proceedings is discussed and any 
parallel strategies or follow-up litigation is briefly commented on. The discussion of each focus matter 
concludes with a case file that summarises the key elements. The cut-off date for the focus matters is 
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31 March 2017. All significant developments that took place on or before that date are included in the 
discussion, those thereafter not.  
2.3.1. Tudor Shaft: informal settlement exposed to radiation 
2.3.1.1. Factual background 
Tudor Shaft is an old mining shaft located in the West Rand, a minerals-wealthy region northwest of 
Johannesburg. The mine is no longer operative, but its remains were never removed and the area never 
rehabilitated. Moreover, in the course of 1996-1997,1092 an informal settlement emerged at the site, 
right beside and even on top of the unrehabilitated, radioactive tailings dam.1093 The dam contains 
uranium waste produced when gold was extracted from the former mine. Aside from extremely high 
levels of uranium, a soil sample test has showed high traces of aluminium, arsenic, cadmium, cobalt, 
copper, mercury, manganese, nickel and zinc.1094 Residents at the informal settlement got into contact 
with those contaminants by inhaling and even ingesting the dust of the tailings that is blown about by 
the wind, by consuming crops grown in contaminated soil, by playing barefoot on the soil, by using 
the soil for the production of traditional medicines, and by bathing in contaminated water.1095 
Moreover, several other uraniferous tailings dams which are still managed by mining companies, are 
located in the immediate surroundings of Tudor Shaft. The actual impact on animal and human health 
is under-researched, however.1096 
By 2012 the Tudor Shaft informal settlement comprised around 450 dwellings (constructed out of 
corrugated iron, wood and other materials) that were inhabited by approximately 1,800 people. The 
residents were poor people, living on very low incomes. The living conditions at the settlement were 
dire. People had no electricity, and there were only three communal water standpipes and seven 
chemical toilets, which were serviced twice a week.1097 Most residents were keen on being relocated to 
a safer environment. Since the 1990s civil society actors, the Federation for a Sustainable Environment 
in particular, has called on government to resettle the informal ‘Tudor Shaft community’ and to 
rehabilitate the site. A sustained advocacy campaign was embarked on, which included taking people 
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to the site, organizing community workshops, lobbying government, presenting at conferences and 
seminars, and making submissions to the media.  
A reaction from the responsible government actors was bound to ensue. Indeed, in 2009, a plan was 
drafted jointly by the Department of Water Affairs and the National Nuclear Regulator, but little 
concrete action followed. Later also the local municipality, Mogale City, came on board, as the owner 
of the land on which the Tudor Shaft is located. Early 2011, the municipality (allegedly forcibly) 
relocated some seventeen families living closest to (or even on top of) the tailings dam, which met 
with resistance, however.1098 Together with the National Nuclear Regulator, the municipality then 
approached Mintails, the mining company that owns Mogale Gold and that holds a mining right to 
reclaim the tailings dam (which means that it is entitled to extract any remaining minerals) and to 
conduct gold recovery activities in the area. They did so, apparently because Mintails has the 
expertise, manpower, infrastructure and systems that are necessary to rehabilitate the area.1099The 
mining company supposedly agreed to cooperate with them in order “to resolve the challenges in 
relation to the Tudor Shaft community” as part of its social and labour plan1100 – this document is not 
publicly available, as was explained earlier (supra Section 2.2.3). In particular, while the municipality 
would relocate about sixty living structures of families living in the immediate vicinity of the dam, 
Mintails would work on the dam.  
When in June 2012 Powerstar (the transport firm contracted by Mintails) started to remove one 
particular hill of mining waste, the Federation for a Sustainable Environment was concerned that no 
precautionary measures had been adopted to prevent that radioactive dust would be released during 
this attempt at rehabilitation, and the residents claimed that they had not been informed, let alone 
consulted, in advance. Within 24 hours the Federation for a Sustainable Environment was in court.  
2.3.1.2. Legal framework 
The Tudor Shaft matter is an extremely complex case that implicates many different actors, both 
government and private. As far as government is concerned, the matter revolves around numerous 
issues, such as radiation, non-rehabilitated, polluting tailings dams, informal settlements, and the lack 
of basic service delivery. These issues trigger the competence of different government spheres and 
departments, each of which sees an opportunity in that complexity to point the finger to the other(s). 
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First, given that the land on which the Tudor Shaft is located is owned by the local municipality, 
Mogale City,1101 it has a duty under Section 28(1)-(2) of the National Environmental Management Act 
(NEMA) to take reasonable measures in order to prevent or to minimise and rectify significant 
pollution or degradation of the environment. Section 28(4) of the NEMA1102 enumerates the possible 
measures that the municipality could adopt for that purpose, such as remediation or an investigation 
into and an assessment of the environmental impacts. The municipality’s responsibility is also 
triggered by Section 152(d) of the Constitution, which stipulates that “the objects of local government 
are (…) to promote a safe and healthy environment,” an objective that falls under the legislative and 
executive mandate of the local council.1103  
Second, where mining causes ecological degradation, pollution or environmental damage, contravenes 
the conditions of any authorisation granted, or is harmful to health, safety or well-being of people and 
requires urgent remedial measures, the Minister of Mineral Resources is mandated by Section 45(1) of 
the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) to direct the holder of the relevant 
right or permit to investigate, evaluate, assess and report on the impact of such incident, to take 
remedial measures and to complete such measures before a specified date. If the holder fails to comply 
with such directive, the Minister may take the necessary measures him- or herself and subsequently 
recover the costs from the rights holder.1104 If, however, the rights holder has ceased to exist, has been 
liquidated or cannot be traced, the Minister may direct the regional manager to take those measures, 
which in that case have to be funded from the financial provision.1105  
Third, the National Nuclear Regulator is the statutory body established by the National Nuclear 
Regulator Act, which has the mandate to protect persons, property and the environment against 
nuclear damage.1106 All organs of state, however, that bear some kind of responsibility for monitoring 
and controlling radioactive material, must co-operate to ensure effectiveness and to minimise 
duplication of such functions and procedures.1107 For that purpose, the National Nuclear Regulator 
should conclude a cooperative agreement with those organs of state.1108 The responsibility for 
coordination thus falls upon the National Nuclear Regulator, which should also ensure that no person 
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constructs, operates, decontaminates or decommissions a nuclear installation without a license.1109 In 
casu, no such license was obtained for the removal operations in June 2012.1110 
Fourthly, Section 28(4) of the NEMA authorises the Director-General of the Department of 
Environmental Affairs to enforce compliance with subsection (1) and, in particular, to direct the owner 
of the land and/or the polluter – in casu the mineral rights holder or the local municipality – to take the 
necessary measures to prevent or to minimise and rectify the pollution or degradation of the 
environment. An investigation into, and evaluation and assessment of, the environmental impact of the 
activities is one of the measures that could be ordered accordingly. In September 2011, the Department 
of Environmental Affairs had already issued such a directive against the municipality, ordering it to 
take reasonable measures to rectify the environmental degradation,1111 in particular to resettle the 
residents of the informal settlement and to submit a report containing a detailed radiological 
assessment to determine the extent of the contamination in the area. The municipality disputed its 
responsibility, however.  
The fact that the different government actors involved seek to abandon their respective responsibilities 
by passing the buck on to the other(s), does not accord with the principle of cooperative government 
codified in Section 41(1)(h) of the Constitution.1112 Under this principle organs of state are expected to 
cooperate with one another in mutual trust and good faith. Instead of blaming each other, the 
responding government actors should assist, support, inform and consult with one another about the 
problem, coordinate their actions and, in any case, avoid legal proceedings against one another.  
Finally, not only government’s responsibility is at stake, but also that of the holder of any relevant 
right or permit. According to Section 43(1) of the MRPDA the holder of the mining right remains 
responsible for any environmental liability, pollution and ecological degradation until a closure 
certificate has been issued, which in casu never happened.1113 While it is unclear who conducted the 
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mining operations that generated the tailings dam,1114 the mining company in the picture is Mintails, 
which currently holds a mining right over the area.1115 Although the mining company has allegedly 
committed itself to conducting the removal operations in terms of its social and labour plan, it is not 
clear whether Mintails accepts to bear any legal obligations in that regard.1116 
2.3.1.3. The litigation 
As was said, when on 28 June 2012 Powerstar began to remove the dump in an attempt to rehabilitate 
part of the Tudor Shaft site, the Federation for a Sustainable Environment, represented by the Legal 
Resources Centre, was in court the next day. They applied for an urgent interdict declaring the mine 
residue removal operations unlawful and hazardous to public health and directing the responding 
parties to cease the operations immediately, pending the supply of a risk assessment report which 
shows that public health would not be adversely affected by the removal operations.1117  
The Federation for a Sustainable Environment complained that the removal operations of the 
uraniferous tailings were not carried out adequately; they caused dust liberation and heavy dust fallout, 
water was only intermittently sprayed to prevent such dust and the spraying water mobilised and 
solubilised the heavy metals, which could then be absorbed in the soil, while children were also 
playing in and drinking the water.1118 The urgent application was directed against the National Nuclear 
Regulator, the local municipality, the Minister of Energy,1119 and the Minister of Environmental 
Affairs, with the company conducting the removal operations being cited as an interested party, 
without direct relief being sought from it, to ensure that it would not continue the operations out of 
ignorance. No mining company was cited – although Mintails is involved in the out-of-court 
mediation process as will be discussed infra in Section 2.3.1.4. 
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 The Federation for a Sustainable Environment believes that the owner of the mine residue is DRD Gold, 
which had transferred its mining right to another company which subsequently sold it to Mintails, but the change 
of ownership flowing from the first transferal has allegedly not been registered. First Applicant’s Replying 
Affidavit, in re: Federation for a Sustainable Environment v. National Nuclear Regulator (24611/12) (date 
unknown), para. 27.3. 
1115
 Mintails denies having acquired the Tudor dump, however. 
1116
 First Respondent’s Replying Affidavit, in re: Federation for a Sustainable Environment v. National Nuclear 
Regulator (24611/12) (31 October 2012), para. 3.18 and 3.23. This is opposed by the Federation for a 
Sustainable Environment because Mintails will reprocess the tailings dam and thus gain therefrom. First 
Applicant’s Replying Affidavit, in re: Federation for a Sustainable Environment v. National Nuclear Regulator 
(24611/12) (date unknown), paras 32 and 36.  
1117
 First Applicant’s Notice of Motion, in re: Federation for a Sustainable Environment v. National Nuclear 
Regulator (24611/12) (29 June 2012). 
1118
 First Applicant’s Founding Affidavit, in re: Federation for a Sustainable Environment v. National Nuclear 
Regulator (24611/12) (29 June 2012), paras 23-25; First Applicant’s Replying Affidavit, in re: Federation for a 
Sustainable Environment v. National Nuclear Regulator (24611/12) (date unknown), para. 60. 
1119
 The Minister was originally cited as ‘Minister of Energy’, but the co-applicants later joined the Minister of 
Mineral Resources. Second and further Applicants’ Supplementary Affidavit, in re: Federation for a Sustainable 
Environment v. National Nuclear Regulator (24611/12) (31 October 2013), paras 17-19. 
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At the hearing, that same day on 29 June, undertakings were given by Mogale City not to continue 
with removal operations and the court immediately drafted an interim order by agreement, suspending 
those operations pending the hearings that would take place on 10 July 2012.1120 The matter was 
eventually postponed, but the responding parties agreed not to restart the removal operations.1121  
After the urgent order of 29 June 2012 the residents of the Tudor Shaft informal settlement, 
represented by the Socio-Economic Rights Initiative, applied for leave to intervene in the matter, in 
particular because they were concerned about the health impacts of the unrehabilitated site and 
because they feared that their eviction would come up as the solution for the hazardous situation. 
Hence, through their intervention they mainly sought to ensure that proper consideration would be 
given to their interests and that they would be consulted with regard to any future step taken by either 
government or company.1122 The application to intervene was granted by the High Court in September 
2012. Notwithstanding their intervention, however, the residents of the informal settlement have 
mainly been “conspicuous by their absence”.1123 Like many poor communities, they are largely 
unaware of their rights and the environment is far from their top concern.1124 Nevertheless, the fact that 
the residents are somewhat more conscious about the health risks posed by their living environment, 
which was established in a socio-legal study,1125 is the result of the sustained advocacy work by the 
Federation for a Sustainable Environment on site. 
In the months following the urgent order and the intervention by the residents, court papers were 
exchanged amongst the different parties. In those papers, by and large, the applicants argued that all 
the different government actors bear a responsibility and should cooperate to resolve the problem, 
whereas the responding parties each denied having competence in the matter and pointed the finger to 
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the others, to the company that used to mine the site and to Mintails that reclaims the site.1126 
Eventually, the parties agreed to attempt to resolve their dispute out-of-court, as discussed next. 
2.3.1.4. Follow-up, out-of-court processes 
The urgent application and the exchange of court papers triggered the start of an out-of-court 
mediation process. In particular, the responding parties undertook to negotiate and consult with the 
Federation for a Sustainable Environment, the residents of the Tudor Shaft informal settlement and 
their respective legal representatives in relation to the rehabilitation of the site, the health impact 
assessment and the resettlement of the community.  
With respect to resettlement, the municipality soon agreed to relocate the residents to an area 
designated for government-subsidised housing in terms of the reconstruction and development 
programme.1127 Nevertheless, the relocation was postponed several times, allegedly because the 
municipality lacked budget. Dissatisfied with this state of affairs, protests broke out in the settlement 
in early 2016, in the course of which one person died.1128 By the end of 2016, however, most residents 
were finally relocated, except for about one hundred persons who are not entitled to such housing, 
namely foreigners and persons whose monthly income exceeds a certain amount.1129 
As regards the rehabilitation of the area, the mediation process is ongoing and also the South African 
Human Rights Commission participates in the meetings. Although they agreed that all parties would 
endeavour to reach consensus regarding the lawful removal of the uraniferous tailings dam so that no 
new court application would be necessary, agreement on a final solution has yet to be reached. In the 
course of 2015, the Federation for a Sustainable Environment also lodged a complaint with the Public 
Protector. Some issues in dispute include the terms of reference of an impact study, the expert that 
should be appointed and whether the final report and its recommendations would be adopted in a court 
order, making it enforceable, for instance, through contempt of court proceedings.1130 At some point, 
however, the Department of Environmental Affairs commissioned an environmental and health risk 
assessment study, but notwithstanding its findings and recommendations, the radioactive and toxic 
tailings dam has yet to be removed and the area has still not been rehabilitated.1131 As insiders have 
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confirmed, the mediation process moves slowly, as it has proved to be difficult to convene meetings 
and as Mintails has refused to disclose certain records.1132  
2.3.1.5. Case file 
Table 4. The Tudor Shaft matter: case file 
Litigating parties 
Their legal representatives 
Federation for a Sustainable Environment 
Legal Resources Centre 
Counterparties  Government National Nuclear Regulator, Mogale City, Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Minister of Mineral Resources 
Company Powerstar, the transport company contracted for the removal 
operations (joined as an interested party in the urgent application) 
Mintails, the mining company holding reclamation rights (not 
involved in the urgent application) 
Co-litigating parties 
Their legal representatives 
Residents of the Tudor Shaft informal settlement  
Socio-Economic Rights Institute  
Funding of the litigation  Own funds of the public interest law firms  
Issue Pollution by radioactive contaminants 
Cause of action Statutory law, interpreted in light of the Constitution, in particular 
Sections 24 (environment) and 41 (co-operative government) 
Direct relief sought - Declaratory order finding the mine residue removal 
operations unlawful and hazardous to public health 
- Interdict to cease the operations immediately pending the 
supply by the respondents of the risk assessment report or 
other satisfactory measures showing that public health will 
not be adversely affected by such removal operations 
- Costs 
Broader objectives - A health and environmental impact study  
- Adequate rehabilitation of the area and removal of the dam 
- Relocation of the informal settlement 
Litigation stage Draft order by agreement 
 No removal operations pending the hearing of the matter 
Out-of-court processes - Mediation process  
- Involvement of the South African Human Rights Commission  
- Complaint with the Public Protector 
Timeline 28 Jun. 2012 Removal operations start 
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29 Jun. 2012 Application by the Federation for a 
Sustainable Environment for an urgent 
interdict and urgent order by the Court 
27 Jul. 2012 Application by the residents of the informal 
settlement to intervene as co-applicants  
12 Sep. 2012 Order by the Court accepting the intervention 
Oct.– Nov. 2012 Replying affidavits 
2012-present Mediation out-of-court 
End of 2016 Relocation of the residents  
2.3.2. Carolina: contaminated water for disadvantaged communities 
2.3.2.1. Factual background 
Acid mine drainage (which is the outflow of polluted water that contains excessive concentrations of 
toxic metals1133) is one of the greatest environmental challenges confronting South Africa. Due to the 
high number of abandoned and derelict mines in the country, there is a constant risk of acidic water 
spreading underground and flowing into streams and rivers. Acute emergencies are particularly 
common after heavy rainfalls during the rainy season. In addition to being an environmental disaster, 
the pollution of water resources by acid mine drainage has far-reaching consequences for public 
health.1134 It affects people who depend on natural resources for their water supply as well as people 
who are connected to the water supply services, because the infrastructure is frequently antiquated and 
incapable of treating the water adequately. Moreover, people are often not aware that the water is toxic 
or do not understand the long-term impacts, especially when they only use the water for bathing, 
growing crops and feeding cattle. Even if they know, however, alternatives do not exist or are scarce. 
The town of Carolina and its nearby townships, Silobela and Caropark, are located in one of several 
regions where there is a constant threat of acid mine drainage. Although the residents are connected to 
the water network, the antiquated infrastructure does not protect against contamination from external 
sources.1135 When in January 2012 a heavy storm caused the run-off ponds of nearby coal mines to 
overflow, acid mine drainage flew straight into the dam that is the source of the resident’s water 
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supply. As the treatment plant lacked the capacity to purify the water, it became unfit for consumption. 
The pH level dropped to 3.7,1136 while the presence of iron, aluminium, manganese and sulphate far 
exceeded acceptable levels – as set by South African regulations and by the World Health 
Organization.1137  
Warnings were given to the residents of Carolina that their water was unfit for human and animal 
consumption, but those did not reach the poorer residents in the townships.1138 Although the 
municipality supplied water in tanks, those supplies were intermittent and insufficient; they were 
refilled ad hoc, their volume fell short of the prescribed standards and for many residents the tanks 
were not located within 200 metres.1139 Accordingly, some people – especially in the Silobela 
township – were forced to continue to drink the contaminated water. When they went to hospital 
having become sick and suffering from vomiting, diarrhoea and skin rashes, they were advised under 
no circumstances to drink tap water anymore.1140 The water crisis lasted for seven months and affected 
about 17,000 people.1141 In May 2012 protests broke out during which some tanks got burnt, but they 
were not replaced.1142  
2.3.2.2. Legal framework 
The situation in Carolina raises two concerns: access to potable water and acid mine drainage 
degrading the environment. As will be evident from the discussion below, to date only the former 
concern has been tackled through litigation. Nevertheless, the legal framework in relation to both 
questions is discussed.  
The Water Services Act1143 is adopted by the state to achieve the right of everyone to have access to 
sufficient water in accordance with Section 27(1)(b) of the Constitution. Section 3 of this Act 
reiterates, first of all, that everyone is entitled to basic water supply at any time.1144 According to the 
applicable regulations,1145 the minimum standard of basic water supply is 25 litres per person per day 
or 5 kilolitres per household per month, water must be accessible within 200 metres of a household 
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and the supply should never be interrupted for more than seven full days in a year.1146 Each time that 
the supply is interrupted for more than 24 hours, steps must be taken to ensure that a consumer has 
access to alternative water services of at least 10 litres per person per day.1147 The authority 
responsible for basic water supply is the municipality, which may appoint a water services provider for 
the actual activity of supplying water.  
Although government bears the overall responsibility to ensure that basic water is supplied, in the case 
of Carolina the water supply was actually interrupted due to contamination by acid mine drainage. The 
legal framework in this connection is similar to the one sketched in the context of the Tudor Shaft 
matter. 
Firstly, Section 19 of the National Water Act (NWA) is the twin-provision of Section 28 of NEMA 
and stipulates in subsection (1) that the coals mines must take all reasonable measures to prevent water 
contamination from occurring, continuing or recurring.1148 Reasonable measures could consist of 
ceasing, modifying or controlling the act or process that causes the pollution, eliminating its source, 
containing or preventing the movement of acid mine drainage and remedying the effects of the 
pollution.1149 These companies could be directed to take such measures by the catchment management 
agency, which is a government agency.1150 If the directive is not complied with, the agency may itself 
take the necessary measures and recover the costs jointly and severally from the mines that were 
responsible for the acid mine drainage.1151  
Secondly, also Section 45 of the MPRDA1152 is again relevant given that acid mine drainage is a form 
of pollution caused by mining. The Minister of Mineral Resources is thus mandated to direct the coal 
mines to investigate, evaluate, assess and report on the impact of acid mine drainage, to take remedial 
measures and to complete such measures before a specified date. If the coal mines do not comply with 
the directive, the required measures may be taken by the Minister who can recover the costs from the 
mining companies.  
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2.3.2.3. The litigation 
After an (unsuccessful) attempt to agree a negotiated solution for the dire situation in Carolina,1153 the 
Legal Resources Centre and Lawyers for Human Rights launched on behalf of, respectively, the 
Federation for a Sustainable Environment and the Silobela community an application for an urgent 
interdict against the responsible authorities within the different spheres of government, being national, 
provincial and local government. The goal of the urgent application was the provision of water within 
the shortest period of time possible. In particular, they sought an order (1) declaring the failure by the 
responding parties to provide access to water unlawful, (2) directing them to provide temporary 
potable water within 24 hours, (3) directing them to engage actively and meaningfully with the 
applicants regarding the steps taken to ensure that water would once again be supplied through the 
water services, as well as regarding where, when, at what volume and how regularly temporary water 
would be made available in the interim, and (4) directing them to report to the court within one month 
as to the measures taken to ensure that water would once again be supplied through the water services.  
The High Court judge was responsive to the applicants’ case, except for their wish to obtain an order 
against national and provincial government. According to the judge, those levels of government only 
have a general duty to regulate the supply of water and to support local government so that it is 
capable of supplying water (including by providing funds).1154 If courts actually ordered national and 
provincial government to intervene in local government, this would negate the separation of spheres 
established by the Constitution and would amount to an interference by the courts in political 
matters.1155 The eventual court order was only directed against the mayor and the municipal manager 
of the district municipality (and not of the local municipality), and included all relief requested by the 
applicants with the small difference that the municipality was given 72 hours to provide temporary 
potable water instead of 24. Costs were awarded jointly and severally against the mayors and 
municipal managers of both municipalities – even though no relief was awarded against the local 
municipality.  
The district municipality1156 appealed the decision by the High Court on technical grounds – including, 
notably, the argument that the order was not directed against the right municipality, which is the water 
services authority for the affected area. Leave to appeal was granted, but upon a counter-application by 
the applicants’ legal representatives the judge accepted that the appeal did not suspend the original 
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order.1157 The municipalities appealed this interim execution order, which was rejected by the judge, 
who provided arguments for that decision in a separate judgment, dated some three weeks later.1158 
Also the applicants applied for leave to appeal, but their application was dismissed for having been 
lodged out of time – for a discussion, see infra Box 21. Even though the appeal had no suspensive 
effect and was eventually even abandoned, the municipalities never complied with the original 
order.1159 In the meantime, however, the different parties involved had started to engage out-of-court, 
as will be discussed next (infra Section 2.3.2.4).  
The original application was only concerned with the urgent provision of water to the affected 
community and did not address the causes of the pollution (namely the acid mine drainage).1160 
Therefore, the mines were not cited in the urgent application (see also infra Box 10). Nevertheless, as 
the discussion of the legal framework above shows, the mines could be demanded to take certain 
measures to minimise and rectify the pollution caused by acid mine drainage. Whilst it is the 
responsibility of government to enforce the polluter pays principle in accordance with Section 19 of 
the NWA, interested parties could apply to the court for an order directing the responsible government 
agency to exercise its mandate.1161 The litigating parties that were involved in the 2012 urgent 
application are conscious of the fact that everything (the supply of water in tanks and the investments 
in infrastructure) was eventually paid for by government, a cost which is then ultimately borne by the 
South African people. However, they do not see much prospect in going “to court to force government 
to get the money back from the mine”, because they believe “that was never going to happen.”1162  
2.3.2.4. Out-of-court processes and related litigation 
Similar to the Tudor shaft matter, the applicants first filed for (and obtained) an urgent order against 
government and, thereafter, tried to engage, out-of-court, with both government and the responsible 
mining companies to find a solution on the longer term. In the Carolina matter the main concerns were 
that the quality of the water would be monitored, the water infrastructure (and in particular the 
treatment plant) repaired and acid mine drainage from nearby mines prevented in the future. 
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Following the urgent application, the Department of Water Affairs eventually agreed to engage with 
the community and the Federation for a Sustainable Environment regarding the water crisis in 
Carolina, even though it had strongly opposed the urgent application in which, they believe, they 
should not have been joined (see also infra Box 10). In particular, the Department established a task 
team that is composed of officials from its national and provincial offices, local public servants, 
community leaders and the community’s legal representatives.1163 Accordingly, regular meetings are 
organised in which the different stakeholders engage with one another. The task team is also informed 
about and monitors the test results of water samples, so that the community is informed on a regular 
basis about the water quality. The Department has also promised to improve the water infrastructure, 
which is estimated at a high cost (200 million South African Rand).1164  
Against a background of court proceedings and community mobilisation the mines began to take 
measures to reduce the risk of acid mine drainage as well. Nevertheless, they deny being responsible 
for any water contamination after January 2012 and have not paid for the infrastructure investments by 
government.1165 Some informal talks between the mines and the applicants’ legal representatives have 
taken place in the Komati Catchment Forum,1166 but the usefulness of attending this forum is 
questioned, because no information disclosed there can be used and because it, allegedly, functions as 
a talk-shop where the mines use the right discourse without significantly changing their behaviour on 
the ground.1167  
Lawyers for Human Rights has also brought the case to the attention of the South African Human 
Rights Commission. Whether this submission has had practical implications is not clear. From public 
documents it is only apparent that the Commission has discussed the situation in Carolina in a 
committee, which found that government must “protect people against mining companies (…) who 
pollute the water” and must “ensure transparency and accountability”.1168  
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Finally, the successful outcome of the urgent application in the Carolina matter has sparked other 
litigation relating to access to water. The High Court’s order in FSE v. Minister of Water Affairs meant 
a huge victory for lawyers, activists and scholars. Indeed, only a few years’ earlier, the Constitutional 
Court had found in Mazibuko v. Johannesburg that “it is clear that the right [to have access to water] 
does not require the state upon demand to provide every person with sufficient water without more”1169 
and, hence, the Court had refused to “adopt a quantified standard determining the content of the 
right.”1170 The order in the Carolina matter demonstrates that at the very least citizens can claim to be 
immediately provided with the basic water supply that the government itself has set by law.1171 The 
judge also explicitly acknowledged that under certain circumstances courts should order government 
to act in a given way.  
(…) many a times in the Country, when communities register their dissatisfaction over service 
delivery, they resort to a chaotic and uncontrolled destructive frenzy. Good governance requires that 
such possibilities should be averted and the Courts should not refrain in ordering those structures of 
governance in taking positive steps aimed at achieving this, inter alia, and the progressive realization 
of the ethos enshrined in the Constitution;1172 
Moreover, in his judgment motivating the urgent order the High Court judge considered the historical, 
economic and social context of access to water, noting that Silobela is one of those communities that 
“still bears the brunt of the legacy of apartheid, under developed, under resourced [sic]”,1173 and called 
upon the state to “take measures that are progressively geared towards eradicating the incongruity in 
living areas of communities, structured on racial divide by the hitherto apartheid regime.”1174 This is 
significant, as scholars1175 have called upon the judiciary to consider the vulnerable position of 
litigating parties in cases relating to access to basic needs, instead of resorting to a merely procedural 
scrutiny under the reasonableness standard of review (see supra Section 2.2.1.1). Since that court 
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 Mazibuko v. Johannesburg, supra note 685, para. 50. Cf. ibid. para 57 (holding that “that obligation requires 
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order several other applications have been filed, demanding the immediate supply of water to 
communities that are deprived thereof (see infra Box 32) .1176  
2.3.2.5. Case file 
Table 5. The Carolina matter: case file 
Litigating parties 
Their legal representatives 
Federation for a Sustainable Environment 
Legal Resources Centre 
Silobela concerned community 
Lawyers for Human Rights 
Counterparties Government - National: Minister of Water Affairs and Director-General of 
the Department of Water Affairs  
- Provincial: Acting Regional Director-General and Regional 
Director of the Department of Water Affairs, and Member of 
the Executive Council for Cooperative Governance and 
Traditional Affairs (Mpumalanga) 
- Local: Mayors and Municipal Managers of the District 
Municipality (Gert Sibanda) and the Local Municipality 
(Albert Luthuli) 
- Komati Catchment Agency 
Company The mining companies (Tselentis (Msobo, formerly Xstrata), 
Mimosa (Northern Coal), Coastal Fuel and Witrand (Siphetha 
Coal) and Union (BHP Billiton)) supposedly responsible for the 
acid mine drainage were not cited in the urgent application  
Funding of the litigation Own funds of the public interest law firms  
Issue Water contamination due to acid mine drainage  
Cause of action The Constitution, Section 27(2) 
Statutory law, interpreted in light of the Constitution, in particular 
Section 27(1)(b) (water) 
Direct relief sought - Declaratory order finding the failure to provide potable water 
unlawful and unconstitutional  
- Interdict to provide temporary potable water within 24 hours 
- Interdict to engage actively and meaningfully on the 
immediate and long-term supply of water  
- Structural interdict to report to the court within one month as 
                                                     
1176
 In those cases acid mine drainage was not the cause of the deprivation. See e.g. Kuhne and AfriForum v. 
Vhembe District Municipality, which resulted first in an order by agreement and later in another order seeking to 
ensure compliance with the former. Applicants’ Notice of Motion and Founding Affidavit, in re: Kuhne v. the 
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to the measures taken to ensure water supply  
- Permission for any party to re-enrol the application for 
hearing on the same papers 
- Costs, jointly and severally, by whoever opposes the 
application  
Broader objectives - Prevention of acid mine drainage 
- Reparation of the water infrastructure 
- Monitoring of the quality of the water 
- Consultation with the affected community 
Litigation stage Court order (10 July 2012) 
 Declaratory order 
 Interdict to provide water (but within 72 hours) 
 Interdict to engage meaningfully 
 Structural interdict to report to the court 
Leave to appeal was granted (but abandoned in 2014), without 
suspensive effect 
Out-of-court processes - Engagement and monitoring through the task team 
- Informal talks in the catchment forum with the mining 
companies 
- Involvement of the South African Human Rights Commission 
Related litigation - Kuhne v. Vhembe (successful) 
- AfriForum v. Merafong (unsuccessful)1177  
- Molefe v. Merafong (successful) 
Timeline Jan. 2012 Acid mine drainage flows from coal mines 
into the dam supplying Carolina  
11 Jan. 2012 Water quality survey shows that the water is 
unfit for consumption 
Feb. 2012 Water is supplied in tanks  
16 May 2012 Service-delivery protests break out 
22 Jun. 2012 Application for an urgent interdict 
10 Jul. 2012 Urgent order by the Court 
26 Jul. 2012 Leave to appeal against the urgent order 
granted but without suspensive effect 
15 Aug. 2012 Judgment providing reasons for rejecting 
appeal against the interim execution order 
9 Jun. 2014 Application for condonation and leave to 
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 One respondent gave the following explanation as to why this urgent application (which also concerned the 
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cross-appeal dismissed 
2014 Appeal by the municipalities abandoned 
2.3.3. Silicosis class action: thousands of mineworkers suffering from silicosis 
2.3.3.1. Factual background1178 
Blasting, drilling, transportation and other processes associated with the extraction of gold generate 
crystalline silica dust. This dust is raised into the air, although mitigating measures can be taken, and 
can be inhaled by mineworkers, in particular when they are not adequately protected against exposure 
to such dust. Upon inhalation the smallest silica particles are deposited in the alveolus region of the 
lung and cause scarring or ‘fibrosis’ of the lung tissue, which impairs the normal functioning of the 
lung. This condition, called silicosis, is caused exclusively by the inhalation of crystalline silica dust 
and is irreversible, incurable and painful. It is also a latent and progressive disease, with the first 
symptoms manifesting after several (on average 10 to 15) years and worsening over time. It is thus 
possible that a patient is only diagnosed long after having worked in the mines. The symptoms of 
silicosis include chest pains, a persistent cough and shortness of breath. Medical research has also 
established that silicosis patients are at a significantly higher risk to contract chronic pulmonary 
disease, tuberculosis and lung cancer.  
Hence, current and former underground mineworkers should be monitored continuously and, when 
diagnosed with silicosis, they have to be treated in order to manage the (incurable) disease, its 
symptoms and complications. Nevertheless, the migratory labour system, which draws mineworkers 
from remote areas and neighbouring countries (supra Section 2.1.1.2), thwarts the required ongoing 
medical monitoring and treatment. As sick mineworkers either lose their job or quit before being 
diagnosed with silicosis (or before hearing such diagnosis), their former employers are able to 
withdraw from their responsibility, whilst access to health services in the labour sending areas is 
severely restricted. The result is that sick mineworkers become a burden for their already-
impoverished families and communities.1179 
After gold mining had begun in 1886, a first Commission of Inquiry into the causes and prevalence of 
silicosis was already appointed in 1902.1180 Both the industry and government are thus aware of the 
risk for mineworkers to contract this condition since time immemorial. How many mineworkers are 
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 The facts described in this section are derived from the judgment by the High Court certifying the class 
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currently affected by silicosis is unknown, but estimates vary from 17,000 up to 500,000.1181 The 
incidence of silicosis amongst South African mineworkers is at an unusually high level, which has 
several causes. Originally, the country’s laws on health and safety in the mines were too lax as 
government wanted to attract investment and stimulate the mining industry. However, a tighter 
statutory standard for the exposure to dust and more stringent labour conditions in general had little 
impact, since monitoring by government was poor, measurements were susceptible to manipulation 
and individual protective equipment was absent or deficient. The fact that most mineworkers came 
from isolated areas where health services are non-existent or substandard, is another factor. As a 
result, since gold mining began in the late 19th century thousands of (predominantly black) 
mineworkers have contracted silicosis, because they got exposed to too high doses of dust,1182 and 
were not provided with (adequate) personal protective equipment, which in some instances still 
happens today. 
It is important to stress that although a zero rate exposure to silica dust is impossible, several readily-
available measures to mitigate the risks are known to the industry and to governments world-wide. 
Examples of preventive measures include informing mineworkers about the risk and educating them 
on the means to mitigate that risk, preventing or minimizing dust generation by spraying water, 
evacuating contaminated air through proper ventilation, diluting dust with clean air and providing 
suitable respiratory protection equipment. 
2.3.3.2. Legal framework 
In terms of the common law (at least as it is argued by the mineworkers’ legal representatives), the 
mines (or their parent mining companies, see infra Box 11) owe a duty of care to the mineworkers, to 
take reasonable measures to provide a safe and healthy work environment that is not injurious to their 
health and/or to take reasonable care for the safety of the persons who enter the mines. Aside from any 
duty under common law, the employers of mines also have to comply with the Mine Health and Safety 
Act and the regulations in force under that Act.1183 In particular, Chapter 2 of the Act, which stipulates 
their duties concerning health and safety, includes such duties as ensuring that the mine is designed, 
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 The period during which time many thousands of mineworkers have allegedly contracted silicosis due to 
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constructed and equipped to provide conditions for safe operation and a healthy working environment, 
providing and maintaining a working environment that is safe and without risk to the health of 
employees, supplying the necessary health and safety equipment and facilities to its employees, and 
ensuring that employees comply with health and safety requirements.1184 Furthermore, Chapter 9 of the 
Regulations, dealing with environmental engineering and occupational hygiene, stipulates inter alia 
that employers must ensure that their employees are not exposed to airborne pollutants above the limit 
set by those regulations.1185 
As was already mentioned in the discussion of the applicable laws (supra Section 2.2.2), South 
African employees who contract an occupational disease or get involved in a work-related accident, 
are entitled to statutory compensation, which is paid out without intervention by the employer, who 
contributes to the system by paying compulsory levies, however. Two statutory compensation schemes 
exist, one applicable to mineworkers who contract a compensatable disease from working in the mines 
(the Occupational Diseases in Mine Works Act, ODIMWA) and one applicable to all other 
occupational diseases (the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act, COIDA). The 
COIDA explicitly provides that employees who are entitled to statutory compensation, cannot sue 
their employer for damages, on whatever legal basis.1186 For a long time this provision was believed to 
apply with equal force to mineworkers who have contracted a compensatable disease, until the 
Constitutional Court found in Mankayi v. AngloGold Ashanti (see also infra Box 3) that mineworkers’ 
right to claim common law damages has not extinguished under ODIMWA. This judgment meant a 
huge victory for sick mineworkers, not only because of the low compensation awards under 
ODIMWA, but also because the entire system had proven to be a complete failure due to additional 
problems, such as the excessively bureaucratised process and the tremendous backlog in 
disbursements. Hence, in reality for a very long time mineworkers with silicosis simply lost their job, 
were not compensated, had to pay for the treatment themselves, could no longer act as breadwinners 
and became a burden for their already-impoverished families and communities. Accordingly, the 
Constitutional Court’s judgment in Mankayi v. AngloGold Ashanti opened the door for follow-up 
litigation for damages.  
2.3.3.3. The litigation 
Local advocates (including medical practitioners), community-based organisations and lawyers have 
joined forces to denounce the unjust plight of mineworkers with silicosis. Over the years several 
lawsuits were brought against specific mining companies by individual mineworkers (albeit often 
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jointly). Nevertheless, many thousands of victims remained in the lurch, especially the most 
vulnerable ones who belong to the poorest and most marginalised communities. Since they lack the 
required resources and are frequently not even aware of their rights, they do not travel to town to hire a 
lawyer – let alone that they can pay for legal services – and are reluctant to get involved in protracted 
litigation against an extremely powerful counterparty (see also infra Section 2.5.3).  
Therefore, three law firms decided to combine their efforts and to launch a class action, which they 
believe to be the only vehicle through which they can secure compensation for every mineworker who 
has contracted silicosis from working in the gold mines, even if he is not a party to the litigation, or for 
his dependants. In fact, the class action actually deals with two classes, one covering the mineworkers 
with silicosis and one covering the mineworkers with pulmonary tuberculosis.1187 Where both 
conditions are combined, the disease is called silico-tuberculosis, and those patients are included in the 
silicosis class.  
The interests at stake in the silicosis class action are by far the greatest of the three focus matters – and 
of any lawsuit that has been or is conducted in South Africa for that matter. The action was launched 
by some sixty class representatives on behalf of all sick mineworkers (possibly totalling up to 500,000 
individuals), against the gold mining industry, namely thirty parent mining companies that throughout 
the years covered by the class action (1965 till present) have owned, controlled or operated one or 
more of the over eighty goldmines cited, which are spread across the country. If successful, damages 
will be due to all mineworkers who are effectively diagnosed with silicosis or pulmonary tuberculosis. 
Irrespective of its final resolution, whether it is an actual judgment, an arbitration decision or an out-
of-court settlement, the silicosis class action is a landmark case of significant importance for the duties 
of the South African mining industry, and potentially for business and human rights in general.  
The lawsuit will be a long-winded case with several intermediate stages (in particular certification, 
establishment of liability, and determination of damages) and possibly many more interlocutory claims 
and exceptions, delaying the main case. Even during the certification proceedings two major 
interlocutory issues were pleaded. The first one was the application by two nongovernmental 
organisations, namely Sonke Gender Justice and Treatment Action Campaign, both represented by 
Section27, to intervene as third parties so as to adduce additional argument regarding the need for the 
High Court to certify the silicosis and tuberculosis classes. The Court admitted the amici, but 
dismissed two of the three affidavits that they wanted to submit as additional evidence. This 
intervention and the Court’s decision is discussed below (infra Box 14). 
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The second interlocutory matter concerned an application by one of the mining companies, Gold 
Fields, to join the US-based law firm funding one of the South African law firms’ involvement in the 
class action to make it liable for an adverse costs order if the certification application is unsuccessful. 
This joinder application failed. Under common law, a party funding a lawsuit may be held liable for its 
costs by being joined as a co-litigant to the funded litigation.1188 The High Court considered, however, 
that litigation funding agreements have an inherently positive element, because they promote access to 
justice for litigants who due to poverty and lack of resources would otherwise not be able to enforce 
their rights.1189 Therefore, to decide whether a litigation funder should be joined so as to become liable 
for the costs a distinction should be made between pure litigation funders and ‘controlling funders’ or 
‘funders-for-own-interest’.1190 According to the Court, Motley Rice acted as a pure litigation funder, as 
it did not stand to gain from the certification proceedings as a matter of business and did not act as the 
mineworkers’ attorney. This decision by the High Court does not preclude another attempt by the 
mining companies to join Motley Rice in the next stage of the proceedings, however.1191  
Then, on 13 May 2016 the High Court delivered its judgment certifying the two classes as they were 
proposed by the claimants. According to the Court, its decision to certify the class was demanded by 
the interests of justice, because otherwise “the vast majority of them who cannot sue individually 
would have to live with the fact that the law, with all its promises, affords them no remedy for the pain 
and suffering endured while battling the growth of fibrotic forests in their ever depleting lungs.”1192 As 
this fragment already indicates, the language used in the certification judgment is rather bold. The 
judges did not hide their abhorrence for the facts of the case and their moral condemnation of the 
mining companies, which also the following paragraph eloquently shows.  
With remarkable consistency their evidence reveals that the mining companies stripped them of their 
dignity, and concomitantly compromised their health and safety, with such intensity and ferocity that 
they were effectively dehumanised.1193 
The judges also condemned the obstructionist attitude of the mining companies during the certification 
proceedings, denouncing that they had not refrained from “deliberately undermining the interests of 
justice”, and urged them to change their attitude for the remainder of the litigation.1194 One of the 
defence tactics employed by the mining companies was to discredit the commitment of the 
mineworkers’ legal representatives. Although they are all well-known, respected lawyers, a smear 
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campaign was launched in which mining companies tried to disavow them by making public 
statements questioning the equitability of the contingency fee agreements and claiming that the 
lawyers were money-grubbers who litigated “for their own gain rather than in the genuine interests of 
class members”.1195 In the hearings on the class certification they even explicitly impugned the 
lawyers’ competence and professionalism. All these accusations were summarily dismissed by the 
High Court, however.1196  
Six mining companies sought leave to appeal the certification judgment by the High Court, which 
includes the certification order as well as the order pertaining to the transmissibility of general 
damages – in its judgment the High Court developed the common law in relation to the latter issue, as 
will be explained below (infra Box 25). The High Court originally only granted leave to appeal in 
relation to the latter order, and not for the certification itself, as the judges believed that such appeal 
does not have a reasonable prospect of success, amongst other reasons because the mining companies 
“are unable to show that there is any real alternative to the matter being adjudicated on a class-wide 
basis.”1197 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Appeal has decided to hear all issues, and that appeal is 
pending. 
If also the Supreme Court of Appeal certifies the class action, the main case will then continue in two 
stages, a ‘bifurcated process’.1198 In a first set of proceedings the liability of the mining companies for 
the diseases contracted by their (former) employees will be established. The relief sought during that 
first stage is thus declaratory in nature, and those proceedings will be conducted on an opt-out basis – 
all mineworkers that meet the class definition are thus automatically bound by the action unless they 
express their wish not to be included.1199 The damages to which individual mineworkers are entitled 
will be determined in the second stage, and those proceedings will be conducted on an opt-in basis. In 
order to be included and, if the action is successful, to receive damages, mineworkers thus not only 
need to meet the class definition but also to confirm in writing that they want to be included.1200  
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2.3.3.4. Preceding, parallel and follow-up litigation and out-of-court processes 
The silicosis class action is not the first lawsuit in South Africa that deals with the plight of 
mineworkers who have contracted silicosis from working underground. Aside from the test case of 
Mankayi v. AngloGold Ashanti, which was mentioned several times before, there are at least two 
famous other cases that preceded that litigation, both of which were settled – one only shortly before 
the High Court certified the class action, which confused many mineworkers, thinking that it was their 
case that had been settled and that they would be compensated soon.1201 One case was conducted, 
jointly, by the Legal Resources Centre and Mbuyisa Neale Attorneys Inc. in South Africa and Leigh 
Day in the UK and concerned twenty-three mineworkers with silicosis. The case is popularly known 
as the President Steyn litigation,1202 called after the gold mine where the plaintiffs had allegedly 
contracted silicosis. After the President Steyn litigation got settled in September 2013, the Legal 
Resources Centre decided to pursue a class action in South Africa together with Richard Spoor 
Attorneys Inc. and Abrahams Kiewitz Attorneys Inc., because contrary to what they had hoped the 
case had not resulted in a broader, industry-wide settlement.1203  
Even before the President Steyn litigation got settled, Leigh Day and Mbuyisa Neale Attorneys started 
pursuing another case before the UK courts, where the High Court eventually rejected jurisdiction, 
forcing the lawyers to start afresh in South Africa, where they filed summons in the High Courts in 
Pretoria and Johannesburg against two mining companies, Anglo American and AngloGold 
Ashanti.1204 They purposefully decided not to join the silicosis class action and to pursue individual 
claims instead, as they felt this was in their clients’ best interests given that individual (but joined) 
cases would take less time to reach a finality (see also infra Section 2.4.4).1205 The litigation initially 
concerned thirty-one mineworkers, but in the end covered 4,365 mineworkers. In March 2016 a 
settlement was agreed and a trust fund created to compensate those plaintiffs who are effectively 
diagnosed with silicosis. 
While the class action is ongoing, several other silicosis-related lawsuits are pending as well. Twenty-
two coal mineworkers have, for instance, launched an action for damages against Sasol for having 
                                                     
1201
 AS (explaining how the week when the case of Richard Meeran had been settled, with many clients calling 
to ask what had happened, whether they had settled). 
1202
 In fact, the case was going to proceed through arbitration. 
1203
 R3. 
1204
 In the original lawsuit in the UK only Anglo American South Africa was cited, as a few years earlier Anglo 
American had moved its headquarters to this country. The mineworkers’ legal representatives claimed that the 
UK courts had jurisdiction because the central administration of the subsidiary of Anglo American, namely 
Anglo American South Africa, was based at the headquarters of its parent company. In July 2013, the High 
Court rejected that argument. Flatela Vava and Others v. Anglo American South Africa Ltd. [2013] EWHC (QB) 
2131 (Eng.), affirmed by Young v. Anglo American South Africa Limited and Others [2014] EWCA Civ 1130 
(Eng.).  
1205
 AS. 
222 
 
contracted pneumoconiosis1206 in its underground coal mines. In addition, some cases by (former) gold 
miners with silicosis have been launched in parallel with the class action. Most of these cases seek to 
flesh out concrete legal questions, such as whether the mining companies’ duties amount to strict 
liability or whether negligence must be established, whether parent companies überhaupt bear any 
duties as ‘employers’, which defences mining companies try to bring, and whether such defences 
might result in an apportionment of damages.1207  
One interesting application, for instance, concerns the request by two former gold miners to obtain 
access to records held by their former employer, AngloGold Ashanti, concerning their own 
employment experiences as well as general safety and health practices at the responding party’s 
subsidiary mines.1208 In principle, the Promotion of Access to Information Act (supra Section 2.2.2) 
establishes a procedure through which records can be requested from private actors when access to 
such information is necessary for the exercise by the requester of a right.1209 AngloGold Ashanti 
refused the request, however, arguing that the two applicants are prospective members of the class 
action (which was not yet certified at the time of the refusal) so that they can no longer request access 
to information outside of the court proceedings. In other words, the mining company’s argument read 
that from the launch of the certification proceedings onwards mineworkers who are in principle 
covered by the class definition even though they may still decide to opt out of the class, can only 
request information through discovery.1210  
This argument was challenged by the applicant-mineworkers and their legal representatives, who 
argued that they needed the information to assess the merits of a possible legal strategy (such as opting 
out of the class action and, perhaps, launching a separate individual claim or accepting to be bound by 
the class action). The High Court agreed with AngloGold Ashanti, however, holding that “an 
application to certify a class action, albeit such proceedings seeks no final relief, and has as yet no true 
plaintiffs because no summons has yet been issued or served (…) constitutes ‘proceedings’ which 
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have commenced”1211 and that “[p]ersons who are members of a class sought to be certified (…) are 
not distinguishable (…) from the representative proto-plaintiffs cited as applicants in a certification 
application.”1212 Given that the applicants’ attorneys (from Richard Spoor Attorneys Inc.) had advised 
many other mineworkers on their litigation perspectives – the class representatives in particular for the 
institution of the certification proceedings – the High Court also believed that, on the facts, the 
applicants do not reasonably require the requested information for the purpose of obtaining advice.1213 
Leave to appeal this judgment was granted, however, and that appeal is pending.1214 
Lastly, two processes have been initiated out-of-court and independent from (albeit possibly triggered 
by) the silicosis class action: an industry-led initiative to eliminate silicosis and a government-led 
process of law reform. Although there is no evidence of any causal link between the launch of the 
silicosis class action and these two initiatives, it seems safe to assume that they were triggered by the 
litigation.1215 
In November 2014 five mining companies – later joined by a sixth one, together the largest mining 
companies cited in the silicosis class action – announced their initiative to establish an industry-
working group that would be tasked with advancing proposals for preventive measures to eliminate 
silicosis and for the detection and treatment of current incidences of silicosis.1216 This working group 
has already agreed on a number of measures to manage silica dust, measures which should be 
implemented throughout the industry in South Africa. The working group also provides a forum where 
the industry, together with the trade unions and the class action lawyers, can explore common ground 
for accommodating the claims of the members of the class action. 
Possibly even more significant is the initiation by government in 2015 of a process to reform the law 
on occupational diseases and accidents. In particular, the compensation schemes under ODIMWA and 
COIDA would be amended to ensure that sick and injured employers are entitled to adequate 
compensation that is swiftly disbursed – the most likely scenario at present being the integration of 
ODIMWA into COIDA.1217 The mining industry has communicated that it is actively engaging with 
                                                     
1211
 Mahaeeane and Another v. AngloGold Ashanti Limited (2014/112111) unpublished (HC) (6 October 2015), 
para. 29.  
1212
 Ibid. para. 42.4. 
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 Ibid. paras 38 and 42.6. 
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 Mahaeeane and Another v. AngloGold Ashanti Limited (2014/112111) (leave to appeal) unpublished (HC) (7 
December 2015). The court granted leave for two reasons: legal certainty and the importance of the matter for 
class members, in particular “the implications [of class actions] for persons who, by reason of the definition of 
the scope of the classes, become implicated, (…) and what freedom of action they may have to paddle their own 
canoes in the water of litigation.”  
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 R12, R29. 
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 See the initiative’s website at www.oldcollab.co.za. 
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 R23. Lawyers question whether this is the right solution given that COIDA has its own deficits, operates as 
an insurance scheme rather than a fund and expressly prohibits employees to sue their employer. R12.  
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the government regarding this law reform process.1218 Rumours have it that the law reform process 
was in fact prompted by the mining industry, who has put pressure on government as they want to 
bring the continual threat of lawsuits by former employees claiming damages to an end. Initially, the 
class action lawyers were not invited, but as they found out they were allowed to participate in the 
discussions.  
Moreover, in the meantime, the mining industry has deployed financial and human resources to assist 
the Medical Bureau for Occupational Diseases, which manages ODIMWA, in making up the backlog 
in processing and disbursing compensation claims. This support is readily admitted by the industry 
itself,1219 even though lawyers have expressed their concerns about the appropriateness of the mining 
industry being involved in deciding claims to compensate harm which they themselves have caused. 
One respondent expressed this concern as follows. 
So the industry pumped all this money in (…) They have now since the convert a senior guy from 
[X] to be the acting COO of the MBOD. They have sent a bunch of doctors there to certify. I mean 
this is all questionable, in our mind, because they are mine doctors, they do not want to find disease. 
This guy is being paid by [X].1220 
2.3.3.5. Case file 
Table 6. The silicosis class action: case file 
Litigating parties 
Their legal representatives 
Gold mineworkers 
The Legal Resources Centre, Richard Spoor Attorneys Inc. and 
Abrahams Kiewitz Attorneys Inc. 
Counterparties Government n/a 
Company Thirty parent mining companies 
Intervening parties 
Their legal representatives 
Sonke Gender Justice and Treatment Action Campaign1221 
Section27 
Funding of the litigation The Legal Resources Centre is funded by Legal Aid South Africa 
Richard Spoor Attorneys and Abrahams Kiewitz Attorneys offer 
their services pursuant to a contingency fee agreement, but their 
investment in the litigation is pre-funded by two US-based law 
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 M. Schmidt (CEO African Rainbow Minerals), A. Sangqu (CEO Anglo American SA), S. Venkatakrishnan 
(CEO AngloGold Ashanti), N. Holland (CEO Gold Fields), P. Steenkamp (CEO Harmony), and N. Froneman 
(CEO Sibanye), “Op-Ed: How to make gold mining silicosis-free” (City Press 20 March 2016). This is watched 
with some suspicion by civil society. AS.  
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 “Op-ed: How to make gold mining silicosis-free”, supra note. 
1220
 AS. ‘COO’ stands for chief operating officer and ‘MBOD’ for Medical Bureau for Occupational Diseases. 
[X] was inserted to replace the name of the specific mining company that was named by the respondent.  
1221
 They intervened in the certification proceedings, which are separated from the trial proceedings. 
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firms, respectively Motley Rice LLC and Hausfield LP  
Issue Mineworkers’ exposure to hazardous dust  
Cause of action Statutory law 
Common law of tort 
The Constitution, in particular Sections 10 (human dignity), 11 
(life), 12(1)(c) (bodily integrity), 23 (fair labour practices), 24 
(environment) and 27 (healthcare services) 
Direct relief sought - Certification of the classes 
- (If certified: damages with interest & costs) 
Broader objectives - Reform of the compensation system for mineworkers 
- Preventive measures by the mining industry 
Litigation stage Certification of the class 
Leave to appeal the certification order dismissed by the High 
Court but granted by the Supreme Court of Appeal 
Leave to appeal the declaratory order on the transmissibility of 
damages granted  
Out-of-court processes The mining industry working group on Occupational Lung 
Disease (‘Old Collab’) 
Law reform process 
Financial and human assistance by the mining companies to the 
Medical Bureau for Occupational Diseases 
Preceding/parallel/follow-up 
litigation 
- Mankayi v. AngloGold Ashanti (Constitutional Court) 
- Qubeka v. AngloGold Ashanti (settled) 
- Makoti v. Sasol Mining (ongoing) 
- Strombeck v. Harmony Gold & Others (ongoing) 
- Mahaeeane v. AngloGold Ashanti (on appeal) 
Timeline 21 Dec. 2012 Application by Richard Spoor for the 
certification of a class action 
17 Oct. 2013 Order by the Court consolidating the 
applications by Spoor and Abrahams1222 
11 Dec. 2014 Application for an intervention as amici 
28 Aug. 2015 Order by the Court admitting the amici 
13 May 2016 Order by the Court certifying the class 
24 Jun. 2016 Leave to appeal partially granted by the High 
Court  
13 Sep. 2016 Leave to appeal granted by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal  
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 They had first initiated separate actions. Nkala and Others v. Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited and 
Others (31324/12, 31326/12, 31327/12, 48226/12, 08108/13) (consolidation order) unpublished (HC) (17 
October 2013). 
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2.4. The use of strategic litigation 
This is the first of three Sections dealing with strategic litigation to enforce accountability for human 
rights violations by business enterprises, in particular when mining companies cause environmental 
degradation and thereby create health hazards to which mineworkers and neighbouring communities 
are exposed. Four issues are covered in this Section. First, the determinants are reviewed that influence 
the decision of lawyers and activists to litigate (Section 2.4.1), following which the option to go to a 
forum outside South Africa is briefly considered (Section 2.4.2). Thereafter, it is explained how 
strategic litigation frequently tackles uncharted legal terrain, which calls for the careful use of test 
cases (Section 2.4.3), and the Section ends with a discussion of the difficult decision that often 
confronts litigating parties, namely whether they should accept a settlement proposal (Section 2.4.4).  
2.4.1. Determinants to use litigation as a strategy 
2.4.1.1. General rule: engagement first 
A priori it should be noted that an important reason why litigation is in principle not the first way-to-
go if there is a dispute between mineworkers or communities, on the one hand, and government or 
mining companies, on the other, is the fact that parties are expected to exhaust other, less adversarial 
strategies before going to court. The success rate of such prior engagement largely depends on the 
amenability of the parties involved.1223 Two observations should be made in this connection, which is, 
first, that the approach of lawyers and activists towards such engagement differs depending on the 
actor with whom they have to engage,1224 and, second, that mining companies tend to rely on 
consultants for their engagement efforts with local communities.1225  
If parties “jump the gun”1226 and skip prior, out-of-court engagement, they risk being reprimanded in 
court. Although the conduct of litigating parties is not a jurisdictional fact that determines the outcome 
of proceedings, it is kept in mind by the judges, inter alia when they decide on granting costs orders 
(see also infra Section 2.6.4.3).1227 In one case, for instance, the Constitutional Court noted that “the 
respondents’ litigious record portrays a lack of restraint in employing legal devices to deal with 
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 R3, R28. Cf. R7, R9 (complaining about government’s willingness to engage). 
1224
 R28.  
1225
 R22, R29 (noting that dealings with communities require training and expertise on the part of the mining 
companies, which they generally do not have).  
1226
 R14. 
1227
 Mtunzini Conservancy v. Tronox KZN Sands (Pty) Ltd and Another (10629/2012) [2013] ZAKZDHC 1 (8 
January 2013), para. 82. Contra Magaliesberg Protection Association v. MEC: Department of Agriculture, 
Conservation, Environment and Rural Development, North West Provincial Government and Others (563/12) 
[2013] ZASCA 80 (30 May 2013), paras 61 and 63 (reversing the High Court’s decision to impose costs).  
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challenges that should more appropriately be dealt with through engagement.”1228 Too litigious 
conduct is thus not welcomed, but at the same time South African courts acknowledge that where it is 
necessary to advance their main object and to protect their interests, advocacy organisations have the 
ancillary right to litigate, which is an accessory of their ordinary activities.1229 Judges have even 
expressed their gratitude towards these organisations for bringing important cases to the courts’ 
attention.1230  
2.4.1.2. Pros and cons of litigation 
Even aside from the expectation that they first try and engage with the counterparties in case of a 
conflict, litigation is always a last resort for civil society actors, whether law firms or advocacy 
organisations, given that it bears many risks and downsides.1231 First of all, legal proceedings are 
costly1232 and time-consuming.1233 Hence, it is a big venture for advocacy organisations and public 
interest law firms to commit themselves to, which ties up organisational resources for a long time,1234 
in the face of a counterparty, government or company, which probably has deep litigation pockets.1235 
Second, litigation is also a risky undertaking, the results of which are unpredictable.1236 If 
unsuccessful, resources will be diverted for several more years in trying to undo that outcome.1237 
Third, protracted legal proceedings that are vehemently opposed by the counterparty, may destabilise 
the party seeking relief – in particular communities or mineworkers, but even public interest 
organisations as well – and cause divisions within that party.1238  
Fourth, litigation is inherently adversarial and creates a more hostile relationship. There is thus a risk 
that communication channels are shut off, which reduces the opportunities for civil society to have an 
impact on the conduct of government and mining companies.1239 Therefore, activists as well as 
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 Pilane and Another v. Pilane and Another (CCT 46/12) [2013] ZACC 3 (28 February 2013), para. 71. 
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 Landev. v. Black Eagle Project, supra note 812, para. 44. 
1230
 Biowatch v. Registrar Genetic Resources, supra note 294, para. 19; ArcelorMittal v. VEJA, supra note 570, 
para. 14 ; Landev. v. Black Eagle Project, supra note 812, para. 13; Magaliesberg Protection Association v. 
MEC Agriculture, supra note 1227, para. 61. 
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 R3, R4, R14, R16, R17, R19, R20, R32. 
1232
 R1, R4, R5, R7, R13, R32. 
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 R2, R5, R7, R12, R13, R20, R30, R32, R33. Two reasons are that the courts are clogged up with cases and 
that they are often not severe enough with respect to delaying efforts by the counterparty. R18, R33.  
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 R4, R5, R7, R10. Cf. R30 (describing litigation as “just a hard enterprise”). 
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mining companies, “the top lawyers in the country were in that court room, (…) all the senior counsels, the most 
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 R1, R16, R30. Cf. 32 (saying that they “are so scared of getting a bad decision”). 
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 R10. 
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 R10, R32. 
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 R20, R28. Cf. R4 (describing litigation as “a particularly blunt instrument”). See also Langford (2015), supra 
note 112, 13 (describing how the first few years of the democratic regime civil society “largely adopted the task 
of implementing new government policy rather than maintaining critical distance”).  
228 
 
lawyers prefer, as far as possible, a collaborative strategy. Fifth and finally, the law is limited, and 
where specific concerns are translated into violations of certain rights, many facets to the case are lost 
in translation.1240 Litigation also has a ‘narrowing’ effect in another way, as lawyers only litigate the 
issues that have the greatest prospect of success, which may be disappointing to victims and activists 
who want the entire story told.  
On the other hand, there are advantages to litigation as well. Firstly, litigation can generate power. In 
particular, by having certain rights affirmed it can significantly empower victims and activists, and 
correct (at least partially) the power imbalance between them and their counterparties.1241 Secondly, 
litigation, whether actually launched or used as an insurance, creates a form of leverage, which 
increases the pressure on the other party to come up with a solution.1242 The bluntness of litigation may 
thus sometimes exactly be necessary to send a strong message.1243 Thirdly, if the litigation results in a 
final decision, this judgment may contribute to the development of the law for the benefit of the 
general public, which is particularly important in case of legal uncertainty or legal gaps.1244  
In sum, weighing up the pros and cons of litigation and having regard to the expectation that non-
litigious remedies are exhausted first, there are two main instances where judicial proceedings 
constitute an appropriate tactic to seek to effect change: where everything else has failed or in case of 
an emergency.1245 Some respondents also mentioned that litigation would more readily be considered, 
when clients specifically ask to launch judicial proceedings or when a test case is needed that may then 
be used in similar situations (infra Section 2.4.3).1246 Moreover, respondents agree that when litigation 
is conducted, it should be combined with other strategies that focus more on public education, 
awareness raising, and social mobilisation.1247 Legal proceedings are thus generally embedded in a 
broader strategy and complement advocacy (directed, for instance, at shareholders or at investors like 
pension funds), publicity and media campaigns, and lobbying government.  
2.4.1.3. Contextual factor of considerable importance: the responsiveness of judges 
In deciding whether or not to litigate a particular case, lawyers and activists also take into account 
whether judges are expected to be ‘responsive’ to their claim, which Gloppen identifies as one of the 
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 R3, R12, R18. 
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four stages in litigation.1248 This willingness of judges to respond to a given concern voiced by victims 
of alleged human rights violations is influenced by diverse factors, which Gloppen classifies into the 
following four categories: legal culture (e.g. judges’ judicial ideology), nature of the legal system (e.g. 
structure, formalism and bureaucracy), sensitisation to human rights (e.g., training and curriculum 
development) and composition of the bench (e.g. social and professional background of judges).1249 
Such factors are, in principle, out of the control of litigating parties, although they could be tackled 
through the broader strategy in which the litigation is embedded.  
From the interviews it is apparent that respondents who are involved in or familiar with cases relating 
to environmental health hazards caused by mining in South Africa are mainly concerned about the 
attitude and legal culture of judges. Notwithstanding the independence of the South African judiciary, 
about which all respondents are confident, judges are still people who are members of the society in 
which they perform their functions and who are, at least unconsciously, influenced by a given 
ideology. Many respondents feel that South African judges, as far as human rights, the environment 
and mining is concerned, remain rather conservative, in particular at the lower levels of 
jurisdiction.1250 Therefore, additional training and education of judges on those issues seems 
necessary.1251 Nonetheless, lawyers and activists also realise that in particular instances the ideology of 
judges may turn out in their favour. Depending on the issue at stake a lot thus depends on the 
composition of the bench. This is captured well in the following revealing quote from a respondent 
discussing an ongoing case. 
The judges understood our case. They not only understood our case, but also understood our 
argument. And one of the judges seemed quite, like blatantly, in our favour. It was so obvious that at 
some point I was just like ‘Oh, this is embarrassing’.1252  
2.4.2. Preliminary question: local or transnational litigation?  
Before proceeding with the discussion on strategic litigation specifically in South Africa a brief 
comment should be made on the role of transnational litigation (see also supra Part I, Section 1.2). In 
this context, ‘transnational litigation’ means litigation in third countries for human rights violations of 
which the actual harm was suffered by victims in South Africa.  
It is safe to state that transnational litigation remains exceptional, with only two respondents actually 
having been involved in such litigation and both cases having been dismissed. One of the concerned 
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cases1253 was the silicosis lawsuit launched in the UK courts by individual mineworkers against Anglo 
American, which was following its dismissal relaunched in South Africa where it eventually got 
settled (supra Section 2.3.3.4). As Leigh Day explains on its website, these claims were instituted in a 
foreign forum because they believed that the procedural rules in the UK were more beneficial for their 
clients. In particular, general damages awards are significantly higher in the UK and the procedures for 
dealing with mass claims are well-developed, while definitely at that time such claims were still a 
novelty and rarity in South Africa – and largely remain so until today.1254 Those procedural benefits of 
proceeding in the UK rather than in South Africa were acknowledged by one other respondent, who 
also questioned the experience of judges in the lower courts in South Africa with business-related 
human rights abuses as well as their willingness to send a strong message to the business community, 
especially the mining industry.1255  
Not only is transnational litigation for human rights violations committed in South Africa uncommon, 
several respondents signalled a defiance towards such litigation. Firstly, every lawsuit abroad is 
considered a missed opportunity to develop the law in South Africa and to move its jurisprudence 
forward.1256 Secondly, many respondents are not convinced that foreign courts are the appropriate 
forum to adjudicate such matters for both practical and principled reasons. On the one hand, the 
physical distance and the consequent high costs and practical barriers make it for lawyers and victims 
alike not easy to pursue a case in a foreign forum.1257 On the other, some respondents wondered why 
foreign courts should überhaupt be competent to rule on events that took place in South Africa.1258  
Because the issue of transnational litigation falls outside the scope of this dissertation, which 
concentrates on host state regulation and litigation, it is not explored further. Nevertheless, it should be 
observed that the respondents’ resistance to transnational litigation is accompanied by a confidence 
that the South African courts are independent, impartial and not captured by the mining industry – 
which are all prerequisites for court proceedings to be fair that may not be present in other legal 
systems where human rights violations by transnational corporations are committed.  
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 The other one is known as the ‘South African Apartheid litigation’, instituted before the US courts under the 
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2.4.3. Strategic litigation as explorative litigation and the importance of test cases 
A key characteristic of strategic litigation is its explorative nature. The litigation is aimed at having 
certain rights affirmed so as to empower the direct victims as well as other individuals who find 
themselves in a similar situation and to boost their ability to vindicate their rights. Hence, strategic 
lawsuits generally bear upon novel, uncharted legal issues, but once they are litigated and confirmed, 
they are there for the use of everyone – and, hopefully, without it being necessary to go to court. 
Strategic litigants have to be very creative as well; lawyers continuously explore new ways in which 
the law could empower their clients. One respondent explained, for instance, that it would be 
interesting to test whether extensive blasting by mines could qualify as a covered form of forced 
eviction, which would trigger the application of eviction law, which is very protective in South Africa 
and includes a requirement that the evictor obtains a court order in advance and pays adequate 
compensation.1259  
Given the novelty and creativity inherent to strategic litigation, such lawsuits are generally a learning 
experience.1260 The explorative nature of strategic litigation has a number of consequences, however. 
One is that it increases its unpredictability. Lawyers and activists are aware thereof and acknowledge 
that in some instances they should be careful not to push their luck. This may entail that they have to 
be content with small gains only, that they have to decide not to appeal a decision so as to prevent an 
even worse outcome or that they have to be careful that their litigation does not create a gap in the law 
or increases legal uncertainty.1261  
As strategic litigation is inherently explorative, litigating parties also tend to try and avoid additional 
complicating factors and prefer to concentrate on the main legal question that they want to see 
resolved. In relation to the class action, for instance, one lawyer involved said that “because it is a 
new, novel way of litigating, we want to try and keep the technical issues to a minimum, as much as 
possible.”1262 Other respondents confirmed that they prefer a focused strategy that fixates on one 
particular issue and that they avoid dragging in all the possible different facets to a particular case.1263 
This relates to what was mentioned before, namely that litigation is a blunt instrument and that in 
translating the harm suffered by victims into a court case a lot may be lost, because a narrow, focused 
strategy is considered necessary to increase the litigation’s manageability and its prospect of success. 
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Because of its explorative nature, test cases are crucial in strategic litigation. When the law is 
uncertain and the responsiveness of judges to a particular legal argument unknown, lawyers should be 
careful not to raise expectations that they cannot achieve. Therefore, they look for the perfect case to 
test the tenacity and ambit of an argument, a so-called ‘test case’. Such case typically revolves around 
an aggrieved party, whose case neatly aligns with the problem in relation to which the law should be 
tested, who is likely to raise the sympathy of the courts, the media and/or the public, and who is well-
informed about the duration and risks of litigation (see also infra Section 2.5.1).  
Box 3. Mankayi v. AngloGold Ashanti: test case for the silicosis class action 
South Africa adheres to a hybrid civil law/common law tradition. When a statute is adopted to 
regulate a specific legal domain, that statute extinguishes any common law remedies that existed 
previously if they essentially serve the same purpose. As was explained before (supra Sections 
2.2.2 and 2.3.3.2), employees who suffer from an occupational disease or injury are entitled to 
statutory compensation either under the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases 
Act (COIDA) or under the Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act (ODIMWA). 
For a long time, the prevailing view (at least amongst mining companies and their lawyers) was 
that mineworkers are covered by the definition of ‘employee’ under COIDA so that they fall 
under the general chapters of the latter Act and only move to ODIMWA for their compensation 
regime.1264 According to that view, mineworkers were thus covered by the provision in COIDA 
that expressly indemnifies employers against damages claims by their employees.1265  
Hence, Richard Spoor Attorneys and Abrahams Kiewitz Attorneys, two of the three law firms 
representing the mineworkers in the silicosis class action first sought an authoritative ruling that 
ODIMWA has not extinguished the right of mineworkers to claim common law damages from 
their employers even though they are entitled to statutory compensation. This is the case of 
Mankayi v. AngloGold Ashanti, which is thus an example par excellence of a purposeful test 
case that served to pave the way for expanded litigation.  
The case dealt with one mineworker, Thembekile Mankayi. Both the High Court and the 
Supreme Court of Appeal found against the plaintiff and his lawyers, but the Constitutional 
Court did eventually decide in their favour by holding that ODIMWA did not deprive Mankayi 
of his right to sue for negligence. Unfortunately, by that time Mankayi had died. Nevertheless, 
the Constitutional Court judgment opened the door for several other silicosis lawsuits, amongst 
which the silicosis class action.  
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Naturally, any case in which a novel legal argument or strategy is employed can be considered a test 
case, or be used as such. The law firms or advocacy organisations that were directly involved in that 
case, may not always have the intention to conduct expanded, follow-up litigation in which they can 
reap further benefits from their initial success. The Carolina matter is a good illustration thereof. Its 
successful outcome encouraged several other stakeholders to approach the courts in similar situations 
so as to secure water for deprived communities.1266  
2.4.4. The dilemma of settling strategic court cases 
Even if a court case is launched, it does not necessarily end with a final judgment. Many cases are 
settled out-of-court, which is often preferred by the counterparties, who want to avoid the bad 
publicity, the protracted process and the risk of an adverse precedent being established.1267 However, 
also for the parties that initiated the litigation, a settlement can be attractive or perhaps even an 
objective an sich.  
Lawyers’ deontology dictates that they must always act in their clients’ best interests. The two 
prevalent reasons why lawyers advice their clients to accept a settlement essentially boil down to this 
very fact: it is probably in their clients’ best interests. A settlement, first of all, takes much less time 
than a court case, time which may be precious for the victims.1268 The lawyers involved in the 
President Steyn litigation and the individual cases against Anglo American and AngloGold Ashanti 
mentioned earlier (supra Section 2.3.3.4), justified their decision to settle, respectively, as follows:  
There are various factors that actually pushed us to settle the case, one of them being that a third of 
our clients were dying.1269  
I understand why those clients take the offer. They have been at this for a long time, for 12 years. 
(…) They are ill and they are dying. I will also say this: they are entitled to get compensation within 
their life time.1270 
In addition, settlements end the uncertainty that reigns supreme during litigation, and assure victims 
of, at least partial, relief.1271 This uncertainty is caused not only by the fact that the outcome of 
litigation is inherently unpredictable but also by other, extraneous factors. A good illustration is the 
asbestos litigation, which is comparable to the silicosis litigation and was launched against mining 
                                                     
1266
 Such litigation was launched for the Louis Trichardt community and the Blyvooruitzicht community (see 
also supra Sections 2.3.2.4 and 2.3.2.5, and infra Box 32). Note that Lawyers for Human Rights (which was 
involved in the Carolina matter) represented the applicants in one of the two Blyvooruitzicht cases.  
1267
 R5. 
1268
 R12. 
1269
 AS. 
1270
 AS.  
1271
 R5, R10. 
234 
 
companies by former mineworkers who had contracted asbestosis from working in asbestos mines. 
The asbestos litigation was settled, inter alia because the company involved was going to be liquidated 
making it effectively the “last chance to settle.”1272 
Although a settlement may be in the clients’ best interests, there are some obvious downsides to 
settlements. First of all, settled cases do not contribute to the development of the law and deprive 
public interest litigants of the opportunity to have a precedent set in their favour, which could then be 
used by individuals who find themselves in a similar situation as the parties to the settlement, to have 
their own dispute resolved more quickly and easily.1273 Moreover, as settlements are agreed on a 
without-liability basis, the counterparty does not admit any guilt or liability by entering into that 
agreement. The contents of settlement agreements also remain confidential.1274 Except for the parties 
involved, no one knows what has been agreed, for what reasons and what the victims get in terms of 
compensation. Because settlement agreements are not made public, the media and the general public 
tend to lose interest quickly, so that the matter gets obliterated.1275 The one thing that lawyers at least 
know is that the counterparty is willing to settle, as one lawyer involved in the silicosis class action 
noted in relation to the individual silicosis cases that were settled in March 2016. 
As usual they are all confidential. It is a without liability settlement, we do not know what the terms 
are at all. We do not even know the amount. But we see it as a positive step, because it means they 
are open to settlement. They are open to negotiation. They want to settle.1276  
In any case, the dilemma to settle a case may create tensions between the attorneys of the victims and 
any advocacy organisation involved in the matter, either directly or indirectly (namely through their 
presence on the ground, for instance by providing support to victims). Advocacy organisations are 
primarily interested in the establishment of precedents and are not constrained by the best interests’ of 
the clients in the same way as lawyers are. One respondent, for instance, said the following about a 
settlement offered by a mining company to a community affected by its operations.  
[X] did offer a settlement on that case, and we differed with the lawyers. (…) The settlement offer 
was kind of being pushed by them without coming to the whole committee.1277 (…) But the lawyers, 
you know, their clients are the community, so they have to do what is best for the client. I know this 
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kind of conflict can come up often in a situation, but (…) I was thinking: ‘Oh my god, we have 
worked all this time. (…) We need precedent setting, you can do twenty million cases.’1278 
When a case is settled and financial compensation is paid out in terms of that settlement, the general 
practice is to establish a trust, which then provides compensation to the victims who satisfy the 
conditions stipulated in the settlement agreement. Such a trust is managed by independent trustees, 
who have some expertise that is relevant for the issue underlying the litigation and the subsequent 
settlement, and who are appointed by the parties to the settlement. Examples are the Asbestos Relief 
Trust (following the settlement of the asbestos litigation) and the Q(h)ubeka Trust (following the 
settlement of the individual silicosis cases against Anglo American and AngloGold Ashanti). 
2.5. Practicalities of access to justice 
This second Section on strategic litigation to ensure accountability for environmental degradation 
caused by mining and for the consequent health hazards to which mineworkers and neighbouring 
communities are exposed, explains a number of practicalities confronting litigating parties. Such 
litigation can, for instance, only be launched, if victims are able to secure legal representation (Section 
2.5.1) and if they overcome a number of practical barriers that impede access to justice or discourage 
victims from approaching the courts (Section 2.5.2). Following a review of these two hurdles, the 
Section continues with a discussion of standing rights, which could respond to some of these hurdles 
(Section 2.5.3). However, even when the court system seems accessible, litigating parties may 
anticipate on certain difficulties that may arise during the proceedings (Section 2.5.4).  
2.5.1. Availability of legal services 
As was mentioned several times before, communities and mineworkers who are harmed by human 
rights violations committed by mining companies generally do not dispose of the resources to 
vindicate their rights in court and, accordingly, depend on free or cheap legal representation. 
Furthermore, given the type of cases funded by Legal Aid South Africa and, in particular, the fact that 
civil matters and impact litigation remain underrepresented in the board’s strategy (supra Section 
1.4.1.2), they will rarely be granted state-based legal aid. One exception is the silicosis class action, for 
which the Legal Resources Centre is funded by Legal Aid South Africa, as they had initially accepted 
to fund the President Steyn Litigation, which got settled without achieving the objective of creating an 
industry-wide compensation scheme.1279 Most cases are thus taken to heart by public interest law firms 
that provide free legal services or by lawyers who work for a contingent fee. The latter lawyers 
regularly have to face comments, however, questioning where their real interest lie, notwithstanding 
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that contingency fee agreements are strictly regulated in South Africa so as to avoid abuse (supra 
Section 1.4.1.2). Also the mining companies cited in the silicosis class action have gone that road.  
Box 4. Contingency fees and the silicosis class action 
Some mining companies have objected against the contingency fee agreements concluded by 
Richard Spoor Attorneys and Abrahams Kiewitz Attorneys with their respective client-
mineworkers. They argued that the agreements violated the law, allegedly because they did not 
express a preliminary view about the prospect of success, did not define what would constitute 
‘success’ or ‘partial success’ and did not indicate the fees due in case of partial success. The 
mining companies’ concern that the case is pursued “at the instance of the lawyers for their own 
gain rather than in the genuine interests of class members” was quickly picked up in the 
media.1280 
The attorneys amended their agreements and the High Court eventually rejected the mining 
companies’ objections. Replying to the first objection, the judges held that “[a] legal 
representative will presumably not take the risk inherent in contingency fee arrangements unless 
s/he holds the view that the client has reasonable prospects of success in the contemplated 
action.”1281 The amended agreements also no longer contain any reference to a fee that would be 
due in case of partial success.1282 
Thanks to the various public interest law firms as well as the law firms accepting contingent fees 
(supra Section 2.1.2), the number of lawyers willing and able to take on human rights cases related to 
environmental hazards caused by mining is relatively high in South Africa. Nonetheless, in absolute 
figures they remain few.1283 Not every victim is thus able to secure legal representation and approach 
the courts. The question that arises then is how lawyers select their cases or decide whether they 
should take on a particular case. The determinants that transpire from the interviews can broadly be 
classified into three categories: lawyer-related factors, client-related factors, and subject-related 
factors. Before discussing these factors, it should be reiterated that whilst mineworkers and 
communities have to struggle to secure legal representation, they face a counterparty, whether 
government or mining companies, that is hugely endowed and most probably assisted by a strong legal 
team.1284 
The lawyer-related factors are more practical considerations. In particular, the law firm must have the 
required human, financial and technical resources available to conduct the case or, in other words, they 
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need to be able to allocate lawyers (attorneys and/or advocates) and budget to the case and they must 
dispose of the necessary technical expertise.1285 As to the client-related factors, given that the stakes 
are high in strategic litigation and reach beyond the individual case, while the outcome is uncertain, 
lawyers admit that it is important to select the ‘right’ case with the ‘right’ facts and the ‘right’ 
client(s). Crucial is whether the case is perceived as winnable.1286 What lawyers also find important in 
this regard is that their clients represent the different interests that are at stake in that particular case. 
For instance, where the matter relates to environmental degradation affecting a community, lawyers 
prefer to have two parties represented in the litigation, namely the community directly affected as well 
as an advocacy organisation acting in the interest of environmental protection or sustainable 
development,1287 which allows them to pool limited resources and different forms of expertise.1288 This 
preference is reflected in Table 17a in Annex 1, listing the litigating parties in directly relevant cases.  
Box 5. The applicants in the Carolina and Tudor Shaft matters  
Both in the Carolina matter and in the Tudor Shaft matter there were two applicants, that is the 
Federation for a Sustainable Environment and the community that was in casu affected, being 
the Silobela concerned community and the Tudor Shaft informal settlement.  
True, in the Tudor Shaft case the urgent application was initially launched only by the 
Federation for a Sustainable Environment, which was due to the extreme urgency resulting in 
the case being launched, heard and a court order adopted within 24 hours. Afterwards, however, 
they ensured that the residents of the Tudor Shaft informal settlement were informed and got the 
opportunity to intervene as co-applicants.  
“The FSE was of course concerned that the community was not represented in these proceedings and 
they had not even been engaged. And they then asked the community if they needed legal 
representation and directed them to [SERI].”1289 
Even if no advocacy organisation is directly involved in the litigation, lawyers like to cooperate with 
them, because through these organisations they have an on-site contact point.1290 Moreover, advocacy 
organisations are regularly the ones that inform them about a possible court case in the first place.1291 
When the affected party is a community, lawyers also prefer to get instructions from some kind of 
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community structure that represents a larger portion of the community so as to ensure that they speak 
with one voice.1292 Such structure ensures accountability within the community, contributes towards 
community empowerment and mobilisation and helps avoiding frictions and conflicts within the 
community, and it also forms a more formidable opponent. 
In addition, the ‘right’ client needs to be informed well about the litigation process and its inherent 
unpredictability and lengthy nature. Especially lawyers who work with clients who belong to 
marginalised groups that are not familiar with the legal system, invest a lot of time in managing their 
clients’ expectations.1293 They need to understand the risks inherent to litigation as well as the fact that 
their situation is unlikely to change substantially in the short term, so as to avoid that the clients lose 
their interest in the lawsuit at some point during that long process and abandon the case.1294 A final 
client-related factor is that lawyers, as well as advocacy organisations supporting such cases, prefer to 
get involved as early as possible, because then they are more in charge of how the events evolve, 
which increases their ability to secure a good outcome.1295 
Finally, the subject-related factors have to do with the issue that is in dispute, especially whether the 
facts underlying the matter and the specific legal issues raised by them correspond to the strategic 
agenda of the law firm and to its long-term objectives (see also supra Section 2.1.2).1296 In this regard, 
some law firms also take into account the specific remedies that their clients want to pursue and the 
(social) impact that such remedies are expected to have. Most public interest law firms are not keen to 
initiate legal proceedings that are purely aimed at securing damages for the individual clients and 
concentrate their efforts on cases that pursue forward-looking remedies with a societal impact,1297 
while others, especially the regular law firms, are interested precisely in the question of damages (see 
also infra Section 2.6.2.2)1298 – which may be related as well to the fact that their fee is dependent on 
the compensation that their clients eventually receive.  
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2.5.2. Practical barriers 
Mineworkers or community members who are affected by mining tend to live in remote and isolated 
areas, not in the towns where the law firms are located, and most of them are poor and illiterate.1299 
These are some of the practical factors that not only impede access to justice but that also inevitably 
affect the relationship of attorneys with their clients, which is quite special in this type of cases.1300 
The following anecdotal quote from a respondent aptly captures this reality.  
When I go and consult with clients, it is almost like an adventure. You have to call them, [but] some 
of them do not have phones. So, they have given you either their sons or daughters’ phones who are 
in the city (…) wherever they may be or you call the neighbour. So, you call them and say: “Hi, it is 
me, the lawyer from Johannesburg. I would like to speak with (…). When can I call?” If it is like a 
neighbour: “Call after 30 minutes”. You know that means they have to go and give him the phone. 
Then you have to tell them: “We want you to come and see us next week, can you come?”. In 
Lesotho, what I find interesting is that they will be like: “Oh, I will need to hire a horse”. Like 
literally, because there is no transport. “[I will need to] get a horse and leave it somewhere and then I 
need get transport. (…) I will borrow money.” Then I have to give back the transport money because 
they have actually borrowed, and the interest is ridiculous in areas like this.1301 
The fact that these victim groups are generally poor and illiterate may also involve unexpected 
challenges for their lawyers.1302 A good illustration is found in the President Steyn litigation (see supra 
Section 2.3.3.4), where after the settlement the lawyers faced the challenge that only two of their 
twenty-three clients had a bank account and that none of them was used to handle large sums of 
money. The same situation is likely to repeat itself for the silicosis class action, but this time the 
number of clients is many times higher.  
When you get these now thousands of people coming, and I can bet you the majority of them will 
not have bank accounts. Like opening up accounts for them? What we did with the twenty-three, is 
that (…) we even provided them with financial counselling, like financial advice on how to invest 
the money. (…) Should we settle this case, it is a big exercise, because honestly (…) most of them 
cannot even write.1303 
The practical barriers for vulnerable mineworkers and communities who seek access to justice can also 
be heightened purposefully by mining companies. One regularly applied tactic is to create frictions 
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within these groups.1304 Mining companies often distribute pamphlets within the community to try and 
convince people of the benefits that mining brings to them (see, for instance, Figure 2 supra in Part I, 
Section 5.3.4),1305 or they simply offer jobs to some people within the community or buy people off, 
mostly the chief and his entourage.1306 When the community is fragmented and some of its members 
do not agree with the grievances expressed by the others, it becomes harder for lawyers to present a 
strong case to the courts – and, as was said before (supra Section 2.5.1), lawyers prefer to represent a 
strong community that speaks with one voice. Mining companies can also provoke animosity within 
their workforce. One element in the events that led to the wildcat strike at Marikana (supra Box 2) 
were the tensions amongst mineworkers based on their labour union affiliation, which were allegedly 
exploited by the company.1307 It should also be noted in this connection that many mining companies 
do not shy away from abusing the lack of knowledge of mineworkers and communities, or their 
gullibility.1308  
Another tactic used by mining companies are SLAPP suits, which were also discussed earlier (supra 
Section 1.4.1.3). Such lawsuits can be directed against activists who challenge mining companies, 
against victims who want to vindicate their rights, or against their legal representatives.1309 In some 
cases people are not merely intimidated through lawsuits or claims for damages, but even physically 
threatened.1310 Finally, intimidation can take the form of ad hominem attacks against individual 
victims, activists or lawyers, generally in the media. An example is the smear campaign against the 
law firms conducting the silicosis class action pursuant to a contingency fee agreement (infra Box 4).  
2.5.3. Standing rights 
Litigating parties in lawsuits relating to human rights, environmental degradation and mining, 
generally base their claim on several types of standing. They do not only act on their own behalf but 
also on behalf of other members of the affected group to which they belong, and, in the case of a 
voluntary association, on behalf of its members, and they nearly always act in the public interest, 
sometimes even specifically in the interest of the environment.1311 That advocacy organisation base 
their standing on Section 38(d) of the Constitution (public interest litigation) is logical. However, even 
direct victims tend to claim that they act in their own interest as well as in the public interest, because 
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the litigation bears upon a recurring set of facts with many people finding themselves in a similar 
situation and because constitutional rights are at stake that affect a range of people. By way of 
illustration, the standing rights relied on in the focus matters are listed in Table 7 below.  
Table 7. Standing rights in the focus matters1312 
Tudor Shaft 
matter 
Federation for a Sustainable Environment S38(a), (b) and (d) of the Constitution 
Residents of the informal settlement (not mentioned)1313 
Carolina 
matter 
Federation for a Sustainable Environment s38(c), (d) and (e) of the Constitution 
Silobela concerned community s38(b), (c), (d) and (e) of the Constitution 
Silicosis class action S38(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Constitution 
A more interesting question is whether a collective or mass claim that seeks individualised relief, such 
as damages, for a high number of plaintiffs is filed as several individual cases (that are likely joined) 
or as a class action. The latter rule of standing has a number of straightforward advantages, which 
could be summarised as follows.  
The class action mechanism is a powerful tool by which the poor can take on the powerful, the 
Davids take on the Goliaths, and the have-nots take on the haves. And, people [that have been 
wronged] who otherwise do not have any path to recourse, still have any hope for recourse.1314 
Class actions are described by public interest lawyers as the only realistic option for poor people with 
little education to vindicate their rights, especially when they have to face a powerful counterparty, 
such as government and, definitely, the mining industry.1315 Individually, these people have no power, 
would not dare to litigate against such an opponent and would not be able to secure individualised free 
or cheap legal services.1316 The High Court agreed with this position when it certified the silicosis class 
action, emphasizing that “the court should be careful not to close its doors in the face of the indigent, 
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the weak and the meek, seeking to access justice”1317 and conceding that a class action was the only 
realistic option for mineworkers to assert their rights.1318  
Class actions are also more egalitarian in nature given that they ensure that (the benefits of) litigation 
accrue to everyone, even to those people who would never consider to have recourse to the court 
system or who do not know their rights, let alone that they have been violated.1319 Other clear 
advantages of class actions recognised by respondents include their ability (1) to prevent the judicial 
system from being clogged up with an infinite number of individual cases by allowing courts to rule 
on cases raising similar factual, legal and evidential issues in one set of proceedings, and thereby to 
prevent the duplication of costs (judicial economy and efficiency), and (2) to correct the inequality 
between the parties through the power of numbers (equality of arms), but also (3) to protect defendants 
against a multiplicity of actions.1320  
Nonetheless, there are also some downsides to the class action mechanism. A critical one is that class 
actions complicate the litigation and inevitably take more time to reach a finality. That was also the 
specific reason why Leigh Day and Mbuyisa Neale Attorneys decided not to join the class action and 
filed individual summons for each of their clients in the litigation against Anglo American and 
AngloGold Ashanti – this was a mammoth task, however, and required a lot of double work. 
Nevertheless, they felt they could “put in the work, if it will cut the time short” which was all the more 
important given that their clients were dying.1321 This advantage of the individual cases over the class 
action is also recognised by lawyers involved in the silicosis class action.1322 
Class actions are, moreover, not available in every case. A basic requirement is that the experience by 
the victims must be sufficiently similar to raise common issues of fact and law. Even in relation to the 
silicosis class action the question has been raised, especially by the mining companies, whether one 
class action can be launched for mineworkers that have worked at different mines with varying 
working conditions, for instance. Accordingly, lawyers and activists are wondering whether a class 
action could be launched on behalf of all communities that suffer from a particular environmental 
                                                     
1317
 Nkala v. Harmony Gold (certification judgment), supra note 372, para. 105.  
1318
 Ibid. para. 108. 
1319
 R23. 
1320
 R3, R12; Applicants’ Submissions, in re: Nkala v. Harmony Gold (48226/12) (9 June 2015), para. 79; Nkala 
v. Harmony Gold (certification judgment), supra note 372, para. 34. In particular, the following four specific 
reasons were mentioned as to why the class action would serve judicial economy: common legal issues are 
argued and decided in one suit binding on all parties; discovery is produced and disputes regarding discovery 
decided once; expert and fact witnesses need only prepare reports and give testimony once; and, all common 
factual issues are decided in a single trial. Applicants’ Founding Affidavit, in re: Nkala v. Harmony Gold 
(48226/12) (21 December 2012), para. 180. 
1321
 AS.  
1322
 AS.  
243 
 
impact caused by mining.1323 A final drawback is that the legal framework of class actions in South 
Africa is not well-developed; no legislation has been enacted as yet and, in contrast with many other 
common law jurisdictions, there is not a lot of jurisprudence, so that there still exist a lot of 
uncertainties.1324  
2.5.4. Difficulties during the proceedings 
The difficulty in environmental law is environmental science, because if you do not have the science 
to back your claim, then you have a problem. We are already talking about impoverished 
communities with all sorts of diseases and the like. So, when people develop skin rashes and other 
ailments, government and industry are quick to say: ‘But how do you know it is the mine that causes 
that illness?’1325 
As this quote indicates, when litigating parties claim that an unhealthy environment negatively affects 
people, a first, inevitable hurdle is the evidential burden and the need for scientific proof. Recent 
judgments suggest that whenever a mining company itself has conducted an environmental impact 
study to support its position on a particular issue in dispute, the parties opposing that position must 
themselves put forward the scientific evidence overturning the company’s study.1326 Lawyers, who 
themselves lack such technical knowledge, have to attract experts for that task.1327 The need for 
technical knowledge and expertise explains why, as mentioned before (supra Section 2.5.1), lawyers 
prefer to institute a lawsuit on behalf of both an affected community and an interested advocacy 
organisation, as the latter organisation may help with collecting the necessary evidence.1328 In any 
case, the evidential burden is one of the hardest barriers to overcome in this type of cases, and 
generally leads to a massive draw on resources.1329 Even the merely practical aspect of getting 
environmental scientists to act on behalf of the litigating parties can prove to be difficult, as many 
scientists are, or hope to be, employed by the mining industry.1330  
Not only finding and submitting the evidence is challenging, but also the subsequent application of 
legal rules based on that evidence is not straightforward. One question that arises, for instance, is 
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exactly how bad the air or water quality, or the noise pollution has to be for the claim to be well-
founded.1331 There is some helpful jurisprudence, however. A High Court judge has found, for instance 
that the term ‘significant pollution’, which is used in several pieces of environmental legislation, 
should not be interpreted too rigidly because “pollution is (…) a complex, technical and scientific 
issue”.1332 The judge concluded, therefore, that “in light of the constitutional right a person has to an 
environment conducive to health and well-being, (…) the threshold level of significance will not be 
particularly high.” In another judgment a High Court, checking whether the requirements for a final 
interdict were met, found in favour of the applicants who all had complained of similar ailments given 
that “[t]he evidentiary criterion of a preponderance of probability entails no more than that a court 
must from the conceivable probabilities to which the facts of a case lend themselves, select a 
conclusion which to it seems to be the more natural or plausible one.”1333 Very important is the 
Constitutional Court’s judgment in Lee v. Minister of Correctional Services1334, in which the common 
law was developed so as to provide for a flexible test to establish factual causation in tort law. This 
precedent is now also relied upon in the silicosis class action.  
Box 6. Factual causation in the silicosis class action  
In Lee, the Constitutional Court found that to establish factual causation in case of an unlawful 
omission, the plaintiffs do not have to substitute the unlawful conduct with lawful conduct and 
prove that in this alternative scenario the harm would not have occurred.1335 For factual 
causation to be satisfied, it is sufficient for parties to establish that the omission was a ‘more 
probable cause’ of the harm, and that “proper systemic measures would have reduced the 
risk.”1336 
This precedent forms a critical part of the argumentation substantiating the claim in the silicosis 
class action – note that Section27, the legal representatives of the amici, also intervened in Lee 
v. Minister of Correctional Services on behalf of Treatment Action Campaign to submit 
arguments precisely on the need for the Court to develop the common law on factual causation. 
In their heads of argument for the certification proceedings in the silicosis class action, the 
mineworkers’ legal representatives already1337 argue that the applicants satisfy the test for 
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factual causation applied by the majority of the Constitutional Court in Lee.1338 Firstly, the 
mineworkers have contracted silicosis (or tuberculosis) due to the dangerous and unhealthy 
circumstances under which they had to work. Secondly, if the mining companies had properly 
discharged their duties to protect the mineworkers by taking the necessary and universally-
known preventive measures, the epidemic of silicosis, silico-tuberculosis and pulmonary 
tuberculosis among South African gold mineworkers would have been prevented. 
Related to the evidential burden is the need to obtain information. Although the South African 
Constitution entrenches a right to have access to information in Section 32, in practice information is 
mostly only obtained after a long legal battle.1339 In principle, actors who want to obtain access to 
certain records held by either government or a mining company, should submit a request in terms of 
the Promotion of Access to Information Act (supra Section 2.2.2). Nevertheless, such requests are 
often ignored or rejected,1340 after which protracted court proceedings become inevitable unless the 
request is abandoned. Accordingly, years in court may pass by before information is effectively gotten 
hold of, and only then can the requesters proceed to use that information as they have planned – and 
provided that the information is not academic by that time.1341 Another option is to start the litigation 
before having access to all relevant information, which is then requested during the proceedings by 
way of discovery (see supra Part II, Section 2.2.2.1). The obvious downside is that, depending on the 
centrality of that information to the lawsuit, it is hard to ascertain the merits of a claim and its prospect 
of success. 
Box 7. The quest for information in the silicosis class action 
After a battle of several years, the legal representatives of the mineworkers have still not 
succeeded in getting access to the database of the Employment Bureau of Africa, which is 
responsible for the recruitment of mineworkers.1342 People who want to work in the mines go to 
this Bureau, which then sends the mineworkers to the different mines based on demand. In this 
system, most mineworkers work on repeated one year contracts, following which they are 
repatriated to their region of origin, which forms the basis of the migratory labour system (supra 
Section 2.1.1.2). All the employment records of the gold miners are thus at the Bureau’s 
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disposal, and access to those records is necessary to establish which mineworker worked for 
which mine(s) and for how long.  
Also crucial for the class action are the service agreements that the parent mining companies, 
who are the responding parties in the silicosis class action (infra Box 11), have concluded with 
their subsidiary-mines. Fortunately, the mineworkers’ legal representatives already knew a lot 
about those agreements through the documents that one of the law firms involved, the Legal 
Resources Centre, had discovered during the earlier President Steyn Litigation.1343  
2.6. The design of strategic lawsuits 
This third and final Section on accountability for environmental health hazards caused by mining 
discusses the three ‘umbrella decisions’ that parties conducting strategic litigation have to adopt 
(supra Part II, Sections 2.2.2 to 2.2.4): which type of remedy do they pursue (Section 2.6.2), who do 
they sue (Section 2.6.3) and which (legal) arguments do they use (Section 2.6.4). The Section begins, 
however, with explaining that litigating parties first assess their starting position and mission, which is 
a key step in ‘strategic’ litigation (supra Part I, Section 2.4) and influences the cause of action on 
which they will proceed, which in turn affects the available relief, the right counterparty and the 
appropriate arguments (Section 2.6.1).  
2.6.1. Strategizing: starting position and mission 
How a case is strategically designed depends on two crucial assessments, notably (a) what is the 
starting position of the clients (their ‘situation’), and (b) what do they want, (their ‘mission’). As was 
said earlier and as these two criteria suggest, the deontology of lawyers demands that they act in their 
clients’ best interests.1344 Although attorneys may advice their clients as to where their interests lie, 
they ultimately depend on the clients’ instructions, as is also admitted in the following quote from an 
interview.  
It is all very well to have strategic objectives about what we want to achieve from litigation, but we 
have to act in the context of obtaining meaningful remedies for the actual people we are litigating 
for. So, you have to be careful not to let your own objective take over.1345 
Therefore, a lot of the decisions that have to be adopted in the course of strategic litigation, including 
the umbrella decisions as to which proceedings are resorted to and what relief is claimed, who is sued 
and which arguments are used, depend on the clients’ starting position and their wishes and interests in 
solving the problem. Together with an assessment of the prospect of success, the situation and mission 
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of the clients will determine the cause of action. As one respondent said, “the real decisions are about 
cause of action and prospect of success.”1346 Hence, the principal moment at which public interest 
lawyers have a real say in the strategic litigation presents itself when they decide which cases they 
want to take on. It is at that time that they have to consider whether the clients’ particular case aligns 
with their broader objectives of strategic litigation. This is not to say, however, that cases cannot 
tackle several issues at once, both in the interest of the individual clients and in the broader public 
interest.  
In this regard, it should also be noted that the objectives of a concrete case may well extend beyond 
the concrete relief that is sought from the court. Regardless of the actual reparation secured for a 
neighbouring community or for mineworkers, the litigation may be aimed at achieving such objectives 
as setting a precedent, clarifying the law, invalidating a given statute, regulation or agreement or 
particular conduct, or inciting legal or policy reform, whether directly or indirectly by empowering 
victims, by mobilizing people or by raising public awareness.1347 These different types of impact of 
litigation are discussed more in-depth infra in Section 2.7.  
2.6.2. The preferred remedies 
2.6.2.1. The road of civil, criminal or judicial review proceedings 
As Table 17b in Annex 1 demonstrates, most of the directly relevant cases are civil proceedings 
(applications or actions) – this Table even excludes the matters that eventually got settled, which were 
either civil cases as well, or cases proceeding to arbitration. Also judicial review proceedings to 
challenge licenses, for instance, are quite common and are resorted to either to halt certain activities 
or, at least, to influence the decision-making process by government.1348 The more interesting question 
then is, arguably, why criminal proceedings remain exceptional, even though many of the duties 
prescribed by the applicable laws establish criminal liability on the part of the duty bearer.1349  
Only a few of the respondents have ever been involved in criminal proceedings, which means that 
there is little experience available.1350 The one public interest law firm that has experimented more 
often than others with the criminal approach is the Centre for Environmental Rights. This organisation 
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has even published a booklet in which they carefully explain, step-by-step, how community members 
can lay criminal charges when they believe a mining company has committed an offence.1351 The 
Centre has also supported a criminal case that resulted in the first ever, albeit custodial, prison 
sentence being imposed on a director of a recalcitrant mining company.  
Box 8. The Batlhabine criminal case: a first 
Batlhabine is a small village nearby Tzaneen in Limpopo Province. The community suffers 
from severe environmental degradation caused by a clay mining company, Blue Platinum 
Ventures 16, that had started to operate in October 2007. For several years the community tried 
to obtain an intervention by the Department of Mineral Resources, because the mine clearly 
acted in contravention of the law. As nothing happened, one member of the community and 
leader of the Batlhabine Foundation (which was founded specifically to oppose the illegal 
activities of the mining company1352) decided to lay criminal charges against the mining 
company and its seven directors. 
Eventually, in January 2014, one of the seven directors of Blue Platinum Ventures 16 was 
sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, a sentence that was wholly suspended for five years 
provided that the accused would not be convicted again for the same offence and that he would 
rehabilitate the areas that were damaged by the mining activities, within three months.1353 As the 
sentencing transcripts demonstrate,1354 the judge was very much aware of the need to impose an 
‘appropriate sanction’, which according to her, “must be the sentence that will benefit the 
community and at the same time must deter the accused from committing the same offence.” 
She gave the following explanation as to why she did not believe that a fine was appropriate in 
this particular case.  
“Even if the accused can be ordered to pay a fine of [5 million ZAR] the question is whether that [5 
million ZAR] will be used for the benefit of the residents who were affected by these operations. The 
answer is no, the [5 million ZAR] will go into the coffers of the Department of Justice and the 
affected residents will continue to suffer. Therefore it is upon this court to see to it that an 
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appropriate sentence must be the sentence that will benefit the community and at the same time must 
deter the accused from committing the same offence.”1355 
The criminal conviction meant a huge victory for the community and was welcomed across 
South Africa as a precedent-setting case, because for the first time a director was convicted to a 
prison sentence, without the option of a fine – notwithstanding the fact that the sentence was 
suspended on condition of rehabilitation.  
Nevertheless, for two main reasons the conviction did not bring the quest for justice of the 
Batlhabine community to a happy ending. On the one hand, the site is still not rehabilitated, and 
the convicted director is not in prison. The judge’s order to rehabilitate the land within three 
months also showed that she did not understand the process of rehabilitation very well, which 
takes much more time if it is done properly. On the other hand, the community was never 
satisfied with the conviction for three reasons.1356 Firstly, although the charges against the 
company and one director had proceeded to trial, the criminal charges against the six other 
directors of Blue Platinum Ventures 16 had all been dropped. The one remaining director 
seemed to be the “lazy boy”, as one party involved noted.1357 Secondly, the prosecutor accepted 
a guilty plea by the accused director, signed on behalf of himself and of the company, on one 
account, while dropping the remaining charges on thirteen other accounts. Thirdly, the Regional 
Court found both the director and Blue Platinum Ventures 16 guilty, in accordance with their 
plea, but only pronounced sentence on the director.  
Until today the community is trying to get the convicted director, as well as the other directors 
who got off scot-free and government, to take responsibility for the rehabilitation. After writing 
letters to the Office of the Public Prosecutor and the Head of the Regional Courts, the criminal 
case against the mining company was eventually, in August 2015, remitted by the High Court to 
the Regional Court so as to at least enable the judge who initially heard the case to consider 
whether or not the company should be convicted and to pass sentence accordingly.1358  
As the Batlhabine case demonstrates, the battle may be long and the road to a criminal conviction is 
fraught with challenges. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding their lack of experience, many respondents 
recognised that there are, in principle, a number of advantages to criminal proceedings. These include 
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the collection of evidence by the office of the prosecutor, the strong message sent to the mining 
industry and the stigma attached to a criminal conviction.1359  
At the other side of the balance, however, the problem is, first of all, that fines are believed to be too 
low to act as a real deterrent.1360 Therefore, some respondents call for a change in approach and would 
like government to introduce and enforce non-financial sanctions such as pulling licences and closing 
down businesses.1361 Also disadvantageous is the fact that criminal proceedings take a lot of time,1362 
and that their success depends on the capabilities of the prosecutor in charge of the particular case, as 
is confirmed by the Batlhabine saga.1363 Although available in theory, private prosecution, in turn, is 
not considered a real option due to the high costs and burden of proof.1364 People are rather encouraged 
to lay criminal charges, which they can do without a lawyer, and should then hope that the Office of 
the Public Prosecutor exercises its discretion in their favour and pursues the matter.1365  
In February 2017, for instance, the Office decided to prosecute two mining companies, the 
Blyvooruitzicht Gold Mining Company and Village Main Reef Gold Mining Company, and three 
former directors of these companies in the case of the Blyvooruitzicht community, which was 
discussed earlier (supra Box 1).1366 The criminal case has proceeded to court on eleven counts, 
charging the five accused parties with several offences in terms of the National Environmental 
Management Act and the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act. Amongst the charges 
are (1) the failure to clean up the tailings spillages and instead disposing them into the public domain 
which resulted in radiation doses exceeding the statutory limits, (2) the failure to implement dust 
management measures as a result of which dust fallout exceeds statutory limits, and (3) the failure to 
rehabilitate the slime dams. The outcome of this case has to be awaited.  
2.6.2.2. Adequate relief 
As was mentioned before, the relief sought by victims is one of the criteria that is considered by 
lawyers when they decide whether or not to accept a particular case, because once they accept a case, 
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they should labour under the clients’ instructions.1367 Table 17b in Annex 1 lists the relief that 
litigating parties sought in the directly relevant cases (excluding settled cases).  
The main division with respect to relief is the one between (retrospective) claims for damages and 
(more forward-looking) claims for other types of reparation, whereby lawyers acting on the basis of a 
contingency fee agreement are more likely to accept the former, whereas public interest law firms tend 
to support the latter – notwithstanding exceptions. In this regard, it should be emphasised, however, 
that even ‘individualised’, retrospective cases can generate social impacts, with the silicosis class 
action probably being the best example (see also infra Section 2.7). 
Although they admit that damages are part of the story,1368 and are often what practically matters for 
the actual victims, public interest law firms only rarely accept matters that merely seek to secure 
damages for individual claimants.1369 The perceived shortcomings of damages include their inherently 
retrospective nature, namely that they are concerned with the symptoms rather than the causes of 
human rights violations,1370 the allegedly low level of damage awards,1371 and the supposedly narrow 
scope of such relief, which only benefits the actual parties to the litigation (or the members of the 
class).1372 It should also be observed in this connection that lawyers who represent indigent clients, like 
communities and mineworkers, often request the counterparty to make a deposit into a trust fund, 
which is managed for the benefit of all the members of the group.1373 An example is the arbitrated case 
of the Mooifontein community, which has to be relocated because a mine, which is already operating 
at close range, wants to expand its operations further onto their land. A part of the sum requested is 
asked to be paid in a trust, and the parties also pray for an order appointing a consultancy firm to 
administer the implementation of the award.1374  
Sometimes public interest law firms support claims for damages, however. One evident example is the 
Legal Resources Centre’s involvement in the silicosis class action. Nevertheless, even though the 
silicosis litigation is primarily concerned with securing financial compensation for the affected 
mineworkers, precisely because the case is launched as a class action it is possible to secure damages 
on a broader and, hence, more egalitarian basis.1375 The litigation directly and indirectly pursues 
broader objectives as well, respectively to “get some sort of compensation schemes for all former gold 
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mine workers that contracted silicosis”1376 and to “lead to changes in the legislative framework or in 
the way in which mining companies feel they must conduct themselves”1377 (infra Section 2.7).  
More common for public interest law firms is to seek relief in the form of declaratory orders or 
interdicts, including structural interdicts. A mandatory interdict that is commonly requested (and 
granted) is an order to engage meaningfully. The respondents discerned a number of benefits to such 
orders, including the fact that they force the different parties to engage with one another,1378 which is 
often one of the few real opportunities for indigent people to be heard.1379 Moreover, if a court orders 
meaningful engagement, the responsibility to solve the conflict and to find a compromise is given back 
to the parties involved rather than being imposed from the top down.1380 Meaningful engagement is 
also supposed to take place out-of-court and, hence, outside of the adversarial process that court 
proceedings essentially are, so that the parties can cool down for a moment.1381 Nevertheless, orders to 
engage meaningfully are not without criticism either. In particular, there is a lot of scepticism as to 
whether such engagement can really be ‘meaningful’ when the parties find themselves in an unequal 
bargaining position, which raises the concern whether the weaker party actually has a voice in solving 
the problem.1382 Also structural orders are popular, because they increase the likelihood that the order 
is actually complied with and thus ensure better enforcement,1383 and because they rightly suggest that 
an effective remedy is a process, rather than a once-off event.1384  
Box 9. The Carolina matter: order for meaningful engagement and structural interdict 
The applicants in the Carolina matter requested four types of relief, all of which were granted – 
except for a small adjustment in the deadline for the provision of potable water in the interim 
which was set at 72 hours instead of 24 hours (supra Section 2.3.2.5). Two of the orders 
concerned respectively an order for meaningful engagement (on the provision of water on the 
short and long term) and an order to report back to the court on the measures adopted to secure 
the provision of water on the long term. 
The municipality never complied with these orders, however. Nevertheless, the Department of 
Water Affairs eventually agreed to engage with the applicants and their legal representatives, 
out-of-court, even though contrary to what the applicants had requested, the High Court judge 
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had not granted any order against that Department (supra Section 2.3.2.4). The Department also 
agreed to regularly inform the applicants and their representatives about the steps taken to 
address the water problem in Carolina and drafted a plan of action together with them. One 
respondent enthusiastically said the following about this development in the case.  
“This is how engagement should take place (…) So these are all the things that ordinarily would 
have been included in that draft order which we would seek the court to endorse and make an order 
of court, but we are getting it through outside advocacy and mediation.”1385 
2.6.3. The counterparty 
When a mining company causes environmental health hazards and thereby infringes upon the rights of 
mineworkers or communities, there are, broadly speaking, two possible scenarios: either the company 
violates the law or the law does not adequately protect the rights at stake. In the two scenarios, both 
government and the mining company are in some way involved in the chain of events leading up to the 
infringements of human rights. Each time the mining company is the actual culprit. As to government, 
its responsibility to implement and enforce the law is at stake in the first scenario, while the second 
scenario revolves around its responsibility to regulate. In addition, there may be instances where 
government purposely creates an enabling environment for mining companies to commit those human 
rights violations, by deliberately omitting to regulate or to enforce.1386  
Several determinants affect the decision of victims, activists and lawyers to concentrate either on 
government or on the mining company. These determinants may be strategic (relating to the broader 
objectives pursued), practical (relating to the prospect of success) or principled (relating to a 
fundamental position as to who is responsible) and they generally interrelate, which means that a 
strategic, practical or principled consideration to sue the one actor constitutes, respectively, a strategic, 
practical or principled consideration not to sue the other. Table 17a of Annex 1 displays the 
counterparty in all directly relevant cases. 
This section begins with an analysis of the determinants of the choice to sue either government or 
mining companies (Section 2.6.3.1). After a discussion of the relevant strategic (i), practical (ii) and 
principled (iii) considerations, particular attention is paid to how the choice of a counterparty may 
reveal something about the role of civil society (iv). Thereafter, two specific issues related to suing 
mining companies are explored, namely institutional versus individual corporate liability and parent 
company versus subsidiary liability (Section 2.6.3.2). The Section ends with a table summarizing the 
findings (Section 2.6.3.3).  
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2.6.3.1. Government versus mining companies 
(i) A matter of strategy  
A preliminary observation is that, as was said before (supra Section 2.6.1), the identity of the 
counterparty in legal proceedings is generally linked to the choice of remedy and the cause of action 
on the basis of which the court is approached. For instance, if the case is about the supply of basic 
services, such as water, respondents do not consider it opportune to approach mining companies.1387 
Claims for damages, on the other hand, are generally directed against the responsible mining 
company.  
In terms of strategy, one important reason why public interest law firms, at least traditionally, focus on 
government is that the scope of such litigation is believed to be broader; it is not only about this 
particular mine but about how government regulates and monitors mining.1388  
If we approach every single recalcitrant mining company on a one-by-one basis, we are never getting 
anywhere. So, what we are starting to realise is that we have to tackle it in a systemic way.1389  
On the other hand, respondents working for public interest law firms acknowledge that the incentive 
for a mining company to change its behaviour may be greater when that particular mining company is 
sued, rather than government.1390 They also realise that in some instances the South African 
government lacks the capacity to regulate and to enforce.1391 Facing this obstacle, they adopt either one 
of the following strategies: they sue the mining company, they ask an order from the court equipping 
the specific state actor with the necessary capacities,1392 or they engage with government in order to 
ensure that they are capable of effectively implementing environmental legislation. In the latter 
scenario, they could apply for an interim interdict, however, so as to prevent that the mining company 
launches or continues its operations in the meantime.1393 
In any case, recently public interest law firms have begun to experiment more with the idea of direct 
corporate accountability. Moreover, even when government is sued, the involved mining companies 
are cited as interested parties, so that they are informed about the ongoing proceedings and about the 
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possible eventual judgment.1394 No direct relief is sought against those mining companies, but the 
applicants’ lawyers can develop arguments regarding the duties of those companies and, accordingly, 
provide courts with an opportunity to rule on those duties and to specify them.1395 This way civil 
society actors gradually explore and develop the interplay between the government’s responsibility to 
regulate and monitor, and the mining companies’ duties to respect constitutional rights.1396 
(ii) A matter of practice and feasibility 
Notwithstanding the caveat that a lot is decided at the time when lawyers accept a case, they must 
advice their clients on their prospect of success and on the pros and cons of a particular litigation 
strategy. This is where the practicalities of suing either government or mining companies come to the 
fore once again. Several practical determinants are relevant in this regard, including the (financial) 
capacity of the counterparty, its attitude and its (temporary or perpetual) existence, the complexity of 
the case, the stigma attached to suing government, and the (il)legality of the situation.  
ii.a) Financial capacity of the counterparty 
One important consideration to sue the responsible mining company is that this is generally where the 
resources are. For instance, when victims want to obtain damages for the harm that they suffered due 
to the environmental degradation caused by mining, the litigation is likely to concentrate on the 
mining company, the simple reason being that “you sue the party with the deeper pockets”.1397 This 
holds true all the more because the judiciary is reticent to award damages against government, which 
already suffers from a lack of financial resources.1398 Nevertheless, precisely because they have the 
resources, mining companies are formidable opponents that can recruit the best lawyers, order 
expensive studies and can litigate forever.1399  
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ii.b) The counterparty’s attitude 
As regards the willingness of mining companies and government to cooperate during the judicial 
proceedings, which is another practical reflection, the respondents seem divided. On the one hand, 
because of their seemingly unlimited resources mining companies are not deterred by the cost of 
litigating and may not shy away from delaying the proceedings. On the other, some respondents feel 
that government is more obstructionist than private companies, partly because government is very 
bureaucratic.1400 The precise government department that is involved may also be a relevant factor, 
with national government having a better record than local government and the Department of 
Environmental Affairs scoring better than the Department of Mineral Resources, for instance.1401 
Moreover, sometimes the problem of government is not one of lacking the will to cooperate but of 
lacking the necessary resources, in which case the better option may be to sue the responsible mining 
company.1402  
Ultimately, however, much depends on the personalities of the concrete individuals involved, rather 
than on their affiliation to either government or mining company.1403  
ii.c) The counterparty’s existence 
Proceeding against the responsible mining company may also be difficult when (it is submitted that) 
‘the’ company that caused the environmental degradation no longer exists, either because it has been 
dissolved or because its ownership has changed.1404 The discussion about the ownership over the 
Tudor dump is a good example thereof (see supra Section 2.3.1). This is also why members of the 
Blyvooruitzicht community (supra Box 1), for instance, have submitted an urgent application to the 
High Court to prevent the liquidation of the Blyvooruitzicht Gold Mining Company so as to protect 
their interests.  
ii.d) Complexity of the proceedings 
Another practical consideration is that suing companies seems harder than suing government. The 
difficulty to get access to relevant information as well as to obtain the required scientific evidence 
(supra Section 2.5.4) is one of the main reasons why government seems more amenable to being sued 
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than the mining companies.1405 This obviously relates to the causes of action and the different 
responsibilities of government and of mining companies. Whilst government simply failed to regulate, 
monitor or enforce, to substantiate a claim against a mining company, it is necessary to prove that they 
are indeed liable, namely that they perpetrated the act that caused actual harm (or is likely to cause 
such harm) and that this act constitutes a breach of legal duties.1406  
Commissioning expert studies to prove that a mining company has caused or causes pollution, that this 
pollution affects the health or well-being of either mineworkers or host communities, and that such 
conduct satisfies the legal requirements to trigger its liability, places an enormous demand on the 
limited resources of the litigating parties – both financially and in terms of time.1407 This becomes even 
more complicated when several mining companies have contributed to the same pollution, which may 
raise the question whether these mining companies can be held jointly and severally liable so that the 
litigating parties do not have to show who is responsible for what and are not dragged into a long 
process with the companies simply pointing the finger at one another.1408 They believe that the state 
should call the mine(s) to account, all the more because government has access to certain information, 
which communities, activists and lawyers do not have.1409  
Box 10. Was the Carolina matter a ‘war against the state’? 
Only government was included in the 2012 urgent application by Lawyers for Human Rights 
and the Legal Resources Centre on behalf of the Federation for a Sustainable Environment and 
the Silobela community. In the media the Minister of Water Affairs, who was amongst the 
actors cited, spoke about “a war against the state”, and publicly questioned the lawyers’ 
motivations for not having sued the coal mines that were responsible for the water 
contamination.1410 Also in court such complaints were uttered, as the judgment reports how the 
responding parties “contend that the cause of the water problem is not on their part but the 
mines.”1411 In reply the judge noted, however, that the responding parties themselves had “not 
stated what steps they have taken against the mines towards coming with a permanent solution 
to this problem”, whereby the judge alluded to the government’s shared responsibility in the 
events given its duty to regulate and to enforce. 
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According to the applicants’ lawyers, the decision to sue only government was motivated by 
two considerations. First, the immediate concern of the litigation was ensuring that the affected 
communities would once again have access to potable water.1412 Such relief is generally not 
sought from mining companies. Second, collecting the evidence that shows that those particular 
mines that were named (see the case file, supra Section 2.3.2.5) were indeed responsible for the 
water contamination, whether in full or in part,1413 would have required lots of resources – and 
would definitely not have been possible in the context of an urgent application.1414 Since the 
water crisis in 2012, water samples are now taken on a regular basis, however.  
ii.e) Stigma 
The stigma to litigation arises from a lot of things. (…) Unique to South Africa is the political 
history of moving from the Apartheid state, domination by a white minority, (…) to a majoritarian 
democracy. And so the fidelity to that democracy in the sense that anything that challenges it is 
against the revolution that led to it. [Counter-revolutionary] is the label (…) applied to people who 
are challenging government. Even when that challenge to government is in the interest of 
constitutional rights.1415  
As this quote from a respondent suggests, a practical forethought when parties decide who they should 
sue, which seems peculiar to South Africa and should be understood in light of its history, relates to 
the anticipated reactions of the general public. Especially public interest law firms and advocacy 
organisations have to be careful not to forfeit public support by being branded ‘counter-revolutionary’, 
because they continuously attack government.1416 The political context should thus be taken into 
account and the fact that the party in power is still worshipped for its role in ending Apartheid. This 
concern about being branded ‘counter-revolutionary’ should also be linked to the fact that most 
lawyers are white people, because black people are still catching up in highly educated positions, 
which is a legacy from Apartheid.  
ii.f) Illegal or substandard conduct 
Finally, when the conduct complained of is not illegal but civil society actors believe that the mining 
company could and should do better, or when such conduct falls short of international standards and 
best practices, lawyers and activists would rather concentrate their efforts on the mining company than 
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on government.1417 The purpose then is to gradually build consensus around certain standards of 
conduct, in particular by having them included in jurisprudence or by having them voluntarily 
complied with in practice, standards which government may (hopefully) eventually endorse.  
(iii) A matter of principle  
The decision to sue either government or mining company is not only determined by practical 
considerations but also by principled beliefs about who should be called to account. Some respondents 
feel strongly about the fact that the state should watch over its people and protect the rights in the Bill 
of Rights. Hence, the state is responsible when mining companies degrade the environment in such a 
way that it infringes upon the rights of communities or mineworkers.1418 Litigation is then used as a 
tool to ensure that government complies with its duty to regulate, monitor and enforce standards of 
behaviour for mining companies so that the rights of the people are safeguarded. This viewpoint is not 
only motivated by Section 7(2) of the Constitution, which imposes on all organs of state a duty to 
protect the rights in the Bill of Rights, but also by the legal framework that establishes that the state is 
the custodian of the country’s mineral resources and the public trustee of its natural resources,1419 
which have to be managed for the benefit of the South African people.1420  
The overarching idea is that the state is the public trustee of all these environmental resources. Not 
that that allows the companies to wash their hands, but the state must, first and foremost, make sure 
that all these different companies and parties operate responsibly and if it has not done that well, it 
really ultimately is the responsible one.1421 
On the other hand, the mining companies are the ones who actually perpetrate the human rights 
violations,1422 whilst government is only indirectly responsible for failing to adequately regulate, 
monitor and enforce standards for corporate behaviour – “the state is the non-protector”.1423 
Sometimes the mining companies may even be responsible for the deficient regulation, monitoring and 
enforcement by government, by having exploited their powerful economic position to ensure that 
government does not affect their interests.1424 In view of this realisation that the mining company is the 
actual perpetrator, as one respondent acknowledged, “trying to compel government to get the company 
to do what it is supposed to do is an indirect way of holding the company accountable.”1425 Therefore, 
where this is the preferred road for victims, respondents believe that they should have a direct recourse 
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against the mining company.1426 Expecting them to demand the state to do its job is not the same and 
even disempowers victims in some way.1427  
Moreover, precisely because the mining companies are the actual perpetrators and the ones who reap 
the benefits from those human rights violations, the respondents agree that ultimately the financial 
responsibility should lie with the mining companies.1428 Hence, even when they sue government, they 
would try and force government to recover any costs made to remedy the pollution from the 
responsible mining companies.  
(iv) A matter of principled pragmatism: the role of civil society 
The choice of suing government or mining company also correlates with the opinion of respondents 
about the appropriate role of civil society. This role is evaluated in relation to three targets: 
government, mining industry and affected (groups of) individuals. As regards the first two targets, 
civil society actors can play either a more supportive, collaborative role or a watchdog role.  
The respondents accept that they should watch government, meaning that they should monitor whether 
government performs its functions and fulfils its mandate.1429 Nevertheless, if possible, they prefer to 
cooperate with government, rather than to adopt an adversarial approach, because, on the one hand, 
they realise that in many instances government simply lacks the resources and the capacity to live up 
to its task and, on the other, contrary to when the Apartheid regime was in power, the current 
government is democratic and, hence, in principle amenable to collaboration with civil society.1430 
As far as the mining industry is concerned, respondents seem divided on the question whether 
watching the industry should be part of their role. They definitely want to collaborate with and support 
mining companies so as to ensure that they are aware of their duties and able to comply therewith.1431 
However, if companies fail to comply with their obligations, the question is whether civil society 
should be the one to enforce compliance, whether through litigation or otherwise.1432 They would 
rather have government performing that task, because regulation, monitoring and enforcement is 
essentially the state’s job. Nevertheless, many respondents conceded that in some instances civil 
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society has to watch the industry, because government itself lacks the resources1433 – or is captured by 
a conflict of interests or by corruption.1434 Adopting such a role is very resource-intensive, 
however.1435 Therefore, there is no question that they agree that, ideally, this should not be their 
responsibility.1436  
You do not want to do the state’s job. You want the state to do their job. I do not want to have a job 
in ten years’ time, because the only reason why [our] program [exists] is because there is a gap, 
because the state is not fulfilling their obligations in terms of communities and environmental 
imperatives.1437 
It is remarkable that also companies do not (always) appreciate that civil society actors act as 
watchdogs. They often try to defend themselves precisely by arguing that watching the industry is not 
the role of civil society, but of government. According to those companies, civil society actors should 
not behave as ‘alternative regulatory authorities.’1438 This viewpoint is not agreed by the judiciary,1439 
however, unless a statute expressly prescribes that aggrieved parties should request the authorities to 
take appropriate action vis-à-vis the company.1440  
Finally, civil society actors have an important task in empowering potential victims of abuse by 
mining companies, so that they themselves can stand up for their interests and rights.1441 
Empowerment has by far the biggest long term impact (see also infra Section 2.7). In fact, lawyers and 
activists currently function as intermediaries, because communities and mineworkers do not have the 
resources to defend themselves. If they are empowered, they can in turn demand government to 
perform its role as protector of its people and demand mining companies to respect their rights. 
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Moreover, as civil society actors remain relatively few in numbers, the more individuals are 
empowered, the more likely government and mining companies will be called to account.  
If communities have the capacity to understand the impacts, to understand what kind of recourse 
they have, they are far more likely to be part of negotiations and to be seen as formidable 
opposition.1442 
(v) Schematic recapitulation 
 Table 8. Determinants to sue government or mining company 
Government Mining company 
Involvement  Failure to regulate or to monitor and enforce Actual perpetrator 
Objective of 
the liability 
To require government to regulate, monitor 
and enforce 
To enforce compliance with the law 
To hold them financially liable 
Determinants  Yes No Yes No 
- The protector 
(regulator and 
enforcer), 
custodian and 
public trustee  
- More systemic 
impact  
- More amenable to 
being sued  
- Role of civil 
society is to watch 
government 
- Lack of capacity, 
rather support 
government and 
capacitate it  
- Too bureaucratic 
- Counter-
revolutionary  
- Indirect way of 
holding companies 
accountable 
- The culprit 
- Greater individual 
impact 
- Development of 
higher standards 
- Less bureaucratic 
- High 
compensations 
- Direct recourse 
- Deep litigation 
pockets 
- Resource-
intensive: 
information and 
evidence 
- ‘The’ company no 
longer exists 
As Table 8 also suggests, lawsuits against government and mining companies should in fact be 
complementary, and not mutually exclusive. The respective involvement of government and mining 
company is not the same, and neither is their respective liability. This is acknowledged by lawyers and 
activists, who admit that the precise interplay between the respective responsibilities of government 
and mining companies should be explored further, whether through litigation or otherwise.  
There is a really important link between regulation and obligations of the private sector. In a way we 
have to force the debate around what it means for corporate parties to be responsible for human 
rights. (…) For us it is important to have a strong constitutional and theoretical basis for any 
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argument that we make. So that is why we engage in some of these court cases, so that (…) the 
courts can have a chance to [build their jurisprudence].1443  
2.6.3.2. Suing mining companies: who? 
As was also explained in the general discussion (supra Part II, Section 2.2.3), when litigating parties 
decide to sue the mining company, perhaps together with government, they also have to decide 
whether to sue the company as such, which is an abstract entity, or a responsible agent within that 
company (i) and whether to draw the parent company of the subsidiary that actually perpetrated the 
conduct into the proceedings (ii). Below, the viewpoints of respondents in relation to each of these 
further decisions is discussed in turn.  
(i) Institutional versus individual corporate liability  
Opinions diverge on the question whether the company as such or its agents (or both) should be sued. 
Pros and cons to both institutional and individual corporate liability are discerned. In practice, 
however, it seems that criminal proceedings are more likely to target individual agents, whereas civil 
litigation tends to be directed against the company as such. This can also be seen from Tables 17a and 
17b in Annex 1. 
Individual accountability of directors or executives has the advantage of having a real impact on those 
individuals, so that it is believed to act as a better deterrent and to create a greater incentive to change 
behaviour.1444 Moreover, mining companies are perceived as these huge, abstract entities, which 
makes it hard, especially for victims, to understand how a remedy affects them.1445 Orders to pay 
financial compensation, for instance, can easily be absorbed by large companies.1446  
Also respondents acknowledge that a downside to individual accountability is that when the agent has 
been convicted, there is no guarantee that business within the company will not simply continue as 
usual. Even if the convicted individual is the one who actually committed, ordered or tolerated the 
activities, he or she may have been incited by the culture reigning at that mining company. Individual 
agents are often just one link in a chain of responsibilities leading to the eventual human rights 
violations. Those agents themselves do not even know the entire story. When only the individual agent 
is then sued and convicted, the mining company gets the opportunity to hide behind that ‘fall guy’ 
without reviewing its internal policies and changing its corporate culture.1447 For instance, one 
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respondent said the following about the executives that were commissioned before the Commission of 
Inquiry investigating the happenings at Marikana (supra Box 2). 
It is a fantastic example of how Lonmin is so big and they hide behind that. So the people that they 
put up on the stand for phase 2 to answer the questions about the [Social and Labour Plans], they 
were people who had been involved at some point, but Lonmin is so big. Many of their answers were 
just: ‘Oh, I do not know about that.’ Which takes us nowhere.1448 
(ii) Parent company liability  
Generally, mines are established as juristic entities in their own right, which are owned and controlled 
by a larger company or operated as a joint venture that is owned and controlled by two or more 
companies. The mineral right may be held either by the subsidiary mine or by the parent mining 
company.1449 When lawyers and activists approach a mine that degrades the environment and thereby 
creates health hazards for mineworkers or neighbouring communities, this automatically involves the 
company operating that mine. In other words, the owner of the mine (the parent mining company) is 
nearly always part of the story. The respondents also indicated that they target these ‘controlling’ 
mining companies because those companies have deeper pockets (in the case of damages claims)1450 
and because the concerned mine may no longer be operational or its ownership may have changed.1451 
Parent companies are also deemed liable, because of their superior knowledge and the control that they 
exercise over their subsidiary mines and because, in the end, they are one and the same – given, for 
instance, that the same directors sit on the respective boards of the mine and of the parent company.1452 
Also the silicosis class action is launched against the parent mining companies that owned and 
controlled the mines where the mineworkers have allegedly contracted silicosis or pulmonary 
tuberculosis. 
Box 11. Parent company liability in the silicosis class action 
In the silicosis class action, thirty mining companies have to face justice for the purportedly 
poor working conditions at eighty-two mines. Many of these mines have been owned by several 
of the responding mining companies at different points in time. To give an example, the 
Buffelsfontein Gold Mine has been owned and controlled by Randgold and Exploration 
Company Ltd (in 1996), by DRD Gold Ltd (from 1997 to 2005), by Simmer and Jack Mines Ltd 
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(from 2005 to 2011), by Buffelsfontein Gold Mines Ltd (from 1999 to date) and by Village 
Main Reef Ltd (since 2011 to date).1453  
The applicants’ legal representatives1454 argue that the parent mining companies are liable for 
the working conditions at the mines because they effectively directed, managed and controlled 
the business of their subsidiaries in order to maximise the returns on their investment and 
because they did so as an integrated part of their own business. According to the applicants, the 
parent companies assumed this control both on a formal and informal basis. Formally, the 
parent companies had concluded service agreements with their subsidiaries, on the basis of 
which the parent provided services, guidance and advice inter alia with respect to mine 
planning and design, mine ventilation, environmental control, dust control design, and the 
provision of medical services. Informally, the subsidiaries recognised that the parent company 
had superior knowledge of mining and that ultimate authority resided in that company, and to 
that extent the subsidiaries were entitled and did in fact rely on that superior knowledge and 
authority in the conduct of their mining activities.  
The next step in their argumentation is that the parent companies were not only aware of the 
poor environmental conditions and of the measures that could reasonably be taken to prevent 
exposure to harmful quantities of dust, but also knew that their subsidiaries would rely on them 
to provide guidance and advice on those environmental conditions and on reasonable preventive 
measures, and that such guidance and advice would have a material impact on the working 
conditions at the mines. Hence, by not providing such guidance and advice, the parent 
companies acted negligently, wrongfully and unlawfully.  
The claim for damages is thus based on the direct liability of the parent mining companies, in 
accordance with precedents from the UK courts, in particular Chandler v. Cape Plc and 
Thompson v. The Renwick Group Plc (see also supra Part II, Section 2.2.3.3).1455 The parent 
companies are not held liable qualitate qua, as mere owners of their subsidiaries, but for their 
own negligent, wrongful and unlawful behaviour on the grounds that they have failed to guide 
and advice their subsidiaries on their working conditions, due to which the mineworkers have 
contracted silicosis or pulmonary tuberculosis.  
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It should be noted that this argumentation in the silicosis class action in fact amounts to assuming an 
obligation to protect on the part of the parent mining company for the working conditions at their 
subsidiary mines. Moreover, as was said, the silicosis class action is not exceptional for being directed 
against parent mining companies. A similar strategy was, for instance, used in Bareki v. Gencor,1456 in 
which a community affected by asbestos pollution sought an order against Gencor to have the area 
rehabilitated. The contamination was caused by the Griqualand Chrysotile Mine, which was wholly-
owned by Gefco, a subsidiary of Gencor. According to the applicants, “at all material times Gencor 
was the majority shareholder of (…) Gefco and provided management services to Gefco.”1457  
More controversial than the issue of involving the South African parent company, is the question 
whether foreign companies should be drawn into the dispute where the mining company owning and 
operating a mine belongs to a multinational group. There has not been much experimenting with the 
question of foreign parent company liability, which is largely due to the fact that lawyers want to 
avoid the complex jurisdictional questions that will inevitably arise in such litigation.1458 Nevertheless, 
respondents acknowledge that those parent companies are also responsible, that they have easily 
gotten away with their conduct until today and that their double standards (as they generally abide by 
higher standards in their home countries) should be denounced.1459  
2.6.4. Use of human rights 
This Section begins with discussing the possible role for international law as well as foreign and non-
legally binding standards in strategic litigation in South Africa relating to environmental health 
hazards caused by mining (Section 2.6.4.1). That role seems rather limited in practice despite the 
openness to international and foreign law that is dictated by the Constitution (supra Section 1.3). Next, 
the Section feeds back into the questions of horizontality and protective duties that were discussed at 
length before (supra Section 1.2.1), by analysing what strategic litigation may reveal about litigating 
parties’ position on these questions (Section 2.6.4.2). Finally, the impact of using human rights 
arguments in litigation is scrutinised in-depth (Section 2.6.4.3).  
A priori it should be emphasised that the subsidiarity principle (supra Section 1.2.1.2), which requires 
litigating parties to rely on any law implementing the Constitution, does not mean that as a matter of 
principle human rights have no place in litigation unless no implementing law is available or such law 
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is claimed to be unconstitutional. The subsidiarity principle only precludes reliance on the Constitution 
as a direct cause of action. However, notwithstanding occasional oblivions, it is standard practice to 
cite the constitutional rights that the rules of (statutory or common) law used directly in the litigation 
seek to implement.  
2.6.4.1. The role of international (and foreign) law 
Because the South African Constitution was inspired by international human rights law as it stood at 
the time of its adoption, the rights incorporated in the Bill of Rights are generally on par with 
international human rights law, and sometimes even offer more protection than international law (and 
definitely than many other constitutions). For this reason, the South African Constitution is rightly 
considered a progressive human rights instrument, which is a fact that arouses a degree of satisfaction 
after South Africa having been an outcast for many years.1460 This also means, however, that the use of 
international human rights law in litigation should not be taken for granted. 
The mutually beneficial interaction between international and national human rights in theory was 
explained before (supra Part II, Section 2.2.4.1), but can be briefly recapped as follows. On the one 
hand, international human rights law is particularly valuable for national human rights law, when there 
is uncertainty about its precise meaning or when judges want to ensure that national law develops in 
line with international standards. On the other hand, a major way in which international law is 
developed further is through its application by domestic courts. Nevertheless, although the 
contribution of domestic litigation to international human rights law is of great interest to human rights 
law an sich, it is unlikely to feature prominently on the mind of actors that litigate at the domestic 
level, whose primary interests lie at that level and relate to furthering their (locally-defined) human 
rights goals.  
Lawyers, but also activists, experts and scholars, reckon that, as a matter of principle, international 
human rights law is relevant to domestic litigation in light of the interpretative mandates of the 
Constitution.1461 Nonetheless, the data indicate that at least in cases related to mining, environmental 
degradation and human rights, respondents often omit to cite international instruments and do not 
seem to have a real strategy to use such instruments.1462 There are two main reasons for that omission. 
First, they lack the time, manpower, expertise and financial resources to conduct research into and 
report on international law.1463 Hence, if South African law suffices to build a strong case, they are not 
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inclined to make such an investment. This is somewhat different for civil society actors that are 
affiliated with international nongovernmental organisations or that have a human rights research 
department.1464 Second, they consider the Bill of Rights and South African law strong enough to 
substantiate their case. As the discussion of the legal framework suggested (supra Section 2.2) and as 
respondents have confirmed,1465 the problem in South Africa is not one of insufficient or deficient 
laws, but one of lacking or inadequate application of the law. It is thus not all that surprising that many 
respondents said that referring to international law is often simply redundant as constitutional rights 
and implementing laws offer enough protection,1466 so that international human rights law “can purely 
add to what we have already.”1467 Moreover, an argument that constitutional rights are at stake, as 
opposed to international human rights, is sometimes appraised as bearing more weight, both morally 
and legally.1468 When it is used, international law rather serves to sustain and contextualise a case that 
is cogently founded on the Constitution and on national law (persuasive force).1469 As one respondent 
explained, “they just provide support, reassurance to courts that the approach that we are asking them 
to take is consistent with international law.”1470 In this regard, it is also noteworthy that many 
respondents admit to prefer African sources over other sources of international law.1471  
A first scenario where international law could be valuable, however, is when national standards do not 
exist or are below international standards.1472 A reason for lawyers to make such arguments then is that 
if courts accept them (in principle as persuasive rather than as prescriptive norms), these standards 
gradually infuse South African jurisprudence and, accordingly, get more weight.1473 Amongst the 
directly relevant cases there were no examples of references to hard international law as far as the 
concrete issue of environmental health hazards caused by mining is concerned. References to non-
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legally binding or foreign standards are more common.1474 In cases dealing with the resettlement of 
people who are adversely affected by mining activities, for instance,1475 lawyers frequently revert to 
the performance standards of the International Finance Corporation, in particular the fifth standard 
dealing with land acquisition and involuntary resettlement, which makes provision for mandatory 
consultation and for land-based or financial compensation and other benefits, such as moving 
allowances.1476 Foreign standards are, for instance, used in the case of blasting, which is an activity 
associated with mining that creates a lot of noise and dust pollution and regularly causes the houses of 
people living nearby to crack or collapse. Because South African standards are lacking, lawyers rely 
on standards from Canada, Australia or the US, for example, which regulate issues like the minimal 
distance to houses, the permissible amount of explosives used and the need for advance warnings, to 
assess the merits of a court case.1477 Another example of the use of foreign standards is found in the 
Tudor Shaft matter. 
Box 12. The Tudor Shaft matter: a preliminary health risk assessment 
At some point during the dispute, the residents of the Tudor Shaft informal settlement and their 
legal representatives commissioned their own, preliminary study into the health impacts of the 
uraniferous tailings dam. That study was carried out based on the standards developed by the 
US Environmental Protection Agency. In particular, they used those standards to demonstrate 
that the level of exposure to contaminants and the resulting excess risk of cancer are not 
acceptable.1478 They indicated, moreover, that the American standards probably underestimate 
the actual risk for several reasons, including the poor access of residents to health facilities and 
the fact that it concerns an informal settlement, not a residential area.1479  
A second scenario in which references to international law (or to non-legally binding or foreign 
standards) are valuable is where South African standards are available, but should be interpreted, 
applied and, if necessary, developed in accordance with international standards. International law 
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could, for instance, guide the courts in giving content to economic, social and cultural rights.1480 As 
was explained (supra Section 2.2.1.1), many scholars are dissatisfied with the way in which the South 
African judiciary has applied a standard of reasonableness to review government conduct in relation to 
unqualified socio-economic rights, because they feel that courts have consistently refused to provide 
these rights with concrete content and that they focus on procedure as opposed to substance. 
Interestingly, the judgment in the Carolina matter constitutes a small step in the right direction.  
Box 13. A rare reference to international law in the Carolina matter 
When the High Court judge granted the responding parties leave to appeal its order, he also 
accepted the applicants’ request that such appeal would not suspend the original order. To 
justify that decision, the judge cited the General Comment by the UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights on the right to water, which stipulates that water supply has to be 
sufficient and continuous for personal and domestic uses.1481 This citation supported the judge’s 
finding that the right to water is not only violated when people actually die due to water 
shortages, but also when the water is unsafe for human consumption.1482 Hence, the judge 
concluded that “[t]he community stands to suffer more harm” than the responding parties who 
“cannot suffer greater harm than that which will be suffered by the community in the form of 
health risk, to say the least”, and granted an interim execution order.1483  
Another example relates to the polluter pays principle, which remains a largely elusive concept in 
South African law. Although the applicable legislation establishes liability on the part of the polluter, 
which has to take the necessary remedial measures or pay for them,1484 the precise scope of that 
obligation has not been fully explored. Therefore, one respondent pondered on the need to bring cases 
to the courts, so as to have the principle developed in conformity with international environmental and 
human rights law.1485  
A new area where the argument has been made that South African law should be developed in line 
with international law relates specifically to the issue of business and human rights. This debate has 
only more recently caught the interest of South African lawyers and activists, so that the 
responsiveness of judges to such arguments has yet to be tested. The most prominent case in which the 
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international legal framework on business and human rights was actually referenced, were the 
certification proceedings in the silicosis class action. 
Box 14. The silicosis class action and the UNGPs 
When Section27, the legal representatives of the amici (Sonke Gender Justice and Treatment 
Action Campaign), applied to intervene in the certification proceedings, they wanted to submit 
as evidence an affidavit by Anand Grover, the former Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Health, in which he elaborated on corporate accountability for human rights under international 
law, according to the UNGPs in particular.  
In their answering affidavit opposing the intervention by the amici, two of the largest gold 
mining companies involved in the class action strongly opposed the admission of this affidavit. 
Above all, they stressed that the UNGPs are neither binding nor enforceable and that the Court 
should be careful in applying soft law directly in domestic proceedings. According to the 
intervening parties, however, this argument is meritless because “it does not need to be binding 
in order to be relevant”1486 – which is correct, see supra Section 1.3. In addition, on a more 
procedural note, the opposing mining companies argued that an expert opinion on a matter of 
international law is irrelevant and inadmissible since international law is part of South African 
law so that expert advice is not required.  
The affidavit by Anand Grover was indeed not admitted by the High Court.1487 This decision 
was regretted, because “there is value in having the UN Special Rapporteur responsible for (…) 
the reports that inform the development of [international] law (…) speak to the law.”1488 In any 
case, the amici still invoked international law in their submissions to the court.1489 In particular, 
they referred to the UN Framework on Business and Human Rights and the UNGPs and 
highlighted the emphasis placed by these documents on access to remedy, which is impeded by 
barriers such as the cost of bringing individual claims and the difficulties encountered in 
securing legal representation.1490 Through this reference they sought to bolster their argument 
that the class action had to be certified to ensure that the mineworkers’ access to justice is 
effective.  
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Without the intervention by the amici, international law would most probably not have been 
mentioned in the class action at all, as one lawyer involved acknowledged, saying that “there 
was no international element in it all until they came in.”1491 In its judgment certifying the class 
action, the High Court did not explicitly respond to these submissions on international law, 
however. 
Besides the evident scenarios where international human rights law is valuable, in particular in case of 
gaps in the law, legal uncertainty or new developments, the respondents mentioned two other 
situations in which, or reasons why, they would refer to international instruments. The first one is 
when government blatantly violates its obligations under international human rights law.1492 Such 
cases are rare, however, and no examples related to environmental health hazards caused by mining 
are known.1493 Secondly, international law is sometimes believed to add a symbolic dimension to the 
case. Civil society actors are still grateful for the support of the international community to the anti-
Apartheid struggle and attach a great deal of importance to the new, democratic state’s membership of 
the international community, which is why they want the state to show compliance with international 
law.1494 The perception that South Africa falls short of those international standards can have an 
important symbolic impact. 
2.6.4.2. Human rights in cases relating to corporate accountability: questions of protective duties and 
horizontality 
Lawyers are well aware that the rights in the Bill of Rights have horizontal effect provided that the 
nature of the right lends itself to such effect.1495 Of those rights that are at stake where mining 
companies cause environmental health hazards (supra Section 2.2.1.2), only two do not have 
horizontal effect, namely the right to have the environment protected through legislative and other 
measures and the right to just administrative action (Sections 24(b) and 33 of the Constitution), as both 
these rights clearly only bind the state. The other rights (to human dignity, life, freedom and security 
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of the person, an environment not harmful to health, adequate housing, health care services, sufficient 
food and water, and information) are capable of binding mining companies. 
In the end, if the Constitution only applied vertically, it would not really make sense, because the 
pollution is being done mainly by companies.1496 
The more difficult question relates to the horizontal scope and application of those rights. As to their 
horizontal scope, respondents agree that the human rights duties of mining companies cannot be the 
same as those of the state.1497 Although they use different terms to express this idea, the respondents 
coincide that mining companies should at least respect human rights. In addition, however, and as was 
already mentioned (supra Section 2.6.3.2), the fact that litigation, including the silicosis class action, is 
often directed against parent mining companies suggests that companies may under certain 
circumstances also be assumed to bear an obligation to protect human rights. Moreover, corporate 
human rights obligations may depending on the circumstances entail that they must act in a given way, 
as is illustrated by the argumentation in the silicosis class action.1498. 
Box 15. The silicosis class action: positive human rights duties 
The submissions in the silicosis class action are a good illustration of the easiness with which it 
is accepted that mining companies must also take positive action to prevent that mineworkers’ 
rights are violated. The applicants’ legal representatives argue that the mining companies “failed 
to ensure that the conditions of work of the members of the class did not infringe [their] 
constitutional rights”,1499 following which they enumerate a number of reasonable preventive 
measures that the mining companies could and should have adopted to improve the working 
conditions at the mines. Those measures included informing workers of the risk and educating 
them as to the means by which that risk may be mitigated, identifying the source of dust, 
preventing or minimizing the escape of dust through the introduction of appropriate engineering 
controls, monitoring the efficacy of such measures by checking the amount of harmful dust to 
which mineworkers are exposed, and monitoring the health of mineworkers.1500  
Also the horizontal application of human rights raises many questions. The respondents admit that 
their understanding of horizontal application is still limited, which is also due to the fact that there is 
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little jurisprudence on this issue.1501 As was explained in the general discussion on horizontal 
application in South Africa (supra Section 1.2.1.2), few cases have, for instance, been based on a 
constitutional cause of action (direct horizontal application). A judgment in the silicosis class action 
on the merits may at least provide some of the much needed additional guidance on this issue. 
Box 16. Will the silicosis class action set a precedent on constitutional causes of action?  
Already in the certification proceedings the applicants’ legal representatives argue that their 
claim is supported by three causes of action, respectively under statutory law, common law and 
the Constitution. They admit, however, that at the stage of certification it is not yet necessary for 
the High Court to determine whether the breaches of statutory duties, common law duties, and 
constitutional rights indeed give rise to three separate causes of action or, rather, underpin and 
reinforce a common law claim for damages.1502 That issue will have to be determined by the 
trial court, which, if that court indeed gets the opportunity to rule on this question, may set an 
important precedent on the direct horizontal application of the Constitution.  
Another contentious or difficult point is the indirect horizontal application of the Constitution through 
the common law. While the respondents accept that the Constitution infuses all legislation (indirect 
horizontal application through statutory law)1503 and may create an independent cause of action or a 
special remedy like constitutional damages (direct horizontal application, which is rare, however),1504 
they are somewhat more reticent to use the Constitution when common law is applied. This finding 
accords with the criticism that the transformative objective has yet to be realised as far as the common 
law is concerned and the general ascertainment that the common law has only in rare instances been 
developed or sought to be developed in accordance with the Bill of Rights (see supra Section 1.2.1 
and infra Section 2.6.4.3).1505 
The lawyers who are working in public interest organisations tend to shy away from delictual issues 
and the more traditional common law idea, and I think it is a problem.1506 
To me there is very little room for the Constitution in delict (…) It is difficult to bring it in, into 
these old, established principles, all these Latin phrases and terms.1507 
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An example of a case that was merely argued based on the (common) law of nuisance, without any 
reference to the Constitution and the possible rights at stake, is Van Eck v. Clyde Brickfields.1508 This 
case was launched by a neighbouring community against a company that mined clay and 
manufactured bricks from it. The applicants lost their application, which was fraught with strategic 
errors, one of which being that they narrowly constructed their case on the traditional common law of 
nuisance and only requested an interdict that would address the noise pollution, but not the other forms 
of pollution about which they had complained, notably water and dust pollution and increased 
traffic.1509 The case is interesting to compare with what one respondent said, namely that the law of 
nuisance may need to be developed in accordance with the Constitution so that it does cater for the 
specific concerns of communities living nearby mining operations that are affected by pollution.1510 
An important question that arises, for instance, is whether a community whose use and enjoyment of 
their land is not only disturbed by the activities of a neighbouring mine, but who suffer actual harm 
therefrom should not only be entitled to an interdict but also to a claim for damages.1511 Again, the 
silicosis class action is one of those few cases in which the litigating parties seek to have the 
Constitution applied indirectly to private actors, through the common law.  
Box 17. Infusing the common law with the Constitution in the silicosis class action 
According to the mineworkers’ legal representatives, the mining companies have negligently, 
wrongfully and unlawfully breached their common law duty of care to provide a safe and 
healthy working environment that was not injurious to their health.1512 To found a delictual 
action, they must show the following elements: (1) that the mining companies failed to act; (2) 
that this omission was wrongful (‘breach of a legal duty’); (3) that the mining companies were 
at fault (‘negligence’); (4) that the omission caused the damage suffered by the mineworkers; 
and (5) that the damage is capable of quantification.1513  
As their founding affidavits and heads of argument for the certification proceedings indicate, 
they believe that common law of delict should be infused by the Constitution. In particular, the 
Bill of Rights should not only inform the burden of proof in relation to factual causation (see 
                                                     
1508
 Van Eck and Others v. Clyde Brickfields (Pty) Ltd and Others (6020/2002) [2006] ZAGPHC 165 (7 April 
2006). 
1509
 See also Centre for Environmental Rights and University of the Witwatersrand School of Law, Mining and 
Environmental Litigation Review (June 2012), 14. 
1510
 R13. 
1511
 For a discussion, see Van der Walt (2005), supra note 624, in particular at 5-6 and 51. 
1512
 Applicants’ Founding Affidavit, in re: Nkala v. Harmony Gold (48226/12) (21 December 2012), para. 132.2; 
Applicants’ Submissions, in re: Nkala v. Harmony Gold (48226/12) (9 June 2015), para. 84.1. 
1513
 Nkala v. Harmony Gold (certification judgment), supra note 372, para. 57. 
276 
 
also infra Box 26), but also the test to establish wrongfulness and negligence.1514 In this regard, 
before the trial court the mineworker’s lawyers would like to plead on questions such as 
whether a violation of constitutional rights amounts to a breach of a legal duty,1515 whether the 
legal convictions of the community justify the imposition of liability on the mining companies 
for failing to take the necessary steps to prevent silicosis and tuberculosis,1516 and whether the 
breaches of the legal duties constitute grounds for imposing strict liability.1517  
When human rights are invoked in litigation against government about a matter that in fact revolves 
around the conduct of mining companies, such arguments necessarily relate to the protective duties of 
organs of state – the judiciary’s protective duties are at stake both in litigation against private actors 
and against state actors. This was evident in the discussion of the (principled) determinants to sue 
either government or mining companies, where the respondents justified their decision to target 
government based on its (protective) duties of regulation, monitoring and enforcement (supra Section 
2.6.3.1). The focus matter that provides the best example of how serious environmental degradation by 
mining triggers the protective duties of government is the Tudor Shaft case, which precisely relates to 
government’s responsibility for a situation that was in fact created by a mine.  
Box 18. Tudor Shaft and the protective duties of government 
The 2012 urgent application launched by the Federation for a Sustainable Environment, in 
which the residents of the informal settlement later joined as co-applicants, revolved precisely 
around the protective duties of the different government actors whose competence was in some 
way triggered by the hazardous situation at Tudor Shaft. The co-applicants argued, for instance, 
that those actors not only bear an obligation not to cause or exacerbate environmental risks, but 
also to take reasonable steps to rehabilitate an environment that poses a health risk to the 
community.1518 This is all the more important in the case of a derelict mine over which no 
private actor assumes responsibility. Each of the government actors cited either had a duty to 
remedy the contamination or to ensure that the contamination would be remedied, and they had 
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to do so in accordance with environmental regulations,1519 and after having consulted with the 
affected residents.1520 
2.6.4.3. The impact of human rights  
A final question that arises with respect to the use of human rights in strategic litigation, pertains to 
their concrete impact, which evidently triggers the protective duties of the judges that have to decide 
on the dispute between victims and either government or mining companies. The question of impact is 
discussed at three levels: symbolic impact (i), impact on the way in which the case proceeds (ii) and 
impact on substantive law (iii).  
(i) The symbolism of human rights arguments 
Regardless of the material impact of the use of human rights arguments, there are a number of 
symbolic reasons for litigating parties to cite human rights. Two such reasons are that human rights 
add a meaningful moral layer to a legal case, and that it is hard for counterparties to defend themselves 
by arguing against human rights.1521 On top of that, they represent universal language, so that everyone 
should be aware of and understand human rights.1522 Although such moral arguments may not have a 
(straightforwardly) material impact on the resolution of the case, they can at least result in a moral 
condemnation of the counterparty, in the judgment itself and/or outside the courtroom, in particular in 
the media, which in turn can have real repercussions, especially for the latter party’s reputation. 
Box 19. The silicosis class action: certifying judges reproach the mining industry 
According to the legal representatives of the mineworkers, several constitutional rights are at 
stake in the silicosis class action, including the rights to human dignity, life, freedom and 
security of the person, and an environment that is not harmful to health and well-being (supra 
Section 2.3.3.5). These human rights, which are definitely meant to have a material impact on 
the litigation, as the discussion below will demonstrate, also have moral ramifications. Indeed, 
in their judgment certifying the class action, the judges used an exceptionally harsh and 
judgmental tone. They wrote, for instance, that “the mining companies stripped [the 
mineworkers] of their dignity, and concomitantly compromised their health and safety, with 
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such intensity and ferocity that they were effectively dehumanised.”1523 Furthermore, at least 
implicitly, the judges seem to warn government and the business community at large that 
economic growth does not provide them with a carte blanche to violate human rights. 
“Gold mining began (…) in 1886. It has grown over the years (…). In due course it became a 
significant contributor to the growth of the gross domestic product of South Africa and rewarded 
handsomely those who invested in it. (…) As this case demonstrates, simultaneous with that growth, 
the industry left in its trail tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of current and former 
underground mineworkers who suffered from debilitating and incurable silicosis and pulmonary 
tuberculosis (TB). Many mineworkers also died from the diseases.”1524 
Two other, rather symbolic reasons for litigating parties to refer to human rights transpired from the 
interviews. First, respondents accept that the Constitution, which is the supreme law of the country, 
should inform all litigation.1525 Second, on a more pragmatic note, the mission and objectives of many 
public interest organisations and law firms explicitly mention the protection and promotion of human 
rights, so that using such language is an indispensable element of their approach.1526 The Legal 
Resources Centre, for instance, is “committed (…) to ensure that the principles, rights, and 
responsibilities enshrined in our national Constitution are respected, promoted, protected and fulfilled” 
and its mission includes to “enable the vulnerable and marginalised to assert and develop their rights” 
and to “contribute to the development of a human rights jurisprudence and to the social and economic 
transformation of society.”1527 
(ii) Human rights and the proceedings of a case 
Invoking human rights in litigation can have a concrete impact on the way in which the case proceeds. 
On the one hand, some procedural rules are triggered especially when a constitutional issue is raised, 
for instance when a case touches upon a right protected by the Bill of Rights. On the other hand, given 
the judiciary’s protective duties, the very fact that human rights are at stake should affect the reasoning 
and decision-making by judges, in particular when they apply certain procedural rules that are left to 
their discretion. As one respondent affirmed, human rights should inform the inquiry by judges and the 
standards used to decide that inquiry.1528  
First of all, the Constitution used to limit the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction to constitutional 
matters, so that parties had to argue that a constitutional issue was at stake if they wanted to be able to 
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appeal a decision from the High Court or from the Supreme Court of Appeal to the Constitutional 
Court. In 2012, however, the 17th Amendment of the Constitution has broadened the Court’s 
jurisdiction, so that in accordance with Section 167(3)(b) of the Constitution the Court may now 
decide constitutional matters as well as “any other matter, if the Constitutional Court grants leave to 
appeal on the grounds that the matter raises an arguable point of law of general public importance 
which ought to be considered by that Court.”1529 Most respondents regard the appealability of matters 
to the Constitutional Court as positive, although the downside is that it takes more time for a case to 
reach finality.1530 Secondly, the Uniform Rules of Court1531 prescribe that parties who raise a 
constitutional issue must give notice to the registrar, who will then place it on a notice board in order 
to allow interested parties to intervene in the proceedings as amici curiae. When they are admitted as 
amici, such parties can submit affidavits as well as heads of argument. The fact that third parties must 
be given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings, may again be considered as a negative 
impact as well, because it can delay and complicate the proceedings.1532 
Aside from the fact that some procedural rules apply to constitutional litigation in particular, human 
rights may influence the way in which judges exercise the discretion that is left to them in the 
management of their proceedings. In conformity with their protective duties, judges frequently 
exercise the discretion that they have in relation to the application of certain procedural rules in favour 
of public interest litigants, including parties who litigate so as to protect the rights in the Bill of Rights 
(supra Section 2.1.2). The exercise of judicial discretion in favour of public interest litigants is 
particularly common for decisions relating to costs orders, the suspensive effect of appeals, 
condonation and urgency, each of which is discussed in turn.  
ii.a) Costs orders 
In Biowatch v. Registrar Genetic Resources,1533 the Constitutional Court established an important 
exception to the rule that costs follow the event. Namely, a losing party who acts in the public interest 
in pursuing a constitutional matter against government should not be mulcted with costs so as to 
prevent that the risk of adverse costs orders has a chilling effect on public interest litigants.1534 That 
holding and the reasoning behind it has trickled down to the lower South African courts, who, in 
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principle,1535 refuse to order costs against public interest litigants who lose a case against 
government.1536 A good example is discussed below in the context of the (failed) application for 
condonation in the Carolina case (infra Box 21). The question whether a similar rule applies to public 
interest litigation raising a constitutional question against a private party has yet to be decided.1537  
On the other hand, courts are not keen on awarding punitive costs, which is also a matter within their 
discretion, even when public interest litigants request such an order. They only do so under 
exceptional circumstances. At some point in the Carolina litigation the applicants, for instance, 
requested punitive costs because the municipalities never complied with the order and, according to 
them, acted not in good faith. This request was rejected by the judge, who held that “a punitive costs 
order (…) should only be meted against the Government when it is clear that the litigation is 
vexatious”, and cautioned for the possible chilling effect on actors within government to approach the 
courts to seek clarity.1538  
ii.b) Suspensive effect of appeals 
Another area where judges can use their discretion in favour of public interest litigants, relates to the 
suspensive effect of appeals. Rule 49(11) of the Uniform Rules of Court1539 prescribes that the 
operation and execution of the order that is being appealed is suspended pending the decision on 
appeal, unless, on application of a party, the court that gave the order decides otherwise.  
Box 20. The Carolina matter: appeal without suspensive effect 
The applicants in the Carolina matter, for instance, successfully applied to the judge who had 
granted an order directing the district municipality inter alia to supply potable water to the 
community, to have the suspensive effect of the appeal against that order lifted. The judge found 
that the possible harm that the municipalities would suffer if the order was immediately 
executed could not be greater than the harm that the community would suffer if it was 
suspended, at least in the form of the health risk that they would face due to the lack of potable 
water.1540  
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The appeal by the municipalities against that interim execution order, was rejected by the judge, 
who clarified that when there is a prima facie case that the request by applicants to lift the 
suspensive effect of an appeal should be granted, it is for the responding parties to adduce 
evidence for its rebuttal.1541 According to the judge, in casu the applicants had proven a prima 
facie case by adducing evidence that showed that water was still not supplied on a regular basis 
to the affected communities, in breach of a fundamental right of the residents.1542  
ii.c) Condonation 
Condonation means that a court forgives a party for failing to observe certain procedural requirements, 
for instance when the court accepts an application even though it is lodged out of time. Factors borne 
in mind by judges when they decide to grant a request for condonation are the identity of the requester 
and the subject-matter of the case, definitely when constitutional rights are at stake.1543  
A good illustration amongst the directly relevant cases is the judgment of the High Court in two joined 
matters, in which an environmental advocacy organisation (Escarpment Environment Protection 
Group) and a community (respectively Wonderfontein and Langkloof) applied for judicial review of 
the water use licenses granted by the Department for Water Affairs to two mines, operated 
respectively by Xstrata Alloys and WER Mining.1544 The appellants requested condonation for their 
failure to lodge the record of appeal timeously and their failure to lodge a power of attorney 
authorising the appellants’ attorneys to act on appeal. In considering that request, the High Court noted 
that the appellants were non-governmental organisations, with limited resources and represented by a 
public interest law firm (the Legal Resources Centre), and, additionally, that the communities are 
groups who were previously disadvantaged by inadequate access to educational and economic 
resources. According to the judge, this was relevant “not because there is one law for the appellants 
and their attorney and another for other, perhaps more affluent, litigants and their legal representatives 
but because in evaluating the case for condonation, (…) the relatively disadvantaged position in which 
the former have to conduct the litigation” should be taken into account.1545 Other factors that were 
considered in casu by the judge, were the nature of the case and its importance within the context of 
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the interests of justice, as it essentially concerned access to justice, namely the appellants’ right to 
challenge the award of water use licenses to mines.1546  
Although public interest litigants find themselves in a favourable position to have their request for 
condonation accepted, such requests are not automatically accepted as requesters should still be able to 
establish good cause (id est a satisfactory and acceptable explanation) for their failure to comply with 
the rules of the court. That no party has a right to condonation is demonstrated, for instance, by the 
High Court’s refusal to grant condonation to the public interest litigants in the appeal proceedings in 
the Carolina matter.  
Box 21. The Carolina matter: no condonation for cross-appeal 
After having been directed to provide temporary potable water, the local and district 
municipalities sought leave to appeal the High Court’s order, which was granted. Also the 
applicants filed a notice to cross-appeal, because they were not satisfied with the fact that the 
national and provincial governments stayed clear, but they omitted to seek leave to appeal. The 
appeal was postponed sine die, as the leave to cross-appeal and the application for condonation 
first had to be decided by the court that had granted the original order. Given the particular 
circumstances of the case, like the fact that the question of condonation was only raised one and 
a half year after the original court order and that instead of seeking to remedy the situation at 
that time the lawyers simply awaited the appeal hearing, the judge was rather severe on the 
applicants’ legal representatives.  
“The fact that the applicants themselves are not to blame for the failure to comply with the rules, nor 
to apply for condonation much earlier, but their legal representatives were, although it is an 
important fact to be considered, does not necessarily entitle them as of right to be granted 
condonation.”1547 
The judge was mindful of the importance of the issue at stake (“the fundamental right of the 
community of Caroline [sic] to a basic priceless commodity, water”1548), but also took account 
of the cross-appeal’s prospect of success. Convinced that there is no legal basis to hold national 
and provincial government accountable for the water supply in Carolina, the judge concluded 
that “to have the national government dragged to participate in the appeal (…) would be an 
exercise in futility and not in the interest of justice”1549 and rejected the request for condonation.  
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As to costs, however, the judge was again considerate of the public interest at stake and of the 
fact that the applicants themselves were not to blame for the failed application. In such scenario, 
courts generally order the legal representatives to bear the costs, instead of their client, but in 
casu the judge refused to do so, because he was wary of the possible chilling effect on public 
interest attorneys. Therefore, no costs order was made, meaning that each party had to bear its 
own costs.1550 
ii.d) Urgency 
Urgency, finally, is another issue that falls within the courts’ discretion. When a matter is urgent, 
parties do not have the time to comply with the rules of the court that determine the manner in which, 
and the time periods within which, applications should normally be filed by the parties and be handled 
by the courts. Hence, a party submitting an urgent application requests the court to condone non-
compliance with those rules that could not be observed due to the urgency.1551 To decide whether a 
matter is indeed urgent, courts have regard to the seriousness and breadth of the prejudice and harm to 
the applicant and to the availability of an alternative remedy.1552 In the Carolina matter, the judge 
explicitly decided to accept that the matter was urgent because a constitutional right was at stake.  
Box 22. Urgency in the Carolina matter 
The applicants in the Carolina matter submitted that their application was ‘inherently urgent’ 
because the inability to access potable water constitutes a gross infringement of the 
community’s constitutional right to have access to sufficient water and involves a basic human 
need which threatens health, well-being and even life and can thus not await ordinary court 
proceedings.1553 Their argument was accepted by the judge, holding that “when fundamentally 
entrenched rights are violated or compromised or restoration to normality the enjoinment of 
those rights [sic], the matter “intrinsically” becomes urgent.”1554 Moreover, in his judgment 
providing reasons as to why he had rejected leave to appeal the interim execution order, the 
judge reiterated that when the fundamental right to be provided with water is at stake, “the 
process of finalizing the dispute should be expedited.”1555 
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(iii) Human rights and substantive law 
There are four main ways in which human rights may influence the merits of a case: by providing 
litigating parties with a direct cause of action or by influencing the development of the common law 
(iii.a), by determining how common law or statutory law should be interpreted and applied (iii.b), or 
by creating a special remedy, notably a right to constitutional damages (iii.c). This should again also 
be linked to the protective duties of judges, who are duty-bound to consider the human rights that are 
at stake when they rule on disputes.  
iii.a) Human rights providing a direct cause of action or a reason to develop the common 
law 
If there is legislation which deals with the right that you are talking about, you must rely on the 
legislation. And unfortunately or fortunately the environmental space is massively legislated. So it is 
quite difficult to find a path through the legislation where you could say there is no legislation which 
gives effect to the right in this particular way and therefore we want to bring the case directly based 
on Section 24.1556  
As this quote indicates, respondents are well aware that the subsidiarity principle (supra Section 
1.2.1.2) entails that they can only rarely derive a cause of action directly from the Constitution, namely 
when a given constitutional right and the concrete duties imposed by that right are not implemented in 
(statutory or common) law – which is unlikely given the abundance of legislation (supra Section 
2.2.2) – or when they challenge the constitutionality of such implementing law.1557 Remarkably, both 
in the Carolina matter and in the silicosis class action the Constitution was or is used as a direct cause 
of action, however.  
Box 23. The constitutional cause of action in the Carolina matter 
The urgent application in the Carolina matter had two aspects to it. First, it sought to obtain the 
urgent provision of temporary potable water to the affected communities. Second, it also 
demanded the development of a reasonable plan to ensure the supply of water on the longer run. 
That second part of the urgent application was directly based on Section 27(2) of the 
Constitution, whilst the first part was based on the applicable law and regulations as supported 
by the Constitution (infra Box 28).  
According to the applicants, government is obliged under Section 27(2) to develop a reasonable 
plan ensuring that water would be available on the long term.1558 They referred to the 
Constitutional Court’s judgment in Grootboom v. Government of South Africa to argue that the 
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different spheres of government should cooperate in the development and implementation of 
such a plan on the supply of water through the water supply services in Carolina, that this plan 
should respond to the needs of those who are most desperate and that they should at all time 
prevent retrogression in the supply of water.1559 Although the judge granted the relief linked to 
this argument – directing the responding parties to engage actively and meaningfully with the 
applicants regarding the steps being taken to ensure the supply of potable water through the 
water supply services and to report to the court as to the measures taken for that purpose – he 
did not seem to base that order on Section 27(2) of the Constitution, but rather on the Local 
Government Act.1560 This may have to do with the fact that he refused to grant relief against the 
Department, and limited the order to the responsible local government actors.1561  
 
Box 24. The possible constitutional cause of action in the silicosis class action 
The mineworkers’ legal representatives base the class action on three causes of action, one of 
which is directly derived from the Constitution. In particular, they argue that the mining 
companies failed to ensure that the conditions of work of the members of the class did not 
infringe upon their constitutional rights but that they rather unduly exposed them to disease and 
death and that these “constitutional violations give rise to an independent cause of action for 
damages.”1562 As was said before (supra Box 16), however, the availability of a constitutional 
cause of action does not have to be decided at the time of the certification so that the decision of 
the trial court on this issue has to be awaited.  
Not only the use of the Constitution as a direct cause of action is exceptional, but also the request by 
parties that a court would develop the common law to ensure that it is compliant with the Constitution, 
which they are mandated to do by Section 8(3) of the Constitution. Given that this rarely happens, it is 
rather remarkable that already during the certification proceedings in the silicosis class action the 
mineworkers’ lawyers requested one development from the court certifying the class and already 
suggested that they might request another development from the trial court in the next stage of the 
proceedings.  
Box 25. Certifying the class action and developing the common law 
In their heads of argument submitted to the High Court for the certification proceedings, the 
mineworkers’ legal representatives requested the High Court to develop the common law on the 
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transmissibility of damages.1563 After all, under the common law as it stood when the class 
action was launched, claims for general damages were not transmissible to the estate of a 
claimant who died before the stage of litis contestation was reached – id est the closure of the 
pleadings.1564 This would be particularly problematic in the class action, as many mineworkers 
will probably die before that stage is reached given that the class action is likely to drag on for 
years, with certification already taking a lot of time, and may be further delayed by the mining 
companies, who, ironically, most probably contributed to the mineworkers’ death.1565 
Hence, the mineworkers’ lawyers submitted that the common law had to be developed to allow 
for transmissibility, in order to give effect to the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, 
and in particular to the rights to equality, dignity, life, freedom and security of the person, the 
best interests of the child, and access to courts.1566 They argued that especially women and 
children would suffer from the non-transmissibility of general damages, as most mineworkers 
are men who, before they got sick, were the breadwinners of their families.1567 The law, as it 
stood, “served to entrench cycles of gender inequality and poverty and keep women uneducated, 
unemployed, poor.”1568 
The High Court judges agreed with these arguments, and considered themselves “duty-bound” 
to undertake such development, a duty that they could not abdicate.1569 The rule that general 
damages are not transmissible to the estate unless the claimant only died after the pleadings 
were closed, would result in indirect discrimination on the basis of gender, as it would mainly 
disadvantage women, notably the mineworkers’ widows.1570 The High Court thus developed the 
common law so that claims for general damages of a deceased claimant are transmissible to the 
estate provided that the action was instituted before the claimant’s death.1571 Two of the three 
judges did not want to restrict this development to class actions, while one judge dissented on 
this point.1572 As was said, however, the judgment of the High Court has been appealed.  
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Box 26. The silicosis class action and the causation requirement 
The problem of establishing factual causation in cases related to the health effects of 
environmental degradation and the reliance by the mineworkers’ lawyers on the test that was 
developed by the Constitutional Court in Lee were already discussed before (supra Section 2.5.4 
and Box 6). Nevertheless, in their heads of argument the mineworkers’ lawyers indicate that 
they may also request the trial court to develop the common law on the onus of proof for 
negligence and causation. They would like the court to find that once a mineworker has shown 
that he has silicosis and/or tuberculosis and is or was employed on (one of) the mines of the 
cited mining companies, the onus rests on the latter actor(s) to prove that they were not 
negligent and/or that they did not cause the disease.1573 Their argument thus reads that the 
common law should be developed so that as soon as the applicants have established a prima 
facie case, the burden of proof is reversed. 
Whenever the Constitution is used either as a direct cause of action or as guide to develop the common 
law, judges have to apply the legal framework established by the Bill of Rights to rule on the issue, 
including for instance the requirement that any restrictions on constitutional rights satisfy the 
limitations clause in Section 36 of the Constitution. Moreover, if the litigation is amongst private 
parties, courts will conduct a balancing exercise, weighing up the rights of the mineworkers or 
communities against any right of the mining companies that is possibly at stake. 
There is at least one interesting example where the invocation of constitutional rights did not have the 
desired impact on the development of the law by the courts. As was said before (supra Section 
1.4.1.1), class actions are provided by Section 38(c) of the Constitution, but no legislation has ever 
been enacted to regulate their institution. Accordingly, the development of the law on class actions is 
left to the courts. In Mukaddam v. Pioneer Foods, the Constitutional Court had expressly left open the 
question whether the prior certification of a class action is required when it is based on a constitutional 
cause of action but directed against a private actor, as opposed to government. This question was 
tested during the certification proceedings in the silicosis class action.  
Box 27. The silicosis class action: is certification necessary for constitutional litigation 
against private parties? 
Even though the mineworkers’ legal representatives apply for certification, they prayed for a 
finding that certification is not required where a class action is brought against a private party 
based on a constitutional cause of action, an argument that is supported by the intervening 
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parties.1574 The certifying court did not agree. Allowing class actions to proceed without 
certification could result in an abuse of the court process and would cause numerous costly and 
time-consuming interlocutory challenges around precisely those issues that are normally 
decided by the court certifying the class.1575 Furthermore, the judges noted that courts should be 
able to protect their own process even in cases revolving around constitutional rights.1576 
iii.b) Human rights to interpret and apply statutory and common law 
It is standard practice for litigating parties to cite the constitutional rights that are implemented by the 
rules of statutory or common law on which they directly rely – and, in the unlikely event that litigating 
parties omit such reference, the court will normally invoke the relevant constitutional rights at its own 
initiative.1577 The court should then be guided by the constitutional rights at stake when interpreting 
and applying those implementing rules. Accordingly, the Constitution infuses statutory and common 
law and bolsters an ‘ordinary’ case by emphasizing its importance, by sketching the broader context of 
a particular rule and by explaining why that rule is so valuable.1578 Conduct that falls short of the 
requirements set by law can, moreover, not only be declared unlawful, but also unconstitutional, 
precisely because those laws seek to give effect to the Constitution. Each of the three focus matters 
illustrates this.  
Box 28. The right to basic water supply in the Carolina matter 
One of the objectives of the urgent application in the Carolina water case was to secure the 
provision of temporary potable water within the shortest time possible – the other objective was 
the drafting of a plan by government (supra Box 23). The demand was based on the Water 
Services Act, which implements the right of everyone to have access to sufficient water (Section 
27(1)(b) of the Constitution).1579 The minimum standard for such basic water supply is, in turn, 
prescribed by the Regulations relating to Compulsory National Standards and Measures to 
Conserve Water.1580 The applicants’ lawyers reckoned that the Constitutional Court found in 
Mazibuko v. Johannesburg that government cannot be obliged to provide a particular amount of 
free water to its citizens, but they emphasised that the Court also ruled that government is duty-
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bound to take reasonable measures to progressively realise that right.1581 According to them, the 
Water Service Act and its Regulations are such measures and the responding parties are bound 
to comply with the minimum standard set by national government.1582  
This argument was accepted by the High Court,1583 which meant a huge victory and has 
triggered follow-up litigation by other communities that are deprived of water (infra Box 32). 
 
Box 29. Integrating environmental protection and socio-economic needs in the Tudor 
Shaft matter 
At the time of the urgent application, there was no explicit reliance on any constitutional 
right,1584 because the matter was extremely urgent, with the application being launched and the 
court order being adopted within 24 hours of the commencement of the removal operations.1585 
However, in later court papers the Constitution was cited. In their founding affidavit, for 
instance, the co-applicants referred to Section 24 of the Constitution and argued that this 
provision at the very least requires that the responding parties would consult with the residents 
on any steps that they would take in addressing the problems at Tudor Shaft, following which 
they cited the relevant provisions of the National Environmental Management Act and the 
Mineral Resources and Petroleum Development Act.1586  
In an additional affidavit, the residents of the informal settlement and their legal representatives 
outlined the full suite of constitutional provisions that were, according to them, triggered by the 
application.1587 In particular, they argued that in this matter Section 24 of the Constitution had to 
be read in conjunction with Sections 10 (dignity), 11 (life), 26 (housing), and 27 (health care, 
food and water, and social security) of the Constitution. Also Section 28 of the Constitution 
stipulating children’s rights was considered relevant given the high number of children living in 
the settlement and the particular health risks to which they are exposed. Following this 
enumeration of the relevant provisions of the Constitution, they again delved into the applicable 
laws, this time also referring to the National Nuclear Regulator Act. 
                                                     
1581
 Applicants’ Submissions, in re: Nkala v. Harmony Gold (48226/12) (9 June 2015), paras 20-22. 
1582
 Ibid. para. 28. 
1583
 See, respectively, FSE and Silobela v. Minister of Water Affairs (10 July 2012), supra note 1002, paras 10-
15 and FSE and Silobela v. Minister of Water Affairs (26 July 2012), supra note 1157, paras 13-14.  
1584
 Except for locus standi, which was based on Section 38(a), (b) and (d) of the Constitution. These provisions 
are cited supra in Section 1.4.1.1.  
1585
 See also Humby (2013), supra note 175, 103. 
1586
 Second and further Applicants’ Founding Affidavit of Intervention Application, in re: Federation for a 
Sustainable Environment v. National Nuclear Regulator (24611/12) (27 July 2012), paras 20-31.  
1587
 Second and further Applicants’ Supplementary Affidavit, in re: Federation for a Sustainable Environment v. 
National Nuclear Regulator (24611/12) (31 October 2013), paras 52-57. 
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This argumentation arguably demonstrates an awareness on their part that the Tudor Shaft 
matter is in fact an expression of environmental injustice and that the problem should be 
resolved through an integrated approach, taking account of the environmental and socio-
economic rights that are at stake.1588  
 
Box 30. The constitutional provisions at stake in the silicosis class action 
The test case of Mankayi v. AngloGold Ashanti is one of those rare cases in which the lawyers 
themselves omitted to refer to the constitutional rights at stake in their submissions to the Court. 
Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court on its own motion held that “the right to security of the 
person is engaged whenever a person is subjected to some form of injury deriving from either a 
public or a private source.”1589 The finding that the common law right to claim damages for the 
negligent infliction of bodily harm constitutes an effective remedy in order to protect and give 
effect to Section 12(1)(c) of the Constitution then influenced the Court’s interpretation of the 
concerned Acts (COIDA and ODIMWA), and in particular its consideration whether these Acts 
extinguished the right of a mineworker to sue his employer for common law damages (supra 
Box 3).  
Whilst this holding by the Constitutional Court in fact took Mr. Mankayi’s lawyers by surprise 
– “It attracted our surprise [to] go as far as to say that we are actually dealing with a violation of 
the security of the person.”1590 – in the class action they no longer omit to refer to the 
Constitution and invoke no less than six constitutional rights, which they believe to be 
implicated by the conduct of the mining companies (supra Section 2.3.3.5). According to the 
applicants’ lawyers, aside from establishing a direct cause of action (supra Box 24), “the 
Constitution also serves as a basis for interpreting the common law and statute law to give effect 
to the constitutional protections and rights” of the mineworkers.1591  
Mineworkers with silicosis were employed in the mining industry for decades, however. The 
silicosis class action, for instance, comprises all mineworkers who have worked in the mines 
after 12 March 1965. This raises the question whether the Constitution is überhaupt relevant in 
relation to events that preceded its entry into force. That question was decided, however, in 
favour of the mineworkers in an interlocutory judgment adopted in another silicosis lawsuit, 
Qubeka v. AngloGold Ashanti, which later got settled. The High Court judges held that the 
                                                     
1588
 See also the statement by the applicants in their founding affidavit that “mine residue that is radioactive and 
toxic (…) is causing serious risk to human health, especially that of children.” First Applicant’s Founding 
Affidavit, in re: Federation for a Sustainable Environment v. National Nuclear Regulator (24611/12) (29 June 
2012), para. 10. 
1589
 Mankayi v. AngloGold Ashanti, supra note 623, paras 13 and 15. 
1590
 AS. 
1591
 Applicants’ Founding Affidavit, in re: Nkala v. Harmony Gold (48226/12) (21 December 2012), para. 141. 
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values protected by the constitutional rights at stake “are not introduced by the Constitution into 
South African jurisprudence for the first time in 1997. The Constitution merely entrenched these 
common law values against future legislation that might permit their erosion.”1592 
iii.c) Human rights influencing the available types of relief  
Finally, the fact that constitutional rights are at stake may also affect the relief that a court eventually 
grants.1593 In particular, plaintiffs may claim constitutional damages, although they have only rarely 
been awarded (supra Section 1.2.1.2).1594 The only known directly relevant case, in which lawyers 
may seek to obtain constitutional damages is the silicosis class action.  
Box 31. The silicosis class action: what about constitutional damages?  
In their heads of argument, the mineworkers’ legal representatives argued that the question 
whether the applicants have an action for constitutional damages is one of the common 
questions of law that justifies dealing with the mineworkers’ claims by way of a class action.1595 
In particular, before the trial court they want to plead on the legal issue concerning the 
availability of compensatory damages under Sections 12(1)(c) and/or 24 of the Constitution.1596 
It rather seems that the lawyers involved in the class action would like to contribute to building 
jurisprudence on this issue, as they are aware that courts are reticent to award constitutional 
damages and in principle only do so where there is no remedy available at common or statutory 
law,1597 whilst a right to damages for the mineworkers is clearly available, as was also 
confirmed by the Constitutional Court in Mankayi v. AngloGold Ashanti.  
Lastly, it should be observed that human rights could in principle influence the sentence that is 
imposed on a party found guilty of an offence. Although there is no example available amongst the 
directly relevant cases, in another criminal case dealing with an environmental crime (namely illegal 
trade in rhino horns), the sentencing judge explained that a too lenient attitude would not be 
appropriate and that a non-custodial sentence would send out the wrong message.1598 
                                                     
1592
 Qubeka v. AngloGold Ashanti Limited (37336/12) [2014] ZAGPJHC 70 (4 April 2014), para. 26. 
1593
 Even the test to decide to vary or rescind an order, for instance, can be influenced by the constitutional rights 
at stake. Vhembe Forum v. MEC Economic Development (Limpopo), supra note 657, para. 22. 
1594
 Such damages are available when a cause of action is derived directly from the Constitution or when, 
notwithstanding an ‘ordinary’ cause of action being available, courts find that existing remedies are insufficient 
to vindicate the constitutional rights at stake.  
1595
 Applicants’ Founding Affidavit, in re: Nkala v. Harmony Gold (48226/12) (21 December 2012), para. 182.5. 
1596
 Nkala v. Harmony Gold (certification judgment), supra note 372, para. 72.7. 
1597
 Fose v. Minister of Safety and Security, supra note 107, para. 67.  
1598
 Lemthongthai v. S (849/2013) [2014] ZASCA 131 (25 September 2014), para. 20 (holding also that 
“[c]onstitutional values dictate a more caring attitude towards fellow humans, animals and the environment in 
general” and that “allowing the kind of behaviour that resulted in the convictions (…) case to be dealt with too 
leniently will have the opposite effect to what was intended”). 
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2.7. Assessing ‘success’ 
The concept of success was discussed at length before (supra Part II, Section 2.2.5), and this analysis 
demonstrated that success has multiple dimensions. To evaluate the different possible impacts of 
litigation, it was suggested to use three combined classification systems. First, impacts can be direct or 
indirect, which depends on whether or not a particular effect expressly featured in the lawsuit (by 
being included in the parties’ claims or argumentation, the court’s reasoning and/or the eventual court 
order). Second, a distinction is made between material and symbolic impacts based on whether the 
effect is tangible or not. Third and finally, success is assessed at three levels, that is in court (victory or 
defeat in terms of the judgment and the order), at the level of the actual situation of the parties directly 
involved (concrete impact) and at the level of the broader society (social impact). Aside from the 
multidimensional nature of success, also the difficulty of attributing impacts to the litigation and the 
fact that it may take a long time before the impacts become apparent should be taken into account.  
Public interest lawyers and activists in South Africa are well aware of the diverse dimensions to 
success,1599 as well as of the difficulty to measure impacts1600 and to attribute them to the litigation.1601 
Hence, their approach to the question of success is definitely imbued with common sense and realism. 
Whether they regard a lawsuit as successful largely depends on the goals or indicators that they have 
set, and they admit that the more ambitious those objectives are, the harder it is to be successful.1602 
Moreover, often they have to adapt their objectives in the course of the proceedings due to changing 
circumstances1603 – “you have to sacrifice a bit on what is the best way of going about it”.1604 What 
success will look like in the end is thus unpredictable at the time that the litigation is launched.1605 The 
unpredictability of the entire enterprise and the need to be flexible are important considerations that 
are borne in mind, because if parties are not satisfied with a certain outcome, they must carefully 
weigh their options given that the decision on appeal may even be worse.1606 Lastly, how successful 
litigation ultimately is also depends upon the time and resources that they are willing and able to 
invest not only in monitoring the impacts but also in ensuring that those impacts get the chance to 
materialise. In other words, the respondents acknowledge that litigation does not end with the court 
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 R3, R4, R7, R9, R23. 
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 R4, R7, R10, R14, R34. 
1601
 R7, R14, R34. 
1602
 R34. 
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 R28. 
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 R23. 
1605
 R23, R28. 
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 R16. See also R. Wynberg and D. Fig, A Landmark Victory for Justice: Biowatch’s Battle With the South 
African State and Monsanto (Durban: Biowatch, 2013), 71. 
293 
 
order but requires significant post-order engagement through monitoring and enforcement, which 
comes at a further cost.1607  
Table 9 gives an overview of the different impacts that were mentioned by respondents to illustrate 
success or, if they are not achieved, (partial) failure. It is noteworthy that one specific expression of 
success featured prominently amongst the respondents’ reactions when they were asked about their 
understanding of success, which is ‘power’ – regardless of whether such power is created directly or 
indirectly by the litigation and whether it benefits only the parties involved or the broader society. 
Crucial for civil society actors is thus the question whether the litigation has changed “the repository 
of power”.1608 This should be aligned with Langford et al and Andreassen and Crawford’s analysis of 
the different types of power that can be created (supra Part II, Section 2.2.5). Therefore, where the 
examples below relate to power, the type of power created is indicated based on the classification 
system of Langford et al (leverage, perception and organisational power).  
 Table 9. Possible impacts of litigation according to respondents 
Direct impacts Indirect impacts 
Court 
Victory 
Material 
 Judgment clarifies the law or gives a 
certain interpretation of the law 
 Relief sought is ordered 
 (No adverse) costs are ordered 
 
Material 
 Precedent is applied in other court cases  
 The case sparks other litigation  
 Information obtained through the 
proceedings (discovery) is used in other 
litigation 
Symbolic 
 Judgment shows understanding of the 
plight of the applicants/plaintiffs** 
and/or the context of the case 
 Judgment uses powerful language 
 Judgment morally condemns the 
counterparty**  
Symbolic 
 The judgment is a first 
 The case is reported in the media** 
Concrete 
success 
Material 
 Adequate court order addressing the 
situation of the litigants 
 Implementation of the court order: 
there is compliance or the order is 
enforced 
Material 
 Relief obtained can be and is used to bring 
the harmful situation or activity to an end 
or to ensure compliance with the law 
 Parties engage out-of-court 
 The conduct of the involved company 
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 R7, R14, R20, R27, R32. See also Centre for Environmental Rights, Community Casebook on Mining and 
Environment (2014), 2 (pointing out that “a legal victory is not always a complete victory” and that “[t]he law 
has its own limits because it depends on the willingness of government officials (…) and mining companies to 
abide by the law and the orders of the court”).  
1608
 R25. 
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 Possibility to enforce compliance 
through contempt of court  
changes 
 The litigation affects the share prices of 
the company 
 The relief sought is granted out-of-court 
Symbolic  
 Judgment affirms the rights of the 
litigants* 
Symbolic  
 Judgment shifted the power balance 
 Specific individuals amongst the litigants 
emerged as leaders*** 
 The litigation created a strong movement 
within the community*** 
 The community is empowered* 
Social 
success 
Material  
 Judgment changes law or policy 
Material 
 Compliance with the precedent at own 
initiative, id est without requiring new 
litigation 
 Government initiates law or policy reform 
process at own initiative, perhaps 
involving parties involved in the litigation 
 Companies agree on industry standards 
 Precedent is used for advocacy 
Symbolic  
 Judgment acknowledges the issue** 
 A precedent-setting case 
Symbolic  
 There is a change in discourse by 
companies** 
 Media reports on the issue** 
 Similarly placed individuals are 
empowered* 
 Precedent is referenced at conferences  
 Judgment confirms the receptiveness of 
courts to the concerned issues*/**  
 Outcome of the litigation sends a message 
to the mining industry*/**  
 There is a change in power dynamics*/** 
* leverage, ** perception, *** organisational power 
These different possible impacts of litigation, as depicted in abstracto in Table 9, can be illustrated,1609 
first of all, through two cases that were discussed earlier in this Chapter, the Batlhabine case1610 (supra 
Box 8) and the case of Bareki v. Gencor1611 (see also supra Section 2.6.3.2). In the Batlhabine case a 
director was convicted to a prison sentence, without having the possibility of opting for a fine instead, 
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 Only the most relevant impacts of these two cases are mentioned. For a thorough discussion of the impacts of 
two other example cases, see infra Boxes 31 and 32. 
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 S v. Blue Platinum Ventures, supra note 1353.  
1611
 Bareki v. Gencor, supra note 1456.  
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which was a first and is for that reason deemed a landmark case by several respondents.1612 They hope 
that this conviction has sent a strong message to the mining industry.1613 At the same time, several 
respondents admitted that eventually only one of the fourteen charges had been prosecuted, that the 
other six directors had remained out of range, that the company itself had been found guilty but not 
sentence, that the area is still not rehabilitated, while the convicted director is not in prison.1614 
Moreover, whether it really has or will have an impact on the conduct of mining companies in general 
is as yet uncertain.1615  
That the indirect impacts of litigation should never be underestimated is nicely illustrated by the case 
of Bareki v. Gencor on asbestos pollution. The applicants in this case (the chief of the community and 
an advocacy organisation) wanted to use Section 28 of NEMA, which mandates government to direct 
the person responsible for the pollution to take remedial measures, as their cause of action. In October 
2005, the High Court decided, however, that the Act was not applicable, because the pollution 
complained of predated its entry into force. Dissatisfied with this finding, legal scholars called for 
“[l]egislative reform establishing a more comprehensive regime that takes the special characteristics of 
historically polluted sites into account.”1616 In 2009, the Act was indeed amended and Section 28(1A) 
was inserted, stipulating inter alia that the provision also applies to a significant pollution or 
degradation that occurred before the commencement of the Act.1617 These impacts of the Batlhabine 
and Bareki cases are categorised in Table 10 below.1618 Thereafter, the impacts of the Carolina matter 
and silicosis class action are discussed in detail in Boxes 32 and 33. 
 Table 10. The impacts of the Batlhabine and Bareki cases 
Direct impacts Indirect impacts 
Court Victory Material 
 13 of the 14 charges were dropped  
 The director was convicted 
 The other six directors were not 
prosecuted 
 The company was found guilty but not 
sentenced 
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 R4, R7, R14, R26, R32, R34. 
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 R14, R32. 
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 R7, R14, R34. 
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 T. Field, “Liability to Remedy Asbestos Pollution: Analysis of Bareki NO and Another v Gencor Ltd and 
Others 2006 (1) SA 432 (T),” J. Envtl. L. 18(3) (2006), 494. 
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Concrete 
success 
Material 
 The area is still not rehabilitated 
 The director is not in prison 
 
Social success  Material  
 The NEMA was amended to allow its 
retrospective application 
Symbolic  
 The first criminal conviction of a 
director of a mining company without 
the option of a fine 
Symbolic  
 A message is sent to the mining 
industry that non-compliance with the 
law can lead to a prison sentence for 
the directors 
? It is uncertain whether the conviction 
will actually change the conduct of 
companies and their directors 
 
Box 32. Evaluating the success of the urgent application in the Carolina matter  
The applicants in the 2012 urgent application got all the relief that they had requested – except 
that the judge only ordered the supply of temporary potable water within 72 hours instead of 24. 
The willingness of the High Court to order local government, on an urgent basis, to provide a 
given amount of water immediately to a certain community was a first. Therefore, the case is 
considered a landmark case that has set a ground-breaking precedent. For that reason, the 
judgment has also been cited at various conferences and in many papers, has extensively been 
covered in the media and has encouraged other communities, who are similarly deprived of 
access to the minimum standard of basic water supply, to approach the court for an order (supra 
Section 2.3.2.5). One example is the Blyvooruitzicht community, whose situation was discussed 
before (supra Box 1). The community, which is also represented by Lawyers for Human Rights, 
applied for an order that would secure their access to basic water supply.1619 Their application 
was based on an argumentation very similar to the one that was used in the Carolina matter, 
although no express reference is included.  
Nevertheless, as also the respondents who were involved in the Carolina matter admit, the 2012 
urgent application case was not a complete success. Firstly, the applicants’ lawyers had really 
hoped that the High Court would also order relief against the Department of Water Affairs and 
not only against local government, but this was explicitly refused by the judge. According to 
him, an intervention by national or provincial government in the supply of water by local 
government would negate the separation of the different spheres of government under the 
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 Applicants’ Notice of Motion, in re: Molefe v. Merafong Local Municipality (85928/15) (22 October 2015). 
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Constitution.1620 This was an important defeat for the applicants, because the case was also 
meant to test the extent to which national government must capacitate local government so that 
it can comply with its responsibilities.  
Also in the application for potable water in the case of the Blyvooruitzicht community did the 
litigating parties seek to involve national and provincial government, in addition to local 
government. The matter was somewhat different, however, in that the water supply was not 
interrupted at that time but there was a risk that it would be in the future. The first order sought, 
interdicting such disconnection, was thus only directed against the municipality and the water 
service provider. The other orders sought, namely to draft a plan and to consult with the 
community, were targeted at all responding parties from government. The High Court judge 
granted the orders, albeit in a slightly adapted form. The judge ordered that “in developing the 
water service plan for the Blyvooruitzicht Mining Village, the first responding party [(the 
Merafong Local Municipality)] may in its discretion consult with any other entity (state or non-
state).”1621 Although, unfortunately, the judge did not add any comment to the order, the judge 
at least seems to allude to the responsibility that national and provincial government may bear in 
finding of a definite solution for the water crisis in the Blyvooruitzicht community, which 
arguably constitutes a step into the direction in which public interest lawyers would like to see 
the law evolving, namely towards a system in which national, provincial and local government 
cooperate to resolve crises affecting basic needs. 
Secondly, aside from the fact that no order was granted against provincial and national 
government, the court order in the Carolina matter was also never implemented. Although the 
litigation has sparked an out-of-court engagement process (in which the Department of Water 
Affairs is involved), the municipality never complied with the orders to provide temporary 
potable water in the interim, to meaningfully engage with the applicants and to report back to 
the Court on the measures taken to ensure that water would again be available through the water 
supply services. Instead, they appealed and they refused to abide by the Court’s decision, even 
though the appeal had no suspensive effect. At some point, a punitive costs order was sought by 
the litigating parties, but refused by the court (see also supra Section 2.6.4.3). 
“The implementation of the court order was a big challenge. (…) The people of Carolina have been 
sitting on the problem (…) having a good court order that says they must be given water. (…) The 
weakness that I see was a very good High Court judgment with little results for the community.”1622  
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In sum, the following successful () and unsuccessful () impacts of the urgent application in 
the Carolina matter were identified by respondents involved therein.  
- Direct, material, in court   Decided that lack of access to water is inherently urgent 
   Interdicted local government to immediately provide water 
   Ordered meaningful engagement 
   Granted a structural interdict 
   Did not order relief against national and provincial government 
- Direct, symbolic, in court   Recognised the importance of access to water 
- Indirect, material, in court   Has sparked other litigation 
- Direct, material, concrete   Local government did not provide potable water  
    Local government did not meaningfully engage with the 
   applicants for the first few months, until a new official was  
   appointed 
   Compliance could not be enforced through contempt of court  
   proceedings because the order was vague and there was a  
   material defect (the order targeted the wrong authority) 
- Indirect, material, concrete  The applicants succeeded in involving national government in an 
   engagement process out-of-court 
   National government eventually set up a unit to test the water, to 
   do surveys, to do door-to-door visits, and to communicate the  
   results of the water quality to the community 
   Mining companies took measures to prevent acid mine drainage 
- Indirect, symbolic, concrete  Local government adopted a hostile attitude towards the  
   community, and refused to cooperate  
    National government spoke of a “war against the state” 
- Direct, material, social  Set a good precedent 
- Indirect, symbolic, social  The judgment is cited often at conferences 
 
Box 33. Evaluating the success of the certification of the silicosis class action  
On 13 May 2016 the High Court certified the class action launched by mineworkers with 
silicosis or tuberculosis.1623 The certification, if it is also confirmed on appeal,1624 is only the end 
of a preliminary stage, where it is decided that a case may proceed as a class action and where 
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the class is defined. Certification is obviously very important given that every individual who 
satisfies the class definition will be bound by the outcome of the first stage of the litigation 
regarding the liability of the mining companies for the disease contracted by the mineworkers, 
unless they explicitly opt out of the class, and may in a next stage be awarded damages provided 
that they opt into those proceedings.  
The certification judgment in first instance was a success for the applicants, because the two 
classes – one for silicosis and one for tuberculosis – was certified by the High Court in exactly 
the same terms as the mineworkers’ legal representatives had proposed. Furthermore, the High 
Court also acceded to their request to develop the common law regarding the transmissibility of 
general damages to the estate of a deceased member of the class (supra Box 25) and used bold 
language throughout its judgment, reproving the mining industry (supra Section 2.6.4.3).  
The judgment and the certification proceedings are successful for several other reasons as well. 
Two significant developments since the launch of the class action are the institution of a law 
reform process and the establishment of an industry-working group (supra Section 2.3.3.4), 
which have “to a certain extent been sparked by litigation, although no one really admits that; I 
do not think anything of this would be happening if it was not for the litigation.”1625 
Accordingly, the mineworkers’ legal representatives are hopeful that although the litigation 
concerns a claim for damages, it may have a broader, social impact by leading to a change of the 
working conditions at the mines and to a reform of the statutory compensation scheme.  
The following successful impacts were identified by respondents involved in the certification 
proceedings.  
- Direct, material, in court   Classes were certified as proposed 
    The common law on the transmissibility of general damages was  
   developed 
- Direct, symbolic, in court   The applicants “won on everything they could have won on” 
   It is a powerful judgment, using strong language vis-à-vis the 
   mining industry 
   The language of the judgment shows that the judges understood 
   the context in which the case occurred 
- Indirect, material, in court   The judgment provides additional guidance on the mechanism of 
   class actions to be used by future claimants 
- Indirect, material, concrete  An industry-working group has been set up to eliminate silicosis 
   A law reform process has been instigated by government 
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- Indirect, symbolic, concrete  The mining companies take the legal representatives of the 
   mineworkers seriously 
- Direct, material, social  General damages are transmissible to the estate if a plaintiff dies  
   after having commenced suing for damages 
- Indirect, material, social  The mining companies have already started to change their 
   working practices to reduce risk 
- Indirect, symbolic, social  The litigation has sent a strong message to the mining industry 
   The rhetoric of the mining industry has changed  
   The litigation has put a dent on the mining industry, and has 
   changed the power balance 
   Advocacy organisations see the litigation as an opportunity to 
   educate mineworkers, their families and communities on the risks 
   of working in the mines and on their rights 
2.8. Strategic litigation for corporate accountability in South Africa: some findings 
South Africa is a remarkably rich field for a study on enforcing accountability for human rights 
violations by business enterprises through judicial remedies. Although, admittedly, the litigating 
parties may themselves not always realise the significance of their domestic practice for the business 
and human rights debate at international level (and for the practice in other countries), there is a lot of 
potential. The fourth and final part of the dissertation will discuss the precise links between the 
experiences in South Africa and the international legal framework, and reflect on how international 
initiatives could strengthen the legal responsibility of business enterprises for human rights at the 
domestic level and facilitate the enforcement of accountability for human rights violations by business 
enterprises. Before going into that discussion, however, some findings that run like a leitmotif through 
the case study on environmental health hazards caused by mining should be highlighted first. 
The key actor in the entire story is civil society. They are the indispensable link between the poor and 
vulnerable groups that are affected by the operations of mining companies and the justice system. Both 
advocacy organisations and law firms are crucial, and they form strategic alliances in order to be able 
to perform that role.1626 Mineworkers and communities depend on them to know their rights and, 
definitely, to enforce them. Unfortunately, notwithstanding the relatively high number of civil society 
actors that assist communities and mineworkers in asserting their rights vis-à-vis government and the 
mining industry, in absolute numbers they remain few. This means that the litigated cases only 
represent the tip of the iceberg and that many more remain under the radar.  
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That is also why respondents rightly identify the empowerment of people as the principle task of civil 
society, so that the victims themselves would be able to vindicate their rights, preferably without 
having to approach the courts. Nevertheless, the road towards a fully empowered citizenry still seems 
a very long one. Even civil society actors themselves admit that they often lack the capacity and the 
courage to take up the fight with mining companies directly. Although they admit that ideally victims 
should be able to call companies to account for their behaviour, it is a long road from here. For the 
time being, they would rather have government watching the industry, supported by civil society. 
Looking at those concrete cases that are litigated, what soon becomes clear is that the decisions as to 
who should be cited, which type of proceedings resorted to, which forms of relief sought and which 
arguments used are largely determined by the cause of action on which litigating parties rely, which in 
turn depends on the precise situation of the clients (in particular the direct victims) and what they want 
to get out of the litigation. Therefore, for advocacy organisations and definitely for law firms, broader 
strategic goals as well as principles come to the fore especially when they have to decide whether they 
take on or support a case. Litigation may be inherently unpredictable, but at that time already they try 
to assess and predict, as well as possible, the expected course of the proceedings and to anticipate any 
possible negative developments. Hence, the cases that are selected and that reach the courts’ dockets 
are the ones that are considered ‘winnable’ and that align with the strategic agenda of the civil society 
actors involved.  
When a case is litigated, the Constitution is nearly always cited as the framework within which the 
litigation takes place, regardless whether the lawsuit is directed against mining companies directly or 
against government for (actual or potential) adverse impacts caused by mining. In fact, the Bill of 
Rights and its spirit, purport and objects are to such an extent intertwined with substantive and 
procedural law that it becomes hard to disentangle them – and, perhaps, rightly so. The judiciary, 
which has a duty to protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights, is a vital actor in 
creating, maintaining and strengthening that interconnection, which is in part explained by the fact that 
in a common law system like South Africa (which, in fact, has a hybrid common-law and civil-law 
tradition), the judiciary is not only competent to interpret and apply the law, but to develop it as well, 
under appropriate circumstances.  
Notwithstanding this habituation that the Constitution, including its Bill of Rights, infuses all law and, 
thus, all litigation as well, human rights feature most prominently when there is some kind of gap in, 
or uncertainty regarding, the protection of poor and vulnerable people (such as mineworkers and 
neighbouring communities), against the adverse impacts of business enterprises (such as mining 
companies). This is where human rights can really make a difference. The health of mineworkers or 
neighbouring communities is or risks to be prejudiced by mining activities? Lawyers and activists 
argue that these people’s rights to dignity, life, personal integrity and an environment not harmful to 
health and well-being result in an obligation on the part of mining companies to take certain 
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preventive measures. Mineworkers or neighbouring communities are affected by environmental 
degradation or pollution caused by mining, but the perpetrator cannot be identified or attributing the 
damage to a particular perpetrator is tricky, either in terms of the law or in terms of finding the 
evidence? Lawyers and activists demand that government takes reasonable measures to achieve the 
realisation of the rights at stake, or they demand that government ensures the supply of basic needs 
such as access to potable water. Victims do not know their rights or that they are violated, and/or do 
not dispose of the individual means to approach the courts? Lawyers and activists have successfully 
argued that victims’ right to have access to the courts entails that a class action by a few of them can 
be instituted on behalf of all (unknown) victims. 
The responses to these questions do not assume that human rights should affect business enterprises in 
one particular way (for instance through the direct horizontal application of the rights at stake) to the 
exclusion of all others. Rather, the precise impact that human rights have on business enterprises flows 
from the cause of action relied upon, which, as was said, largely determines the litigation strategy. The 
role of human rights is then an automatism, as it were. What makes this system work, is the close 
relationship between the protective duties of the state, including those of the judiciary, and the human 
rights duties of business enterprises, in whatever way they are enforced (directly, through statutory law 
or through common law). Human rights are the adhesive for a legal framework that adequately 
protects the most vulnerable groups in society.  
The South African legal system may not be perfect, it has proven its potential for the protection and 
promotion of human rights where they are threatened by business enterprises, such as mining 
companies. For instance, while scholars have complained about the fact that the common law has 
hitherto to achieve its transformative objective, there have already been some developments that are 
particularly important for victims of human rights violations by business enterprises in their quest for 
justice. Two examples are the development of the rule on factual causation and the admission of class 
actions in litigation against private parties. Also the way in which parent companies are called to 
account for the conduct of their subsidiaries, could, for instance, inform the debate on the type of 
duties that business enterprises should bear.  
Definitely, in an ideal situation mineworkers and neighbouring communities should not be forced to 
go to court in order to hold mining companies or government accountable and to be able to enjoy their 
rights. Courts being responsive to the plight of these people is a first, indispensable step, however, in 
the evolution towards a system in which those companies accept that they have certain human rights 
duties, as a matter of law. This process could be reinforced by appropriate international initiatives.  
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PART IV.  
TAKING STOCK AND MOVING FORWARD: STRENGTHENING 
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
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This final Part of the dissertation integrates the findings of the fundamental analysis in Part II and the 
case study in Part III. Its purpose is to highlight the links between the international legal framework on 
business and human rights and the experiences of local stakeholders who seek to vindicate human 
rights against business enterprises within domestic legal orders. The lessons learnt are recapped and 
some proposals for the future introduced.  
In particular, Chapter 1 commences with a synopsis of the legal setting of business and human rights, 
both at the international level and within the South African legal order, and with a brief outline of the 
geopolitical context within which the international legal framework should be developed further. 
Following this discussion of the law on the books, the Chapter proceeds with a review of the main 
lessons learnt from the case study (the law in action), while taking note of its limitations.  
Chapter 2 subsequently deals with new building blocks for the international legal framework on 
business and human rights. The recent developments at the level of the United Nations regarding 
access to remedies are explicated first. Thereafter, two approaches are presented, which could advance 
the international legal framework and thereby also strengthen the domestic approaches to ensuring that 
companies are accountable for human rights violations. As will be explained, each of these 
approaches, which constitute a particular ‘form’ that a new building block at the international level 
could adopt, can tackle several issues that relate to business and human rights (‘substance’). The 
Chapter ends with some proposals for further research.  
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1. BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK AND ITS DOMESTIC OPERATIONALISATION  
1.1. The law on the books 
Before discussing the specific lessons that were learnt from the case study and making proposals as to 
how the international legal framework on business and human rights should be developed further, it is 
useful to recapitulate. Therefore, this Section first summarises the current international legal 
framework (Section 1.1.1) and briefly reiterates the way in which the legal effect of human rights on 
business enterprises should be scrutinised within domestic legal orders, using the South African legal 
order as an example (Section 1.1.2). The Section ends with a sketch of the geopolitical setting within 
which proposals for the future have to be made and consensus thereon obtained (Section 1.1.3).  
1.1.1. The international legal framework: a recap 
With globalisation, technological progress, liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation steadily but 
significantly having fortified the status, power and leverage of business enterprises,1627 also the idea 
that these entities should be constrained by human rights has gained a foothold. The consensus is 
shared that this potent position of business enterprises does not only coincide with unique 
opportunities to protect and promote human rights, but also with an increased risk of human rights 
violations.1628 Although for decades already the idea that business enterprises have a responsibility for 
human rights has been arousing interest, both domestically and internationally, in scholarship, in 
practice and in politics, international (human rights) law holds on to the image of a Westphalian 
society with the state as the (primary) duty bearer.1629 
Until today any development going against that traditional paradigm has occurred outside (hard) 
international law, taking the form of soft law or private regulation. Advocates for direct, legally 
binding human rights duties for business enterprises under international law suffered their clearest 
defeat in 2003, when the former Commission on Human Rights decided not to endorse the UN Norms, 
                                                     
1627
 Popova, supra note 202, 120. Cf. A. Nolan, “Addressing Economic and Social Rights Violations by Non-
State Actors through the Role of the State: A Comparison of Regional Approaches to the Obligation to Protect,” 
Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 9 (2009), 228 (distinguishing two main causes, namely globalisation and privatisation). 
1628
 R.C. Bird, “Preface: human rights and business at indeterminate crossroads,” in eds R.C. Bird, D.R. Cahoy 
and J.D. Prenkert, Law, Business and Human Right ix (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014), ix; J. Nolan (2016b), 
supra note 86, 3. 
1629
 Augenstein and Kinley (2015), supra note 189, 829; Hessbruege, supra note 62, 21; Tully (2012b), supra 
note 30, 11. 
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which are, as a result, doomed to remain a draft for ever.1630 As at that time the way towards binding 
international norms was apparently not yet paved, John Ruggie was appointed Special Representative 
on Business and Human Rights to defuse the strife-torn situation.  
His mission was to achieve consensus on the contours of the international legal framework that 
presently governs the responsibility of business enterprises for human rights, within which all existing 
governance regimes could be located and which could then serve as a baseline for the development of 
new regulatory initiatives, possibly including (on the longer term) hard international law. So it 
happened, and respectively in 2008 and 2011 the Human Rights Council endorsed a three-pillar 
Framework and its implementing Guiding Principles, which proclaim that states have an obligation 
under international law to protect human rights against possible interferences by business enterprises, 
which, in turn, have a moral responsibility to respect human rights, while victims should be assured of 
access to remedies.  
Hence, under international law as it stands and is restated by the UNGPs, business enterprises do not 
bear any direct, legally binding human rights duties, let alone that such duties can be enforced before 
an international forum. That does not mean that business enterprises are not presumed to bear any 
human rights duties whatsoever, but that such duties can only become legally binding in accordance 
with national law and judicially enforceable before domestic courts. Indeed, in accordance with their 
obligation to protect, states should take all reasonably available measures to prevent that human rights 
are violated by business enterprises and to remedy those violations that occur notwithstanding 
preventive measures. The greater responsibility thus lies with states – host states in particular given the 
controversies about the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction (supra Part I, Section 1.2) – and 
corporate accountability for human rights should be secured mainly1631 at the domestic level.  
1.1.2. The domestic legal order as the centre of gravity 
As international law has yet to impose legally binding human rights duties on business enterprises, at 
least for the time being the legal effect of human rights on businesses depends on the domestic legal 
framework of states. Given that the extent to which and the way in which human rights constrain 
                                                     
1630
 In 2004 the Commission on Human Rights adopted a decision, without a vote, finding that the UN Norms 
constitute a draft proposal that has “no legal standing.” Commission on Human Rights, “Chapter 41 
Responsibilities of transnational corporations and related business enterprises with regard to human rights.” 
Report on the Sixtieth Session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/127 (15 March – 23 April 2004). 
1631
 Also non-state-based remedies that are administered not on a purely national basis (such as the complaint 
mechanisms before the International Finance Corporation and the national contact points for the Guidelines for 
multinational enterprises of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) can make business 
enterprises accountable for human rights, but at present there is no (quasi-)judicial international body with 
jurisdiction over business enterprises, so that liability for human rights can only be established at the national 
level. For a discussion of the terms ‘responsibility’, ‘accountability’ and ‘liability’, see supra Part I, Section 2.2. 
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business enterprises differs from one domestic legal order to the other, Part II of this dissertation has 
proposed to scrutinise the impact of human rights having regard to two legal constructs: the 
horizontality of human rights, which embraces three dimensions, namely effect, scope and application, 
and the existence (and enforceability) of protective duties on the part of state organs.  
The first step in the horizontality inquiry consists of reviewing whether in a given legal order the idea 
is accepted that human rights could, at least in theory, bind actors other than the state, such as business 
enterprises, and whether the concrete rights at stake are indeed capable of taking effect against private 
actors. Next, the precise duties that human rights with horizontal effect impose on private actors have 
to be defined and the rights holders towards whom such duties are owed identified, so as to know 
whether these duties have been complied with. Only after it is determined that a given right has 
horizontal effect and gives rise to a duty on the part of a business enterprise owed towards a particular 
rights holder, does the issue of horizontal application arise. Moreover, a positive result in the first two 
phases of the horizontality inquiry does not entail that the right will also be applied directly to the 
horizontal relationship between business enterprise and rights holder. The latter scenario occurs when 
a cause of action and/or a special remedy is derived directly from the right that is at stake. Other 
options are (1) for the right to be purely vertically applied, meaning that human rights do not feature 
explicitly in the horizontal relationships, but affect the laws, regulations, policies or other measures 
adopted by the state that govern this horizontal relationship as well as the contracts concluded between 
state actors and business enterprises, or (2) for the right to be applied indirectly, meaning again that 
the relationship between business enterprise and rights holder is affected by laws, regulations, policies 
or other measures but this time with human rights influencing their interpretation, application and 
development by the judiciary. Different sub-models of indirect horizontal application are available, 
depending on whether regard is had to the actual rights or to the values underlying them (direct-
indirect versus indirect-indirect horizontal application) and on the types of remedies available (strong 
versus weak indirect horizontal application).  
Also the question whether state organs have protective duties for human rights should be considered. 
Such duties in fact mirror the obligation to protect that exists under international law. The protective 
duties of the legislature and the executive should influence the laws, regulations and policies that they 
adopt, which in turn either constrain business enterprises or facilitate the enjoyment of rights by the 
rights holders, whilst the protective duties of the judiciary are triggered whenever they are called to 
rule on a dispute among business enterprises and rights holders or between either of them and the 
state, when the latter type of dispute has a radiating effect on the relationship between business 
enterprises and rights holders. The enforceability of the protective duties of the state depends inter alia 
on the system of judicial review that applies in a given legal order.  
In Part III this abstract analytical framework was applied to evaluate the legal impact of human rights 
on business enterprises in the South African legal order. Briefly, this analysis can be recapped as 
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follows. In South African law, there is no principled objection to human rights having horizontal 
effect, including against legal entities like business enterprises, provided that the nature of the concrete 
right at stake lends itself to having such effect. The scope of human rights binding on business 
enterprises is not resolved decisively. First, as to the types of duties that they bear, it is not disputed 
that private actors should at least respect human rights, an obligation which depending on the 
circumstances may also lead to active conduct being required from the duty bearer. Under appropriate 
circumstances also an obligation to protect may be assumed to exist, for instance when a parent 
company is held to owe a duty to certain stakeholders who are affected by the activities of its 
subsidiary. Second, no abstract rule exists to identify rights holders. Nevertheless, when human rights 
are violated, ordinary rules of (factual and legal) causation can be used to establish liability and if 
laws, regulations, policies or contracts impose duties on business enterprises other than to respect 
human rights the rights holders are generally identified in those implementing measures. Finally, 
human rights can be applied to business enterprises through either of the three models of application, 
namely direct horizontal, indirect horizontal or vertical application, and in the case of indirect 
horizontal application also the different forms of that model are, in theory, available.  
The South African Constitution also explicitly acknowledges that all state organs have a duty to 
protect human rights, including against interferences by private actors, such as business enterprises. 
Aside from a duty to protect that is akin to the international obligation to protect human rights and that 
requires the adoption of measures to achieve those rights and to remedy interferences therewith by 
private actors, there also exists a duty of care on the part of organs of the state to look after the 
physical integrity of citizens.  
Given that within the current legal framework for business and human rights the focus lies on the legal 
system of the host state, also the question of available remedies should be assessed, first and foremost, 
within the domestic legal system. This dissertation has concentrated on judicial remedies, by 
examining the use of strategic litigation to ensure that companies bear a responsibility for human 
rights, regardless of whether this goal is achieved by forcing government to monitor and control 
corporate conduct or by directly calling business enterprises to account, in court, for their behaviour. 
By seeking to change the balance of power in society and to subjugate business interests to human 
rights, such litigation pursues a certain form of social change, which has become all the more topical 
in a globalised economy in which states increasingly share power with – or are even dominated by – 
potent business enterprises.  
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1.1.3. The international legal and political landscape for moving forward 
No system is perfect, and criticism is all the more likely when a system emerges from a compromise, 
like the UN Framework on Business and Human Rights and the UNGPs do.1632 The Special 
Representative behind those instruments, John Ruggie, has never denied that the legal framework 
sketched by these instruments was dictated by a need for what he called ‘principled pragmatism’.1633 
He had to work with the options that were given to him, taking into account, in particular, the vetoes 
expressed by the business community and backed up by important players such as the US and the EU 
– although the question may be asked whether human rights should ever be up for a compromise.1634 
In any case, Ruggie has repeated at pains that he does not want the UNGPs to freeze the global debate 
on business and human rights and to preclude the development of new initiatives at the international 
level to strengthen the responsibility of business enterprises for human rights, within whichever of the 
different regimes of the polycentric governance system (supra Part I, Section 1.1). 
Six years have gone by since the Human Rights Council endorsed the UNGPs, and nine years since 
the UN Framework. Nevertheless, if optimistically the geopolitical landscape is considered to have 
undergone some changes during that period, those are taking place slowly.1635 In June 2014, the scene 
was still very divided when the Human Rights Council issued two resolutions, one on the 
implementation of the UNGPs, adopted without a vote and one on the creation of an open-ended 
intergovernmental working group for the elaboration of an international instrument, adopted with a 
divided vote – showing the continued resistance from western states, such as the US and the EU 
member states (supra Table 1). Also the attendance list of the first session, in July 2015, of the open-
ended intergovernmental working group that was established to elaborate a legally binding 
international instrument was still meagre. The second session, organised in October 2016, was more 
successful in the sense that the presence of a number of important players at least sent the message that 
they do not want to break down communication channels.1636 
Nevertheless, even if there seems to be a willingness to discuss, many questions as to what any 
possible novel international instrument should look like remain unanswered and highly controversial 
(see infra Section 2.2.1.1). Admittedly, the UNGPs simply left open the questions that were most 
controversial, two important ones being which human rights bind business enterprises (given that not 
                                                     
1632
 Even the very idea that they are a compromise is challenged by some scholars, who denounce the fact that all 
stakeholders (except for the direct victims) may have been consulted, but that the contours of the framework 
were undisputable.  
1633
 Interim report E/CN.4/2006/97 of the Special Representative, supra note 88, para. 81. 
1634
 Bilchitz and Deva, supra note 39, 12; Deva (2013), supra note 42, 82.  
1635
 See also Ruggie (2016), supra note 41, 69 (doubting whether even most host states where transnational 
corporations operate would accept interference by home states).  
1636
 See supra Part I, Section 1.3. 
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all states have ratified the same human rights instruments)1637 and what concrete duties business 
enterprises bear under those rights. Ever since the creation of the open-ended intergovernmental 
working group also the question whether an international instrument should only apply to the 
transnational corporations, however they may be defined, or all types of companies, has sparked off 
debates.1638 The question as to how the international legal framework should then be advanced is 
explored below in Chapter 2. 
1.2. The law in action: strategic litigation on human rights and environmental health 
hazards caused by mining  
To get a better understanding of the opportunities and challenges of using litigation as a tool to ensure 
that business enterprises are legally responsible for human rights, the dissertation has examined the 
experiences of lawyers and activists in South Africa who actually engage in such an exercise. Before 
reflecting on the way forward for the business and human rights debate at international level, the 
lessons learnt from the case study are flagged (Section 1.2.1) and the limitations to the research 
explicated (Section 1.2.1). 
1.2.1. Lessons learnt 
This Section highlights the most interesting elements from the case study, which either paint the legal 
landscape of business and human rights in South Africa (Section 1.2.1.1) or affect victims’ access to 
judicial remedies on a practical, procedural or legal level (Section 1.2.1.2). To avoid repetition of what 
has been explained before, the elements are merely identified and a brief assessment of their ‘learning 
value’ made. Those lessons are valuable in two ways; they point out gaps in the current international 
legal framework on business and human rights and are informative for both practitioners and 
politicians, in and beyond South Africa, at least on a practical level, namely as to what factors inform 
the preferred road to a remedy and its accessibility.1639 The extent to which these experiences should 
then inform any possible international initiative is another question, however, which will be addressed 
in Chapter 2, taking into account the limitations of the dissertation. 
1.2.1.1. The legal picture of corporate responsibility for human rights 
States are given considerable leeway in implementing their obligation to protect human rights against 
possible interferences by business enterprises. This also applies to the way in which human rights 
                                                     
1637
 This is why the UNGPs simply refer to the Universal Declaration. Bilchitz and Deva, supra note 39, 17. 
1638
 See also supra Part I, Section 2.3. 
1639
 Cf. Zerk (2014), supra note 212, 11 (writing that best practice models could already be useful in showing 
“what effective state responses to the problem of business involvement in gross human rights abuses would look 
like in practice”).  
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should constrain business under national law. It is probably illusionary to expect that this established 
position of international human rights law (under which the measures of implementation are left to the 
discretion of states, provided that they act reasonably) will change any time soon, if ever. 
Nevertheless, the South African legal order can definitely serve as a best practice as to the different 
ways in which human rights have a legal impact on business enterprises, at least on paper – the actual 
implementation by organs of the state is not always so exemplary. In particular, the approach to 
horizontality and protective duties in the South African legal order, as summarised in Table 11 below, 
is an example par excellence of comprehensiveness.  
Table 11. The legal effect of human rights on business enterprises in the domestic legal order: 
the example of South Africa 
In abstracto South Africa 
Horizontal 
effect 
Constitutional 
order 
Are human rights ever capable 
of having horizontal effect?  
Yes  
See Section 8(2) of the Constitution 
Individual right Does a concrete right have 
horizontal effect?  
Depends on the nature of the right  
See Section 8(2) of the Constitution 
CC1640: relevant factors include the 
right’s intensity and its 
susceptibility to invasion by private 
actors, the role of the victim, and 
the countervailing interests of the 
private actor 
Some rights stipulate explicitly that 
they take effect against private 
actors  
See e.g. Sections 11(1)(c) and 
32(1)(b) of the Constitution 
Horizontal 
scope 
Types of duties Which types of duties do 
business enterprises bear?  
Depends on the nature of the duty  
See Section 8(2) of the Constitution 
CC: duty to do no harm, including 
not to interfere, unreasonably, with 
the existing enjoyment of rights 
Rights holders How are the persons towards 
whom business enterprises 
owe these duties identified?  
(no normative theory) 
Horizontal Purely vertical 
application 
Do human rights get effect 
through implementing laws, 
Yes 
See e.g. PAIA for Section 32 of the 
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 In this Table the abbreviation ‘CC’ stands for the Constitutional Court of South Africa.  
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application regulations, policies and other 
measures?  
Constitution  
Direct-indirect 
horizontal 
application 
Do human rights affect the 
interpretation, application and 
development of private law?  
Yes 
See Sections 8(3) and 233 of the 
Constitution 
Indirect-indirect 
horizontal 
application 
Do the values underlying 
human rights affect private 
law?  
Yes 
See Sections 39(2) of the 
Constitution 
Strong versus 
weak indirect 
horizontal 
application 
Can new private law remedies 
be created if existing remedies 
do not suffice?  
Yes 
See Sections 8(3), 38 and 172 of 
the Constitution 
CC: courts may forge new tools 
and shape innovative remedies 
Direct 
horizontal 
Can a cause of action and/or a 
remedy be directly derived 
from the Constitution?  
Yes  
See Sections 38 and 172 of the 
Constitution 
CC: constitutional damages may 
be available 
Protective 
duties 
 Must state organs protect and 
promote human rights when 
they perform their functions? 
Yes 
See Sections 7(1) and 8(1) of the 
Constitution 
Some rights impose specific duties 
See e.g. Section 24(b) of the 
Constitution 
Is compliance therewith 
subject to judicial review? 
Yes 
CC: in case of qualified rights, a 
reasonableness review 
Table 11 shows that human rights bind business enterprises (id est have horizontal effect) and that they 
can constrain them through various avenues. In accordance with their protective duties, the legislature, 
executive and judiciary must consider human rights when the exercise of their functions has an impact 
on the relations between business enterprises and individuals. Accordingly, human rights influence 
laws, regulations, policies, judgments and court orders, as well as other measures. Moreover, in case 
of an actual dispute, human rights may not only constrain business enterprises through the application 
and enforcement of such implementing measures, but may also have a more visible effect. At the very 
least, courts will consider the rights that are at stake when they interpret and apply the relevant laws 
and regulations. Depending on the circumstances of the case, however, they may, for instance, decide 
to develop the common law (strong indirect horizontal application) to give effect to the spirit, purport 
or objects of the Constitution (indirect-indirect horizontal application) or to specific rights in the Bill 
of Rights (direct-direct horizontal application). They may even accept that a direct cause of action is 
derived from the Constitution, or decide to grant constitutional relief (direct horizontal application). 
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As was discussed in the concluding section of the case study (supra Part III, Section 2.8), this 
comprehensiveness explains why the system works so well. Key is the significant uptake by activists 
and lawyers, as well as by judges and authorities, of the Constitution and of the idea that it should 
infuse all law and society. As a result, and given that the Constitution explicitly stipulates that the Bill 
of Rights binds private actors, litigating parties can, and generally do, highlight the rights that are at 
stake in cases relating to corporate conduct interfering with constitutional rights. Such arguments 
suggest the ‘abusive’ or ‘egregious’ nature of certain facts and, importantly, may have practical 
implications for the way in which the litigation proceeds and is eventually decided on its merits. 
Moreover, although litigating parties only rarely resort to their human rights directly, the case study 
does show that there is also value in providing such an option and in having human rights as a safety 
net, when there is a gap or uncertainty in private law. 
The South African situation is not only informative for reason of the comprehensive way in which 
human rights affect business enterprises, but should also be borne in mind when the ‘substance’ of 
possible human rights responsibilities for business enterprises is considered at the international level. 
Notwithstanding that the Constitution explicitly provides that human rights bind private actors and that 
activists, lawyers and scholars readily concede that business enterprises are responsible for human 
rights as a matter of law, there is more reticence as regards the types of duties that these rights should 
impose on companies. In particular, whilst it is undisputed that they must respect human rights and, in 
some instances, protect them against violations by subsidiaries, for instance, and that to comply with 
those obligations they must not only forebear from acting in certain ways but also take the required 
steps, due to negative experiences it is questioned whether it is good idea to involve companies, 
without more, in the protection, facilitation, promotion, and provision of human rights. 
1.2.1.2. Possible barriers to remedies  
The discussion of the three possible barriers to judicial remedies, namely practical (i), procedural (ii) 
and legal (iii) barriers, is each time broken down into ‘good practices’ and ‘(potential) obstacles’. At 
the end of this Section, a summary is provided in Table 12 (iv).  
(i) Practical barriers 
i.a) Good practices 
Distinctive of South Africa is its civil society, which plays a pivotal role in ensuring accountability for 
human rights violations by business enterprises. As numerous other scholars have discussed,1641 this 
strong civil society has its roots in Apartheid but later continued its endeavour to alleviate the plight of 
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 See e.g. Langford (2015), supra note 112, 12-17; Langford et al., supra note 159, 421-426; Madlingozi, 
supra note 320.  
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poor and vulnerable groups, this time supported by a strong and progressive Constitution. 
Accordingly, civil society has contributed significantly to the establishment of a culture of 
constitutionalism, as Oomen calls it,1642 where the Bill of Rights is well integrated in society and 
everyday life.  
As the case study has also demonstrated, one reason why the record of civil society in South Africa is 
so impressive is the strong alliance between activists and lawyers. This alliance is characterised by an 
interaction at three levels. First, their number one priority is empowering the poor and most vulnerable 
groups in society. They are the ones who are most at risk of having their rights violated, such as 
neighbouring communities and mineworkers in the case of abuses in the mining industry – which is 
but one possible incidence, albeit an important one, of human rights violations by business enterprises 
in South Africa. For that purpose they often deploy innovative tactics, such as the organisation of 
community exchanges, but foremost they seek to raise awareness by informing people about their 
rights and by alerting them to possible threats. People knowing and understanding their rights is a 
prerequisite for them ever even to consider seeking justice. 
Second, local activists ensure that the most distressing situations and the most pressing issues reach 
the courts’ dockets. If needed, they themselves engage lawyers, refer people to legal assistance or 
ensure that lawyers are informed about a case. Also of importance in that regard is that the sources for 
litigation funding are very diversified in South Africa. In addition to the state-based legal aid system, 
which mainly concentrates on individuals who seek representation in criminal proceedings, there is a 
relatively large pool of private, highly professionalised lawyers, who provide pro bono services, who 
are employed by a non-profit public interest law firm offering free legal services or who work for a 
contingent fee (subject to strict regulations). It is also permissible for litigation to be funded by a third 
party, but under appropriate circumstances that party can be joined in the proceedings so as to ensure 
accountability on its part. Although the demand for free or cheap legal services still exceeds supply, 
the diversification of sources arguably vouches for more fairness in the allocation of resources.  
Third, also after lawyers have taken on a case the alliance with local activists remains important. On 
the one hand, lawyers are generally based in the cities, whilst their clients, like neighbouring 
communities and mineworkers affected by mining, tend to live in remote areas. Through local 
activists, they have a direct contact on the ground. On the other hand, lawyers often depend on the 
technical expertise of local activists, to collect certain evidence or establish certain facts, like assessing 
the quality of the water, air or soil or examining the health of patients. If they had to engage external 
experts to conduct such activities, this would constitute a massive drain on their already limited 
resources.  
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i.b) (Potential) obstacles 
Some factors continue to represent a barrier for people seeking access to the justice system, however. 
One example is the intimidation of dissonant voices, whether they are members of the affected group, 
activists or lawyers. The tactics used range from distributing pamphlets with open or covert warnings, 
over physical intimidation to the launch of vexatious lawsuits. Even if people may resist such tactics, 
by establishing a community structure that speaks with one voice, by laying criminal complaints, by 
successfully defending themselves against meritless claims, the chilling effect is unmistakable and 
seems nearly insurmountable.  
Other problems that may represent a practical barrier to access and that have surfaced in the case study 
are corruption, government capture and the lack of capacity. Whilst the confidence in the judiciary is 
high, it is unfortunate that people are often forced to resort to the courts, because due to a conflict of 
interests or to incompetence government does not perform its functions as it should.  
(ii) Procedural barriers 
ii.a) Good practices 
Ever since the entry into force of the (interim) Constitution, standing rights have been very wide in 
South Africa. This is appreciated greatly both by activists and by lawyers who represent these activists 
or the actual victims. Many distressing situations and pressing issues would never find their way to the 
judiciary if locus standi was not so wide. Particularly public interest litigation as well as, more 
recently, class actions have proved their value for the development of jurisprudence on issues that 
matter for South African society an sich. In business-related cases that affect a large group of people, 
few victims would consider to file an individual claim so as to vindicate their rights, because 
individually the claims may be too low to merit separate litigation, because most of the victims might 
not be able to secure legal representation, and because they may not have the courage to face a 
powerful counterparty, like a mining company.  
Also remarkable in this regard is that even direct victims of human rights violations, whether they 
litigate an individual case, joined matters or a class action, often claim that they act not only in their 
own interest but also in the public interest. This allows them to highlight the importance of their case 
for similarly placed people and to secure a remedy that may extend beyond their individual matter. 
Moreover, when in South Africa litigation is conducted in the public interest, a number of procedural 
rules are triggered to the benefit of the litigating parties, such as (some degree of) protection against 
adverse costs orders.  
The possibility for civil society actors or individuals to intervene as amici curiae in proceedings that 
relate to a constitutional matter, such as a right protected in the Bill of Rights, is valued highly as well. 
This procedural mechanism permits interested parties to participate in the litigation so as to highlight 
certain questions in the public interest that could otherwise get lost in the complexities of a particular 
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case, whether because the litigating parties themselves have not thought about those issues or because 
they do not have the resources to flesh them out. Often it may be an opportunity for civil society actors 
to advance their strategic agenda, without having to manage the entire case but by simply adducing 
arguments and evidence on specific issues.  
Finally, the case study has also demonstrated the significance of the wide remedial powers of the 
judiciary. The resulting flexibility in terms of the reparations that courts are willing and able to grant is 
appreciated by litigating parties. If none of the existing remedies suffices, the judiciary may even 
develop the common law or derive new forms of relief directly from the Constitution. Especially in 
public interest litigation, parties frequently request a structural order, for instance, which ensures 
supervision by the court as well as public participation.  
ii.b) (Potential) obstacles 
One element that may constitute an obstacle to justice is access to information. It is mentioned as a 
first potential obstacle, because in se the South African legal framework is very progressive so that it 
could be considered a good practice rather than an obstacle. The Constitution indeed provides for a 
right to information, both from government and from private parties, like business enterprises. This 
constitutional right is implemented in a domestic law, the Promotion of Access to Information Act. In 
practice, however, the law has proven to be deficient as most requests for information are either 
ignored or refused so that requesters are forced to approach the court and to engage in a legal battle 
that will take much of their time. Hence, although on paper South Africa is a very transparent society, 
in practice obtaining access to records that directly concern certain people who need that information 
to enforce their rights, proves difficult. 
Furthermore, while the possibility of instituting a class action was mentioned previously as a good 
practice, at the same time it also constitutes a potential obstacle because the rules on class actions are 
not yet as developed as they should be. Parliament has not issued an act regulating class actions and, 
as far as known, neither is there an intention to do so. Accordingly, the mechanism is developed by the 
courts ad hoc, as they decide on the issues that are brought to their dockets. 
Access to judicial remedies may also be hampered by the cost of litigating and, in particular, by the 
risk of incurring an adverse costs order. Although the latter risk is mitigated in public interest 
litigation, it is unclear whether a similar rule applies when such litigation is launched against a private 
actor. In principle, costs orders are borne by the clients, even if they are indigent and only able to 
approach the courts by securing free or cheap legal representation. Adverse costs are thus definitely a 
factor that is considered before a case is brought to the courts, and the higher the anticipated costs the 
more weight that factor will bear. A number of other potential procedural obstacles featured in the case 
study as well, including the lack of expertise on the part of prosecutors and magistrates and the 
collection of evidence, which is a resource-intensive enterprise for litigating parties. Nevertheless, they 
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are regularly forced to rebut the expensive studies commissioned by the counterparty, which, in turn, 
is often endowed. 
(iii) Legal barriers 
iii.a) Good practices 
As the discussion of the legal landscape for business and human rights above has already suggested, 
the (potential) coverage of South Africa law is quite extensive. When an ordinary criminal or private 
law concept does not align with the egregiousness of the facts, parties can have the applicable rules at 
least interpreted and applied in light of the Constitution and, if necessary, developed in conformity 
therewith, and under exceptional circumstances they can even derive a direct cause of action from the 
rights in the Bill of Rights.  
Another notable finding from the case study is that even if a company is the actual perpetrator of a 
certain harm, litigating parties may still prefer to sue government and causes of action are in principle 
available for that purpose. The reason for this preference may be, for instance, that the better cause of 
action (with the greatest prospect of success or requiring fewer resources) lies against government. In 
other instances, respondents have suggested that they may consider it to be government’s 
responsibility to protect its people against (possible) adverse impacts of business activities. Hence, for 
various reasons flexibility regarding the actors that can be sued is considered important by activists 
and lawyers in South Africa. 
iii.b) (Potential) obstacles 
A first potential obstacle regarding the legal framework in South Africa concerns the options of 
establishing liability on the part of the parent company of the subsidiary that actually perpetrated the 
harm. If the silicosis class action, which has been launched against parent mining companies, results in 
a judgment, this will already bring more clarity on the question whether and to what extent this 
constitutes a real obstacle. However, even if the South African courts accept that parent companies 
bear a legal responsibility towards the employees of their subsidiaries, in line with the specific duty of 
care that has been recognised at common law in the English courts, the question is whether a similar 
duty may be found to exist vis-à-vis other groups of people who may be affected by the activities of 
subsidiaries.  
Secondly, even though human rights may be binding on business enterprises – whether directly in 
terms of the Constitution or indirectly through implementing laws and regulations that are interpreted, 
applied or developed in conformity with the Constitution – there is a lot of ambiguity and uncertainty 
regarding the precise duties that these rights create on their part (subsidiaries and parent companies) 
and the right holders towards whom they owe such duties. These issues are presently decided in a 
‘piecemeal’ way, namely when a dispute manifests itself and the case goes to court, the court gets an 
318 
 
opportunity to rule on the issues raised in that case, unless the parties eventually agree on a settlement 
out-of-court. 
Furthermore, although institutional corporate liability is recognised as a general concept under South 
African criminal law, criminal cases are the exception, tend to focus on individuals rather than the 
company as such and the penalties for companies are limited. Civil cases, on the other hand, have 
mainly focused on institutional as opposed to individual corporate liability.  
(iv) Overview of the barriers 
Table 12 below provides an overview of all good practices and (potential) obstacles relating to access 
to judicial remedies that were mentioned in the preceding discussion.  
 Table 12. Overview of barriers to judicial remedies in South Africa 
Good practices (Potential) obstacles 
Practical 
barriers 
- Empowerment of victims by civil 
society 
- Diversification of litigation funding 
- Relatively high number of experienced 
lawyers 
- Alliance and pooling of resources: 
⋅ Potential court cases are brought to 
the attention of lawyers 
⋅ Contact point on the ground 
⋅ Technical expertise and collection of 
evidence  
- Intimidation of dissonant voices 
- Corruption and government capture 
- Lack of capacity within government 
Procedural 
barriers 
- Wide standing rights, including 
representative claims, public interest 
litigation, and class actions 
- Amicus curiae interventions  
- Flexible remedial powers 
- Access to information 
- Rules on class actions 
- Cost of litigating and adverse costs 
orders 
- Lack of expertise within the office of 
the prosecutor and the (regional) courts 
- Evidence 
Legal 
barriers 
- Extensive legal coverage 
- State and company liability 
- Institutional and individual criminal 
and civil liability 
- Rules on direct parent company liability 
- Uncertainty about corporate human 
rights duties 
⋅ Which duties 
⋅ Towards whom 
- Criminal cases: mainly individuals, 
civil cases: mainly corporate entities 
1.2.2. Limitations to the scope of the research 
The case study concentrated on one legal order (South Africa), one topic (human rights violations 
associated with environmental health hazards caused by mining), and one type of remedies (judicial 
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remedies in the host state, where the violations actually occur). Some limitations are thus inherent to 
the scope of the dissertation.  
1.2.2.1. Country focus: South Africa 
(i) Contextualism 
A basic tenet of the dissertation is that the way ahead in the international debate on business and 
human rights should be informed by the practical experiences of local stakeholders who actually try to 
enforce accountability for human rights violations by business enterprises. The case study examined 
those experiences in a single country. Contextualism warns, however, that the unique interplay 
between constitutional cultures and the specific historical, social, political and economic features of a 
country makes that legal constructs or approaches cannot simply be transposed from one legal order to 
the other and be expected to produce exactly the same result.1643 This precept suggests that the extent 
to which domestic experiences from South Africa may inform the debate at the international level and 
subsequently trickle down to other countries is limited. Rules do not exist independently from one 
another, may not be effective in isolation or may generate different outcomes in different legal 
systems.1644 Accordingly, as Zerk has confirmed in her report on access to remedies, commissioned by 
the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (see infra Section 2.1), any changes to 
domestic law so as to respond to the challenges of enforcing corporate accountability through 
domestic remedies must take place against the background of existing law in that country.1645  
A key feature of the South African context in relation to business and human rights is, for instance, its 
history of Apartheid, when many companies openly or covertly collaborated with the regime in the 
design and implementation of discriminatory and segregating policies. Accordingly, for a very long 
time already, the awareness that business enterprises are as capable as the state of committing human 
rights abuses is shared widely amongst South Africans, in particular scholars, lawyers, activists as well 
as politicians. Given that the Constitution of the new democratic state even entrenches the binding 
effect of human rights on business enterprises, litigating parties are little to not hesitant to claim that a 
company has breached human rights, whilst in many other legal orders the express use of human rights 
arguments against actors other than the state still provokes feelings of discomfort. Cases dealing with 
accountability for human rights violations committed by business enterprises are thus litigated in quite 
a unique historical, social, political and legal context. 
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 See also Tushnet (2008), supra note 291, 5-15. 
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 Zerk (2014), supra note 212, 111; Companion document to A/HRC/32/19 with illustrative examples on 
corporate accountability and access to remedy, supra note 230, 5, paras 4-6. 
1645
 Zerk (2014), supra note 212, 110.  
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The specific history to the debate on business and human rights in South Africa is but one example of 
various features that limit the generalisability of findings.1646 Nevertheless, the value of research into 
the experiences of local stakeholders should not be denied altogether for that reason. Rather, such 
limitations should be taken into account when proposals are developed as to how the international 
debate should learn from those experiences. This caveat applies to the form that a building block for 
the international legal framework should adopt as well as to its substance, which will be discussed in 
Chapter 2 below.  
(ii) Special note: not a conflict zone 
A fundamental prerequisite for the discussion on strategic litigation in host states to be relevant is that 
the rule of law is – at least by and large – respected in the concerned country.1647 This is definitely 
problematic in the case of ‘weak governance zones’,1648 where the state is either absent or actively 
involved in human rights violations. In such scenario the basic idea of relying on the host state to 
regulate and monitor the behaviour of business enterprises arguably becomes an exercise in futility. 
That is also why the UNGPs explicitly acknowledge that in conflict-affected areas the role of home 
states and of business enterprises themselves has to carry more weight.1649  
This dissertation has not considered the specific challenges that arise in the context of weak 
governance zones, which constitute a peculiar concern within the debate on business and human rights 
and require an approach that is appropriately adjusted to reckon with those challenges, exceeding the 
purposes of this study. Accordingly, the proposals discussed below should not be considered as 
solutions for governance gaps that are due to totally unwilling or incompetent governments.  
1.2.2.2. Thematic focus: direct human rights violations associated with environmental health hazards 
caused by mining  
To ensure its manageability, the case study in South Africa focused on the mining industry and was 
demarcated on the basis of three indicators, namely (1) direct human rights violations, that are (2) 
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 See also Gloppen (2009), supra note 341, 471-473 (arguing why the South African situation, in many 
respects, is different from other countries). 
1647
 Cf. D. Baumann-Pauly and J. Nolan (eds), Business and Human Rights: From Principles to Practice 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 31-32 (writing that the laws and enforcement mechanisms in host states should be 
the primary option for ensuring greater human rights protection, but that “the reality is that in many countries 
this simply is not occurring”, as “[l]aws are sometimes weak but enforcement is weaker still”). 
1648
 See e.g. Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation, Risk Awareness Tool for Multinational 
Enterprises in Weak Governance Zones (2006), 11 (defining weak governance zones as environments in which 
governments are unable or unwilling to assume their responsibilities). 
1649
 Commentaries to Principles 7 and 23 of the UNGPs, annexed to Report A/HRC/17/31, supra note 33. 
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associated with the health hazards created by environmental degradation or pollution that is caused 
during the extraction of minerals, and (3) suffered by neighbouring communities or mineworkers.1650  
As was explained in Part I, these indicators exclude a number of cases, such as instances of complicity 
that do not amount to direct complicity (id est when a business enterprise knowingly assists another 
actor in violating human rights) and of human rights violations committed by public enterprises or 
enterprises acting as a public actor. Neither are violations considered that are not linked to the core 
activities of mining companies, such as acts perpetrated by private security personnel or by actors 
downstream. Lastly, as the mining industry extracts raw materials, the risk of human rights violations 
in the supply chain of goods processed at those companies does not arise. None of the proposals below 
thus bears on the specific issues that are triggered by those excluded scenarios.  
1.2.2.3. Remedy: litigation in the host state 
Given that, as was again explained and justified in Part I, the focus of the dissertation is on host state 
regulation and litigation, two important issues in the debate on business and human rights have been 
left out, namely extraterritoriality and cooperation in cross-border cases. Hence, it is important to 
stress that the proposals in Chapter 2 do not take into account whether and how an international 
initiative should be adopted so as to clarify and/or develop the standards on the exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction by home states and/or third states. This exclusion is merely motivated by 
the scope of the dissertation and does not deny the need for further guidance on extraterritoriality and 
for strengthened cooperation in cross-border cases.  
1.2.2.4. Other elements beyond the scope of the dissertation 
Finally, at several occasions throughout the dissertation, the caveat is added that a particular 
discussion does not intend to be exhaustive. Indeed, not all possible legal, procedural and practical 
factors that may hinder or facilitate victims’ access to judicial remedies and influence the effectiveness 
of their litigation strategy were discussed. Some were left out (such as the problem of too restrictive 
statutes of limitation), whilst others were only briefly touched upon (such as the attribution of conduct 
by natural persons to corporate entities). Which elements were included in the discussions and their 
prominence was determined on the basis of the interaction between the fundamental study and the case 
study. For instance, the issue of attributing specific conduct to a company and the risk of prescription 
of claims did not feature prominently or even at all on the minds of the South African respondents who 
shared their experiences with strategic litigation. It is suggested that a possible reason therefor may be 
the fact that they accept limitation periods and rules on attribution as a legal fact, on which they cannot 
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exert any influence and about which they cannot be very strategic. In the case study it was, for 
instance, explained that where litigating parties believe that it will be too hard to attribute a certain 
event to a company, they will rather sue government. 
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2. THE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
PROPOSALS FOR NEW ‘BUILDING BLOCKS’ 
The last Chapter of this dissertation reflects on how the international legal framework on business and 
human rights should be developed further. First, an overview is given of some recent initiatives at the 
UN level that specifically deal with access to remedies, in particular judicial remedies (Section 2.1). 
Thereafter, two building blocks for the international legal framework are proposed, namely 
authoritative guidance from (quasi-)judicial regional and international human rights bodies and 
principles derived from best practice models (Section 2.2). Finally, suggestions are made regarding 
which topics would benefit from further research (Section 2.3).  
2.1. Developments at the UN concerning access to remedies 
No human rights framework can be effective without providing remedies; if victims cannot enforce 
their rights, then those rights are mere privileges.1651 This was already acknowledged at the time of the 
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, which incorporates the following 
right. 
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts 
violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.1652 
Also the UN Framework on Business and Human Rights recognises that remedies are vital, and 
devotes a separate pillar to access to remedies. Nevertheless, in practice, Pillar III is frequently 
considered the poor relative of Pillars I (on the state obligation to protect) and II (on the corporate 
responsibility to respect).1653 Key to an effective system of remedies are judicial remedies,1654 but 
existing domestic law remedies have been found to be “fragmented, poorly designed or 
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 See also Černič (2016), supra note 77, 211 (writing that the effectiveness of all other rights depends on 
access to an effective remedy); Drimmer and Laplante, supra note 238, 316 (writing that “for rights to have 
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 Human Rights Council, “Improving accountability and access to remedy for victims of business-related 
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incomplete.”1655 In addition, legal, practical and procedural barriers that impede victims’ access to 
remedies are numerous.1656 
In an attempt to address the concern that judicial remedies fall short of offering the protection that 
victims of human rights violations by business enterprises need, the Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights1657 decided, in early 2013, “to commence a process of conceptual, 
normative and practical clarification of key issues relating to corporate liability for gross human rights 
abuses with the aim of creating a fairer and more effective system of domestic law remedies.”1658 First, 
a study was commissioned into the effectiveness of domestic judicial responses to business 
involvement in gross human rights abuses. That study was carried out by Jennifer Zerk, who published 
her report in February 2014, mapping the elements of criminal and civil law that are relevant in 
business-related matters, as well as the different barriers to judicial remedies that may exist.1659  
Following a request by the Human Rights Council to continue the work on improving access to 
remedy,1660 the Office of the High Commissioner officially launched its ‘accountability and remedy 
project’ in November 2014.1661 After months of research, a report was submitted to the Human Rights 
Council in May 2016, to which a ‘guidance to improve corporate accountability and access to judicial 
remedy for business-related human rights abuse’ (the UN Guidance) was annexed as well as an 
addendum with explanatory notes.1662 The Office also published a companion document with 
illustrative examples.1663 The UN Guidance consists of nineteen policy objectives for domestic legal 
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 Report on corporate accountability and access to remedy (A/HRC/32/19), supra note 1653, para. 4. Or, to be 
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responses, each of which is specified by a number of elements. They are, however, formulated in a 
very flexible way so as to allow states to adapt them to their local context.1664  
In the recommendations part of the report, states are urged to conduct a formal legal review of their 
domestic legal systems so as to assess the extent to which they satisfy the policy objectives and to 
identify areas for improvement.1665 If states respond positively to that request, it will lead to an 
extensive mapping exercise of the existing legal systems across the globe, which could, arguably, 
create a fertile ground for a possible harmonisation effort, provided that there is sufficient support and 
common ground. This call upon states to review their domestic legal system is also supported by the 
Human Rights Council itself. In it is resolution welcoming the report and the UN Guidance, the High 
Commissioner was again requested to continue the work and, importantly, to organise additional 
consultation rounds inter alia to discuss the possibilities for states to review their domestic law 
remedies and to develop a comprehensive strategy for improving accountability and access to remedy, 
for instance as part of their national action plans.1666 At the same time, the Working Group on Business 
and Human Rights was requested “to prepare a study on best practices and how to improve on the 
effectiveness of cross-border cooperation between States with respect to law enforcement on the issue 
of business and human rights.”1667 
This brief discussion of recent developments at the UN suggests a renewed attention for the third pillar 
of the UNGPs. For the time being, this has mainly resulted in preliminary studies and mapping 
exercises, through which the Human Rights Council tries to get hold of the complex legal picture as to 
how corporate accountability can currently be enforced through domestic legal remedies. Further 
developments will definitely ensue, as both the Working Group and the High Commissioner are 
working on the topic, and there is a clear commitment “to improve corporate accountability and access 
to remedies for victims of business-related human rights abuse.”1668 
2.2. Proposals 
2.2.1. Introduction  
Before discussing the building blocks that are proposed for the international legal framework on 
business and human rights, the context within which those proposals are made is explained first 
(Section 2.2.1.1), as well as the general approach used to develop those proposals (Section 2.2.1.2).  
                                                     
1664
 Addendum to the guidance on corporate accountability and access to remedy (A/HRC/32/19/Add.1), supra 
note 387, para. 5. 
1665
 Report on corporate accountability and access to remedy (A/HRC/32/19), supra note 1653, para. 31. 
1666
 Resolution 32/10 of the Human Rights Council, supra note 1656, paras. 4-6 and 13.  
1667
 Ibid. para. 11. 
1668
 Ibid. para. 2.  
326 
 
2.2.1.1. The context of the further development of the international legal framework 
Plenty of knowledge has been produced on the implementation of the UNGPs in general and its third 
pillar in particular since the research project leading to this dissertation was launched in October 2014. 
At the level of the United Nations, for instance, the Office of the High Commissioner initiated an 
‘accountability and remedy’ project in the context of which different domestic corporate 
accountability regimes have been mapped (see supra Section 2.1), but also scholars have conducted a 
lot of research on the UNGPs,1669 including on the access-to-remedy pillar.1670  
The proposals developed below are restricted, however, by the scope of the dissertation, as was 
discussed before (supra Section 1.2.2), and, hence, do not tackle all of the issues on which knowledge 
has been produced recently. The dissertation never aimed at advancing an exhaustive list of proposals 
as to how the international legal framework on business and human rights should be developed further. 
Rather, the objective was to explore whether and how responsibility for human rights on the part of 
business enterprises can be strengthened through host state regulation and enforcement (including 
through litigation), given that the host state is, according to the UNGPs, the primary responsible actor 
from the perspective of international law. It was argued that the practical experiences of local 
stakeholders that seek to ensure accountability for human rights violations by business enterprises may 
reveal some of the challenges to, and opportunities of, this approach.  
Some additional preliminary observations must be made regarding the context within which building 
blocks for the international legal framework are to be developed. Firstly, whatever initiative is 
adopted, it will involve a delicate balancing exercise between providing more guidance to states (and 
‘levelling the playing field’)1671 and leaving sufficient room for manoeuvre for domestic 
implementation – see also the discussion concerning contextualism supra in Section 1.2.2.1.1672 
Secondly, the following comment by Zerk on the limits to what international law can achieve should 
be kept in mind.  
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Convergence of legal standards and procedural matters will not, of itself, address all of the 
problems identified(…) Many of these can only be addressed by a significant injection of 
resources (both financial and technical) at domestic level.1673 
Thirdly, the difficulty with the business and human rights field is that it covers an infinite number of 
issues and cuts across several branches of the law. In particular, the field could be carved up based on 
factors such as the nature of the human rights violations (which specific right, which generation of 
right, a ‘gross violation’ or not, etcetera), the type of business enterprises (national or transnational, 
subsidiary or parent company, which size, which industry, etcetera), the kind of corporate 
involvement (actual perpetrator, direct, silent or beneficial complicity, violations in the supply chain, 
etcetera), and the pillar(s) at stake (state obligation to protect, corporate responsibility to respect, 
access to remedy), to name but a few. The question is, however, whether all issues can ever be covered 
in one initiative or whether several instruments should be developed dealing with the different aspects 
to the business and human rights field.1674 The latter approach would also be hard, however, given that 
these issues are not clearly defined, and intersect in various ways. Perhaps a range of initiatives 
tackling different issues should be developed first, which could then at a later stage be merged into one 
umbrella initiative at a higher level of abstraction. 
Fourthly and finally, the dissertation has argued at several occasions that it does not seem conceivable, 
at present, that a significant number of states would sign and ratify a treaty regulating the human rights 
responsibilities of business enterprises directly as a matter of international law and creating an 
international enforcement mechanism (whether judicial, quasi-judicial or non-judicial) – the latter 
issue being particularly tricky. A more minimalist treaty, such as one that specifies1675 the human 
rights binding on business enterprises and the duties borne by business enterprises under those rights 
but that leaves their enforcement to domestic instances,1676 may have a greater prospect of success.1677 
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 Ibid 111.  
1674
 See also Ramasastry, supra note 76, 173 (admitting that compared with ‘business and human rights’ the anti-
corruption movement was more limited, focussing on one particular harm).  
1675
 Mere specification would still align with the traditional ‘obligation to protect’ approach. States may, 
however, even accept a more intrusive approach, entailing that those responsibilities are directly regulated as a 
matter of international law, but still need to be enforced at the domestic level. See the terminology of Knox 
explained earlier, supra Part II, Section 1.1.1.1.  
1676
 Another option would be to codify a number of procedural rights only, akin to what the Aarhus Convention 
(supra note 765) does in relation to environmental protection. The problem, however, is that contrary to the 
Aarhus Convention, which is concerned with a specific subject matter, the business and human rights field cuts 
across so many different areas that it may be hard to deal with all issues in one treaty. Moreover, the scope of 
application of such a treaty would raise similar unresolved questions as those enumerated in the main text.  
1677
 Some scholars, however, have more fundamental reservations about using treaties to create international law. 
See e.g. Tamo (2016b), supra note 11, 160-161 (writing that treaties do not sufficiently take into account the 
international law-making capacity of non-state actors and that the issue of business and human rights cuts across 
several regimes of international law); Wetzel, supra note 189, 249-250 (writing that treaties have become less 
important and non-state governance systems more, and that there is a risk that it would be a “paper tiger” rather 
than a functioning system). See also Ruggie (2016), supra note 41, 68-69. 
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Even such an instrument is a long way from here,1678 however, as many controversial questions 
remain, including the following: which human rights will bind business enterprises considering that 
not all states have ratified all human rights instruments;1679 how should responsibilities for companies 
be deduced from these existing human rights instruments, which are essentially state-centred;1680 
which business enterprises will be bound by such instrument;1681 towards whom will business 
enterprises owe their duties; will human rights responsibilities differ depending on the size of a 
business enterprise and the type of activities that it carries out; and, which standard of conduct will 
apply and will due diligence serve as a defence.1682 
Therefore, instead of jumping the gun and forcing a treaty for which insufficient support exists or 
which does not succeed in tackling those pressing questions, the better approach would arguably 
consist of taking a number of intermediate steps first.1683 It is submitted that this interim period should 
serve two main goals, namely (1) strengthening the UN Framework and the UNGPs, leaving, at least 
the for time being, its basic tenets unchanged, while (2) searching for common ground to move 
forward.  
2.2.1.2. The approach adopted 
Two transitional initiatives at the international level will be explored in the next two Sections, namely 
authoritative guidance from international and regional (quasi-)judicial human rights bodies (Section 
2.2.2) and the issuance of principles based on best practices by the Human Rights Council (Section 
2.2.3).1684 These are but two illustrative approaches that could serve the priorities of strengthening the 
existing framework and finding (or forging) common ground. It is not argued that either of them is 
necessary for the further development of the international legal framework on business and human 
rights, nor are they the only options.  
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 See also Bilchitz and Deva, supra note 39, 25 (writing that “the human rights obligations of corporations 
(…) could be expressly recognized in a treaty which, given current political realities, could be developed only in 
the distant future”). 
1679
 Perhaps a treaty should first be adopted on the grossest human rights violations. Wetzel, supra note, 249. Or, 
attention could be given first to situations where corporations act as public actors or where they have a direct 
effect on violations by the state or aid and abet such violations. Popova, supra note 202, 140. 
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 Bilchitz and Deva, supra note 39, 17.  
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 Wetzel, supra note 189, 249 (noting the difficulty of defining ‘transnational corporations’ and of creating 
one set of obligations that binds all business enterprises); Ruggie (2016), supra note 41, 69. 
1682
 Cf. López, supra note 17, 61; Michalowski, supra note 229, 236 (both denouncing that within the UNGPs 
the concept of due diligence and its legal implications remain unclear).  
1683
 Cf. Bilchitz and Deva, supra note 39, 25 (arguing in the interim for a purposive interpretation of existing 
international human rights instruments, for the implementation of international norms in domestic law and for 
declarations of commitments to the Universal Declaration by business enterprises); Tamo (2016b), supra note 
11, 161 (pleading for the further development of multi-stakeholder initiatives so as to establish common ground). 
1684
 The latter option is arguably already explored given the Council’s requests to the Working Group on 
Business and Human Rights and to the Office of the High Commissioner (see supra Section 2.1). 
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For each of those two ‘forms’ of building blocks (international jurisprudence and principles), a 
number of suggestions are made as regards the issues that they could cover (‘substance’). Where 
relevant the analysis below will refer to the UN Guidance on corporate accountability and access to 
remedy, because many issues are mentioned in that document, albeit that the objectives and elements 
in the UN Guidance remain very flexible. Based on the research undertaken for this dissertation an 
assessment is made regarding how these substantive questions should be dealt with. That is assessment 
is preliminary, however, in the sense that, first, it cannot be excluded that an extensive mapping 
exercise of the legal systems across the globe may necessitate different findings and, second, there 
may not exist sufficient support for the suggestions made. One controversial issue, for instance, relates 
to the permission of contingency fee agreements even if they are strictly regulated. It was also stressed 
several times before that the analysis is necessarily restricted by the ambit of the dissertation and, 
hence, not exhaustive.  
Lastly, it should be observed that there is arguably a third dimension to the debate as to how the 
international legal framework should be developed further, namely aside from the ‘form’ that any 
building blocks for the framework should adopt and the subjects that they should tackle (their 
‘substance’), also the ‘process’ from which they should emerge. The latter dimension is not discussed 
below,1685 although it is in fact inherent to the bottom-up approach that was adopted in this dissertation 
and if principles emerge from mapping exercises at the domestic level and from best practices derived 
therefrom, the actual experiences of local stakeholders are necessarily considered in that context. Two 
further comments should be made, being that a lot of criticism has been voiced over the fact that the 
former Special Representative never consulted with people who are actually suffering from human 
rights violations by business enterprises (and that his consultation with other stakeholders was 
allegedly rather limited given his non-negotiable framework),1686 and that, evidently, different 
stakeholders should be involved meaningfully, including representatives from the business community, 
nongovernmental organisations and labour unions.1687  
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 See, for instance, the proposal by Melish and Meidinger to add a fourth pillar to the UN Framework on 
participation, which would respond to “the critical role and key responsibilities of civil society actors in global 
governance.” T.J. Melish, and E. Meidinger, “Protect, Respect, Remedy and Participate: ‘New Governance’ 
Lessons for the Ruggie Framework,” in ed. R. Mares, The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights 303 (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012). 
1686
 Deva, supra note, 83-83.  
1687
 Civil society was actively involved during the first two sessions of the open-ended intergovernmental 
working group for the elaboration of a binding instrument. Prior to the second session, for instance, some twenty 
nongovernmental organisations with consultative status in the Economic and Social Council (and many others) 
submitted a written contribution, and over forty participated in the session. Report A/HRC/34/47 on the second 
session of the intergovernmental working group, supra note 54, Annex 1. See also ibid. para. 14 (on the EU’s 
plea for stakeholder involvement); Ramasastry, supra note 76, 183 (arguing in favour of engaging civil society). 
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2.2.2. The role of international and regional human rights courts 
One of the main deficits in the current debate on business and human rights is the lack of consensus on 
the human rights responsibilities of business enterprises, namely which human rights bind business 
enterprises and which duties do they owe towards whom.1688 Authoritative guidance on these 
questions, as well as on how such responsibilities should then be enforced domestically, could come 
from the existing international and regional (quasi-)judicial bodies,1689 including especially the UN 
treaty bodies, the European Court of Human Rights,1690 the European Committee of Social Rights, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights,1691 and the African Commission and Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights.  
Obviously, the human rights instruments monitored by these bodies were only signed onto by states, 
and they do not create jurisdiction over private parties, like business enterprises1692 – although more 
recent treaties at least already refer to the duties of business enterprises.1693 That does not mean, 
however, that they cannot play a role in crystallizing the responsibility of business enterprises for 
human rights under domestic law.1694 Many cases that have been brought before these bodies were 
business-related matters. Well-known examples are López Ostra v. Spain1695 (European Court of 
Human Rights), Marangopoulos v. Greece1696 (European Committee of Social Rights), and Sarayaku 
v. Peru1697 (Inter-American Court of Human Rights). Each time the state was held responsible for 
human rights violations that were (at least in part) perpetrated by a business enterprise. This aligns 
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 Addo and Martin, supra note 17, 348; Baumann-Pauly and Nolan (eds), supra note 1647, 77 (referring to a 
study by the Economist Intelligent Unit in 2015 finding that the biggest obstacle is the lack of understanding 
about what corporate responsibility for human rights entails); J.M. Kamatali, “The New Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights’ Contribution in Ending the Divisive Debate over Human Rights Responsibilities of 
Companies: Is it Time for an ICJ Advisory Opinion?” Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 20(2) (2011-2012), 440. 
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 Compare with Kamatali’s call for authoritative guidance through a ruling by the International Court of 
Justice. Kamatali, supra note 1688.  
1690
 For a discussion, see L. Verdonck, “How the European Court for Human Rights evaded the Business and 
Human Rights Debate in Özel v. Turkey,” Turk. Com. L. Rev. 2(1) (2016): 111-118. 
1691
 For a discussion, see L. Verdonck and E. Desmet, “Moving human rights jurisprudence to a higher gear: 
Rewriting the Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador,” in eds. E. Brems and E. Desmet, 
Rewriting Integrated Human Rights (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017 [forthcoming]). 
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 A. Nolan (2009), supra note 1627, 229.  
1693
 See e.g. Articles 4 and 9 of Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 198.  
1694
 See also the Commentary to Principle 28 of the UNGPS, annexed to Report A/HRC/17/31, supra note 33 
(recognising the role of regional and international human rights bodies as non-state based remedies).  
1695
 European Court of Human Rights, López Ostra v. Spain, App. No. 16798/90 (9 December 1994) (concerning 
the noise and air pollution caused by a waste treatment plant).  
1696
 European Committee of Social Rights, Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights v. Greece, Collective 
Complaint No. 30/2005 (6 December 2006) (concerning serious pollution of a river due to the discharge of 
industrial waste). 
1697
 Inter-American Court for Human Rights, The Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, IACHR 
Series C No 245 (27 June 2012) (concerning an oil concession that covered an indigenous community’s 
traditional territory, causing environmental degradation and affecting the community’s traditional way of living). 
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with the prevailing ‘obligation to protect’ approach1698 and is thus perfectly justifiable, but the least 
that these bodies could have done is explicitly acknowledging that the actual perpetrator of the 
violations was a company and guiding states as to how corporate accountability for human rights 
violations should be enforced within the domestic legal order. In other words, they should recognise 
that business enterprises are responsible for human rights and specify their duties (Section 2.2.2.1) and 
provide guidance on the interaction between different liability regimes at the domestic level, such as 
state versus company liability, criminal versus civil liability and individual versus institutional liability 
(Section 2.2.2.2).  
2.2.2.1. The human rights responsibilities of companies 
It should become standard practice for human rights bodies to acknowledge, instead of ignore, the 
business element in cases that concern human rights violations by business enterprises. Some UN 
treaty bodies already do so, in particular in their general comments and concluding observations, 
where they address the human rights responsibilities of business enterprises, albeit in quite general 
terms.1699 A nice illustration is the following paragraph, included in one of the most recent general 
comments of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,1700 concerning the right to just 
and favourable conditions of work – which is obviously very relevant in the relationships between 
individuals and companies.  
Business enterprises, irrespective of size, sector, ownership and structure, should comply with 
laws that are consistent with the Covenant and have a responsibility to respect the right to just 
and favourable conditions of work, avoiding any infringements and addressing any abuse of 
the right as a result of their actions. In situations in which a business enterprise has caused or 
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 Different terminology is used by those bodies, however. For a comparison of the European Court, the Inter-
American Court, the African Commission and the European Committee, see A. Nolan (2009), supra note 1627. 
For a discussion of the UN treaty bodies, see Human Rights Council, “State responsibilities to regulate and 
adjudicate corporate activities under the United Nations core human rights treaties: an overview of treaty body 
commentaries,” Addendum to the Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of 
human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/35/Add.1 (13 
February 2007), see in particular para. 9. 
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 In individual communications, they adopt the ‘obligation to protect’ approach, like the other bodies. For a 
general discussion, see Report A/HRC/4/35/Add.1 on state responsibilities, supra note 1698. Note that the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child has even adopted a general comment dealing specifically with the 
obligations of states regarding the impact of business enterprises on children’s rights. Committee on the Rights 
of the Child, General comment No. 16 on State obligations regarding the impact of the business sector on 
children’s rights, UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/16 (17 April 2013). 
1700
 Note that this Committee, ever since its General Comment No. 12 (E/C.12/1999/5), supra note 995, has 
discussed the state obligation to protect against possible interferences by business enterprises in all its general 
comments. Report A/HRC/4/35/Add.1 on state responsibilities, supra note 1698, para. 19. 
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contributed to adverse impacts, the enterprise should remedy the damage or cooperate in its 
remediation through legitimate processes that meet recognized standards of due process.1701 
Every business-related case should be seen as an opportunity for the reviewing human rights body to 
reprove the company involved, to declare that business enterprises have human rights responsibilities 
and to specify the precise duties that business enterprises hold under the infringed rights that bind 
them1702 – the wording should preferably be less general or abstract than in the quoted paragraph, 
which is included in a general comment, however, and was thus not adopted at the occasion of a 
specific incident which would allow for more concrete findings. Depending on whether these 
corporate human rights duties are not implemented in domestic law or not enforced, and/or no 
effective remedy is available for victims, the state can then be found to have breached its obligation to 
protect for failing to take all reasonably available measures to regulate, enforce and/or ensure 
redress.1703 This would not amount to the exercise of jurisdiction over business enterprises, which 
these human rights bodies do not have, but would entail that they scrutinise corporate conduct in order 
to assess whether the state is at fault and in what way. This is only a small step to take, as in any case 
their decisions have an impact, albeit indirectly, on business enterprises.1704 
Although this approach would change little in terms of practical outcomes, all the more because no 
relief can be awarded directly against the company involved, such jurisprudence would offer 
invaluable, authoritative guidance on the human rights responsibilities of business enterprises. Besides 
strengthening the international legal framework on business and human rights by specifying the 
responsibility of business enterprises for human rights that should be implemented by states under 
domestic law in accordance with their obligation to protect,1705 such jurisprudence could also ‘forge’ 
common ground given that they are international bodies with jurisdiction over multiple states and, in 
principle, have a lot of authority. Moreover, by reproving both the responsible business enterprises and 
the state, a clear message would be sent that corporate human rights duties, even though they should 
be implemented and enforced domestically, exist independently from and complement the 
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 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General comment No. 23: the right to just and 
favourable conditions of work (article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 
UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/23 (27 April 2016), para. 75.  
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 A good practice is found at the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights. In its report following a 
visit to Mongolia, it mentioned two concrete corporate responsibilities, namely to consult regularly and directly 
with communities where their operations take play and inform them as to how they will be affected by their 
operations and restore land after mining. Human Rights Council, “Visit to Mongolia,” Addendum to the Report 
of the working group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 
UN Doc. A/HRC/23/32/Add.1 (2 April 2013), para. 95 (e)-(f). 
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 Admittedly, in some cases the state will be complicit in the human rights violations and thus also be 
responsible in its own capacity and not only vicariously.  
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 Drimmer and Laplante, supra note 238, 340. 
1705
 Greater specification of the human rights responsibilities of business enterprises is one of the most pressing 
needs in the debate on business and human rights, as was argued before (supra Part II, Section 1.2.2.2). See also 
Knox, supra note 99, 45; Ratner, supra note 98, 448 and 538. 
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responsibility of the state. Thus, a state’s failure to comply with its obligation to protect should not be 
interpreted as a safe-conduct by and for business enterprises. More guidance on the interaction 
between the respective responsibilities of the state and business enterprises is welcome.1706 As soon as 
the jurisprudence would become more settled, companies would also no longer be able to argue that 
they do not know their duties, as they would have been clarified in authoritative rulings by human 
rights bodies. 
2.2.2.2. The interaction between different accountability regimes 
Another topical issue in the business and human rights debate relates to the judicial enforcement of 
accountability for human rights violations committed by business enterprises, which also takes centre 
stage in this dissertation. As the discussion of strategic litigation has demonstrated,1707 a diversity of 
accountability regimes may exist at the domestic level. The question is, however, whether particular 
circumstances require specific judicial remedies.1708 At least three questions regarding the judicial 
enforcement of accountability could be addressed by regional and international (quasi-)judicial human 
rights bodies, when they assess whether the domestic legal framework of a responding state accords 
with its obligations. In particular, these imponderables relate to the interaction between state and 
company liability, between criminal and civil liability, and between institutional and individual 
liability.  
A first concern relates to the interplay between state and company liability, in particular whether, if a 
business enterprise violates human rights, a cause of action should be available against both the state 
and the company, or whether victims should be content if they can sue one of them, or whether that 
depends on the circumstances of the case and, if so, in what way. On the one hand, it is possible that a 
state decides to implement its obligation to protect the rights of its people by creating a public remedy 
that substitutes any private remedy and, hence, excludes the possibility to sue the actual perpetrator. In 
that regard, the South African Constitutional Court, for instance, has held that “the state’s 
constitutional duty to protect and enforce the right to security of the person need not always include a 
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 See also Bilchitz (2013b), supra note 217, 128 (writing that “in order to justify differential responsibilities, 
there is a need to have a clear conception of the respective roles of the corporation and the state”). For a 
discussion of how obligations could be attributed to different actors, see e.g. Vandenhole, supra note 117. In 
relation to primary norms, they argue for complementary duties on the part of host states, third states and non-
state actors, with primary obligations for the host state, and either simultaneous or subsidiary obligations for the 
other actors. As to secondary norms, they argue for shared responsibility, with the degree of responsibility being 
dependent on the scope of obligations and the liability for monetary compensation on the degree of 
responsibility. Note, however, that contrary to most domestic legal systems, international law is not very familiar 
with the idea of shared responsibility. A. Nollkaemper and D. Jacobs, “Shared Responsibility in International 
Law: A Conceptual Framework,” Mich. J. Int'l L. 34 (2012-2013): 359-438. 
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 See supra Part II, Section 2.2 (fundamental part) and Part III, Section 2.6 (case study). 
1708
 Compare also with the statement by Zerk that “there is still a lack of consensus as to which specific features 
of specific jurisdictions amount to unacceptable barriers to justice in practice.” Zerk (2014), supra note 212, 87.  
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civil claim for damages in delict or indeed any private law remedy”1709 – this judgment did not relate 
specifically to business and human rights, however, but concerned the fact that in South Africa victims 
of traffic accidents are entitled to a compensation award from a fund, but cannot sue any person who 
allegedly caused the accident. Arguably, however, at least under certain circumstances, depriving 
victims of the opportunity to call the actual perpetrator to account interferes with their right to have 
access to the courts. 
On the other hand, a state may also decide to restrict victims’ ability to sue state actors. It is 
remarkable in this regard that discussions on ‘access to remedy’ focus mainly on the possibilities of 
calling companies to account. The more recent ‘accountability and access to remedy’ project of the 
Office of the UN High Commissioner, for instance, makes no mention of the possibilities to hold 
government accountable for its failure to prevent human rights violations and/or to offer an effective 
remedy.1710 Nonetheless, the case study has indicated that victims, activists and their lawyers 
sometimes prefer to sue government for its failure to regulate, enforce or ensure redress. Therefore, it 
would be useful to know under what circumstances, if any, it is sufficient for states to provide a cause 
of action against companies but not against any state actor that may have failed to comply with its 
duties.1711  
Second, there is little guidance as regards which human rights violations by business enterprises 
should be dealt with under criminal law, as opposed to mere civil or administrative law. Arguably, not 
every failure by a company to comply with its human rights duties should qualify as a crime, whilst, in 
turn, there may be instances where dealing with corporate abuse through civil or administrative law 
would fly in the face of justice. Human rights bodies are not unfamiliar with making such assessments. 
The European Court of Human Rights, for instance, has in a number of cases found that certain 
breaches of human rights, like intentional killings, slavery and forced labour and human trafficking,1712 
should be covered by criminal law. Evidently, however, those judgments did not deal directly with the 
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 Law Society of South Africa and Others v. Minister for Transport and Another (CCT 38/10) [2010] ZACC 
25 (25 November 2010), para. 79. 
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 A rare exception is found in the recommendations following the visit by the Working Group on business and 
human rights to Mongolia, one of which stipulates that government should “ensure that independent 
administrative courts are empowered to effectively review complaints against administrative organs; review the 
decisions and actions of public officials that violate human rights; and prevent administrative abuses and 
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 European Court of Human Rights, Oneryildiz v. Turkey, App. No. 48939/99 (30 November 2004), para. 92; 
Siliadin v. France, App. no. 73316/01 (26 July 2005), paras 89 and 112; Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, App. No. 
25965/04 (7 January 2010), para. 284. 
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liability of business enterprises but stuck to the traditional approach, meaning that the Court assessed 
the extent to which the state complied with its obligations by designing an effective domestic legal 
framework. 
The third and final question relating to the enforcement of accountability for human rights violations 
by business enterprises concerns the extent to which states are free, first, to accept or decline that legal 
entities, such as companies, can be held accountable and, second, if they provide for such liability, to 
regulate the interaction between individual and institutional liability. In relation to the controversial 
issue of institutional corporate criminal liability (supra Part II, Section 2.2.3.2), the UN Guidance, for 
instance, stipulates that if no such liability exists there should be a viable alternative, such as an 
administrative law regime that includes the option of imposing certain sanctions on companies.1713 
Human rights bodies should at least side with that position – and may even recommend states to 
consider recognizing that companies are criminally responsible. Next, when both individual and 
institutional liability is available in principle, which should be the case at least in civil matters, human 
rights bodies could also provide guidance as to how responsibility should be allocated between 
individuals and companies. For instance, victims would benefit most if the responsibility of company 
and responsible individuals is shared and if they can be held jointly and severally liable, which 
improves their chances of actually being compensated. 
At present, states are left the discretion to adopt the liability regime they see fit. As both the 
fundamental part of the dissertation and the case study have demonstrated,1714 however, litigating 
parties may hold different views about who is responsible, and they may pursue different objectives 
when they resort to litigation.1715 Therefore, adopting a victim-oriented perspective, this dissertation 
submits that in relation to the different liability regimes (state versus company, criminal versus civil 
and institutional versus individual) as much flexibility as possible should be left to victims. Such 
perspective is arguably mandated by human rights law given the prominent place of the right to an 
effective remedy within the system (supra Section 2.1), a right that is vested in the persons whose 
rights are violated. Hence, victims should be able to decide, based on the circumstances of the case 
and their personal preferences, who they want to hold accountable (state, company or individual 
agents) and on what basis (civil or criminal). From a victim-oriented perspective, a one-size-fits-all 
approach does not seem to be appropriate. Rather, a holistic approach should be adopted that offers all 
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 Guidance on corporate accountability and access to judicial remedy (A/HRC/32/19), supra note 213, element 
1.2 (stipulating that “domestic public law regimes make appropriate provisions for corporate criminal liability, or 
its functional equivalent, in cases where business-related human rights impacts are severe”) [emphasis added].  
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 See, in particular, Part II, Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 , and Part III,, Sections 2.6.2 and 2.6.3. 
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 Saunders identifies at least the following ten objectives: securing redress; assigning responsibility; seeing 
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available avenues.1716 In this context, human rights bodies should take up their role to guide states as to 
when, at the very minimum, the different liability regimes should exist concurrently, without being 
mutually exclusive.  
Of course, the jurisprudence of human rights bodies could also provide guidance on other issues 
relating to the enforcement of accountability, aside from the interaction between the different liability 
regimes. By way of illustration, two such questions concern the impact that the qualification of certain 
conduct as a human rights violation may or should have, respectively, on the applicable rules of 
procedural law and on the available forms of relief. An important concern in relation to the rules of 
procedural law concerns the burden and standard of proof, for instance. The UN Guidance is quite 
vague on that point and stipulates only that an ‘appropriate balance’ should be struck “between 
considerations of access to remedy and fairness to all parties”.1717 As to the issue of relief, there is little 
clarity on the precise forms of relief that should be available against companies.1718 Both the 
fundamental study and the case study in this dissertation suggest that flexibility is again crucial. This 
is also recognised by the UN Guidance, which provides that courts should be able “to award a range of 
remedies (…) that may include monetary damages and/or non-monetary remedial measures, such as 
orders for restitution, measures to assist with the rehabilitation of victims and/or resources, satisfaction 
(…) and guarantees of non-repetition (…).”1719 When they are called to rule on business-related 
matters, human rights bodies could thus also integrate guidelines in their rulings concerning burdens 
and standards of proof and the forms of relief that should be available, against the actual perpetrator 
and state actors that have failed to comply with their duties.  
2.2.3. Principles based on mapping and best practices 
2.2.3.1. The approach 
The second proposal to advance the international legal framework on business and human rights is to 
develop principles regarding specific issues within the business and human rights field, either 
immediately at the level of the UN or first at the regional level, like the African Union, the 
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 See also Černič (2015b), supra note 217, 86; Černič (2016), supra note 77, 209 and 211. 
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 Guidance on corporate accountability and access to judicial remedy (A/HRC/32/19), supra note 213, 
elements 1.7 and 12.5. Illustrative examples given in the companion document are the adjustment of standards 
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Companion document to A/HRC/32/19 with illustrative examples on corporate accountability and access to 
remedy, supra note 230, 7, 11, and 25-26. 
1718
 Cf. Deva (2013), supra note 42, 102 (writing that the UNGPs are “silent as to what exact remedies victims of 
corporate human rights abuses can have against companies”).  
1719
 Guidance on corporate accountability and access to judicial remedy (A/HRC/32/19), supra note 213, element 
19.1. 
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Organization of American States and the Council of Europe or the EU, and subsequently at the 
international level.1720 Admittedly, the UN Guidance on improving corporate accountability and access 
to remedy is an important step in this direction, but at the same time the document only includes very 
general policy objectives and implementing elements, and the concrete examples in the companion 
document are illustrative, not prescriptive and “certainly not exhaustive”.1721 The Human Rights 
Council has, moreover, not endorsed the UN Guidance but only ‘welcomed’ the work by the High 
Commissioner.1722  
A first step towards the adoption of a more robust set of principles would arguably require “a thorough 
investigation of approaches taken in different jurisdictions.”1723 That is also why this dissertation 
supports the call by the Human Rights Council that states would review their domestic law regimes 
based on the UN Guidance.1724 The higher the number of states acting upon that call, the fuller the 
picture that will be painted of existing judicial remedies, which could then be used not only to identify 
common ground but possibly also to ascertain whether there are certain features of domestic legal 
orders that are unacceptable because they seriously hamper the ability of rights holders to vindicate 
their rights.1725  
Based on such extensive mapping exercise, best practice models could then be discerned and, 
subsequently, principles derived from them.1726 In a first stage those principles could still be 
formulated as recommendations, being more or less deferential to states depending on the degree of 
convergence that exists regarding a particular element. However, if based on the mapping exercise 
certain rules or practices are considered insuperable obstacles to justice, the recommendation should 
be more robust and states should be urged to eliminate those obstacles. Following their adoption states 
should be encouraged to draft a strategy to respond to the recommendations, for instance by making 
specific commitments in the context of their national action plans.1727 After a few years, the principles 
could be re-evaluated in order to assess whether it is necessary and possible to translate them into 
binding rules or to make them more concrete or robust in another way, and whether other principles 
                                                     
1720
 Compare with Ramasastry, who has examined the lessons that the business and human rights field could 
learn from the anti-corruption movement. Also the United Nations Convention Against Corruption was preceded 
by a series of regional treaties. Ramasastry, supra note 76. 
1721
 Companion document to A/HRC/32/19 with illustrative examples on corporate accountability and access to 
remedy, supra note 230, 2. 
1722
 Resolution 32/10 of the Human Rights Council, supra note 1656, para.1. 
1723
 Companion document to A/HRC/32/19 with illustrative examples on corporate accountability and access to 
remedy, supra note 230, 2.  
1724
 Resolution 32/10 of the Human Rights Council, supra note 1656, para. 4. 
1725
 Zerk (2014), supra note 212, 87 (quoted supra in note 1707).  
1726
 Ibid. 11 (writing that best practice models can show “what effective state responses to the problem of 
business involvement in gross human rights abuses would look like in practice”).  
1727
 Cf. Resolution 32/10 of the Human Rights Council, supra note 1656, para. 5.  
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need to be added. Also their endorsement by the Human Rights Council – or possibly even the General 
Assembly – should be considered.  
As also Zerk has acknowledged,1728 the risk to this approach is that if principles are presented as 
minimum standards, they may become a floor. In particular, states may refrain from pursuing higher 
objectives and adopting more stringent standards. Arguably, however, human rights law is familiar 
with such a risk, as any human rights treaty or instrument may become a floor. The challenge will 
rather be to formulate principles that are sufficiently flexible for adaptation to the local context as well 
as to the company-specific context1729 while avoiding that they are so vague that they become 
inconsequential. Moreover, an advantage of this approach is that it is quite common for principles to 
be developed at the international (or regional) level so as to guide states on how they should design 
their domestic legal framework. One illustration are the ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right 
to a Remedy and Reparation’,1730 which were referenced at several occasions throughout this 
dissertation. Those principles were adopted by the UN General Assembly, which has recommended 
states to “take [them] into account, promote respect thereof and bring them to the attention of members 
of the executive bodies of government, (….) legislative bodies, the judiciary (…)”.1731  
Examples can be found at the regional level as well. In June 2013, for instance, the EU Commission 
has issued a recommendation on collective redress mechanisms1732 – which is not concerned 
specifically with business and human rights, but more generally with “violations of rights granted 
under Union law”.1733 The instrument concentrates on one specific element, namely the availability of 
collective redress mechanisms – although in connection therewith it touches upon a number of related 
issues such as litigation funding – and is quite robust in at least two ways. First, states are urged to 
take measures so as to implement the principles included in the recommendation within two years of 
its adoption and they have to report thereon to the Commission. Within four years the Commission 
would then assess the need for further action, including, possibly, legislative measures at the level of 
the EU.1734 Second, the principles are not always very deferential to states. A good example is Article 
4 which stipulates that states “should designate representative entities to bring representative actions 
on the basis of clearly defined conditions of eligibility” and is followed by three requirements that 
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 Zerk (2014), supra note 212, 107. 
1729
 After all, contrary to states, which in abstracto share many common features, the diversity amongst business 
enterprises is quasi-infinite.  
1730
 UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy (A/RES/60/147), supra note 396.  
1731
 Resolution 60/147 of the General Assembly, supra note 396, para. 2. 
1732
 Recommendation n° 2013/396/EU of the Commission of the European Union of 11 June 2013 on common 
principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning 
violations of rights granted under Union Law, O.J. L 201/60 (26 July 2013).  
1733
 Ibid. Article 1. 
1734
 Ibid. Recitals 24-26. At the time of writing it was not clear whether any follow-up action is being considered 
by the Commission.  
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should at least be included in the conditions set by law. Importantly, although the recommendation 
claims to pursue an appropriate balance between ensuring access to the courts, on the one hand, and 
avoiding abuse and protecting sound administration of justice, on the other,1735 that balance seems to 
have resulted in a bias against certain ideas, which stands at odds with the findings in this dissertation 
as well as with the recommendations of the Office of the UN High Commissioner. Examples are the 
prejudice against contingency fees,1736 and the principled acceptance of the loser pays rule.1737 
It should be observed that also nongovernmental organisations have studied domestic legal 
frameworks and issued principles or recommendations as to how states should design their laws and 
policies so as to improve their effectiveness. Two examples are the ‘Corporate Crime Principles’ 
developed jointly by Amnesty International and the International Corporate Accountability 
Roundtable1738 and, at the regional level, the project by the International Alliance on Natural 
Resources in Africa to develop model mining legislation.1739  
2.2.3.2. Some issues to be covered 
It was said before that the business and human rights field embraces a nearly infinite diversity of 
issues. Whether all these issues can be tackled in one instrument is even questionable, although there 
are many links amongst them. The discussion below, however, focuses on four issues that can either 
facilitate or obstruct access to judicial remedies for victims of human rights violations by business 
enterprises and that featured prominently in the case study: access to legal services (i), standing rights 
(ii), costs (including adverse costs orders) (iii), and rules on establishing parent company liability 
(iv).1740 These issues were selected having regard to the earlier examination of the lessons learnt from 
the case study (supra Section 1.2.1) and taking into account the issues that have already been 
mentioned in the context of the first proposal on the role of human rights bodies (supra Section 2.2.2).  
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 See ibid. Recitals 9-10 and 20-21 and Article 1.  
1736
 Ibid. Article 30. 
1737
 Ibid. Article 13. 
1738
 Amnesty International and International Corporate Accountability Roundtable, The Corporate Crimes 
Principles: Advancing Investigations and Prosecutions in Human Rights Cases (October 2016). 
1739
 Based on an examination of the mining law in five countries (Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Kenya, South Africa, and Zimbabwe), focusing on fourteen ‘focus areas’ (such as ownership or custodianship of 
minerals, mineral rights, resettlement and access to information), the Alliance has identified a number of gaps in 
the law and has already issued some recommendations for the model mining law (which they are still working 
on). International Alliance on Natural Resources in Africa, African Mining and Mineral Policy Guide: A 
resource for non-governmental organisations, activists, communities, governments and academics (2016). 
1740
 Note that the potential barriers that the rules and practices relating to these issues could create is not unique 
to the business and human rights debate, or even to human rights litigation as such. See also Addendum to the 
guidance on corporate accountability and access to remedy (A/HRC/32/19/Add.1), supra note 387, para. 57. 
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(i) Access to legal services 
Diversified sources for free or cheap legal representation are one important way to facilitate, on a 
practical level, access to judicial remedies, as also the UN Guidance already acknowledges.1741 Aside 
from the creation of a state-based legal aid system, the UN Guidance recommends states to encourage 
pro bono legal services and to permit a range of private funding arrangements, albeit subject to 
appropriate regulation, including funding by third party litigation funders, by providers of litigation 
insurances and by lawyers pursuant to a contingency fee agreement.1742 In addition, the companion 
document of the Office of the High Commissioner lists some examples of state-based legal aid 
systems, of manners to improve the availability of and access to pro bono legal services and of 
adequate ways to regulate private litigation funding arrangements.1743 One specific source of legal aid 
that does not feature explicitly in the companion document, but that is typical to the South Africa legal 
landscape, for instance, are the free legal services offered by non-profit, donor-funded public interest 
law firms. That experience may definitely also be informative for other states.  
As to the way forward, a mapping of the different sources for legal aid available in countries across the 
globe would, first of all, be intrinsically valuable, as the South African example shows that there may 
exist interesting practices from which other states could learn as well. Furthermore, future principles 
should not only urge states to facilitate the availability of, and access to, diversified private sources of 
legal aid, which should exist alongside a state-based legal aid system, but should also provide more 
robust recommendations especially as regards private funding arrangements. For instance, in many 
countries contingency fee agreements are prohibited, either by law or by lawyers’ professional code of 
conduct.1744 Also the recommendation of the EU Commission demonstrates that there still exists a 
strong prejudice against such arrangements.1745 Nevertheless, rather than prohibiting private funding 
arrangements, which may be the last resort for indigent victims of human rights violations, it seems 
more appropriate to adopt adequate regulations that minimise the risk of abuse.1746  
(ii) Standing rights 
Another issue that should be the subject of an extensive mapping exercise and that could, 
subsequently, be included in principles, are standing rights. Rules on the capacity to sue may 
                                                     
1741
 Guidance on corporate accountability and access to remedy (A/HRC/32/19), supra note 213, policy objective 
15. 
1742
 Ibid. elements 15.2, 15.4 and 15.5. 
1743
 Companion document to A/HRC/32/19 with illustrative examples on corporate accountability and access to 
remedy, supra note 230, 29-31. 
1744
 Zerk (2014), supra note 212, 80-81.  
1745
 See Article 30 of Recommendation n° 2013/396/EU, supra note 1732.  
1746
 Cf. Zerk (2014), supra note 212, 80-81 (identifying the “impermissibility of contingency fee arrangements” 
as a financial barrier).  
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constitute an important procedural barrier to judicial remedies. The case study in South Africa has, for 
instance, demonstrated how access to the courts is improved significantly by wide standing rights, 
which admit public interest litigation and class actions. Sometimes these vehicles constitute the only 
road to a remedy for the poorest and most vulnerable victim groups, definitely when they are dispersed 
and when the number of affected persons is not well known. 
Also the UN Guidance stipulates, in the context of the need to ensure access to diversified sources of 
litigation funding, that rules of civil procedure should provide for ‘collective redress mechanisms’.1747 
Whilst it is indeed true that such mechanisms may increase litigants’ ability to secure access to free or 
cheap legal services, their value extends beyond this one advantage and includes benefits such as 
facilitating the production of evidence, lowering the cost of litigating, reducing the work load for 
courts, and ensuring more collectivised forms of relief. The companion document to the UN Guidance 
enumerates, by way of example, a number of collective redress mechanisms, namely class actions,1748 
representative actions, regime-specific actions (for instance in environmental law), and provisions for 
the consolidation of claims or their simultaneous hearing,1749 but leaves states free to provide for any 
of them. 
A more robust recommendation urging states to provide for collective redress mechanisms should be 
adopted, which recognises their overall importance, not only for access to legal services. 
Notwithstanding its limitations, the recommendation of the EU Commission, for instance, urges states 
at least to allow certain organisations to bring actions on behalf of a group of affected individuals.1750 
Another example of a strong recommendation is found in the report of the Working Group on 
Business and Human Rights following its visit to Mongolia, in which it calls upon that state to 
consider broadening its standing rights so as to enable public interest litigation.1751 Depending on the 
results of an extensive mapping exercise, a general principle in that regard could perhaps be issued. 
More detailed guidelines could also be provided regarding the conditions that should be met for 
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 Guidance on corporate accountability and access to remedy (A/HRC/32/19), supra note 213, element 15.3. 
1748
 Note that the companion document of the Office of the High Commissioner mentions the possibility of both 
opt-in and opt-out class actions, whilst the recommendation of the European Commission is clearly in favour of 
opt-in classes. Companion document to A/HRC/32/19 with illustrative examples on corporate accountability and 
access to remedy, supra note 230, 30; Article 21 of Recommendation n° 2013/396/EU, supra note 1732. See 
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 Article 4 of Recommendation n° 2013/396/EU, supra note 1732. 
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 “Visit to Mongolia” (A/HRC/23/32/Add.1), supra note 1702, para. 87(f). 
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collective redress mechanisms to be available.1752 The flexible criteria applicable to public interest 
litigation and class actions in South Africa could, for instance, be informative in that regard.  
(iii) Costs 
Because the costs of litigation can be high and even too high for many victims of human rights 
violations by business enterprises, states should be encouraged to cap those costs as much as 
possible.1753 In that regard the UN Guidance, for instance, states that court fees should be reasonable 
and proportionate and that the costs associated with litigation should be reduced through better case 
management and other efficiency measures.1754 Moreover, waivers of court fees should be considered 
in case of indigent parties or litigation in the public interest.1755  
Another issue concerns the risk for a losing party to be slapped with costs. The UN Guidance, for 
instance, pleads for rules on the allocation of costs that “encourage reasonableness on the part of 
litigants, efficient use of legal and other resources in the pursuit of any claim or defence to a claim 
and, as far as possible, the swift conclusion of legal claims.”1756 This part of the UN Guidance should 
have stressed more that states must also be careful not to discourage litigants. Even if they are able to 
secure legal services, a potential adverse costs order may deter them from pursuing their case, and thus 
constitute an important barrier to access the courts.1757 As the case study has demonstrated, in South 
Africa, for instance, in principle no costs order is adopted if public interest litigation against the state 
is unsuccessful. Therefore, it would be interesting to know how other states deal with the issue of costs 
orders and whether best practices could be identified and principles recommended to all states.1758  
(iv) Parent company liability 
Finally, the issue of parent company liability has attracted a lot of scholarly debate, in particular in the 
context of multinational enterprise groups.1759 However, even in the case of litigation in the host state, 
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 The Guidance only stipulates that the criteria for such mechanisms should be “clearly expressed and 
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parties may be interested to sue a parent company that is based in that same country for the conduct or 
activities of its subsidiary. The problem is that establishing liability on the part of a parent company is 
complex due to the principle of separate legal personality, which is widely shared amongst states.1760  
The UN Guidance only addresses the problem of parent company liability by advising states to be 
transparent about what is expected from business enterprises, as the following element shows.  
Domestic public law regimes communicate clearly the standards of management and 
supervision expected of different constituents of group business enterprises with respect to the 
identification, prevention and mitigation of human rights impacts associated with or arising 
from group operations, on the basis of their role and position within the group business 
enterprise, and take appropriate account of the diversity of relationships and linkages through 
which business enterprises may operate, including equity-based and contract-based 
relationships.1761  
The UN Guidance does not include any recommendations on the substance of such standards, which is 
left to the discretion of states. Also the companion document is mainly concerned with the way in 
which standards should be communicated and less with their content; the recommendations mention 
only very few concrete duties,1762 including the establishment of management and risk control systems, 
the training of personnel, and the provision of internal communication systems.1763  
The best chance for litigating parties to hold parent companies accountable seems to consist of arguing 
that the parent company has violated a specific duty of care that it owed towards a certain stakeholder 
group. It is not clear, however, how many states accept such (or a similar) rule. Moreover, whether a 
specific duty of care on the part of parent companies may exist towards other stakeholder groups than 
their subsidiaries’ employees, is uncertain. There are many other outstanding questions, such as the 
precise duties that may arise from such a duty of care. Hence, international principles could, for 
instance, recommend states to provide for a specific duty of care on the part of parent companies, 
advance general standards concerning the elements that must be established for such duty to exist and 
concerning how the stakeholders towards whom such duty is owed should be identified, and specify 
the minimum standards of conduct that would be expected from parent companies under this duty.  
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2.3. Need for further mapping and research  
The business and human rights field looks like an enormous spider web that criss-crosses the entire 
legal spectrum and touches upon infinite issues, which are not limited to law. It seems nearly 
impossible to give a straightforward answer to the question whether the responsibility of business 
enterprises for human rights is effectively ensured within a given domestic legal order and whether, in 
case of a violation, victims can access the domestic court system in order to vindicate their rights. It 
was mentioned several times throughout this final Part of the dissertation, but further research is 
definitely required. In particular, existing laws and practices relating to business and human rights 
should be mapped and normative research should be conducted into a number of specific issues.  
First of all, the need to comprehensively map the existing domestic law regimes and to collect data on 
the actual experiences of stakeholders who get involved in cases relating to business and human rights 
(similar to the data that were collected in the context of the case study for this dissertation) is pressing. 
As was argued before, best practice models could be developed based on such mapping exercises and 
principles issued, which could gradually forge common ground at least with regard to those rules and 
practices that could significantly improve the protection of human rights and strengthen accountability 
for business-related abuses, or that could remove inacceptable barriers to remedies. The results of such 
research could also be useful for regional and international (quasi-)judicial human rights bodies when 
they are called to rule on business-related cases, if they accept their role in strengthening the 
international legal framework on business and human rights.  
In addition, a number of normative questions should be explored further. One such query, which was 
not discussed in this dissertation but with which the researcher has struggled, relates to which conduct 
by business enterprises should rightly qualify as a human rights violation. This concern is not unique 
to the business and human rights debate, however. More generally, the concern has been voiced 
whether human rights are not bandied about, in the sense that ‘ordinary’ cases, such as ‘ordinary torts’, 
are upgraded to human rights cases. Other normative questions concern how corporate human rights 
duties should be derived from the existing state-centred human rights instruments, which types of 
obligations business enterprises should bear, and how an adequate approach to business-related abuses 
in weak governance zones could look like. In relation to the enforcement of accountability for human 
rights violations by business enterprises, issues that require further research relate, for instance, to the 
question when the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over business enterprises should be 
considered legitimate (and perhaps obligatory), and whether the ‘sacred’ principle of separate legal 
personality is still justified in the present times.  
The business and human rights field remains in many ways uncharted legal domain. The UNGPs are 
invaluable, however, in that they have provided a common baseline from which the international legal 
framework can be advanced as well as a skeleton to further explore the nitty-gritty of the business and 
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human rights field. Nevertheless, at this stage, discussing the elaboration of a comprehensive 
initiative, such as a binding treaty on business and human rights, seems premature. More data need to 
be collected and processed first, and more knowledge acquired.  
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ANNEX 1. EMPIRICAL DATA 
Table 13. Respondents 
 Table 13. Respondents 
 Name Position Organisation Date 
Lawyers Emma Algotsson Attorney  Lawyers for human rights  12/11/2014 
Michael Clements Attorney Lawyers for human rights  18/03/2016 
e-mail  
Louise du Plessis Attorney Lawyers for human rights  23/05/2016 
Osmond 
Mngomezulu1764 
Attorney 
Chief Legal 
officer 
Lawyers for human rights  
South African Human Rights 
Commission 
02/02/2015 
23/04/2016 
Naseema Fakir Attorney  Legal Resources Centre  19/11/2014 
16/03/2016 
Sayi Nindi Attorney Legal Resources Centre  19/11/2014 
16/03/2016 
Jason Brickhill Counsel  Legal Resources Centre  25/11/2014 
Wilmien Wicomb Attorney Legal Resources Centre  11/02/2015 
Sithuthukile Mkhize Attorney Legal Resources Centre  25/03/2015 
Neo Nong Legal researcher Legal Resources Centre  16/03/2016 
Richard Spoor Attorney  Richard Spoor Attorneys 02/12/2014 
George Kahn Attorney Richard Spoor Attorneys 15/12/2014 
e-mail  
Georgina Jephson Attorney Richard Spoor Attorneys 12/01/2015 
11/03/2016 
e-mail  
Tracey Davies Attorney Centre for Environmental Rights 04/12/2015 
Catherine Horsfield Attorney Centre for Environmental Rights 04/12/2015 
Lisa Chamberlain Attorney  Centre for Applied Legal Studies 09/12/2014 
Louis Snyman Attorney Centre for Applied Legal Studies 09/12/2014 
Robert Krause Legal researcher  Centre for Applied Legal Studies 11/12/2014 
24/03/2016 
Nomonde Nyembe Attorney Centre for Applied Legal Studies 09/12/2014 
Nomzamo Zondo Attorney Socio-Economic Rights Institute 12/12/2014 
Achmed Mayet Attorney  Legal Aid South Africa  08/01/2015 
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 He had changed jobs by the time of the second interview. 
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Umunyana Rugege Attorney Section27 23/01/2015 
John Stephens Legal Researcher Section27 26/02/2015 
01/06/2016 
Charles Abraham Attorney Abrahams Kiewitz Attorneys 13/02/2015 
Zanele Mbuyisa Attorney Mbuyisa Neale Attorneys 11/04/2016 
Activists Robby Mogalaka Coal Campaign 
Manager 
GroundWork 27/11/2014 
Mashile Phalane Director 
Community 
Liaison Officer  
Batlhabine Foundation 
Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
15/12/2014 
Judith Taylor Member Earthlife Africa Johannesburg 10/01/2015 
Anne Mayher Coordinator International Alliance on Natural 
Resources in Africa 
18/02/2015 
Mariette Liefferink Director Federation for a Sustainable 
Environment 
e-mail  
Lucas Moloto Workshop 
facilitator 
Federation for a Sustainable 
Environment 
27/02/2015 
Experts Melanie Murcott Lecturer  University of Pretoria 15/01/2015 
David Fig Chair 
Researcher  
Board of Trustees Biowatch 
University of Cape Town and the 
Transnational Institute in 
Amsterdam 
14/01/2015 
06/05/2016 
Jill Murray Pathologist National Institute for 
Occupational Health 
03/02/2015 
Tina Da Cruz Trust manager Asbestos Relief Trust 
Kgalagadi Relief Trust 
11/03/2016 
Janet Love1765 Commissioner 
 
National Director 
South African Human Rights 
Commission 
Legal Resources Centre 
09/05/2016 
                                                     
1765
 Shortly before the interview she was appointed to the Electoral Commission and a few weeks later she left 
her position at the Human Rights Commission.  
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Table 14. Observations 
Table 14. Observations1766 
Type (and title) Parties1767 Date Explanatory notes 
Field visit to the 
West Rand mines 
Federation for a 
Sustainable 
Environment 
28/11/2014  
18/12/2014 
- Visit of (abandoned and operating) 
mines and affected communities, 
including Tudor Shaft 
6th Alternative 
Mining Indaba 
Economic Justice 
Network of the 
Fellowship of 
Christian Councils in 
Southern Africa 
09-12/02/2015 - A platform for communities 
affected by mining 
- Organised in parallel with the 
African Mining Indaba 
- Attended mainly by representatives 
from civil society and members of 
affected communities  
- Not limited to South Africa 
Mining company - 
Community  
Federation for a 
Sustainable 
Environment 
27/02/2015 
17/03/2016 
- Feedback meetings between 
representatives of the mine and 
members of the neighbouring 
community on adverse impacts and 
on social investment projects 
Training on natural 
resource governance 
Southern African 
Development 
Community (SADC) 
Lawyers’ Association 
09/03/2015 
10/03/2015  
12/03/2015 
- Included sessions on natural 
resource governance, advocacy 
and strategic litigation  
- Intended for lawyers within the 
SADC 
Field visit to the 
mines in Soweto 
Bench Marks 
Foundation  
12/03/20151768 - Visit of abandoned mines and 
affected communities 
Attorney – client  Richard Spoor 
Attorneys 
07/03/2015 
19/03/2015 
- Community affected by a mine 
- Instructions from the client 
Short course on 
environmental law 
University of Pretoria 17/03/2015 - Introduction to the applicable legal 
framework, including NEMA, 
PAJA and PAIA 
- Attended mainly by civil servants 
and lawyers  
                                                     
1766
 The information is anonymised for confidential meetings. 
1767
 This column mentions either the organiser (in case of a seminar, conference, course of field trip) or the party 
that invited the researcher (in case of a meeting).  
1768
 This field trip took place in the context of the training organised by the Southern African Development 
Community Lawyers’ Association. 
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Seminar on 
transparency in the 
mining industry 
South African Human 
Rights Commission 
20/03/2015 - Included discussions on open 
government and open data, the use 
of the law to promote disclosure, 
and transparency in relation to 
social and labour plans 
- Attended mainly by representatives 
from civil society 
Field visit to the 
Blyvooruitzicht 
mine 
Federation for a 
Sustainable 
Environment 
23/03/2016 - Visit of an abandoned mine and the 
affected community 
Attorney – counsel 
– expert  
Richard Spoor 
Attorneys 
12/04/2016 - Health hazards due to the working 
conditions at the mines  
- Preparation for trial: consultation 
with experts  
Attorney – counsel 
– client  
Richard Spoor 
Attorneys 
13/04/2016 - Health hazards due to the working 
conditions at the mines 
- Preparation for trial: story of the 
mineworkers  
Attorney – mining 
company  
Richard Spoor 
Attorneys 
21/04/2016 - Resettlement of a community 
affected by mining 
- Negotiations between the 
community’s attorneys, 
representatives of the mine and the 
former landowner 
Attorney – counsel Richard Spoor 
Attorneys 
21/04/2016 - Community affected by mining 
- Strategic discussion on a possible 
test case  
Seminar on mine 
closure 
Centre for 
Environmental Rights 
05/05/2016 - Panel presentation by experts on 
the applicable legal framework in 
relation to mine closure 
- Attended mainly by activists and 
lawyers 
Attorney – counsel 
– activist – client – 
expert  
Federation for a 
Sustainable 
Environment & 
Lawyers for Human 
Rights 
11/05/2016 - Adverse impacts of a non-
rehabilitated, abandoned mine on 
the environment and public health 
- General discussion of the options 
to litigate 
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Table 15. Directly relevant and related cases 
Table 15. Directly relevant and related cases1769 
Short case title Litigating party1770 Counterparty1771 Issue 
Directly relevant cases 
Bareki v. Gencor Community & 
advocacy 
organisation 
Mining company & 
government 
Rehabilitation of a site 
polluted by asbestos  
Blom v. Anglo American* Mineworker Mining company Silicosis 
Escarpment Environment 
Protection Group v. 
Department of Water 
Affairs  
Community & 
advocacy 
organisation 
Government & 
mining company 
Water use license 
(environmental impacts) 
Escarpment Environment 
Protection Group v. 
Minister of Water  
Community & 
advocacy 
organisation 
Government & 
mining company 
 
Water use license 
(environmental impacts); 
appointment of water 
tribunal  
Federation for Sustainable 
Environment v. Minister of 
Water Affairs  
Community & 
advocacy 
organisation 
Government Water contamination due to 
acid mine drainage  
Federation for Sustainable 
Environment v. National 
Nuclear Regulator  
Community & 
advocacy 
organisation 
Government & 
company 
Rehabilitation of a 
uraniferous site 
Mahaeeane v. AngloGold 
Ashanti** 
Mineworkers Mining company Access to information 
relating to silicosis  
Makoti v. Sasol  Mineworkers Mining company Pneumoconiosis 
Mankayi v. AngloGold 
Ashanti  
Mineworker Mining company Silicosis  
Nkala v. Harmony Gold** Mineworkers Mining company Silicosis 
Qubeka v. AngloGold* Mineworker Mining company Silicosis 
S v. Blue Platinum 
Ventures*** 
Community Mining company  Rehabilitation of a degraded 
area 
                                                     
1769
 The table is organised alphabetically. The title of ongoing cases (in which a final decision has not yet been 
adopted) is italicised. If the title is followed by one or most asterisks, this means that the case was settled (*), is 
on appeal (**) or has been remitted to the court that took the original decision (***). 
1770
 For this Table, the term ‘litigating parties’ refers to (1) the applicants or plaintiffs, or (2) the aggrieved 
parties in criminal proceedings, even though the prosecuting party is the state. Note that ‘litigating party’ refers 
to the party that initiated the proceedings, even if on appeal that party becomes the ‘responding party’.  
1771
 For this Table, the term ‘counterparty’ refers to (1) the respondents or defendants (even if the party is only 
cited for its interests, see Table 17a), or (2) the accused parties in criminal proceedings. Note that ‘counterparty’ 
refers to the party against whom the proceedings were initiated, even if on appeal that party is the ‘appellant’. 
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S v. Blyvooruitzicht Gold  Community Mining company Seriously degraded area  
Strömbeck v. Harmony 
Gold  
Mineworker Mining company Silicosis 
Van Eck v. Clyde 
Brickfields  
Community Mining company & 
government 
Dust, noise and air pollution 
Vhembe v. MEC Economic 
Development  
Community & 
advocacy 
organisation 
Government & 
mining company 
Environmental authorisation 
(Environmental impacts) 
Visser v. Gefco* Mineworker Mining company Asbestosis 
Related cases 
African Nickel v. van As  Mining company Individual activist Public statements 
(SLAPP)1772 
AfriForum v. Merafong  Community & 
advocacy 
organisation 
Government Access to water in mining 
village 
Gold Fields v. Motley 
Rice1773 
Mining company Litigation funder Liability for costs (SLAPP) 
Molefe v. Merafong  Community Government & 
mining company 
Access to water in mining 
village 
Platreef v. Kgobudi  Mining company Community Opposition (SLAPP) 
Table 16. Legally relevant cases 
Table 16. Legally relevant cases1774 
Short case title Relevant legal issue1775 
Legally relevant cases (i): Environmental, mining or company law 
Agri South Africa v. Minister of Minerals and 
Energy 
Expropriation versus deprivation of mineral rights  
ArcelorMittal v. Vaal Environmental Justice 
Alliance 
Access to information regarding environmental 
impacts; the role of civil society 
Bengwenyama v. Genorah Consultation with landowners, occupiers and 
interested and affected parties; interpretation in 
conformity with the Constitution 
Bengwenyama-Ya-Maswazi Community v. Appropriate relief in judicial review proceedings 
                                                     
1772
 The classification of a case as a SLAPP suit is based on a personal assessment by the researcher. 
1773
 Note that this is an interlocutory decision adopted in the context of the certifications proceedings for the 
silicosis class action.  
1774
 The tile of ongoing cases (in which a final decision has not yet been adopted) is italicised.  
1775
 Id est the issue in relation to which the case is cited in the dissertation.  
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Minister for Mineral Resources  
Coal of Africa v. Akkerland Boerdery Environmental impacts of mining 
Director Mineral Development v. Save the Vaal 
Environment 
Impact of constitutional environmental rights on 
decision-making by administrative authorities 
Exxaro v. Minister of Water Affairs Obligatory mediation instead of appeal to a tribunal 
Fuel Retailers v. DG Environmental Management  Impact of constitutional environmental rights on 
decision-making by administrative authorities 
Hangklip/Kleinmond v. Minister for 
Environmental Planning 
Interpretation in conformity with the Constitution; 
judicial review of the conditions included in an 
environmental authorisation versus separation of 
powers 
Harmony Gold v. Regional Director Water Affairs Interpretation of environmental legislation in 
conformity with the Constitution 
Hekpoort v. Minister of Land Affairs Direct access to the Constitutional Court in litigation 
in the interest of the environmental  
Hichange Investments v. Cape Constitutional relief for polluting industrial 
activities; separation of powers 
Jacobs v. Transand Contractual clause restricting access to the courts 
Kuhne v. Vhembe Government’s duty to provide potable water  
Kebble v. Minister of Water Test for contempt of court 
Kenton on Sea v. Ndlambe  Test for contempt of court; elements for a structural 
interdict 
Kloof Conservancy v. Government Separation of powers; punitive costs 
Landev v. Black Eagle Demand for security for costs (SLAPP) 
Lemthongthai v. S Impact of constitutional environmental rights on 
sentences 
Lionswatch v. MEC Local Government Public interest litigation 
Louisvale Irrigation Board v. Minister of Mineral 
Resources 
Consultation with landowner and occupier; access to 
information; punitive costs 
Magaliesberg Protection Association v. MEC 
Agriculture 
Adverse costs; scientific proof 
Makhanya v. Goede Wellington Boerdery Comparative institutional competence of the 
judiciary and administrative authorities 
MEC Agriculture v. HTF Developers Condonation in public interest litigation; 
interpretation in conformity with the Constitution 
Minister of Water Affairs v. Stilfontein Corporate governance 
Mtunzini Conservancy v. Tronox Sands Adverse costs in case of litigious conduct 
Petro Props v. Barlow Restraining order for speech (SLAPP)  
Pilanesberg Platinum Mine v. Chief Director 
Mineral Regulations 
Scientific evidence 
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Save the Maize Belt v. Regional Mining 
Development and Environment Committee  
Environmental impacts of mining; costs order 
Scholes v. Minister of Mineral Resources Legal status of the Mining Charter 
Sepha Tu Kin v. Kranskoppie Boerdery Environmental impacts of mining 
Shear v. Eye of Africa Comparative institutional competence of the 
judiciary and administrative authorities 
Tergniet and Toekoms v. Outeniqua Kreosootpale Criminal sanctions; test for a declaratory order; test 
for a final interdict; standard of proof 
Thamae v. Roering Abandoned mining village  
Van Rensburg v. Cloete Restraining order for speech (SLAPP)  
Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa 
v. MEC Economic Affairs 
Adverse costs for litigious conduct 
Legally relevant cases (ii): business and human rights cases 
AAA Investments v. Micro Finance Regulatory 
Council 
Privatisation and state responsibilities  
AllPay v. South African Social Security Agency Privatisation and responsibilities of private partner 
Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions v. Continental Horizontal effect and scope of the right to freedom 
of expression; duty to perform a contractual duty 
City of Johannesburg v. Blue Moonlight  Horizontal effect of the right to have access to 
adequate housing 
Juma Musjid v. Essay Horizontal effect and scope of the right to education; 
protective duties of the judiciary  
Khumalo v. Holomisa Horizontal effect and application of the right to 
freedom of expression; balancing of rights  
Minister of Public Works v. Kyalami Ridge Balancing of rights 
Modder East Squatters v. Modderklip Boerdery  Protective duties of the state; appropriate relief; 
constitutional damages 
President v. Modderklip Boerdery  Access to the courts; execution of court orders  
Ramakatsa v. Magashule  Direct horizontal application  
Legally relevant cases (iii): general legal and constitutional framework 
Barkhuizen v. Napier Constitutionality of a contractual time limitation 
clause  
Biowatch v. Registrar Generic Resources Access to information from government and 
companies; costs orders in public interest litigation 
Carmichele v. Minister of Safety The state’s duty of care vis-à-vis its citizens 
Certification of the Constitution Certification of the new Constitution 
Children's Resource Centre Trust v. Pioneer Food Class actions 
Economic Freedom Fighters v. Speaker of the 
National Assembly 
The legal effect and enforcement of reports by the 
public protector 
Ferreira v. Levin Public interest litigation 
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Fose v. Minister of Safety and Security Adequate relief 
Glenister v. President The effect of international law within South Africa 
Government v. Grootboom Reasonableness review; structural interdict  
K v. Minister of Safety and Security The state’s duty of care vis-à-vis its citizens 
Law Society v. Minister for Transport Substitution of a private law remedy by a public law 
remedy 
Lawyers for Human Rights v. Minister of Home 
Affairs 
Public interest litigation 
Lee v. Minister of Correctional Services Factual causation 
Magidiwana v. President Right to legal representation at state expense before 
a commission of inquiry  
Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg Reasonableness review; adequate relief; separation 
of powers 
Minister of Basic Education v. Basic Education 
for All 
Successful rights-battle: Government’s duty to 
provide access to schoolbooks 
Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign Successful rights-battle: Government’s duty to 
provide access to schoolbooks  
Minister of Health v. New Clicks Principle of subsidiarity 
Minister of Justice v. Southern African Litigation 
Centre 
Effect of the Rome Statute within South Africa  
Minister of Safety and Security v. Van 
Duivenboden 
The state’s duty to protect 
Mukaddam v. Pioneer Foods Class actions 
National Commissioner SAPS v. Southern African 
Human Rights Litigation Centre 
Domestication of international agreements 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality v. 
Greyvenouw 
Urgent applications 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of 
South Africa 
Relationship between common law and 
constitutional law 
Progress Office Machines v. South African 
Revenue Services 
Effect of non-incorporated international agreements 
Pilane v. Pilane Prior engagement versus litigious conduct 
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v. Johannesburg Successful rights-battle: protection against eviction 
S v. Makwanyane Successful rights-battle: Abolition of the death 
penalty 
Steenkamp v. Provincial Tender Board Adequate relief; private versus public law remedies 
Transvaal Agricultural Union v. Minister of Land 
Affairs 
Direct access to the Constitutional Court 
Tswelopele v. City of Tshwane  Constitutional relief 
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Table 17. Elements of the litigation in directly relevant cases1776 
Table 17a. Parties and rights 
Short case title Litigating party1777 Counterparty1778 Const.1779 
Bareki v. Gencor - Chief Pule 
- Nkuleleko Environmental 
and Development Group 
 
- Gencor (PC) 
- Gefco 
- Government of South Africa 
- Minister of Minerals and Energy 
- Minister of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism 
S24 
Escarpment 
Environment 
Protection 
Group v. 
Minister of 
Water  
- Escarpment Environment 
Protection Group 
- Wonderfontein 
Community Association 
- Minister of Water and Sanitation 
- Chairperson of the Water Tribunal 
- Water Research Commission 
- The President (IP) 
- Exxaro (IP) 
S34 
Escarpment 
Environment 
Protection 
Group v. 
Department of 
Water  
- Escarpment Environment 
Protection Group 
- Wonderfontein 
Community Association 
- Langkloof Environmental 
Committee 
- Department of Water Affairs 
- Water Tribunal 
- Xstrata Alloys (IP) 
- WER Mining (IP) 
S24; S33 
Federation for 
Sustainable 
Environment v. 
Minister of 
Water  
- Federation for a 
sustainable environment 
- The Silobela concerned 
Community 
 
- Minister of Water Affairs 
- Director-General of Water Affairs 
- Acting Regional Director-General of 
Water Affairs 
- Regional Director of Water Affairs 
- MEC Co-operative Governance and 
Traditional Affairs, Mpumalanga 
- The mayor and the municipal 
manager of Gert Sibanda District 
Municipality 
- The mayor and the municipal 
manager of Albert Luthuli Local 
Municipality  
S27 
                                                     
1776
 Tables 17a and 17b are filled out from the perspective of the litigating parties, based on their court papers 
and/or the judgment. It is not mentioned whether, in case of a judgment, the requested relief was granted and the 
cited parties convicted. The title of ongoing cases (in which a final decision has not yet been adopted) is 
italicised. Settled and arbitrated cases are not included. 
1777
 For the term’s definition, see supra note.  
1778
 For the term’s definition, see supra note. ‘IP’ stands for interested party, meaning that a party is only cited 
for its interests. ‘PC’ stands for parent company.  
1779
 This column mentions the constitutional provisions referenced in the case.  
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- Komati Catchment Agency 
Federation for 
Sustainable 
Environment v. 
National Nuclear 
Regulator  
- Federation for a 
sustainable environment 
- Residents of the Tudor 
Shaft informal settlement 
- National Nuclear Regulator 
- Mogale City Local municipality  
- Minister of Environmental Affairs  
- Minister of Mineral Resources1780 
- Powerstar (IP) 
S10; S11; 
S24; S26; 
S27; S28 
Mahaeeane v. 
AngloGold 
Ashanti 
- M. Mahaeeane 
- M. Thakaso 
- AngloGold Ashanti (PC) S32 
Makoti v. Sasol  - M.J. Makoti & 21 other 
plaintiffs 
- Sasol Mining (PC) “const’l 
norms” 
Mankayi v. 
AngloGold 
Ashanti 
- T. Mankayi  - AngloGold Ashanti (PC) S12 
Nkala v. 
Harmony Gold  
- B. Nkala & 68 other class 
representatives  
- Harmony Gold and twenty-nine 
other respondents (PC) 
S10, S11, 
S12(1)(c), 
S23, S24, 
S27(1)(a)  
S v. Blue 
Platinum 
Ventures 
- Batlhabine Community - Blue Platinum Ventures 
- M.S. Maponya, a director 
/ 
S v. 
Blyvooruitzicht 
Gold Mining 
Company  
- Blyvooruitzicht 
community 
- Blyvooruitzicht Gold Mining 
Company 
- D. Ncube, a director 
- P.M. Saaiman, a director 
- M. Burrell, a director 
- Village Main Reef Gold Mining 
Company  
/ 
Strömbeck v. 
Harmony Gold 
- H.S. Strömbeck - Harmony Gold (PC) 
- Gold Fields (PC) 
- AvGold (PC) 
- Gold Fields Operations (PC) 
- GFI (PC)  
/ 
Van Eck v. 
Clyde 
Brickfields 
- J.F. Van Eck 
- Seven other members of 
the community 
 
- Clyde Brickfields 
- Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Council 
(IP) 
- Minister of Mineral and Energy 
Affairs (IP) 
/ 
Vhembe v. MEC - Vhembe Mineral - MEC Economic Development, S24 
                                                     
1780
 This party was originally cited as ‘Minister of Energy’ (see supra Part III, Section 2.3.1.3). 
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Economic 
Development 
Resources Stakeholders 
Forum 
- Makhado Action Group 
- Mudimele Community 
 
Environment and Tourism, Limpopo 
- Regional Manager of Mineral 
Resources, Limpopo 
- Department of Environmental 
Affairs 
- Head of Economic Development, 
Environment and Tourism, Limpopo 
- Senior General Manager: 
Environment and Tourism, Limpopo 
- Coal of Africa  
 
Table 17b. Attorneys and remedies 
Short case title Attorneys1781 Proceedings
1782
 
Orders 
Bareki v. Gencor Legal Resources 
Centre 
Action - Ordering government to investigate, 
evaluate and assess the impact of the 
mining operations and to report thereon to 
the court, to commence taking reasonable 
measures to rectify the pollution and/or 
environmental degradation, to continue 
with such measures and to complete them 
on or before a date determined by the court 
- Costs 
Alternative claims: 
- Directing Gencor and Gefco to cover the 
dumps or otherwise deal therewith so as to 
prevent dissemination of dust or sand 
- Directing Gencor and Gefco to rehabilitate 
the surface at the opencast mine  
- Ordering the Minister to instruct Gencor 
and Gefco to ensure rehabilitation as near to 
its natural state as is practicable  
Escarpment 
Environment 
Protection 
Group v. 
Minister of 
Water  
Legal Resources 
Centre 
Judicial review - Reviewing and setting aside the failure to 
appoint members to the Water Tribunal 
- Directing the appointment of a chairperson 
and deputy chairperson and such other 
members as may be necessary  
- Punitive costs 
                                                     
1781
 This column mentions the public interest law firm or regular law firm acting for a contingent fee (supra Part 
III, Section 2.1.2) representing the litigating parties. If the litigating parties are not represented by such a law 
firm or if this information is not known, this is marked with n/a (not applicable) or n/k (not known). 
1782
 They can be civil (application/action), criminal or judicial review proceedings.  
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Escarpment 
Environment 
Protection 
Group v. 
Department of 
Water  
Legal Resources 
Centre 
Judicial review - Setting aside and substituting the decision 
by the Water Tribunal declaring that the 
applicants have no standing to appeal the 
grant of a water use license 
- Reviewing and setting aside the water use 
licenses 
- Costs 
Federation for 
Environment v. 
Minister of 
Water  
Legal Resources 
Centre  
Lawyers for 
Human Rights 
Application - Declaring the failure to provide potable 
water unlawful and unconstitutional  
- Directing to provide temporary potable 
water within 24 hours 
- Directing to engage actively and 
meaningfully on the immediate and long-
term supply of water  
- Directing to report to the court within one 
month on the measures taken to ensure 
water supply on the medium and long term 
- Permission for any party to re-enrol the 
application for hearing on the same papers 
- Costs 
Federation for 
Sustainable 
Environment v. 
National Nuclear 
Regulator  
Legal Resources 
Centre 
Socio-Economic 
Rights Institute 
Application - Declaring the mine residue removal 
operations unlawful and hazardous to 
public health 
- Directing the respondents to cease the 
operation with immediate effect pending 
the supply of the risk assessment report or 
other satisfactory measures showing that 
public health will not be adversely affected  
- Costs 
Mahaeeane v. 
AngloGold 
Ashanti 
Richard Spoor 
Attorneys 
Application - Setting aside the refusal to grant access to 
records and ordering to provide access, 
within 30 days 
- Costs  
Makoti v. Sasol  Richard Spoor 
Attorneys 
Action - Damages with interest 
- Costs  
Mankayi v. 
AngloGold 
Ashanti 
Abrahams Kiewitz 
Attorneys 
Richard Spoor 
Attorneys 
Action - Damages with interest 
- Costs  
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Nkala v. 
Harmony Gold  
Legal Resources 
Centre 
Abrahams Kiewitz 
Attorneys 
Richard Spoor 
Attorneys 
1. Application 
2. (Action)  
1. Certification of two classes 
2. (Damages with interest & costs)1783 
S v. Blue 
Platinum 
Ventures 
Centre for 
Environmental 
Rights 
Criminal (In accordance with the penalty clause) 
S v. 
Blyvooruitzicht 
Gold Mining 
Company  
n/k Criminal (In accordance with the penalty clause) 
Strömbeck v. 
Harmony Gold 
Richard Spoor 
Attorneys 
Action - Damages with interest 
- Costs  
Van Eck v. 
Clyde 
Brickfields 
n/a Application - Interdicting to operate any machinery and 
vehicles and to make any noise whatsoever 
between specific times on specific days 
- Costs  
Vhembe v. MEC 
Economic 
Development 
n/k Judicial review - Interim order interdicting the activities 
identified in the environmental 
authorisation, pending the judicial review 
and the finalisation of a regional strategic 
environmental impact assessment for the 
cumulative effects of all proposed mines 
- Reviewing and setting aside the decision 
granting the environmental authorisation or, 
alternatively, reviewing and setting aside 
the decision dismissing the administrative 
appeal against the former decision  
- Confirming the interim order 
- Remitting the matter for reconsideration 
and correction in accordance with any 
recommendations by the court and orders to 
eliminate or remedy pollution and 
degradation 
- Costs  
 
                                                     
1783
 The class first needs to be certified, but the litigating parties’ intention is to claim damages with interest and 
costs.  
362 
 
ANNEX 2. RELEVANT LEGAL PROVISIONS1784 
The Constitution 
Property 
25. (1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit 
arbitrary deprivation of property. 
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application— 
(a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and 
(b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment of which have either 
been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court. (…) 
(4) For the purposes of this section— 
(a) the public interest includes the nation’s commitment to land reform, and to 
reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa’s natural resources; 
and 
(b) property is not limited to land. 
(5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to foster 
conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis. 
(6) A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory 
laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally 
secure or to comparable redress. 
(7) A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory 
laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to restitution of that property 
or to equitable redress. (…) 
Limitation of rights 
36. (1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent 
that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including— 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any right 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 
Assent to Bills 
79. (…) (4) If, after reconsideration, a Bill fully accommodates the President’s reservations, the President must 
assent to and sign the Bill; if not, the President must either— 
(a) assent to and sign the Bill; or 
(b) refer it to the Constitutional Court for a decision on its constitutionality. (…) 
Application by members of National Assembly to Constitutional Court 
80. (1) Members of the National Assembly may apply to the Constitutional Court for an order declaring that all 
or part of an Act of Parliament is unconstitutional. (…) 
                                                     
1784
 Note that only the relevant (parts of the) provisions are cited. Parts that are left out are indicated with (…).  
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Powers and functions of President 
84. (…) (2) The President is responsible for—… 
(c) referring a Bill to the Constitutional Court for a decision on the Bill’s constitutionality; (…) 
Assent to Bills 
121. (…) (2) If, after reconsideration, a Bill fully accommodates the Premier’s reservations, the Premier must 
assent to and sign the Bill; if not, the Premier must either—  
(a) assent to and sign the Bill; or  
(b) refer it to the Constitutional Court for a decision on its constitutionality. (…) 
Application by members to Constitutional Court 
122. (1) Members of a provincial legislature may apply to the Constitutional Court for an order declaring that all 
or part of a provincial Act is unconstitutional. (…) 
Powers and functions of Premiers 
127. (…) (2) The Premier of a province is responsible for— (…) 
(c) referring a Bill to the Constitutional Court for a decision on the Bill’s constitutionality. (…) 
Constitutional Court 
167. (…) (3) The Constitutional Court— (…) 
(b)  may decide- 
(i) constitutional matters, and issues connected with decisions on constitutional matters; and 
(ii) any other matter, if the Constitutional Court grants leave to appeal on the grounds that the matter raises 
an arguable point of law of general public importance which ought to be considered by that Court; and 
(c) makes the final decision whether a matter is within its jurisdiction.  
(4) Only the Constitutional Court may— (…) 
(b) decide on the constitutionality of any parliamentary or provincial Bill, but may do so only in the 
circumstances anticipated in section 79 or 121; 
(c) decide applications envisaged in section 80 or 122; (…) 
(5) The Constitutional Court makes the final decision whether an Act of Parliament, a provincial Act or conduct 
of the President is constitutional, and must confirm any order of invalidity made by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, a High Court, or a court of similar status, before that order has any force. (…) 
Supreme Court of Appeal 
168. (…) (3) The Supreme Court of Appeal may decide appeals in any matter arising from the High Court of 
South Africa or a court of a status similar to the High Court of South Africa (…) 
High Courts 
169. A High Court may decide— 
(a) any constitutional matter (…) 
Powers of courts in constitutional matters 
172. (…) (2) (a) The Supreme Court of Appeal, the High Court of South Africa or a court of similar status may 
make an order concerning the constitutional validity of an Act of Parliament, a provincial Act or any conduct of 
the President, but an order of constitutional invalidity has no force unless it is confirmed by the Constitutional 
Court. (…) 
Establishment and governing principles 
181.(1) The following state institutions strengthen constitutional democracy in the Republic: 
(a) The Public Protector. 
(b) The South African Human Rights Commission. (…) 
(2) These institutions are independent, and subject only to the Constitution and the law, and they must be 
impartial and must exercise their powers and perform their functions without fear, favour or prejudice. (…) 
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Functions of Public Protector 
182. (1) The Public Protector has the power, as regulated by national legislation— 
(a) to investigate any conduct in state affairs, or in the public administration in any sphere of government, that 
is alleged or suspected to be improper or to result in any impropriety or prejudice; 
(b) to report on that conduct; and 
(c) to take appropriate remedial action. (…) 
Functions of South African Human Rights Commission 
184. (1) The South African Human Rights Commission must— 
(a) promote respect for human rights and a culture of human rights; 
(b) promote the protection, development and attainment of human rights; and 
(c) monitor and assess the observance of human rights in the Republic. 
(2) The South African Human Rights Commission has the powers, as regulated by national legislation, necessary 
to perform its functions, including the power— 
(a) to investigate and to report on the observance of human rights; 
(b) to take steps to secure appropriate redress where human rights have been violated; 
(c) to carry out research; and 
(d) to educate. 
(3) Each year, the South African Human Rights Commission must require relevant organs of state to provide the 
Commission with information on the measures that they have taken towards the realisation of the rights in the 
Bill of Rights concerning housing, health care, food, water, social security, education and the environment. (…) 
International agreements 
231. (…) (4) Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into law by national 
legislation; but a self-executing provision of an agreement that has been approved by Parliament is law in the 
Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament. (…) 
Customary international law 
232. Customary international law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act 
of Parliament. 
Application of international law 
233. When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation 
that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international 
law. 
Vexatious Proceedings Act [VPA] 
2. Powers of court to impose restrictions on the institution of vexatious legal proceedings.  
(1) (…) (b) If, on an application made by any person against whom legal proceedings have been instituted by 
any other person or who has reason to believe that the institution of legal proceedings against him is 
contemplated by any other person, the court is satisfied that the said person has persistently and without any 
reasonable ground instituted legal proceedings in any court or in any inferior court, whether against the same 
person or against different persons, the court may, after hearing that other person or giving him an opportunity of 
being heard, order that no legal proceedings shall be instituted by him against any person in any court or any 
inferior court without the leave of that court, or any judge thereof, or that inferior court, as the case may be, and 
such leave shall not be granted unless the court or judge or the inferior court, as the case may be, is satisfied that 
the proceedings are not an abuse of the process of the court and that there is prima facie ground for the 
proceedings. (…) 
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Criminal Procedure Act [CPA] 
7. Private prosecution on certificate nolle prosequi 
(1) In any case in which a Director of Public Prosecutions declines to prosecute for an alleged offence— 
(a) any private person who proves some substantial and peculiar interest in the issue of the trial arising out of 
some injury which he individually suffered in consequence of the commission of the said offence; (…) 
May (…) either in person or by a legal representative, institute and conduct a prosecution in respect of such 
offence in any court competent to try that offence. 
8. Private prosecution under statutory right 
(1) Any body upon which or person upon whom the right to prosecute in respect of any offence is expressly 
conferred by law, may institute and conduct a prosecution in respect of such offence in any court competent to 
try that offence. 
(2) A body which or a person who intends exercising a right of prosecution under subsection (1), shall exercise 
such right only after consultation with the attorney-general concerned and after the attorney-general has 
withdrawn his right of prosecution in respect of any specified offence or any specified class or category of 
offences with reference to which such body or person may by law exercise such right of prosecution. (…) 
332. Prosecution of corporations and members of associations 
(1) For the purpose of imposing upon a corporate body criminal liability for any offence, whether under any law 
or at common law - 
(a) any act performed, with or without a particular intent, by or on instructions or with permission, express or 
implied, given by a director or servant of that corporate body; and 
(b) the omission, with or without a particular intent, of any act which ought to have been but was not 
performed by or on instructions given by a director or servant of that corporate body, 
in the exercise of his powers or in the performance of his duties as such director or servant or in furthering or 
endeavouring to further the interests of that corporate body, shall be deemed to have been performed (and with 
the same intent, if any) by that corporate body or, as the case may be, to have been an omission (and with the 
same intent, if any) on the part of that corporate body. (…) 
(5) When an offence has been committed, whether by the performance of any act or by the failure to perform any 
act, for which any corporate body is or was liable to prosecution, any person who was, at the time of the 
commission of the offence, a director or servant of the corporate body shall be deemed to be guilty of the said 
offence, unless it is proved that he did not take part in the commission of the offence and that he could not have 
prevented it, and shall be liable to prosecution therefor, either jointly with the corporate body or apart therefrom, 
and shall on conviction be personally liable to punishment therefor. (…) 
Compensation of Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act [COIDA] 
35. Substitution of compensation for other legal remedies 
(1) No action shall lie by an employee or any dependant of an employee for the recovery of damages in respect 
of any occupational injury or disease resulting in the disablement or death of such employee against such 
employee‘s employer, and no liability for compensation on the part of such employer shall arise save under the 
provisions of this Act in respect of such disablement or death. (…) 
Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act [ODIMWA] 
100. No person entitled to benefits from more than one source in respect of same disease 
(…) (2) Notwithstanding anything in any other law contained, no person who has a claim to benefits under this 
Act in respect of a compensatable disease as defined in this Act, on the ground that such person is or was 
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employed at a controlled mine or a controlled works, shall be entitled, in respect of such disease, to benefits 
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1941 (Act No. 30 of 1941), or any other law. 
Mine Health and Safety Act [MHSA] 
1. Objects of Act 
The objects of this Act are 
(a) to protect the health and safety of persons at mines; 
(b) to require employers and employees to identify hazards and eliminate, control and minimise the risks 
relating to health and safety at mines; (…) 
(e) to provide for effective monitoring of health and safety conditions at mines; (…) 
(g) to provide for investigations and inquiries to improve health and safety at mines; and 
(h) to promote 
(i) a culture of health and safety in the mining industry; (…) 
2. Employer to ensure safety 
(1) The employer of every mine that is being worked must 
(a) ensure, as far as reasonably practicable, that the mine is designed, constructed and equipped 
(i) to provide conditions for safe operation and a healthy working environment; and 
(ii) with a communication system and with electrical, mechanical and other equipment as necessary to 
achieve those conditions; (…) 
5. Employer to maintain healthy and safe mine environment 
(1) As far as reasonably practicable, every employer must provide and maintain a working environment that is 
safe and without risk to the health of employees. 
(2) As far as reasonably practicable, every employer must— 
(a) identify the relevant hazards and assess the related risks to which persons who are not employees may be 
exposed; and 
(b) ensure that persons who are not employees, but who may be directly affected by the activities at the mine, 
are not exposed to any hazards to their health and safety. 
6. Employer to ensure adequate supply of health and safety equipment 
(1) Every employer must— 
(a) supply all necessary health and safety equipment and health and safety facilities to each employee; and 
(b) maintain, as far as reasonably practicable, that equipment and those facilities in a serviceable and hygienic 
condition. 
(2) Every employer must ensure that sufficient quantities of all necessary personal protective equipment are 
available so that every employee who is required to use that equipment is able to do so. 
(3) Every employer must take reasonable steps to ensure that all employees who are required to use personal 
protective equipment are instructed in the proper use, the limitations and the appropriate maintenance of that 
equipment. 
7. Employer to staff mine with due regard to health and safety 
(1) As far as reasonably practicable, every employer must— 
(a) ensure that every employee complies with the requirements of this Act; 
(b) institute the measures necessary to secure, maintain and enhance health and safety; 
(c) provide persons appointed under subsections (2) and (4) with the means to comply with the requirements of 
this Act and with any instruction given by an inspector; 
(d) consider an employee's training and capabilities in respect of health and safety before assigning a task to 
that employee; and 
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(e) ensure that work is performed under the general supervision of a person trained to understand the hazards 
associated with the work and who has the authority to ensure that the precautionary measures laid down by 
the employer are implemented. (…) 
Water Services Act [WSA] 
3. Right of access to basic water supply and basic sanitation 
(1) Everyone has a right of access to basic water supply and basic sanitation. 
(2) Every water services institution must take reasonable measures to realise these rights. 
(3) Every water services authority must, in its water services development plan, provide for measures to realise 
these rights. 
(4) The rights mentioned in this section are subject to the limitations contained in this Act. 
Regulations relating to compulsory national standards and measures to conserve water [Water 
Service Regulations] 
3. Basic water supply 
The minimum standard for basic water supply services is - 
(a) the provision of appropriate education in respect of effective water use; and 
(b) a minimum quantity of potable water of 25 litres per person per day or 6 kilolitres per household per 
month—  
(i) at a minimum flow rate of not less than 10 litres per minute; 
(ii) within 200 metres of a household; and 
(iii) with an effectiveness such that no consumer is without a supply for more than seven full days in any 
year. 
4. Interruption in provision of water services 
A water services institution must take steps to ensure that where the water services usually provided by or on 
behalf of that water services institution are interrupted for a period of more than 24 hours for reasons other than 
those contemplated in section 4 of the Act, a consumer has access to alternative water services comprising - 
(a) at least 10 litres of potable water per person per day; and 
(b) sanitation services sufficient to protect health. 
Contingency Fees Act [CFA] 
2. Contingency fees agreements 
(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law or the common law, a legal practitioner may, if in his or 
her opinion there are reasonable prospects that his or her client may be successful in any proceedings, enter into 
an agreement with such client in which it is agreed- 
(a) that the legal practitioner shall not be entitled to any fees for services rendered in respect of such 
proceedings unless such client is successful in such proceedings to the extent set out in such agreement; 
(b) that the legal practitioner shall be entitled to fees equal to or, subject to subsection (2), higher than his or 
her normal fees, set out in such agreement, for any such services rendered, if such client is successful in 
such proceedings to the extent set out in such agreement. 
(2) Any fees referred to in subsection (1)(b) which are higher than the normal fees of the legal practitioner 
concerned (hereinafter referred to as the ‘success fee’), shall not exceed such normal fees by more than 100 per 
cent: Provided that, in the case of claims sounding in money, the total of any such success fee payable by the 
client to the legal practitioner, shall not exceed 25 per cent of the total amount awarded or any amount obtained 
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by the client in consequence of the proceedings concerned, which amount shall not, for purposes of calculating 
such excess, include any costs. 
3. Form and content of contingency fees agreement 
(…) (3) A contingency fees agreement shall state— (…) 
(b) that, before the agreement was entered into, the client- 
(i) was advised of any other ways of financing the litigation and of their respective implications; (…) 
(h) that the client will have a period of 14 days, calculated from the date of the agreement, during which he, 
she or it will have the right to withdraw from the agreement by giving notice to the legal practitioner in 
writing: Provided that in the event of withdrawal the legal practitioner shall be entitled to fees and 
disbursements in respect of any necessary or essential work done to protect the interests of the client during 
such period, calculated on an attorney and client basis; and 
4. Settlement 
(1) Any offer of settlement made to any party who has entered into a contingency fees agreement, may be 
accepted after the legal practitioner has filed an affidavit with the court, if the matter is before court, or has filed 
an affidavit with the professional controlling body, if the matter is not before court, stating— (…) 
(3) Any settlement made where a contingency fees agreement has been entered into, shall be made an order of 
court, if the matter was before court. 
5. Client may claim review of agreement or fees 
(1) A client of a legal practitioner who has entered into a contingency fees agreement and who feels aggrieved by 
any provision thereof or any fees chargeable in terms thereof may refer such agreement or fees to the 
professional controlling body or, in the case of a legal practitioner who is not a member of a professional 
controlling body, to such body or person as the Minister of Justice may designate by notice in the Gazette for the 
purposes of this section. 
(2) Such professional controlling body or designated body or person may review any such agreement and set 
aside any provision thereof or any fees claimable in terms thereof if in his, her or its opinion the provision or fees 
are unreasonable or unjust. 
National Water Act [NWA] 
2. Purpose of Act 
The purpose of this Act is to ensure that the nation’s water resources are protected, used, developed, conserved, 
managed and controlled in ways which take into account amongst other factors— 
(a) meeting the basic human needs of present and future generations; 
(b) promoting equitable access to water; 
(c) redressing the results of past racial and gender discrimination; 
(d) promoting the efficient, sustainable and beneficial use of water in the public interest; 
(e) facilitating social and economic development; (…) 
3. Public trusteeship of nation’s water resources 
(1) As the public trustee of the nation’s water resourced the National Government, acting through the Minister, 
must ensure that water is protected, used, developed, conserved, managed and controlled in a sustainable and 
equitable manner, for the benefit of all persons and in accordance with its constitutional mandate. 
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), the Minister is ultimately responsible to ensure that water is allocated 
equitably and used beneficially in the public interest, while promoting environmental values. 
(3) The National Government, acting through the Minister, has the power to regulate the use, flow and control of 
all water in the Republic. 
19. Prevention and remedying effects of pollution 
(1) An owner of land, a person in control of land or a person who occupies or used the land on which— 
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(a) any activity or process is or was performed or undertaken, or 
(b) any other situation exists, 
which causes, has caused or is likely to cause pollution of a water resource, must take all reasonable measures to 
prevent any such pollution from occurring, continuing or recurring. 
(2) The measures referred to in subsection (1) may include measures to— 
(a) cease, modify or control any act or process causing the pollution; 
(b) comply with any prescribed waste standard or management practice; 
(c) contain or prevent the movement of pollutants; 
(d) eliminate any source of the pollution; 
(e) remedy the effects of the pollution; and 
(f) remedy the effects of any disturbance to the bed and banks of a watercourse. 
(3) A catchment management agency may direct any person who fails to take the measures required under 
subsection (1) to – 
(a) commence taking specific measures before a given date; 
(b) diligently continue with those measures; and 
(c) complete them before a given date. 
(4) Should a person fail to comply, or comply inadequately with a directive given under subsection (3), the 
catchment management agency may take the measures it consider necessary to remedy the situation. 
(5) Subject to subsection (6), a catchment management agency may recover all costs incurred as a result of it 
acting under subsection (4) jointly and severally from the following persons: 
(a) Any person who is or was responsible for, or who directly or indirectly contributed to, the pollution or the 
potential pollution; 
(b) the owner of the land at the time when the pollution or the potential for pollution occurred, or that owner’s 
successor-in-title; 
(c) the person in control of the land or any person who has a right to use the land at the time when (…) 
(d) any person who negligently failed to prevent (…) 
(6) The catchment management agency may in respect of the recovery of costs under subsection (5), claim from 
any other person who, in the opinion of the catchment management agency, benefitted from the measures 
undertaken under subsection (4), to the extent of such benefit. (…) 
National Environmental Management Act [NEMA] 
2. Principles 
(1) The principles set out in this section apply throughout the Republic to the actions of all organs of state that 
may significantly affect the environment and (…) 
(a) shall apply alongside all other appropriate and relevant considerations, including the State's responsibility to 
respect, protect, promote and fulfil the social and economic rights in Chapter 2 of the Constitution and in 
particular the basic needs of categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination; 
(b) serve as the general framework within which environmental management and implementation plans must 
be formulated; 
(c) serve as guidelines by reference to which any organ of state must exercise any function when taking any 
decision in terms of this Act or any statutory provision concerning the protection of the environment; 
(d) serve as principles by reference to which a conciliator appointed under this Act must make 
recommendations; and 
(e) guide the interpretation, administration and implementation of this Act, and any other law concerned with 
the protection or management of the environment. 
(2) Environmental management must place people and their needs at the forefront of its concern, and serve their 
physical, psychological, developmental, cultural and social interests equitably. 
(3) Development must be socially, environmentally and economically sustainable. 
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(4) (…) 
(c) Environmental justice must be pursued so that adverse environmental impacts shall not be distributed in 
such a manner as to unfairly discriminate against any person, particularly vulnerable and disadvantaged 
persons. (…) 
(o) The environment is held in public trust for the people, the beneficial use of environmental resources must 
serve the public interest and the environment must be protected as the people's common heritage. (…) 
28. Duty of care and remediation of environmental damage 
(1) Every person who causes, has caused or may cause significant pollution or degradation of the environment 
must take reasonable measures to prevent such pollution or degradation from occurring, continuing or recurring, 
or, in so far as such harm to the environment is authorised by law or cannot reasonably be avoided or stopped, to 
minimise and rectify such pollution or degradation of the environment. 
(1A) Subsection (1) also applies to a significant pollution or degradation that— 
(a) occurred before the commencement of this Act; 
(b) arises or is likely to arise at a different time from the actual activity that caused the contamination; or 
(c) arises through an act or activity of a person that results in a change to pre-existing contamination. 
(2) Without limiting the generality of the duty in subsection (1), the persons on whom subsection (1) imposes an 
obligation to take reasonable measures, include an owner of land or premises, a person in control of land or 
premises or a person who has a right to use the land or premises on which or in which— 
(a) any activity or process is or was performed or undertaken; or 
(b) any other situation exists, 
which causes, has caused or is likely to cause significant pollution or degradation of the environment. 
(3) The measures required in terms of subsection (1) may include measures to— 
(a) investigate, assess and evaluate the impact on the environment; 
(b) inform and educate employees about the environmental risks of their work and the manner in which their 
(c) tasks must be performed in order to avoid causing significant pollution or degradation of the 
environment; 
(d) cease, modify or control any act, activity or process causing the pollution or degradation; 
(e) contain or prevent the movement of pollutants or the causant of degradation; 
(f) eliminate any source of the pollution or degradation; or 
(g) remedy the effects of the pollution or degradation. 
(4) The Director-General, the Director-General of the department responsible for mineral resources or a 
provincial head of department may, after having given adequate opportunity to affected persons to inform him or 
her of their relevant interests, direct any person who is causing, has caused or may cause significant pollution or 
degradation of the environment to— 
(a) cease any activity, operation or undertaking; 
(b) investigate, evaluate and assess the impact of specific activities and report thereon; 
(c) commence taking specific measures before a given date; 
(d) diligently continue with those measures; and 
(e) complete those measures before a specified reasonable date: 
Provided that the Director-General or a provincial head of department may, if urgent action is necessary for the 
protection of the environment, issue such directive, and consult and give such opportunity to inform as soon 
thereafter as is reasonable.(…)  
(7) Should a person fail to comply, or inadequately comply, with a directive under subsection (4), the Director-
General or provincial head of department may take reasonable measures to remedy the situation or apply to a 
competent court for appropriate relief. 
(8) Subject to subsection (9), the Director-General, the Director-General of the department responsible for 
mineral resources or provincial head of department may recover costs for reasonable remedial measures to be 
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undertaken under subsection (7), before such measures are taken and all costs incurred as a result of acting under 
subsection (7), from any or all of the following persons— 
(a) any person who is or was responsible for, or who directly or indirectly contributed to, the pollution or 
degradation or the potential pollution or degradation; 
(b) the owner of the land at the time when the pollution or degradation or the potential for pollution or 
degradation occurred, or that owner's successor in title; 
(c) the person in control of the land or any person who has or had a right to use the land at the time when (…) 
(d) any person who negligently failed to prevent (…) 
Provided that such person failed to take the measures required of him or her under subsection (1). (…) 
(12) Any person may, after giving the Director-General, the Director-General of the department responsible for 
mineral resources or provincial head of department 30 days' notice, apply to a competent court for an order 
directing the Director-General, the Director-General of the department responsible for mineral resources or any 
provincial head of department to take any of the steps listed in subsection (4) if the Director-General, the 
Director-General of the department responsible for mineral resources or provincial head of department fails to 
inform such person in writing that he or she has directed a person contemplated in subsection (8) to take one of 
those steps, and the provisions of section 32(2) and (3) shall apply to such proceedings, with the necessary 
changes. 
(13) When considering any application in terms of subsection (12), the court must take into account the factors 
set out in subsection (5). 
32. Legal standing to enforce environmental laws 
(1) Any person or group of persons may seek appropriate relief in respect of any breach or threatened breach of 
any provision of this Act, including a principle contained in Chapter 1, or of any provision of a specific 
environmental management Act, or of any other statutory provision concerned with the protection of the 
environment or the use of natural resources— 
(a) in that person's or group of person's own interest; 
(b) in the interest of, or on behalf of, a person who is, for practical reasons, unable to institute such 
proceedings; 
(c) in the interest of or on behalf of a group or class of persons whose interests are affected; 
(d) in the public interest; and 
(e) in the interest of protecting the environment. 
(2) A court may decide not to award costs against a person who, or group of persons which, fails to secure the 
relief sought in respect of any breach or threatened breach of any provision of this Act, including a principle 
contained in Chapter 1, or of any provision of a specific environmental management Act, or of any other 
statutory provision concerned with the protection of the environment or the use of natural resources, if the court 
is of the opinion that the person or group of persons acted reasonably out of a concern for the public interest or in 
the interest of protecting the environment and had made due efforts to use other means reasonably available for 
obtaining the relief sought. 
(3) Where a person or group of persons secures the relief sought in respect of any breach or threatened breach of 
any provision of this Act, or of any provision of a specific environmental management Act, or of any other 
statutory provision concerned with the protection of the environment, a court may on application- 
(a) award costs on an appropriate scale to any person or persons entitled to practise as advocate or attorney in 
the Republic who provided free legal assistance or representation to such person or group in the preparation 
for or conduct of the proceedings; and 
(b) order that the party against whom the relief is granted pay to the person or group concerned any reasonable 
costs incurred by such person or group in the investigation of the matter and its preparation for the 
proceedings. 
33. Private prosecution 
(1) Any person may— 
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(a) in the public interest; or 
(b) in the interest of the protection of the environment, 
institute and conduct a prosecution in respect of any breach or threatened breach of any duty, other than a public 
duty resting on an organ of state, in any national or provincial legislation or municipal bylaw, or any regulation, 
licence, permission or authorisation issued in terms of such legislation, where that duty is concerned with the 
protection of the environment and the breach of that duty is an offence. 
34. Criminal proceedings 
(…) (7) Any person who is or was a director of a firm at the time of the commission by that firm of an offence 
under any provision listed in Schedule 3 shall himself or herself be guilty of the said offence and liable on 
conviction to the penalty specified in the relevant law, including an order under subsection (2), (3) and (4), if the 
offence in question resulted from the failure of the director to take all reasonable steps that were necessary under 
the circumstances to prevent the commission of the offence: Provided that proof of the said offence by the firm 
shall constitute prima facie evidence that the director is guilty under this subsection. (…) 
43. Appeals 
(1) Any person may appeal to the Minister against a decision taken by any person acting under a power 
delegated by the Minister under this Act or a specific environmental management Act. (…) 
(2) Any person may appeal to an MEC against a decision taken by any person acting under a power delegated by 
that MEC under this Act or a specific environmental management Act. (…) 
(4) An appeal under subsection (1), (1A) or (2) must be noted and must be dealt with in the manner prescribed 
and upon payment of a prescribed fee. 
(5) The Minister or an MEC, as the case may be, may consider and decide an appeal or appoint an appeal panel 
to consider and advise the Minister or MEC on the appeal. 
(6) The Minister or an MEC may, after considering such an appeal, confirm, set aside or vary the decision, 
provision, condition or directive or make any other appropriate decision, including a decision that the prescribed 
fee paid by the appellant, or any part thereof, be refunded. (…) 
National Nuclear Regulator Act [NNRA] 
3. Establishment of National Nuclear Regulator 
A juristic person to be known as the National Nuclear Regulator, comprising a board, a chief executive officer 
and staff, is hereby established. 
5. Objects of Regulator 
The objects of the Regulator are to— 
(a) provide for the protection of persons, property and the environment against nuclear damage through the 
establishment of safety standards and regulatory practices; 
(b) exercise regulatory control related to safety over— 
(i) the siting, design, construction, operation, manufacture of component parts, and decontamination, 
decommissioning and closure of nuclear installations; and (…) 
6. Co-operative governance 
(l) To give effect to the principles of co-operative government and intergovernmental relations contemplated in 
Chapter 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act No. 108 of 1996), all organs of state, as 
defined in section 239 of the Constitution, on which functions in respect of the monitoring and control of 
radioactive material or exposure to ionizing radiation are conferred by this Act or other legislation, must co-
operate with one another in order to— 
(a) ensure the effective monitoring and control of the nuclear hazard; 
(b) co-ordinate the exercise of such functions: 
(c) minimise the duplication of such functions and procedures regarding the exercise of such functions: and 
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(d) promote consistency in the exercise of such functions. 
(2) The Regulator must conclude a Co-operative agreement with every relevant organ of state to give effect to 
the co-operation contemplated in subsection (1).  
20. Restrictions on certain actions 
(1) No person may site, construct, operate, decontaminate or decommission a nuclear installation, except  
under the authority of a nuclear installation licence. 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act [PAJA] 
3. Procedurally fair administrative action affecting any person 
(1) Administrative action which materially and adversely affects the rights or legitimate expectations of any 
person must be procedurally fair. 
(2) 
(a) A fair administrative procedure depends on the circumstances of each case. 
(b) In order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative action, an administrator, subject to 
subsection (4), must give a person referred to in subsection (1)— 
(i) adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the proposed administrative action; 
(ii) a reasonable opportunity to make representations; 
(iii) a clear statement of the administrative action; 
(iv) adequate notice of any right of review or internal appeal, where applicable; and 
(v) adequate notice of the right to request reasons in terms of section 5. 
(3) In order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative action, an administrator may, in his or 
her or its discretion, also give a person referred to in subsection (1) an opportunity to— 
(a) obtain assistance and, in serious or complex cases, legal representation; 
(b) present and dispute information and arguments; and 
(c) appear in person. (…) 
4. Administrative action affecting public 
(1) In cases where an administrative action materially and adversely affects the rights of the public, an 
administrator, in order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative action, must decide whether – 
(a) to hold a public inquiry in terms of subsection (2); 
(b) to follow a notice and comment procedure in terms of subsection (3); 
(c) to follow the procedures in both subsections (2) and (3); 
(d) where the administrator is empowered by any empowering provision to follow a procedure which is fair but 
different, to follow that procedure; or 
(e) to follow another appropriate procedure which gives effect to section 3. (…) 
6. Judicial review of administrative action 
(1) Any person may institute proceedings in a court or a tribunal for the judicial review of an administrative 
action. 
(2) A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative action if— (…) 
7. Procedure for judicial review 
(…) (2)  
(a) Subject to paragraph (c), no court or tribunal shall review an administrative action in terms of this Act 
unless any internal remedy provided for in any other law has first been exhausted. 
(b) … 
(c) A court or tribunal may, in exceptional circumstances and on application by the person concerned, exempt 
such person from the obligation to exhaust any internal remedy if the court or tribunal deems it in the 
interest of justice. (…) 
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8. Remedies in proceedings for judicial review 
(1) The court or tribunal, in proceedings for judicial review in terms of section 6(1), may grant any order that is 
just and equitable, including orders— 
(a) directing the administrator— 
(ii) to give reasons; or 
(iii) to act in the manner the court or tribunal requires; 
(b) prohibiting the administrator from acting in a particular manner; 
(c) setting aside the administrative action and— 
(i) remitting the matter for reconsideration by the administrator, with or without directions; or 
(ii) in exceptional cases— 
(aa) substituting or varying the administrative action or correcting a defect resulting from the 
administrative action; or 
(bb) directing the administrator or any other party to the proceedings to pay compensation; 
(d) declaring the rights of the parties in respect of any matter to which the administrative action relates; 
(e) granting a temporary interdict or other temporary relief; or 
(f) as to costs. 
(2) The court or tribunal, in proceedings for judicial review in terms of section 6(3), may grant any order that is 
just and equitable, including orders— 
(a) directing the taking of the decision; 
(b) declaring the rights of the parties in relation to the taking of the decision; 
(c) directing any of the parties to do, or to refrain from doing, any act or thing the doing, or the refraining from 
the doing, of which the court or tribunal considers necessary to do justice between the parties; or 
(d) as to costs. 
Promotion of Access to Information Act [PAIA] 
9. Objects of Act 
The objects of this Act are – 
(a) to give effect to the constitutional right of access to— 
(i) any information held by the State; and 
(ii) any information that is held by another person and that is required for the exercise or protection of any 
rights; 
(b) to give effect to that right— 
(i) subject to justifiable limitations, including, but not limited to, limitations aimed at the reasonable 
protection of privacy, commercial confidentiality and effective, efficient and good governance; and 
(ii) in a manner which balances that right with any other rights, including the rights in the Bill or Rights in 
Chapter 2 of the Constitution; 
(c) to give effect to the constitutional obligations of the State of promoting a human rights culture and social 
justice (…) 
(e) generally, to promote transparency, accountability and effective governance of all public and private bodies 
by, including, but not limited to, empowering and educating everyone—  
(i) to understand their rights in terms of this Act in order to exercise their rights in relation to public and 
private bodies; 
(ii) to understand the functions and operation of public bodies; and 
(iii) to effectively scrutinise, and participate in, decision-making by public bodies that affects their rights. 
7. Act not applying to records requested for criminal or civil proceedings after commencement of proceedings 
(1) This Act does not apply to a record of a public body or a private body if— 
(a) that record is requested for the purpose of criminal or civil proceedings; 
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(b) so requested after the commencement of such criminal or civil proceedings, as the case may be; and 
(c) the production of or access to that record for the purpose referred to in paragraph (a) is provided for in any 
other law. (…) 
50. Right of access to records of private bodies 
(1) A requester must be given access to a record of a private body if— 
(a) that record is required for the exercise or protection of any rights; 
(b) that person complies with the procedural requirements in this Act relating to a request for access to that 
record; and 
(c) access to that record is not refused in terms of any ground for refusal contemplated in Chapter 4 of this Part. 
(2) In addition to the requirements referred to in subsection (1), when a public body, referred to in paragraph (a) 
or (b)(i) of the definition of “public body” in section 1, requests access to a record of a private body for the 
exercise or protection of any rights, other than its rights, it must be acting in the public interest. 
(3) A request contemplated in subsection (1) includes a request for access to a record containing personal 
information about the requester or the person on whose behalf the request is made. 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act [MPRDA] 
2. Objects of Act 
The objects of this Act are to— (…) 
(c) promote equitable access to the nation's mineral and petroleum resources to all the people of South Africa; 
(d) substantially and meaningfully expand opportunities for historically disadvantaged persons, including 
women and communities, to enter into and actively participate in the mineral and petroleum industries and 
to benefit from the exploitation of the nation's mineral and petroleum resources; 
(h) give effect to section 24 of the Constitution by ensuring that the nation's mineral and petroleum resources 
are developed in an orderly and ecologically sustainable manner while promoting justifiable social and 
economic development; and 
(i) ensure that holders of mining and production rights contribute towards the socio-economic development of 
the areas in which they are operating. 
3. Custodianship of nation's mineral and petroleum resources 
(1) Mineral and petroleum resources are the common heritage of all the people of South Africa and the State is 
the custodian thereof for the benefit of all South Africans. 
(2) As the custodian of the nation's mineral and petroleum resources, the State, acting through the Minister, may- 
(a) grant, issue, refuse, control, administer and manage any reconnaissance permission, prospecting right, 
permission to remove, mining right, mining permit, retention permit, technical co-operation permit, 
reconnaissance permit, exploration right and production right; and 
(b) in consultation with the Minister of Finance, prescribe and levy, any fee payable in terms of this Act. (…) 
6. Principles of administrative justice 
(1) Subject to the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 2000 (Act No.3 of 2000), any administrative process 
conducted or decision taken in terms of this Act must be conducted or taken, as the case may be, within a 
reasonable time and in accordance with the principles of lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural fairness. 
(2) Any decision contemplated in subsection (1) must be in writing and accompanied by written reasons for such 
decision. 
23. Granting and duration of mining right 
(1) Subject to subsection (4), the Minister must grant a mining right if— (…) 
(e) the applicant has provided for the prescribed social and labour plan; (…) 
38A. Environmental authorisations 
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(1) The Minister is the responsible authority for implementing environmental provisions in terms of the National 
Environmental Management Act, 1998 (Act No. 107 of 1998) as it relates to prospecting, mining, exploration, 
production or activities incidental thereto on a prospecting, mining, exploration or production area. 
(2) An environmental authorisation issued by the Minister shall be a condition prior to the issuing of a permit or 
the granting of a right in terms of this Act. 
43. Issuing of a closure certificate 
(1) The holder of a prospecting right, mining right, retention permit, mining permit, or previous holder of an old 
order right or previous owner of works that has ceased to exist, remains responsible for any environmental 
liability, pollution, ecological degradation, the pumping and treatment of extraneous water, compliance to the 
conditions of the environmental authorisation and the management and sustainable closure thereof, until the 
Minister has issued a closure certificate in terms of this Act to the holder or owner concerned. (…) 
45. Minister's power to recover costs in event of urgent remedial measures 
(1) If any prospecting, mining, reconnaissance, exploration or production operations or activities incidental 
thereto cause or results in ecological degradation, pollution or environmental damage, or is in contravention of 
the conditions of the environmental authorisation, or which may be harmful to health, safety or well-being of 
anyone and requires urgent remedial measures, the Minister, in consultation with the Minister of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism, may direct the holder of the relevant right or permit in terms of this Act or the holder of an 
environmental authorisation in terms of National Environmental Management Act, 1998, to- 
(a) investigate, evaluate, assess and report on the impact of any pollution or ecological degradation or any 
contravention of the conditions of the environmental authorisation; 
(b) take such measures as may be specified in such directive in terms of this Act or the National Environmental 
Management Act, 1998; and  
(c) complete such measures before a date specified in the directive. 
(2) 
(a) If the holder fails to comply with the directive, the Minister may take such measures as may be necessary to 
protect the health and well-being of any affected person or to remedy ecological degradation and to stop 
pollution of the environment. 
(b) Before the Minister implements any measure, he or she must afford the holder an opportunity to make 
representations to him or her. 
(c) In order to implement the measures contemplated in paragraph (a), the Minister may by way of an ex parte 
application apply to a High Court for an order to seize and sell such property of the holder as may be 
necessary to cover the expenses of implementing such measures. 
(d) In addition to the application in terms of paragraph (c), the Minister may use funds appropriated for that 
purpose by Parliament to fully implement such measures. 
(e) The Minister may recover an amount equal to the funds necessary to fully implement the measures from the 
holder concerned. 
46. Minister's power to remedy environmental damage in certain instances 
(1) If the Minister directs that measures contemplated in section 45 must be taken to prevent pollution or 
ecological degradation of the environment, to address any contravention in the environmental authorisation or to 
rehabilitate dangerous health or safety occurrences but establishes that the holder of a reconnaissance 
permission, prospecting right, mining right, retention permit or mining permit, the holder of an old order right or 
the previous owner of works, as the case may be or his or her successor in title is deceased or cannot be traced or 
in the case of a juristic person, has ceased to exist, has been liquidated or cannot be traced, the Minister in 
consultation with the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, may instruct the Regional Manager 
concerned to take the necessary measures to prevent pollution or ecological degradation of the environment or to 
rehabilitate dangerous health and social occurrences or to make an area safe. 
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(2) The measures contemplated in subsection (1) must be funded from financial provision made by the holder of 
the relevant right, permit, the previous holder of an old order right or the previous owner of works in terms of the 
National Environmental Management Act, 1998, where appropriate, or if there is no such provision or if it is 
inadequate, from money appropriated by Parliament for the purpose. 
47. Minister's power to suspend or cancel rights, permits or permissions 
(1) Subject to subsections (2), (3) and (4), the Minister may cancel or suspend any reconnaissance permission, 
prospecting right, mining right, mining permit, retention permit or holders of old order tights or previous owner 
of works, if the holder or owner thereof— (…) 
(2) Before acting under subsection (1), the Minister must— 
(a) give written notice to the holder indicating the intention to suspend or cancel the right; 
(b) set out the reasons why he or she is considering suspending or canceling the right; 
(c) afford the holder a reasonable opportunity to show why the right, permit or permission should not be 
suspended or cancelled; and 
(d) notify the mortgagee, if any, of the prospecting right, mining right or mining permit concerned of his or her 
intention to suspend or cancel the right or permit. (…) 
96. Internal appeal process and access to courts 
(1) Any person whose rights or legitimate expectations have been materially and adversely affected or who is 
aggrieved by any administrative decision in terms of this Act may appeal within 30 days becoming aware of 
such administrative decision in the prescribed manner to— 
(a) the Director-General, if it is an administrative decision by a Regional Manager or any officer to whom the 
power has been delegated or a duty has been assigned by or under this Act; 
(b) the Minister, if it is an administrative decision that was taken by the Director-General or the designated 
agency. 
(2)  
(a) An appeal in terms of subsection (1) does not suspend the administrative decision, unless it is suspended by 
the Director-General or the Minister, as the case may be. 
(b) Any subsequent application in terms of this Act must be suspended pending the finalisation of the appeal 
referred to in paragraph (a). 
(3) No person may apply to the court for the review of an administrative decision contemplated in subsection (1) 
until that person has exhausted his or her remedies in terms of that subsection. 
(4) Sections 6,7(1) and 8 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 2000 (Act No.3 of 2000), apply to any 
court proceedings contemplated in this section.  
100. Transformation of minerals industry 
(1) The Minister must, within five years from the date on which this Act took effect— 
(a) and after consultation with the Minister for Housing, develop a housing and living conditions standard for 
the minerals industry; and 
(b) develop a code of good practice for the minerals industry in the Republic. 
(2) 
(a) To ensure the attainment of Government's objectives of redressing historical, social and economic 
inequalities as stated in the Constitution, the Minister must within six months from the date on which this 
Act takes effect develop a broad-based socio-economic empowerment Charter that will set the framework 
for targets and time table for effecting the entry into and active participation of historically disadvantaged 
South Africans into the mining industry, and allow such South Africans to benefit from the exploitation of 
mining and mineral resources and the beneficiation of such mineral resources. 
(b) The Charter must set out, amongst others how the objects referred to in section 2(c), (d), (e), (f) and (i) can 
be achieved. 
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Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Regulations [MPRDA Regulations] 
41. Objectives of social and labour plan 
The objectives of the social and labour plan are to— 
(a) promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of all South Africans; 
(b) contribute to the transformation of the mining industry; and 
(c) ensure that holders of mining rights contribute towards the socio-economic development of the areas in 
which they are operating. 
45. Reporting of social and labour plan 
The holder of a mining right must submit an annual report on the compliance with the social and labour plan to 
the relevant Regional Manager. 
46. Contents of social and labour plan 
The contents of a social and labour plan must include the following: 
(a) A preamble which provides background information of the mine in question; 
(b) a human resources development programme which must include— 
(i) a skills development plan which identifies and reports on— 
(aa) the number and education levels of the employees (…) ; and 
(bb) the number of vacancies that the mining operation has been unable to fill for a period longer than 
12 months (…); 
(ii) a career progression plan and its implementation in line with the skills development plan; 
(iii) a mentorship plan and its implementation in line with the skills development plan and the needs for the 
empowerment groups; 
(iv) an internship and bursary plan and its implementation in line with the skills development plan; and 
(v) the employment equity statistics (…)  
(c) A local economic development programme which must include— 
(i) the social and economic background of the area in which the mine operates; 
(ii) the key economic activities of the area in which the mine operates; 
(iii) the impact that the mine would have in the local and sending communities; 
(iv) the infrastructure and poverty eradication projects that the mine would support in line with the 
Integrated Development Plan of the areas in which the mine operates and the major sending areas; 
(v) the measures to address the housing and living conditions of the mine employees; 
(vi) the measures to address the nutrition of the mine employees; and 
(vii) the procurement progression plan and its implementation for HDSA companies in terms of capital 
goods, services and consumables and the breakdown of the procurement (…) 
(d) processes pertaining to management of downscaling and retrenchment which must include— 
(i) the establishment of the future forum; 
(ii) mechanisms to save jobs and avoid job losses and a decline in employment; 
(iii) mechanisms to provide alternative solutions and procedures for creating job security where job losses 
cannot be avoided; and 
(iv) mechanisms to ameliorate the social and economic impact on individuals, regions and economies 
where retrenchment or closure of the mine is certain. 
(e) to provide financially for the implementation of the social and labour plan in terms of the implementation 
of— 
(i) the human resource development programme; 
(ii) the local economic development programmes; and 
(iii) the processes to manage downscaling and retrenchment. 
(f) an undertaking by the holder of the mining right to ensure compliance with the social and labour plan and to 
make it known to the employees. 
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Legal Aid South Africa Act [LASAA] 
3. Objects of Legal Aid South Africa 
The objects of Legal Aid South Africa are to— 
(a) render or make available legal aid and legal advice; 
(b) provide legal representation to persons at state expense; and 
(c) provide education and information concerning legal rights and obligations, 
as envisaged in the Constitution and this Act. 
4. Powers, functions and duties of Board 
(1) The Board may do all that is necessary or expedient to achieve the objects referred to in section 3, including 
the following: 
(a) Provide legal services, representation and advice, by— 
(i) employing legal practitioners and candidate attorneys; 
(ii) employing paralegals, who are persons that are not legal practitioners but have knowledge and 
understanding of the law, its procedures and its social context acquired through training, education, 
work experience or a national registered qualification in paralegal practice; and 
(iii) procuring the services of legal practitioners in private practice by entering into contracts or agreements 
with them and other entities. (…) 
Protection of Investment Act [PIA] 
4. Purpose of Act 
The purpose of this Act is to— 
(a) protect investment in accordance with and subject to the Constitution, in a manner which balances the 
public interest and the rights and obligations of investors; 
(b) affirm the Republic’s sovereign right to regulate investments in the public interest; and 
(c) confirm the Bill of Rights in the Constitution and the laws that apply to all investors and their investments 
in the Republic. 
10. Legal protection of investment 
Investors have the right to property in terms of section 25 of the Constitution. 
12. Right to regulate 
(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act, the government or any organ of state may, in 
accordance with the Constitution and applicable legislation, take measures, which may include— 
(a) redressing historical, social and economic inequalities and injustices; (…) 
(c) upholding the rights guaranteed in the Constitution; (…) 
(f) achieving the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights; or 
(g) protecting the environment and the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources. (…) 
13. Dispute resolution 
(…) (4) Subject to applicable legislation, an investor, upon becoming aware of a dispute as referred to in 
subsection (1), is not precluded from approaching any competent court, independent tribunal or statutory body 
within the Republic for the resolution of a dispute relating to an investment. 
(5) The government may consent to international arbitration in respect of investments covered by this Act, 
subject to the exhaustion of domestic remedies. The consideration of a request for international arbitration will 
be subject to the administrative processes set out in section 6. Such arbitration will be conducted between the 
Republic and the home state of the applicable investor. 
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Uniform Rules of the Court 
16A Submissions by an amicus curiae 
(1)  
(a) Any person raising a constitutional issue in an application or action shall give notice thereof to the registrar 
at the time of filing the relevant affidavit or pleading. 
(b) Such notice shall contain a clear and succinct description of the constitutional issue concerned. 
(c) The registrar shall, upon receipt of such notice, forthwith place it on a notice board designated for that 
purpose. 
(d) The notice shall be stamped by the registrar to indicate the date upon which it was placed on the notice 
board and shall remain on the notice board for a period of 20 days. 
(2) Subject to the provisions of national legislation enacted in accordance with section 171 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), and these Rules, any interested party in a constitutional 
issue raised in proceedings before a court may, with the written consent of all the parties to the proceedings, 
given not later than 20 days after the filing of the affidavit or pleading in which the constitutional issue was first 
raised, be admitted therein as amicus curiae upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon in writing by 
the parties. (…) 
(5) If the interested party contemplated in subrule (2) is unable to obtain the written consent as contemplated 
therein, he or she may, within five days of the expiry of the 20-day period prescribed in that subrule, apply to the 
court to be admitted as an amicus curiae in the proceedings.(…) 
49 Civil Appeals from the High Court  
(…) (11) Where an appeal has been noted or an application for leave to appeal against or to rescind, correct, 
review or vary an order of a court has been made, the operation and execution of the order in question shall be 
suspended, pending the decision of such appeal or application, unless the court which gave such order, on the 
application of a party, otherwise directs. (…) 
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